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SKETCHES

OF THE

HISTORY OF MAN.

BY THE HONOURABLE

HENRY HOME OF KAMES,

ONE OF THE SENATORS OF THE COLLEGE OF JUSTICE, AND ONE OF THE LORDS COMMISSIONERS OF JUSTICIARY IN SCOTLAND.

CONSIDERABLY ENLARGED

BY THE LAST ADDITIONS AND CORRECTIONS

OF THE AUTHOR.

A NEW EDITION, IN THREE VOLUMES.

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SKETCHES

SKETCHES
OF THE
HISTORY OF MAN.

BOOK III.

A BRIEF ACCOUNT OF ARISTOTLE'S LOGIC, WITH REMARKS.

INTRODUCTION.

IN reviewing the foregoing ſketch, it occurred, that a fair analyſis of Ariſtotle's logic, would be a valuable addition to the hiſtorical branch. A diſtinct and candid account of a ſyſtem that for many ages governed the reaſoning part of mankind, cannot but be acceptable to the public. Curioſity will be gratified, in ſeeing a phantom delineated that ſo long faſcinated the learned world; a phantom, which ſhows infinite genius, but like

the pyramids of Egypt or hanging gardens of Babylon, is abſolutely uſeleſs unleſs for raiſing wonder. Dr Reid, profeſſor of moral philoſophy in the College of Glaſgow, reliſhed the thought; and his friendſhip to me prevailed on him, after much ſolicitation, to undertake the laborious taſk. No man is better acquainted with Ariſtotle's writings; and, without any enthuſiaſtic attachment, he holds that philoſopher to be a firſt-rate genius.

The logic of Ariſtotle has been on the decline more than a century; and is at preſent relegated to ſchools and colleges. It has occaſionally been criticiſed by different writers; but this is the firſt attempt to draw it out of its obſcurity into daylight. From what follows, one will be enabled to paſs a true judgment on that work, and to determine whether it ought to make a branch of education. The Doctor's eſſay, as a capital article in the progreſs and hiſtory of the ſciences, will be made welcome, even with the fatigue of ſqueezing through many thorny paths, before a diſtinct view can be got of that ancient and ſtupendous fabric.

It will at the ſame time ſhow the hurt that Ariſtotle has done to the reaſoning faculty, by drawing it out of its natural courſe into devious paths. His artificial mode of reaſoning, is no leſs ſuperficial than intricate: I ſay, ſuperficial; for in none of his logical works, is a ſingle truth attempted to be proved by ſyllogiſm that requires a proof: the propoſitions

propoſitions he undertakes to prove by ſyllogiſm, are all of them ſelf-evident. Take for inſtance the following propoſition, That man has a power of ſelf-motion. To prove this, he aſſumes the following axiom, upon which indeed every one of his ſyllogiſms are founded, That whatever is true of a number of particulars joined together, holds true of every one ſeparately; which is thus expreſſed in logical terms, Whatever is true of the genus, holds true of every ſpecies. Founding upon that axiom, he reaſons thus: "All animals have a "power of ſelf-motion: man is an animal: *ergo*, "man has a power of ſelf-motion." Now if all animals have a power of ſelf-motion, it requires no argument to prove, that man, an animal, has that power: and therefore, what he gives as a concluſion or conſequence, is not really ſo; it is not *inferred* from the fundamental propoſition, but is *included* in it. At the ſame time, the ſelf-motive power of man, is a fact that cannot be known but from experience; and it is more clearly known from experience than that of any other animal. Now, in attempting to prove man to be a ſelf-motive animal, is it not abſurd, to found the argument on a propoſition leſs clear than that undertaken to be demonſtrated? What is here obſerved, will be found applicable to the greater part, if not the whole, of his ſyllogiſms.

Unleſs for the reaſon now given, it would appear ſingular, that Ariſtotle never attempts to apply

his ſyllogiſtic mode of reaſoning to any ſubject handled by himſelf: on ethics, on rhetoric, and on poetry, he argues like a rational being, without once putting in practice any of his own rules. It is not ſuppoſable that a man of his capacity could be ignorant, how inſufficient a ſyllogiſm is for diſcovering any latent truth. He certainly intended his ſyſtem of logic, chiefly if not ſolely, for diſputation: and if ſuch was his purpoſe, he has been wonderfully ſucceſsful; for nothing can be better contrived for wrangling and diſputing without end. He indeed in a manner profeſſes this to be his aim, in his books *De Sophiſticis elenchis*.

Some ages hence, when the goodly fabric of the Romiſh ſpiritual power ſhall be laid low in the duſt, and ſcarce a veſtige remain; it will among antiquaries be a curious inquiry, What was the nature and extent of a tyranny, more oppreſſive to the minds of men, than the tyranny of ancient Rome was to their perſons. During every ſtep of the inquiry, poſterity will rejoice over mental liberty, no leſs precious than perſonal liberty. The deſpotiſm of Ariſtotle with reſpect to the faculty of reaſon, was no leſs complete, than that of the Biſhop of Rome with reſpect to religion; and it is now a proper ſubject of curioſity, to inquire into the nature and extent of that deſpotiſm. One cannot peruſe the following ſheets, without ſympathetic pain for the weakneſs of man with reſpect to his nobleſt faculty; but that pain will redouble his

ſatisfaction,

ſatisfaction, in now being left free to the dictates of reaſon and common ſenſe.

In my reveries, I have more than once compared Ariſtotle's logic to a bubble made of ſoap-water for amuſing children; a beautiful figure with ſplendid colours; fair on the outſide, empty within. It has for more than two thouſand years been the hard fate of Ariſtotle's followers, Ixion like, to embrace a cloud for a goddeſs.—But this is more than ſufficient for a preface: and I had almoſt forgot, that I am detaining my readers from better entertainment, in liſtening to Dr Reid.

CHAP. I.

OF THE FIRST THREE TREATISES.

SECT. I. *Of the Author.*

ARISTOTLE had very uncommon advantages; born in an age when the philoſophical ſpirit in Greece had long flouriſhed, and was in its greateſt vigour; brought up in the court of Macedon, where his father was the King's phyſician;

twenty years a favourite ſcholar of Plato, and tutor to Alexander the Great; who both honoured him with his friendſhip, and ſupplied him with every thing neceſſary for the proſecution of his inquiries.

Theſe advantages he improved by indefatigable ſtudy, and immenſe reading. He was the firſt, we know, ſays Strabo, who compoſed a library. And in this the Egyptian and Pergamenian kings, copied his example. As to his genius, it would be diſreſpectful to mankind, not to allow an uncommon ſhare to a man who governed the opinions of the moſt enlightened part of the ſpecies near two thouſand years.

If his talents had been laid out ſolely for the diſcovery of truth and the good of mankind, his laurels would have remained for ever freſh: but he ſeems to have had a greater paſſion for fame than for truth, and to have wanted rather to be admired as the prince of philoſophers than to be uſeful: ſo that it is dubious, whether there be in his character, moſt of the philoſopher or of the ſophiſt. The opinion of Lord Bacon is not without probability, That his ambition was as boundleſs as that of his royal pupil; the one aſpiring at univerſal monarchy over the bodies and fortunes of men, the other over their opinions. If this was the caſe, it cannot be ſaid, that the philoſopher purſued his aim with leſs induſtry, leſs ability, or leſs ſucceſs than the hero.

His

His writings carry too evident marks of that philoſophical pride, vanity, and envy, which have often ſullied the character of the learned. He determines boldly things above all human knowledge; and enters upon the moſt difficult queſtions, as his pupil entered on a battle, with full aſſurance of ſucceſs. He delivers his deciſions oracularly, and without any fear of miſtake. Rather than confeſs his ignorance, he hides it under hard words and ambiguous expreſſions, of which his interpreters can make what they pleaſe. There is even reaſon to ſuſpect, that he wrote often with affected obſcurity, either that the air of myſtery might procure greater veneration, or that his books might be underſtood only by the adepts who had been initiated in his philoſophy.

His conduct towards the writers that went before him has been much cenſured. After the manner of the Ottoman princes, ſays Lord Verulam, he thought his throne could not be ſecure unleſs he killed all his brethren. Ludovicus Vives charges him with detracting from all philoſophers, that he might derive that glory to himſelf, of which he robbed them. He rarely quotes an author but with a view to cenſure, and is not very fair in repreſenting the opinions which he cenſures.

The faults we have mentioned are ſuch as might be expected in a man, who had the daring ambition to be tranſmitted to all future ages, as the

prince of philoſophers, as one who had carried every branch of human knowledge to its utmoſt limit; and who was not very ſcrupulous about the means he took to obtain his end.

We ought, however, to do him the juſtice to obſerve, that although the pride and vanity of the ſophiſt appear too much in his writings in abſtract philoſophy; yet in natural hiſtory the fidelity of his narrations ſeems to be equal to his induſtry; and he always diſtinguiſhes between what he knew and what he had by report. And even in abſtract philoſophy, it would be unfair to impute to Ariſtotle all the faults, all the obſcurities, and all the contradictions, that are to be found in his writings. The greateſt part, and perhaps the beſt part, of his writings is loſt. There is reaſon to doubt whether ſome of thoſe we aſcribe to him be really his; and whether what are his be not much vitiated and interpolated. Theſe ſuſpicions are juſtified by the fate of Ariſtotle's writings, which is judiciouſly related, from the beſt authorities, in Bayle's dictionary, under the article *Tyrannion*, to which I refer.

His books in logic which remain, are, 1. One book of the Categories. 2. One of Interpretation. 3. Firſt Analytics, two books. 4. Laſt Analytics, two books. 5. Topics, eight books. 6. Of Sophiſms, one book. Diogenes Laertius mentions many others that are loſt. Thoſe I have mentioned have commonly been publiſhed together, under

the

the name of *Ariſtotle's Organon*, or *his Logic*; and for many ages, Porphyry's Introduction to the Categories has been prefixed to them.

SECT. 2. *Of Porphyry's Introduction.*

In this Introduction, which is addreſſed to Chryſoarius, the author obſerves, That in order to underſtand Ariſtotle's doctrine concerning the categories, it is neceſſary to know what a *genus* is, what a *ſpecies*, what a *ſpecific difference*, what a *property*, and what an *accident*; that the knowledge of theſe is alſo very uſeful in definition, in diviſion, and even in demonſtration: therefore he propoſes, in this little tract, to deliver ſhortly and ſimply the doctrine of the ancients, and chiefly of the Peripatetics, concerning theſe five *predicables*; avoiding the more intricate queſtions concerning them; ſuch as, Whether *genera* and *ſpecies* do really exiſt in nature? or, Whether they are only conceptions of the human mind? If they exiſt in nature, Whether they are corporeal or incorporeal? and, Whether they are inherent in the objects of ſenſe, or disjoined from them? Theſe, he ſays, are very difficult queſtions, and require accurate diſcuſſion; but that he is not to meddle with them.

After this preface, he explains very minutely each of the five words above mentioned, divides and ſubdivides each of them, and then purſues all the

the agreements and differences between one and another through ſixteen chapters.

Sect. 3. *Of the Categories.*

The book begins with an explication of what is meant by univocal words, what by equivocal, and what by denominative. Then it is obſerved, that what we ſay is either ſimple, without compoſition or ſtructure, as *man*, *horſe*; or, it has compoſition and ſtructure, as, *a man fights*, *the horſe runs*. Next comes a diſtinction between a ſubject of predication; that is, a ſubject of which any thing is affirmed or denied, and a ſubject of inheſion. Theſe things are ſaid to be inherent in a ſubject, which, although they are not a part of the ſubject, cannot poſſibly exiſt without it, as figure in the thing figured. Of things that are, ſays Ariſtotle, ſome may be predicated of a ſubject, but are in no ſubject; as *man* may be predicated of James or John, but is not in any ſubject. Some again are in a ſubject, but can be predicated of no ſubject. Thus, my knowledge in grammar is in me as its ſubject, but it can be predicated of no ſubject; becauſe it is an individual thing. Some are both in a ſubject, and may be predicated of a ſubject, as ſcience; which is in the mind as its ſubject, and may be predicated of geometry. Laſtly, Some things can neither be in a ſubject, nor be predicated of any ſubject. Such are all individual ſubſtances, which cannot be predicated, becauſe they are individuals; and

and cannot be in a ſubject, becauſe they are ſubſtances. After ſome other ſubtilties about predicates and ſubjects, we come to the categories themſelves; the things above mentioned being called by the ſchoolmen the *anteprædicamenta*. It may be obſerved, however, that notwithſtanding the diſtinction now explained, the *being in a ſubject*, and the *being predicated truly of a ſubject*, are in the Analytics uſed as ſynonymous phraſes; and this variation of ſtyle has led ſome perſons to think that the Categories were not written by Ariſtotle.

Things that may be expreſſed without compoſition or ſtructure, are, ſays the author, reducible to the following heads. They are either *ſubſtance*, or *quantity*, or *quality*, or *relatives*, or *place*, or *time*, or *having*, or *doing*, or *ſuffering*. Theſe are the predicaments or categories. The firſt four are largely treated of in four chapters; the others are ſlightly paſſed over, as ſufficiently clear of themſelves. As a ſpecimen, I ſhall give a ſummary of what he ſays on the category of ſubſtance.

Subſtances are either primary, to wit, individual ſubſtances, or ſecondary, to wit, the genera and ſpecies of ſubſtances. Primary ſubſtances neither are in a ſubject, nor can be predicated of a ſubject; but all other things that exiſt, either are in primary ſubſtances, or may be predicated of them. For whatever can be predicated of that which is in a ſubject, may alſo be predicated of the ſubject itſelf. Primary ſubſtances are more ſubſtances than

than the ſecondary; and of the ſecondary, the ſpecies is more a ſubſtance than the genus. If there were no primary, there could be no ſecondary ſubſtances.

The properties of ſubſtance are theſe: 1. No ſubſtance is capable of intenſion or remiſſion. 2. No ſubſtance can be in any other thing as its ſubject of inheſion. 3. No ſubſtance has a contrary; for one ſubſtance cannot be contrary to another; nor can there be contrariety between a ſubſtance and that which is no ſubſtance. 4. The moſt remarkable property of ſubſtance, is, that one and the ſame ſubſtance, may, by ſome change in itſelf, become the ſubject of things that are contrary. Thus, the ſame body may be at one time hot, at another cold.

Let this ſerve as a ſpecimen of Ariſtotle's manner of treating the categories. After them, we have ſome chapters, which the ſchoolmen call *poſt-prædicamenta;* wherein firſt, the four kinds of oppoſition of terms are explained; to wit, *relative*, *privative*, of *contrariety*, and of *contradiction*. This is repeated in all ſyſtems of logic. Laſt of all we have diſtinctions of the four Greek words which anſwer to the Latin ones, *prius*, *ſimul*, *motus*, and *habere*.

SECT. 4. *Of the book concerning Interpretation.*

We are to conſider, ſays Ariſtotle, what a noun is, what a verb, what affirmation, what negation, what

what ſpeech. Words are the ſigns of what paſſeth in the mind; writing is the ſign of words. The ſigns both of writing and of words are different in different nations, but the operations of mind ſignified by them are the ſame. There are ſome operations of thought which are neither true nor falſe. Theſe are expreſſed by nouns or verbs ſingly, and without compoſition.

A noun is a ſound, which, by compact, ſignifies ſomething without reſpect to time, and of which no part has ſignification by itſelf. The cries of beaſts may have a natural ſignification, but they are not nouns; we give that name only to ſounds which have their ſignification by compact. The caſes of a noun, as the genitive, dative, are not nouns. *Non homo* is not a noun, but, for diſtinction's ſake, may be called a *nomen infinitum*.

A verb ſignifies ſomething by compact with relation to time. Thus *valet* is a verb; but *valetudo* is a noun, becauſe its ſignification has no relation to time. It is only the preſent tenſe of the indicative that is properly called a verb; the other tenſes and moods are variations of the verb. *Non valet* may be called a *verbum infinitum*.

Speech is ſound ſignificant by compact, of which ſome part is alſo ſignificant. And it is either enunciative, or not enunciative. Enunciative ſpeech is that which affirms or denies. As to ſpeech which is not enunciative, ſuch as a prayer or wiſh, the conſideration of it belongs to oratory, or poetry.

Every

Every enunciative ſpeech muſt have a verb, or ſome variation of a verb. Affirmation is the enunciation of one thing concerning another. Negation is the enunciation of one thing from another. Contradiction is an affirmation and negation that are oppoſite. This is a ſummary of the firſt ſix chapters.

The ſeventh and eighth treat of the various kinds of enunciations or propoſitions, univerſal, particular, indefinite, and ſingular; and of the various kinds of oppoſition in propoſitions, and the axioms concerning them. Theſe things are repeated in every ſyſtem of logic. In the ninth chapter, he endeavours to prove, by a long metaphyſical reaſoning, that propoſitions reſpecting future contingencies are not, determinately, either true or falſe; and that if they were, it would follow, that all things happen neceſſarily, and could not have been otherwiſe than as they are. The remaining chapters contain many minute obſervations concerning the equipollency of propoſitions both pure and modal.

CHAP.

CHAP. II.

REMARKS.

SECT. I. *On the Five Predicables.*

THE writers on logic have borrowed their materials almoſt entirely from Ariſtotle's Organon, and Porphyry's Introduction. The Organon, however, was not written by Ariſtotle as one work. It comprehends various tracts, written without the view of making them parts of one whole, and afterwards thrown together by his editors under one name on account of their affinity. Many of his books that are loſt, would have made a part of the Organon if they had been ſaved.

The three treatiſes of which we have given a brief account, are unconnected with each other, and with thoſe that follow. And although the firſt was undoubtedly compiled by Porphyry, and the two laſt probably by Ariſtotle, yet I conſider them as the venerable remains of a philoſophy more ancient than Ariſtotle. Archytas of Tarentum, an eminent mathematician and philoſopher of

of the Pythagorean ſchool, is ſaid to have wrote upon the ten categories; and the five predicables probably had their origin in the ſame ſchool. Ariſtotle, though abundantly careful to do juſtice to himſelf, does not claim the invention of either. And Porphyry, without aſcribing the latter to Ariſtotle, profeſſes only to deliver the doctrine of the ancients and chiefly of the Peripatetics, concerning them.

The writers on logic have divided that ſcience into three parts; the firſt treating of ſimple apprehenſion and of terms; the ſecond, of judgment and of propoſitions; and the third, of reaſoning and of ſyllogiſms. The materials of the firſt part are taken from Porphyry's Introduction and the Categories; and thoſe of the ſecond from the book of Interpretation.

A predicable, according to the grammatical form of the word, might ſeem to ſignify, whatever may be predicated, that is, affirmed or denied, of a ſubject: and in that ſenſe every predicate would be a predicable. But logicians give a different meaning to the word. They divide propoſitions into certain claſſes, according to the relation which the predicate of the propoſition bears to the ſubject. The firſt claſs is that wherein the predicate is the *genus* of the ſubject; as when we ſay, *This is a triangle, Jupiter is a planet.* In the ſecond claſs, the predicate is a *ſpecies* of the ſubject; as when we ſay, *This triangle is right-angled.* A third

third clafs is when the predicate is the ſpecific difference of the ſubject; as when we ſay, *Every triangle has three ſides and three angles.* A fourth when the predicate is a property of the ſubject; as when we ſay, *The angles of every triangle are equal to two right angles.* And a fifth clafs is when the predicate is ſomething accidental to the ſubject; as when we ſay, *This triangle is neatly drawn.*

Each of theſe claſſes comprehends a great variety of propoſitions, having different ſubjects, and different predicates; but in each clafs the relation between the predicate and the ſubject is the ſame. Now it is to this relation that logicians have given the name of *a predicable.* Hence it is, that although the number of predicates be infinite, yet the number of predicables can be no greater than that of the different relations which may be in propoſitions between the predicate and the ſubject. And if all propoſitions belong to one or other of the five claſſes above mentioned, there can be but five predicables, to wit, *genus, ſpecies, differentia, proprium,* and *accidens.* Theſe might, with more propriety perhaps, have been called *the five claſſes of predicates;* but uſe has determined them to be called *the five predicables.*

It may alſo be obſerved, that as ſome objects of thought are individuals, ſuch as, *Julius Cæſar, the City Rome;* ſo others are common to many individuals, as *good, great, virtuous, vicious.* Of this laſt kind are all the things that are expreſſed by ad-

jectives. Things common to many individuals, were by the ancients called *univerſals*. All predicates are univerſals, for they have the nature of adjectives; and, on the other hand, all univerſals may be predicates. On this account, univerſals may be divided into the ſame claſſes as predicates; and as the five claſſes of predicates above mentioned have been called the five predicables, ſo by the ſame kind of phraſeology they have been called *the five univerſals;* although they may more properly be called the *five claſſes of univerſals.*

The doctrine of the five univerſals or predicables makes an eſſential part of every ſyſtem of logic, and has been handed down without any change to this day. The very name of *predicables* ſhews, that the author of this diviſion, whoever he was, intended it as a complete enumeration of all the kinds of things that can be affirmed of any ſubject; and ſo it has always been underſtood. It is accordingly implied in this diviſion, that all that can be affirmed of any thing whatever, is either the *genus* of the thing, or its *ſpecies*, or its *ſpecific difference*, or ſome *property* or *accident* belonging to it.

Burgerſdick, a very acute writer in logic, ſeems to have been aware, that ſtrong objections might be made to the five predicables, conſidered as a complete enumeration: but, unwilling to allow any imperfection in this ancient diviſion, he endeavours to reſtrain the meaning of the word *predicable*,

dicable, ſo as to obviate objections. Thoſe things only, ſays he, are to be accounted predicables, which may be affirmed of *many individuals*, *truly*, *properly*, and *immediately*. The conſequence of putting ſuch limitations upon the word *predicable* is, that in many propoſitions, perhaps in moſt, the predicate is not a predicable. But admitting all his limitations, the enumeration will ſtill be very incomplete: for of many things we may affirm truly, properly, and immediately, their exiſtence, their end, their cauſe, their effect, and various relations which they bear to other things. Theſe, and perhaps many more, are predicables in the ſtrict ſenſe of the word, no leſs than the five which have been ſo long famous.

Although Porphyry and all ſubſequent writers, make the predicables to be, in number, five; yet Ariſtotle himſelf, in the beginning of the Topics, reduces them to four; and demonſtrates, that there can be no more. We ſhall give his demonſtration when we come to the Topics; and ſhall only here obſerve, that as Burgerſdick juſtifies the fivefold diviſion, by reſtraining the meaning of the word *predicable*; ſo Ariſtotle juſtifies the fourfold diviſion, by enlarging the meaning of the words *property* and *accident*.

After all, I apprehend, that this ancient diviſion of predicables with all its imperfections will bear a compariſon with thoſe which have been ſubſti-

tuted in its ſtead by the moſt celebrated modern philoſophers.

Locke, in his Eſſay on the Human Underſtanding, having laid it down as a principle, That all our knowledge conſiſts in perceiving certain agreements and diſagreements between our ideas, reduces theſe agreements and diſagreements to four heads: to wit, 1. Identity and diverſity; 2. Relation; 3. Coexiſtence; 4. Real Exiſtence *. Here are four predicables given as a complete enumeration, and yet not one of the ancient predicables is included in the number.

The author of the Treatiſe of Human Nature, proceeding upon the ſame principle that all our knowledge is only a perception of the relations of our ideas, obſerves, "That it may perhaps be eſteemed "an endleſs taſk, to enumerate all thoſe qualities "which admit of compariſon, and by which the "ideas of philoſophical relation are produced: "but if we diligently conſider them, we ſhall find, "that without difficulty they may be compriſed "under ſeven general heads: 1. Reſemblance; "2. Identity; 3. Relations of Space and Time; "4. Relations of Quantity and Number; 5. De-"grees of Quality; 6. Contrariety; 7. Cauſa-"tion †". Here again are ſeven predicables given as a complete enumeration, wherein all the predicables of the ancients, as well as two of Locke's are left out.

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* Book 4. chap. 1. † Vol. 1. p. 33. and 125.

The ancients in their diviſion attended only to categorical propoſitions which have one ſubject and one predicate; and of theſe to ſuch only as have a general term for their ſubject. The moderns, by their definition of knowledge, have been led to attend only to relative propoſitions, which expreſs a relation between two ſubjects, and theſe ſubjects they ſuppoſe to be always ideas.

SECT. 2. *On the Ten Categories, and on Diviſions in general.*

The intention of the categories or predicaments is, to muſter every object of human apprehenſion under ten heads: for the categories are given as a complete enumeration of every thing which can be expreſſed without *compoſition* and *ſtructure*; that is, of every thing that can be either the ſubject or the predicate of a propoſition. So that as every ſoldier belongs to ſome company, and every company to ſome regiment; in like manner every thing that can be the object of human thought, has its place in one or other of the ten categories; and by dividing and ſubdividing properly the ſeveral categories, all the notions that enter into the human mind may be muſtered in rank and file, like an army in the day of battle.

The perfection of the diviſion of categories into ten heads, has been ſtrenuouſly defended by the

followers of Ariſtotle, as well as that of the five predicables. They are indeed of kin to each other; they breathe the ſame ſpirit, and probably had the ſame origin. By the one we are taught to marſhal every term that can enter into a propoſition, either as ſubject or predicate; and by the other, we are taught all the poſſible relations which the ſubject can have to the predicate. Thus, the whole furniture of the human mind is preſented to us at one view, and contracted, as it were, into a nut-ſhell. To attempt, in ſo early a period, a methodical delineation of the vaſt region of human knowledge, actual and poſſible, and to point out the limits of every diſtrict, was indeed magnanimous in a high degree, and deſerves our admiration, while we lament that the human powers are unequal to ſo bold a flight.

A regular diſtribution of things under proper claſſes or heads, is, without doubt, a great help both to memory and judgment. As the philoſopher's province includes all things human and divine that can be objects of inquiry, he is naturally led to attempt ſome general diviſion, like that of the categories. And the invention of a diviſion of this kind, which the ſpeculative part of mankind acquieſced in for two thouſand years, marks a ſuperiority of genius in the inventor, whoever he was. Nor does it appear, that the general diviſions, which, ſince the decline of the Peripatetic philoſophy,

philoſophy, have been ſubſtituted in place of the ten categories, are more perfect.

Locke has reduced all things to three categories; to wit, ſubſtances, modes, and relations. In this diviſion, time, ſpace, and number, three great objects of human thought, are omitted.

The author of the Treatiſe of Human Nature has reduced all things to two categories; to wit, ideas and impreſſions: a diviſion which is very well adapted to his ſyſtem; and which puts me in mind of another made by an excellent mathematician in a printed theſis I have ſeen. In it the author, after a ſevere cenſure of the ten categories of the Peripatetics, maintains, that there neither are nor can be more than two categories of things; to wit, *data* and *quæſita*.

There are two ends that may be propoſed by ſuch diviſions. The firſt is, to methodize or digeſt in order what a man actually knows. This is neither unimportant nor impracticable; and in proportion to the ſolidity and accuracy of a man's judgment, his diviſions of the things he knows, will be elegant and uſeful. The ſame ſubject may admit, and even require, various diviſions, according to the different points of view from which we contemplate it: nor does it follow, that becauſe one diviſion is good, therefore another is naught. To be acquainted with the diviſions of the logicians and metaphyſicians, without a ſuperſtitious attachment to them, may be of uſe in dividing the ſame

ſubjects, or even thoſe of a different nature. Thus, Quinctilian borrows from the ten categories his diviſion of the topics of rhetorical argumentation. Of all methods of arrangement, the moſt antiphiloſophical ſeems to be the invention of this age; I mean, the arranging the arts and ſciences by the letters of the alphabet, in dictionaries and encyclopedies. With theſe authors the categories are, A, B, C, &c.

Another end commonly propoſed by ſuch diviſions, but very rarely attained, is to exhauſt the ſubject divided; ſo that nothing that belongs to it ſhall be omitted. It is one of the general rules of diviſion in all ſyſtems of logic, That the diviſion ſhould be adequate to the ſubject divided: a good rule, without doubt; but very often beyond the reach of human power. To make a perfect diviſion, a man muſt have a perfect comprehenſion of the whole ſubject at one view. When our knowledge of the ſubject is imperfect, any diviſion we can make, muſt be like the firſt ſketch of a painter, to be extended, contracted, or mended, as the ſubject ſhall be found to require. Yet nothing is more common, not only among the ancient, but even among modern philoſophers, than to draw, from their incomplete diviſions, concluſions which ſuppoſe them to be perfect.

A diviſion is a repoſitory which the philoſopher frames for holding his ware in convenient order. The philoſopher maintains, that ſuch or ſuch a thing

thing is not good ware, becauſe there is no place in his ware-room that fits it. We are apt to yield to this argument in philoſophy, but it would appear ridiculous in any other traffic.

Peter Ramus, who had the ſpirit of a reformer in philoſophy, and who had force of genius ſufficient to ſhake the Ariſtotelian fabric in many parts, but inſufficient to erect any thing more ſolid in its place, tried to remedy the imperfection of philoſophical diviſions, by introducing a new manner of dividing. His diviſions always conſiſted of two members; one of which was contradictory of the other; as if one ſhould divide England into Middleſex and what is not Middleſex. It is evident that theſe two members comprehend all England: for the logicians obſerve, that a term along with its contradictory, comprehend all things. In the ſame manner, we may divide what is not Middleſex into Kent and what is not Kent. Thus one may go on by diviſions and ſubdiviſions that are abſolutely complete. This example may ſerve to give an idea of the ſpirit of Ramean diviſions, which were in no ſmall reputation about two hundred years ago.

Ariſtotle was not ignorant of this kind of diviſion. But he uſed it only as a touchſtone to prove by induction the perfection of ſome other diviſion, which indeed is the beſt uſe that can be made of it. When applied to the common purpoſe of diviſion, it is both inelegant, and burdenſome to the memory;

memory; and, after it has put one out of breath by endleſs ſubdiviſions, there is ſtill a negative term left behind, which ſhews that you are no nearer the end of your journey than when you began.

Until ſome more effectual remedy be found for the imperfection of diviſions, I beg leave to propoſe one more ſimple than that of Ramus. It is this: When you meet with a diviſion of any ſubject imperfectly comprehended, add to the laſt member an *et cætera*. That this *et cætera* makes the diviſion complete, is undeniable; and therefore it ought to hold its place as a member, and to be always underſtood, whether expreſſed or not, until clear and poſitive proof be brought that the diviſion is complete without it. And this ſame *et cætera* is to be the repoſitory of all members that ſhall in any future time ſhew a good and valid right to a place in the ſubject.

Sect. 3. *On Diſtinctions.*

Having ſaid ſo much of logical diviſions, we ſhall next make ſome remarks upon diſtinctions.

Since the philoſophy of Ariſtotle fell into diſrepute, it has been a common topic of wit and raillery, to inveigh againſt metaphyſical diſtinctions. Indeed the abuſe of them in the ſcholaſtic ages, ſeems to juſtify a general prejudice againſt them: and ſhallow thinkers and writers have good reaſon to be jealous of diſtinctions, becauſe they make ſad

ſad work when applied to their flimſy compoſitions. But every man of true judgment, while he condemns diſtinctions that have no foundation in the nature of things, muſt perceive, that indiſcriminately to decry diſtinctions, is to renounce all pretenſions to juſt reaſoning: for as falſe reaſoning commonly proceeds from confounding things that are different; ſo without diſtinguiſhing ſuch things, it is impoſſible to avoid error, or detect ſophiſtry. The authority of Aquinas, or Suarez, or even of Ariſtotle, can neither ſtamp a real value upon diſtinctions of baſe metal, nor hinder the currency of thoſe of true metal.

Some diſtinctions are verbal, others are real. The firſt kind diſtinguiſh the various meanings of a word; whether proper, or metaphorical. Diſtinctions of this kind make a part of the grammar of a language, and are often abſurd when tranſlated into another language. Real diſtinctions are equally good in all languages, and ſuffer no hurt by tranſlation. They diſtinguiſh the different ſpecies contained under ſome general notion, or the different parts contained in one whole.

Many of Ariſtotle's diſtinctions are verbal merely; and therefore, more proper materials for a dictionary of the Greek language, than for a philoſophical treatiſe. At leaſt, they ought never to have been tranſlated into other languages, when the idiom of the language will not juſtify them: for this is to adulterate the language, to introduce foreign

reign idioms into it without neceſſity or uſe, and to make it ambiguous where it was not. The diſtinctions in the end of the Categories of the four words, *prius*, *ſimul*, *motus*, and *habere*, are all verbal.

The modes or ſpecies of *prius*, according to Ariſtotle, are five. One thing may be prior to another; firſt, in point of time; ſecondly, in point of dignity; thirdly, in point of order; and ſo forth. The modes of *ſimul* are only three. It ſeems this word was not uſed in the Greek with ſo great latitude as the other, although they are relative terms.

The modes or ſpecies of *motion* he makes to be ſix, to wit, generation, corruption, increaſe, decreaſe, alteration, and change of place.

The modes or ſpecies of *having* are eight. 1. Having a quality or habit, as having wiſdom. 2. Having quantity or magnitude. 3. Having things adjacent, as having a ſword. 4. Having things as parts, as having hands or feet. 5. Having in a part or on a part, as having a ring on one's finger. 6. Containing, as a caſk is ſaid to have wine. 7. Poſſeſſing, as having lands or houſes. 8. Having a wife.

Another diſtinction of this kind is Ariſtotle's diſtinction of cauſes; of which he makes four kinds, efficient, material, formal, and final. Theſe diſtinctions may deſerve a place in a dictionary of the

the Greek language; but in Engliſh or Latin they adulterate the language. Yet ſo fond were the ſchoolmen of diſtinctions of this kind, that they added to Ariſtotle's enumeration, an impulſive cauſe, an exemplary cauſe, and I don't know how many more. We ſeem to have adopted into Engliſh a final cauſe; but it is merely a term of art, borrowed from the Peripatetic philoſophy, without neceſſity or uſe: for the Engliſh word *end* is as good as *final cauſe*, though not ſo long nor ſo learned.

SECT. 4. *On Definitions.*

It remains that we make ſome remarks on Ariſtotle's definitions, which have expoſed him to much cenſure and ridicule. Yet I think it muſt be allowed, that in things which need definition and admit of it, his definitions are commonly judicious and accurate; and had he attempted to define ſuch things only, his enemies had wanted great matter of triumph. I believe it may likewiſe be ſaid in his favour, that until Locke's eſſay was wrote, there was nothing of importance delivered by philoſophers with regard to definition, beyond what Ariſtotle has ſaid upon that ſubject.

He conſiders a definition as a ſpeech declaring what a thing is. Every thing eſſential to the thing defined, and nothing more, muſt be contained in the definition. Now the eſſence of a thing conſiſts

ſiſts of theſe two parts: Firſt, What is common to it with other things of the ſame kind; and, ſecondly, What diſtinguiſhes it from other things of the ſame kind. The firſt is called the *genus* of the thing, the ſecond its *ſpecific difference*. The definition therefore conſiſts of theſe two parts. And for finding them, we muſt have recourſe to the ten categories; in one or other of which every thing in nature is to be found. Each category is a *genus*, and is divided into ſo many ſpecies, which are diſtinguiſhed by their ſpecific differences. Each of theſe ſpecies is again ſubdivided into ſo many ſpecies, with regard to which it is a genus. This diviſion and ſubdiviſion continues until we come to the loweſt ſpecies, which can only be divided into individuals, diſtinguiſhed from one another, not by any ſpecific difference, but by accidental differences of time, place, and other circumſtances.

The category itſelf being the higheſt genus, is in no reſpect a ſpecies, and the loweſt *ſpecies* is in no reſpect a *genus;* but every intermediate order is a genus compared with thoſe that are below it, and a ſpecies compared with thoſe above it. To find the definition of any thing, therefore, you muſt take the genus which is immediately above its place in the category, and the ſpecific *difference*, by which it is diſtinguiſhed from other ſpecies of the ſame *genus*. Theſe two make a perfect definition. This I take to be the ſubſtance of Ariſtotle's

ſtotle's ſyſtem; and probably the ſyſtem of the Pythagorean ſchool before Ariſtotle, concerning definition.

But notwithſtanding the ſpecious appearance of this ſyſtem, it has its defects. Not to repeat what was before ſaid of the imperfection of the diviſion of things into ten categories, the ſubdiviſions of each category are no leſs imperfect. Ariſtotle has given ſome ſubdiviſions of a few of them; and, as far as he goes, his followers pretty unanimouſly take the ſame road. But when they attempt to go farther, they take very different roads. It is evident, that if the ſeries of each category could be completed, and the diviſion of things into categories could be made perfect, ſtill the higheſt genus in each category could not be defined, becauſe it is not a ſpecies; nor could individuals be defined, becauſe they have no ſpecific difference. There are alſo many ſpecies of things, whoſe ſpecific difference cannot be expreſſed in language, even when it is evident to ſenſe, or to the underſtanding. Thus green, red, and blue, are very diſtinct ſpecies of colour; but who can expreſs in words wherein green differs from red or blue?

Without borrowing light from the ancient ſyſtem, we may perceive, that every definition muſt conſiſt of words that need no definition; and that to define the common words of a language that have no ambiguity, is trifling, if it could be done; the only uſe of a definition being to give a clear and

and adequate conception of the meaning of a word.

The logicians indeed diſtinguiſh between the definition of a word, and the definition of a thing; conſidering the former as the mean office of a lexicographer, but the laſt as the grand work of a philoſopher. But what they have ſaid about the definition of a thing, if it have a meaning, is beyond my comprehenſion. All the rules of definition agree to the definition of a word; and if they mean by the definition of a thing, the giving an adequate conception of the nature and eſſence of any thing that exiſts; this is impoſſible, and is the vain boaſt of men, unconſcious of the weakneſs of human underſtanding.

The works of God are but imperfectly known by us. We ſee their outſide; or perhaps we diſcover ſome of their qualities and relations, by obſervation and experiment aſſiſted by reaſoning: but even of the ſimpleſt of them we can give no definition that comprehends its real eſſence. It is juſtly obſerved by Locke, that nominal eſſences only, which are the creatures of our own minds, are perfectly comprehended by us, or can be properly defined; and even of theſe there are many too ſimple in their nature to admit of definition. When we cannot give preciſion to our notions by a definition, we muſt endeavour to do it by attentive reflection upon them, by obſerving minutely their agreements and differences, and eſpecially by

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a right underſtanding of the powers of our own minds, by which ſuch notions are formed.

The principles laid down by Locke with regard to definition, and with regard to the abuſe of words, carry conviction along with them. I take them to be one of the moſt important improvements made in logic ſince the days of Ariſtotle: not ſo much becauſe they enlarge our knowledge, as becauſe they make us ſenſible of our ignorance; and ſhew that a great part of what ſpeculative men have admired as profound philoſophy, is only a darkening of knowledge by words without underſtanding.

If Ariſtotle had underſtood theſe principles, many of his definitions, which furniſh matter of triumph to his enemies, had never ſeen the light: let us impute them to the times rather than to the man. The ſublime Plato, it is ſaid, thought it neceſſary to have the definition of a man, and could find none better than *Animal implume bipes;* upon which Diogenes ſent to his ſchool a cock with his feathers plucked off, deſiring to know whether it was a man or not.

SECT. 5. *On the Structure of Speech.*

The few hints contained in the beginning of the book concerning Interpretation relating to the ſtructure of ſpeech, have been left out in treatiſes of logic, as belonging rather to grammar; yet I

apprehend this is a rich field of philoſophical ſpeculation. Language being the expreſs image of human thought, the analyſis of the one muſt correſpond to that of the other. Nouns adjective and ſubſtantive, verbs active and paſſive, with their various moods, tenſes, and perſons, muſt be expreſſive of a like variety in the modes of thought. Things that are diſtinguiſhed in all languages, ſuch as ſubſtance and quality, action and paſſion, cauſe and effect, muſt be diſtinguiſhed by the natural powers of the human mind. The philoſophy of grammar, and that of the human underſtanding, are more nearly allied than is commonly imagined.

The ſtructure of language was purſued to a conſiderable extent, by the ancient commentators upon this book of Ariſtotle. Their ſpeculations upon this ſubject, which are neither the leaſt ingenious nor the leaſt uſeful part of the Peripatetic philoſophy, were neglected for many ages, and lay buried in ancient manuſcripts, or in books little known, till they were lately brought to light by the learned Mr Harris in his Hermes.

The definitions given by Ariſtotle, of a noun, of a verb, and of ſpeech, will hardly bear examination. It is eaſy in practice to diſtinguiſh the various parts of ſpeech; but very difficult, if at all poſſible, to give accurate definitions of them.

He obſerves juſtly, that beſides that kind of ſpeech called a *propoſition*, which is always either true

true or falſe, there are other kinds which are neither true nor falſe; ſuch as, a prayer, or wiſh; to which we may add, a queſtion, a command, a promiſe, a contract, and many others. Theſe Ariſtotle pronounces to have nothing to do with his ſubject, and remits them to oratory, or poetry; and ſo they have remained baniſhed from the regions of philoſophy to this day: yet I apprehend, that an analyſis of ſuch ſpeeches, and of the operations of mind which they expreſs, would be of real uſe, and perhaps would diſcover how imperfect an enumeration the logicians have given of the powers of human underſtanding, when they reduce them to ſimple apprehenſion, judgment, and reaſoning.

SECT. 6. *On Propoſitions.*

Mathematicians uſe the word *propoſition* in a larger ſenſe than logicians. A problem is called a *propoſition* in mathematics, but in logic it is not a propoſition: it is one of thoſe ſpeeches which are not enunciative, and which Ariſtotle remits to oratory or poetry.

A propoſition, according to Ariſtotle, is a ſpeech wherein one thing is affirmed or denied of another. Hence it is eaſy to diſtinguiſh the thing affirmed or denied, which is called *the predicate*, from the thing of which it is affirmed or denied, which is called *the ſubject*; and theſe two are call-

ed *the terms of the propoſition.* Hence likewiſe it appears, that propoſitions are either affirmative or negative; and this is called *their quality.* All affirmative propoſitions have the ſame quality, ſo likewiſe have all negative; but an affirmative and a negative are contrary in their quality.

When the ſubject of a propoſition is a general term, the predicate is affirmed or denied, either of the whole, or of a part. Hence propoſitions are diſtinguiſhed into univerſal and particular. *All men are mortal,* is an univerſal propoſition; *Some men are learned,* is a particular; and this is called *the quantity of the propoſition.* All univerſal propoſitions agree in quantity, as alſo all particular: but an univerſal and a particular are ſaid to differ in quantity. A propoſition is called *indefinite,* when there is no mark either of univerſality or particularity annexed to the ſubject: thus, *Man is of few days,* is an indefinite propoſition; but it muſt be underſtood either as univerſal or as particular, and therefore is not a third ſpecies, but by interpretation is brought under one of the other two.

There are alſo ſingular propoſitions, which have not a general term but an individual for their ſubject; as, *Alexander was a great conqueror.* Theſe are conſidered by logicians as univerſal, becauſe, the ſubject being indiviſible, the predicate is affirmed or denied of the whole, and not of a part only. Thus all propoſitions, with regard to quality,

lity, are either affirmative or negative; and with regard to quantity, are univerſal or particular; and taking in both quantity and quality, they are univerſal affirmatives, or univerſal negatives, or particular affirmatives, or particular negatives. Theſe four kinds, after the days of Ariſtotle, came to be named by the names of the four firſt vowels, A, E, I, O, according to the following diſtich:

Aſſerit A, negat E, ſed univerſaliter ambæ;
Aſſerit I, negat O, ſed particulariter ambo.

When the young logician is thus far inſtructed in the nature of propoſitions, he is apt to think there is no difficulty in analyſing any propoſition, and ſhewing its ſubject and predicate, its quantity and quality; and indeed, unleſs he can do this, he will be unable to apply the rules of logic to uſe. Yet he will find, there are ſome difficulties in this analyſis, which are overlooked by Ariſtotle altogether; and although they are ſometimes touched, they are not removed by his followers. For, 1. There are propoſitions in which it is difficult to find a ſubject and a predicate; as in theſe, *It rains*, *It ſnows*. 2. In ſome propoſitions either term may be made the ſubject or the predicate as you like beſt; as in this, *Virtue is the road to happineſs*. 3. The ſame example may ſerve to ſhew, that it is ſometimes difficult to ſay, whether a propoſition be univerſal or particular. 4. The quality of ſome propoſitions is ſo dubious, that logicians have never been able to agree whether they be affirmative

or negative; as in this propoſition, *Whatever is inſentient is not animal.* 5. As there is one claſs of propoſitions which have only two terms, to wit, one ſubject and one predicate, which are called *categorical propoſitions;* ſo there are many claſſes that have more than two terms. What Ariſtotle delivers in this book is applicable only to categorical propoſitions; and to them only the rules concerning the converſion of propoſitions, and concerning the figures and modes of ſyllogiſms, are accommodated. The ſubſequent writers of logic have taken notice of ſome of the many claſſes of complex propoſitions, and have given rules adapted to them; but finding this work endleſs, they have left us to manage the reſt by the rules of common ſenſe.

CHAP. III.

ACCOUNT OF THE FIRST ANALYTICS.

SECT. I. *Of the Converſion of Propoſitions.*

IN attempting to give ſome account of the Analytics and of the Topics of Ariſtotle, ingenuity requires me to confeſs, that though I have often

often purpoſed to read the whole with care, and to underſtand what is intelligible, yet my courage and patience always failed before I had done. Why ſhould I throw away ſo much time and painful attention upon a thing of ſo little real uſe? If I had lived in thoſe ages when the knowledge of Ariſtotle's Organon entitled a man to the higheſt rank in philoſophy, ambition might have induced me to employ upon it ſome years of painful ſtudy; and leſs, I conceive, would not be ſufficient. Such reflections as theſe, always got the better of my reſolution, when the firſt ardor began to cool. All I can ſay is, that I have read ſome parts of the different books with care, ſome ſlightly, and ſome perhaps not at all. I have glanced over the whole often, and when any thing attracted my attention, have dipped into it till my appetite was ſatisfied. Of all reading it is the moſt dry and the moſt painful, employing an infinite labour of demonſtration about things of the moſt abſtract nature, delivered in a laconic ſtyle, and often, I think, with affected obſcurity; and all to prove general propoſitions, which when applied to particular inſtances appear ſelf-evident.

There is probably but little in the Categories or in the book of Interpretation, that Ariſtotle could claim as his own invention: but the whole theory of ſyllogiſms he claims as his own, and as the fruit of much time and labour. And indeed

it is a ſtately fabric, a monument of a great genius, which we could wiſh to have been more uſefully employed. There muſt be ſomething however adapted to pleaſe the human underſtanding, or to flatter human pride, in a work which occupied men of ſpeculation for more than a thouſand years. Theſe books are called *Analytics*, becauſe the intention of them is to reſolve all reaſoning into its ſimple ingredients.

The firſt book of the Firſt Analytics, conſiſting of forty-ſix chapters, may be divided into four parts; the firſt treating of the converſion of propoſitions; the ſecond, of the ſtructure of ſyllogiſms, in all the different figures and modes; the third, of the invention of a middle term; and the laſt, of the reſolution of ſyllogiſms. We ſhall give a brief account of each.

To convert a propoſition, is to infer from it another propoſition, whoſe ſubject is the predicate of the firſt, and whoſe predicate is the ſubject of the firſt. This is reduced by Ariſtotle to three rules. 1. An univerſal negative may be converted into an univerſal negative: thus, *No man is a quadruped;* therefore, *No quadruped is a man.* 2. An univerſal affirmative can be converted only into a particular affirmative: thus, *All men are mortal;* therefore, *Some mortal beings are men.* 3. A particular affirmative may be converted into a particular affirmative: as, *Some men are juſt;* therefore, *Some juſt perſons are men.* When a propoſition may

may be converted without changing its quantity, this is called *ſimple converſion*; but when the quantity is diminiſhed, as in the univerſal affirmative, it is called converſion *per accidens*.

There is another kind of converſion, omitted in this place by Ariſtotle, but ſupplied by his followers, called *converſion by contrapoſition*, in which the term that is contradictory to the predicate is put for the ſubject, and the quality of the propoſition is changed; as, *All animals are ſentient;* therefore, *What is inſentient is not an animal.* A fourth rule of converſion therefore is, That an univerſal affirmative, and a particular negative, may be converted by contrapoſition.

SECT. 2. *Of the Figures and Modes of pure Syllogiſms.*

A ſyllogiſm is an argument, or reaſoning, conſiſting of three propoſitions, the laſt of which, called *the concluſion*, is inferred from the two preceding, which are called *the premiſes*. The concluſion having two terms, a ſubject and a predicate, its predicate is called the *major* term, and its ſubject the *minor* term. In order to prove the concluſion, each of its terms is, in the premiſes, compared with a third term, called the *middle* term. By this means one of the premiſes will have for its two terms the major term and the middle term; and

and this premiſe is called the *major* premiſe, or the *major* propoſition of the ſyllogiſm. The other premiſe muſt have for its two terms the minor term and the middle term, and it is called the *minor* propoſition. Thus the ſyllogism conſiſts of three propoſitions, diſtinguiſhed by the names of the *major*, the *minor*, and the *concluſion*: and although each of theſe has two terms, a ſubject and a predicate, yet three are only three different terms in all. The major term is always the predicate of the concluſion, and is alſo either the ſubject or predicate of the major propoſition. The minor term is always the ſubject of the concluſion, and is alſo either the ſubject or predicate of the minor propoſition. The middle term never enters into the concluſion, but ſtands in both premiſes, either in the poſition of ſubject or of predicate.

According to the various poſitions which the middle term may have in the premiſes, ſyllogiſms are ſaid to be of various figures. Now all the poſſible poſitions of the middle term are only four: for, firſt, it may be the ſubject of the major propoſition, and the predicate of the minor, and then the ſyllogiſm is of the firſt figure; or it may be the predicate of both premiſes, and then the ſyllogiſm is of the ſecond figure; or it may be the ſubject of both, which makes a ſyllogiſm of the third figure; or it may be the predicate of the major propoſition, and the ſubject of the minor, which makes the fourth figure. Ariſtotle takes no notice of

of the fourth figure. It was added by the famous Galen, and is often called *the Galenical figure.*

There is another diviſion of ſyllogiſms according to their modes. The mode of a ſyllogiſm is determined by the quality and quantity of the propoſitions of which it conſiſts. Each of the three propoſitions muſt be either an univerſal affirmative, or an univerſal negative, or a particular affirmative, or a particular negative. Theſe four kinds of propoſitions, as was before obſerved, have been named by the four vowels, A, E, I, O; by which means the mode of a ſyllogiſm is marked by any three of thoſe four vowels. Thus A, A, A, denotes that mode in which the major, minor, and concluſion, are all univerſal affirmatives; E, A, E, denotes that mode in which the major and concluſion are univerſal negatives, and the minor is an univerſal affirmative.

To know all the poſſible modes of ſyllogiſm, we muſt find how many different combinations may be made of three out of the four vowels, and from the art of combination the number is found to be ſixty-four. So many poſſible modes there are in every figure; conſequently in the three figures of Ariſtotle there are one hundred and ninety-two, and in all the four figures two hundred and fifty-ſix.

Now, the theory of ſyllogiſm requires, that we ſhew what are the particular modes in each figure, which do, or do not, form a juſt and concluſive ſyllogiſm,

logiſm, that ſo the legitimate may be adopted, and the ſpurious rejected. This Ariſtotle has ſhewn in the firſt three figures, examining all the modes one by one, and paſſing ſentence upon each; and from this examination he collects ſome rules which may aid the memory in diſtinguiſhing the falſe from the true, and point out the properties of each figure.

The firſt figure has only four legitimate modes. The major propoſition in this figure muſt be univerſal, and the minor affirmative; and it has this property, that it yields concluſions of all kinds, affirmative and negative, univerſal and particular.

The ſecond figure has alſo four legitimate modes. Its major propoſition muſt be univerſal, and one of the premiſes muſt be negative. It yields concluſions both univerſal and particular, but all negative.

The third figure has ſix legitimate modes. Its minor muſt always be affirmative; and it yields concluſions both affirmative and negative, but all particular.

Beſides the rules that are proper to each figure, Ariſtotle has given ſome that are common to all, by which the legitimacy of ſyllogiſms may be tried. Theſe may, I think, be reduced to five. 1. There muſt be only three terms in a ſyllogiſm. As each term occurs in two of the propoſitions, it muſt be preciſely the ſame in both: if it be not, the ſyllogiſm is ſaid to have four terms, which makes a vicious

vicious ſyllogiſm. 2. The middle term muſt be taken univerſally in one of the premiſes. 3. Both premiſes muſt not be particular propoſitions, nor both negative. 4. The concluſion muſt be particular, if either of the premiſes be particular; and negative, if either of the premiſes be negative. 5. No term can be taken univerſally in the concluſion, if it be not taken univerſally in the premiſes.

For underſtanding the ſecond and fifth of theſe rules, it is neceſſary to obſerve, that a term is ſaid to be taken univerſally, not only when it is the ſubject of an univerſal propoſition, but when it is the predicate of a negative propoſition; on the other hand, a term is ſaid to be taken particularly, when it is either the ſubject of a particular, or the predicate of an affirmative propoſition.

SECT. 3. *Of the Invention of a Middle Term.*

The third part of this book contains rules general and ſpecial for the invention of a middle term; and this the author conceives to be of great utility. The general rules amount to this, That you are to conſider well both terms of the propoſition to be proved; their definition, their properties, the things which may be affirmed or denied of them, and thoſe of which they may be affirmed or denied: theſe things collected together, are the materials from which your middle term is to be taken.

The ſpecial rules require you to conſider the quantity and quality of the propoſition to be proved,

ved, that you may diſcover in what mode and figure of ſyllogiſm the proof is to proceed. Then from the materials before collected, you muſt ſeek a middle term which has that relation to the ſubject and predicate of the propoſition to be proved, which the nature of the ſyllogiſm requires. Thus, ſuppoſe the propoſition I would prove is an univerſal affirmative, I know by the rules of ſyllogiſms, that there is only one legitimate mode in which an univerſal affirmative propoſition can be proved; and that is the firſt mode of the firſt figure. I know likewiſe, that in this mode both the premiſes muſt be univerſal affirmatives; and that the middle term muſt be the ſubject of the major, and the predicate of the minor. Therefore of the terms collected according to the general rule, I ſeek out one or more which have theſe two properties; firſt, That the predicate of the propoſition to be proved can be univerſally affirmed of it; and ſecondly, That it can be univerſally affirmed of the ſubject of the propoſition to be proved. Every term you can find which has thoſe two properties, will ſerve you as a middle term, but no other. In this way, the author gives ſpecial rules for all the various kinds of propoſitions to be proved; points out the various modes in which they may be proved, and the properties which the middle term muſt have to make it fit for anſwering that end. And the rules are illuſtrated, or rather, in my opinion, purpoſely darkened,

ened, by putting letters of the alphabet for the ſeveral terms.

SECT. 4. *Of the remaining part of the Firſt Book.*

The reſolution of ſyllogiſms requires no other principles but theſe before laid down for conſtructing them. However, it is treated of largely, and rules laid down for reducing reaſoning to ſyllogiſms, by ſupplying one of the premiſes when it is underſtood, by rectifying inverſions, and putting the propoſitions in the proper order.

Here he ſpeaks alſo of hypothetical ſyllogiſms; which he acknowledges cannot be reſolved into any of the figures, although there be many kinds of them that ought diligently to be obſerved; and which he promiſes to handle afterwards. But this promiſe is not fulfilled, as far as I know, in any of his works that are extant.

SECT. 5. *Of the Second Book of the Firſt Analytics.*

The ſecond book treats of the powers of ſyllogiſms, and ſhows, in twenty-ſeven chapters, how we may perform many feats by them, and what figures and modes are adapted to each. Thus, in ſome ſyllogiſms ſeveral diſtinct concluſions may be drawn from the ſame premiſes: in ſome, true concluſions may be drawn from falſe premiſes: in ſome, by aſſuming the concluſion and one premiſe, you may prove the other; you may turn a direct ſyllogiſm into one leading to an abſurdity.

We

We have likewiſe precepts given in this book, both to the aſſailant in a ſyllogiſtical diſpute, how to carry on his attack with art, ſo as to obtain the victory; and to the defendant, how to keep the enemy at ſuch a diſtance as that he ſhall never be obliged to yield. From which we learn, that Ariſtotle introduced in his own ſchool, the practice of ſyllogiſtical diſputation, inſtead of the rhetorical diſputations which the ſophiſts were wont to uſe in more ancient times.

CHAP. IV.

REMARKS.

SECT. I. *Of the Converſion of Propoſitions.*

WE have given a ſummary view of the theory of pure ſyllogiſms as delivered by Ariſtotle, a theory of which he claims the ſole invention. And I believe it will be difficult, in any ſcience, to find ſo large a ſyſtem of truths of ſo very abſtract and ſo general a nature, all fortified by demonſtration, and all invented and perfected by one man. It ſhows a force of genius and labour

bour of inveſtigation, equal to the moſt arduous attempts. I ſhall now make ſome remarks upon it.

As to the converſion of propoſitions, the writers on logic commonly ſatisfy themſelves with illuſtrating each of the rules by an example, conceiving them to be ſelf-evident when applied to particular caſes. But Ariſtotle has given demonſtrations of the rules he mentions. As a ſpecimen, I ſhall give his demonſtration of the firſt rule. "Let A B be an univerſal negative propoſition; I ſay, that if A is in no B, it will follow that B is in no A. If you deny this conſequence, let B be in ſome A, for example, in C; then the firſt ſuppoſition will not be true; for C is of the B's." In this demonſtration, if I underſtand it, the third rule of converſion is aſſumed, that if B is in ſome A, then A muſt be in ſome B, which indeed is contrary to the firſt ſuppoſition. If the third rule be aſſumed for proof of the firſt, the proof of all the three goes round in a circle; for the ſecond and third rules are proved by the firſt. This is a fault in reaſoning whioh Ariſtotle condemns, and which I would be very unwilling to charge him with, if I could find any better meaning in his demonſtration. But it is indeed a fault very difficult to be avoided, when men attempt to prove things that are ſelf-evident.

The rules of converſion cannot be applied to all propoſitions, but only to thoſe that are categorical; and we are left to the direction of common ſenſe in the converſion of other propoſitions. To give an example: Alexander was the ſon of Philip; therefore Philip was the father of Alexander: A is greater than B; therefore B is leſs than A. Theſe are converſions which, as far as I know, do not fall within any rule in logic; nor do we find any loſs for want of a rule in ſuch caſes.

Even in the converſion of categorical propoſitions, it is not enough to tranſpoſe the ſubject and predicate. Both muſt undergo ſome change, in order to fit them for their new ſtation: for in every propoſition the ſubject muſt be a ſubſtantive, or have the force of a ſubſtantive; and the predicate muſt be an adjective, or have the force of an adjective. Hence it follows, that when the ſubject is an individual, the propoſition admits not of converſion. How, for inſtance, ſhall we convert this propoſition, God is omniſcient?

Theſe obſervations ſhow, that the doctrine of the converſion of propoſitions is not ſo complete as it appears. The rules are laid down without any limitation; yet they are fitted only to one claſs of propoſitions, to wit, the categorical; and of theſe only to ſuch as have a general term for their ſubject.

SECT.

SECT. 2. *On Additions made to Ariſtotle's Theory.*

Although the logicians have enlarged the firſt and ſecond parts of logic, by explaining ſome technical words and diſtinctions which Ariſtotle has omitted, and by giving names to ſome kinds of propoſitions which he overlooks; yet in what concerns the theory of categorical ſyllogiſms, he is more full, more minute and particular, than any of them: ſo that they ſeem to have thought this capital part of the Organon rather redundant than deficient.

It is true, that Galen added a fourth figure to the three mentioned by Ariſtotle. But there is reaſon to think that Ariſtotle omitted the fourth figure, not through ignorance or inattention, but of deſign, as containing only ſome indirect modes, which, when properly expreſſed, fall into the firſt figure.

It is true alſo, that Peter Ramus, a profeſſed enemy of Ariſtotle, introduced ſome new modes that are adapted to ſingular propoſitions; and that Ariſtotle takes no notice of ſingular propoſitions, either in his rules of converſion, or in the modes of ſyllogiſm. But the friends of Ariſtotle have ſhewn, that this improvement of Ramus is more ſpecious than uſeful. Singular propoſitions have the force of univerſal propoſitions, and are ſubject to the ſame rules. The definition given by Ariſtotle of an univerſal propoſition applies to them; and

therefore he might think, that there was no occaſion to multiply the modes of ſyllogiſm upon their account.

Theſe attempts, therefore, ſhow rather inclination than power, to diſcover any material defect in Ariſtotle's theory.

The moſt valuable addition made to the theory of categorical ſyllogiſms, ſeems to be the invention of thoſe technical names given to the legitimate modes, by which they may be eaſily remembered, and which have been compriſed in theſe barbarous verſes.

Barbara, Celarent, Darii, Ferio, dato primæ;
Ceſare, Cameſtris, Feſtino, Baroco, ſecundæ;
Tertia grande ſonans recitat *Darapti, Felapton;*
Adjungens *Diſamis, Datiſi, Bocardo, Feriſon.*

In theſe verſes, every legitimate mode belonging to the three figures has a name given to it, by which it may be diſtinguiſhed and remembered. And this name is ſo contrived as to denote its nature: for the name has three vowels, which denote the kind of each of its propoſitions.

Thus, a ſyllogiſm in *Bocardo* muſt be made up of the propoſitions denoted by the three vowels, O, A, O; that is, its major and concluſion muſt be particular negative propoſitions, and its minor an univerſal affirmative; and being in the third figure, the middle term muſt be the ſubject of both premiſes.

This

This is the myſtery contained in the vowels of thoſe barbarous words. But there are other myſteries contained in their conſonants: for, by their means, a child may be taught to reduce any ſyllogiſm of the ſecond or third figure to one of the firſt. So that the four modes of the firſt figure being directly proved to be concluſive, all the modes of the other two are proved at the ſame time, by means of this operation of reduction. For the rules and manner of this reduction, and the different ſpecies of it, called *oſtenſive* and *per impoſſible*, I refer to the logicians, that I may not diſcloſe all their myſteries.

The invention contained in theſe verſes is ſo ingenious, and ſo great an adminicle to the dextrous management of ſyllogiſms, that I think it very probable that Ariſtotle had ſome contrivance of this kind, which was kept as one of the ſecret doctrines of his ſchool, and handed down by tradition, until ſome perſon brought it to light. This is offered only as a conjecture, leaving it to thoſe who are better acquainted with the moſt ancient commentators on the Analytics, either to refute or to confirm it.

SECT. 3. *On Examples uſed to illuſtrate this Theory.*

We may obſerve, that Ariſtotle hardly ever gives examples of real ſyllogiſms to illuſtrate his rules. In demonſtrating the legitimate modes, he takes A, B, C, for the terms of the ſyllogiſm.

Thus, the firſt mode of the firſt figure is demonſtrated by him in this manner. "For," ſays he, "if A is attributed to every B, and B to every C, "it follows neceſſarily, that A may be attributed "to every C." For diſproving the illegitimate modes, he uſes the ſame manner; with this difference, that he commonly for an example gives three real terms, ſuch as, *bonum*, *habitus*, *prudentia*; of which three terms you are to make up a ſyllogiſm of the figure and mode in queſtion, which will appear to be inconcluſive.

The commentators and ſyſtematical writers in logic, have ſupplied this defect; and given us real examples of every legitimate mode in all the figures. We acknowledge this to be charitably done, in order to aſſiſt the conception in matters ſo very abſtract; but whether it was prudently done for the honour of the art, may be doubted. I am afraid this was to uncover the nakedneſs of the theory; it has undoubtedly contributed to bring it into contempt; for when one conſiders the ſilly and uninſtructive reaſonings that have been brought forth by this grand organ of ſcience, he can hardly forbear crying out, *Parturiunt montes, et naſcitur ridiculus mus.* Many of the writers of logic are acute and ingenious, and much practiſed in the ſyllogiſtical art; and there muſt be ſome reaſon why the examples they have given of ſyllogiſms are ſo lean.

We

We ſhall ſpeak of the reaſon afterwards; and ſhall now give a ſyllogiſm in each figure as an example.

No work of God is bad;

The natural paſſions and appetites of men are the work of God;

Therefore none of them is bad.

In this ſyllogiſm, the middle term, *work of God*, is the ſubject of the major and the predicate of the minor; ſo that the ſyllogiſm is of the firſt figure. The mode is that called *Celarent*; the major and concluſion being both univerſal negatives, and the minor an univerſal affirmative. It agrees to the rules of the figure, as the major is univerſal, and the minor affirmative; it is alſo agreeable to all the general rules; ſo that it maintains its character in every trial. And to ſhow of what ductile materials ſyllogiſms are made, we may, by converting ſimply the major propoſition, reduce it to a good ſyllogiſm of the ſecond figure, and of the mode *Ceſare*, thus:

Whatever is bad is not the work of God;

All the natural paſſions and appetites of men are the work of God;

Therefore they are not bad.

Another example:

Every thing virtuous is praiſe-worthy;

Some pleaſures are not praiſe-worthy.

Therefore ſome pleaſures are not virtuous.

Here the middle term *praiſe-worthy* being the predicate of both premiſes, the ſyllogiſm is of the ſecond figure; and ſeeing it is made up of the propoſitions, A, O, O, the mode is *Baroco*. It will be found to agree both with the general and ſpecial rules: and it may be reduced into a good ſyllogiſm of the firſt figure upon converting the major by contrapoſition, thus:

What is not praiſe-worthy is not virtuous;
Some pleaſures are not praiſe-worthy;
Therefore ſome pleaſures are not virtuous.

That this ſyllogiſm is concluſive, common ſenſe pronounces, and all logicians muſt allow; but it is ſomewhat unpliable to rules, and requires a little ſtraining to make it tally with them.

That it is of the firſt figure is beyond diſpute; but to what mode of that figure ſhall we refer it? This is a queſtion of ſome difficulty. For, in the firſt place, the premiſes ſeem to be both negative, which contradicts the third general rule; and moreover, it is contrary to a ſpecial rule of the firſt figure, That the minor ſhould be negative. Theſe are the difficulties to be removed.

Some logicians think, that the two negative particles in the major are equivalent to an affirmative; and that therefore the major propoſition, *What is not praiſe-worthy, is not virtuous*, is to be accounted an affirmative propoſition. This, if granted, ſolves one difficulty; but the other remains. The moſt ingenious ſolution, therefore, is this;

this: Let the middle term be *not praiſe-worthy*. Thus, making the negative particle a part of the middle term, the ſyllogiſm ſtands thus:

Whatever is *not praiſe-worthy* is not virtuous;
Some pleaſures are *not praiſe-worthy*;
Therefore ſome pleaſures are not virtuous.

By this analyſis, the major becomes an univerſal negative, the minor a particular affirmative, and the concluſion a particular negative, and ſo we have a juſt ſyllogiſm in *Ferio*.

We ſee, by this example, that the quality of propoſitions is not ſo invariable, but that, when occaſion requires, an affirmative may be degraded into a negative, or a negative exalted to an affirmative. Another example:

All Africans are black;
All Africans are men;
Therefore ſome men are black.

This is of the third figure, and of the mode *Daraptì*; and it may be reduced to *Darii* in the firſt figure, by converting the minor.

All Africans are black;
Some men are Africans;
Therefore ſome men are black.

By this time I apprehend the reader has got as many examples of ſyllogiſms as will ſtay his appetite for that kind of entertainment.

SECT.

SECT. 4. *On the Demonſtration of the Theory.*

Ariſtotle and all his followers have thought it neceſſary, in order to bring this theory of categorical ſyllogiſms to a ſcience, to demonſtrate, both that the fourteen authoriſed modes conclude juſtly, and that none of the reſt do. Let us now ſee how this has been executed.

As to the legitimate modes, Ariſtotle and thoſe who follow him the moſt cloſely, demonſtrate the four modes of the firſt figure directly from an axiom called the *Dictum de omni et nullo*. The amount of the axiom is, That what is affirmed of a whole *genus*, may be affirmed of all the ſpecies and individuals belonging to that *genus*; and that what is denied of the whole genus, may be denied of its ſpecies and individuals. The four modes of the firſt figure are evidently included in this axiom. And as to the legitimate modes of the other figures, they are proved by reducing them to ſome mode of the firſt. Nor is there any other principle aſſumed in theſe reductions but the axioms concerning the converſion of propoſitions, and in ſome caſes the axioms concerning the oppoſition of propoſitions.

As to the illegitimate modes, Ariſtotle has taken the labour to try and condemn them one by one in all the three figures: but this is done in ſuch a manner that it is very painful to follow him. To give a ſpecimen. In order to prove, that thoſe modes

modes of the firſt figure in which the major is particular, do not conclude, he proceeds thus: "If "A is or is not in ſome B, and B in every C, no "concluſion follows. Take for the terms in the "affirmative caſe, *good*, *habit*, *prudence*, in the "negative, *good*, *habit*, *ignorance*." This laconic ſtyle, the uſe of ſymbols not familiar, and, in place of giving an example, his leaving us to form one from three aſſigned terms, give ſuch embarraſſment to a reader, that he is like one reading a book of riddles.

Having thus aſcertained the true and falſe modes of a figure, he ſubjoins the particular rules of that figure, which ſeem to be deduced from the particular caſes before determined. The general rules come laſt of all, as a general corollary from what goes before.

I know not whether it is from a diffidence of Ariſtotle's demonſtrations, or from an apprehenſion of their obſcurity, or from a deſire of improving upon his method, that almoſt all the writers in logic I have met with, have inverted his order, beginning where he ends, and ending where he begins. They firſt demonſtrate the general rules, which belong to all the figures, from three axioms; then from the general rules and the nature of each figure, they demonſtrate the ſpecial rules of each figure. When this is done, nothing remains but to apply theſe general and ſpecial rules, and to reject every mode which contradicts them.

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This method has a very ſcientific appearance: and when we conſider, that by a few rules once demonſtrated, an hundred and ſeventy-eight falſe modes are deſtroyed at one blow, which Ariſtotle had the trouble to put to death one by one, it ſeems to be a great improvement. I have only one objection to the three axioms.

The three axioms are theſe: 1. Things which agree with the ſame third, agree with one another. 2. When one agrees with the third, and the other does not, they do not agree with one another. 3. When neither agrees with the third, you cannot thence conclude, either that they do, or do not agree with one another. If theſe axioms are applied to mathematical quantities, to which they ſeem to relate when taken literally, they have all the evidence that an axiom ought to have: but the logicians apply them in an analogical ſenſe to things of another nature. In order, therefore, to judge whether they are truly axioms, we ought to ſtrip them of their figurative dreſs, and to ſet them down in plain Engliſh, as the logicians underſtand them. They amount therefore to this. 1. If two things be affirmed of a third, or the third be affirmed of them; or if one be affirmed of the third, and the third affirmed of the other; then they may be affirmed one of the other. 2. If one is affirmed of the third, or the third of it, and the other denied of the third, or the third of it, they may be denied one of the other. 3. If both are denied

nied of the third, or the third of them; or if one is denied of the third, and the third denied of the other; nothing can be inferred.

When the three axioms are thus put in plain Engliſh, they ſeem not to have that degree of evidence which axioms ought to have; and if there is any defect of evidence in the axioms, this defect will be communicated to the whole edifice raiſed upon them.

It may even be ſuſpected, that an attempt by any method to demonſtrate that a ſyllogiſm is concluſive, is an impropriety ſomewhat like that of attempting to demonſtrate an axiom. In a juſt ſyllogiſm, the connection between the premiſes and the concluſion is not only real, but immediate; ſo that no propoſition can come between them to make their connection more apparent. The very intention of a ſyllogiſm is, to leave nothing to be ſupplied that is neceſſary to a complete demonſtration. Therefore a man of common underſtanding, who has a perfect comprehenſion of the premiſes, finds himſelf under a neceſſity of admitting the concluſion, ſuppoſing the premiſes to be true; and the concluſion is connected with the premiſes with all the force of intuitive evidence. In a word, an immediate concluſion is ſeen in the premiſes, by the light of common ſenſe; and where that is wanting, no kind of reaſoning will ſupply its place.

SECT.

SECT. 5. *On this Theory, conſidered as an Engine of Science.*

The ſlow progreſs of uſeful knowledge, during the many ages in which the ſyllogiſtic art was moſt highly cultivated as the only guide to ſcience, and its quick progreſs ſince that art was diſuſed, ſuggeſt a preſumption againſt it; and this preſumption is ſtrengthened by the puerility of the examples which have always been brought to illuſtrate its rules.

The ancients ſeem to have had too high notions, both of the force of the reaſoning power in man, and of the art of ſyllogiſm as its guide. Mere reaſoning can carry us but a very little way in moſt ſubjects. By obſervation, and experiments properly conducted, the ſtock of human knowledge may be enlarged without end; but the power of reaſoning alone, applied with vigour through a long life, would only carry a man round, like a horſe in a mill who labours hard but makes no progreſs. There is indeed an exception to this obſervation in the mathematical ſciences. The relations of quantity are ſo various and ſo ſuſceptible of exact menſuration, that long trains of accurate reaſoning on that ſubject may be formed, and concluſions drawn very remote from the firſt principles. It is in this ſcience and thoſe which depend upon it, that the power of reaſoning triumphs; in other matters its trophies are inconſiderable.

ſiderable. If any man doubt this, let him produce, in any ſubject unconnected with mathematics, a train of reaſoning of ſome length, leading to a concluſion, which without this train of reaſoning would never have been brought within human ſight. Every man acquainted with mathematics can produce thouſands of ſuch trains of reaſoning. I do not ſay, that none ſuch can be produced in other ſciences; but I believe they are few, and not eaſily found; and that if they are found, it will not be in ſubjects that can be expreſſed by categorical propoſitions, to which alone the theory of figure and mode extends.

In matters to which that theory extends, a man of good ſenſe, who can diſtinguiſh things that differ, can avoid the ſnares of ambiguous words, and is moderately practiſed in ſuch matters, ſees at once all that can be inferred from the premiſes; or finds, that there is but a very ſhort ſtep to the concluſion.

When the power of reaſoning is ſo feeble by nature, eſpecially in ſubjects to which this theory can be applied, it would be unreaſonable to expect great effects from it. And hence we ſee the reaſon why the examples brought to illuſtrate it by the moſt ingenious logicians, have rather tended to bring it into contempt.

If it ſhould be thought, that the ſyllogiſtic art may be an uſeful engine in mathematics, in which pure reaſoning has ample ſcope: Firſt, It may be obſerved,

obſerved, That facts are unfavourable to this opinion: for it does not appear, that Euclid, or Apollonius, or Archimedes, or Hugens, or Newton, ever made the leaſt uſe of this art; and I am even of opinion, that no uſe can be made of it in mathematics. I would not wiſh to advance this raſhly, ſince Ariſtotle has ſaid, that mathematicians reaſon for the moſt part in the firſt figure. What led him to think ſo was, that the firſt figure only yields concluſions that are univerſal and affirmative, and the concluſions of mathematics are commonly of that kind. But it is to be obſerved, that the propoſitions of mathematics are not categorical propoſitions, conſiſting of one ſubject and one predicate. They expreſs ſome relation which one quantity bears to another, and on that account muſt have three terms. The quantities compared make two, and the relation between them is a third. Now to ſuch propoſitions we can neither apply the rules concerning the converſion of propoſitions, nor can they enter into a ſyllogiſm of any of the figures or modes. We obſerved before, that this converſion, *A is greater than B*, therefore *B is leſs than A*, does not fall within the rules of converſion given by Ariſtotle or the logicians; and we now add, that this ſimple reaſoning, *A is equal to B, and B to C;* therefore *A is equal to C*, cannot be brought into any ſyllogiſm in figure and mode. There are indeed ſyllogiſms into which mathematical propoſitions may enter,

and

and of ſuch we ſhall afterwards ſpeak: but they have nothing to do with the ſyſtem of figure and mode.

When we go without the circle of the mathematical ſciences, I know nothing in which there ſeems to be ſo much demonſtration as in that part of logic which treats of the figures and modes of ſyllogiſm; but the few remarks we have made, ſhew, that it has ſome weak places: and beſides, this ſyſtem cannot be uſed as an engine to rear itſelf.

The compaſs of the ſyllogiſtic ſyſtem as an engine of ſcience, may be diſcerned by a compendious and general view of the concluſion drawn, and the argument uſed to prove it, in each of the three figures.

In the firſt figure, the concluſion affirms or denies ſomething of a certain ſpecies or individual; and the argument to prove this concluſion is, That the ſame thing may be affirmed or denied of the whole genus to which that ſpecies or individual belongs.

In the ſecond figure, the concluſion is, That ſome ſpecies or individual does not belong to ſuch a genus; and the argument is, That ſome attribute common to the whole genus does not belong to that ſpecies or individual.

In the third figure, the concluſion is, That ſuch an attribute belongs to part of a genus; and the argument is, That the attribute in queſtion belongs

to a ſpecies or individual which is part of that genus.

I apprehend, that in this ſhort view, every concluſion that falls within the compaſs of the three figures, as well as the mean of proof, is comprehended. The rules of all the figures might be eaſily deduced from it; and it appears, that there is only one principle of reaſoning in all the three: ſo that it is not ſtrange, that a ſyllogiſm of one figure ſhould be reduced to one of another figure.

The general principle in which the whole terminates, and of which every categorical ſyllogiſm is only a particular application, is this, That what is affirmed or denied of the whole genus, may be affirmed or denied of every ſpecies and individual belonging to it. This is a principle of undoubted certainty indeed, but of no great depth. Ariſtotle and all the logicians aſſume it as an axiom or firſt principle, from which the ſyllogiſtic ſyſtem, as it were, takes its departure: and after a tedious voyage, and great expence of demonſtration, it lands at laſt in this principle as its ultimate concluſion. *O curas hominum! O quantum eſt in rebus inane!*

Sect. 6. *On Modal Syllogiſms.*

Categorical propoſitions, beſides their quantity and quality, have another affection, by which they are divided into pure and modal. In a pure propoſition,

poſition, the predicate is barely affirmed or denied of the ſubject; but in a modal propoſition, the affirmation or negation is modified, by being declared to be neceſſary, or contingent, or poſſible, or impoſſible. Theſe are the four modes obſerved by Ariſtotle, from which he denominates a propoſition modal. His genuine diſciples maintain, that theſe are all the modes that can affect an affirmation or negation, and that the enumeration is complete. Others maintain, that this enumeration is incomplete; and that when an affirmation or negation is ſaid to be certain or uncertain, probable or improbable, this makes a modal propoſition, no leſs than the four modes of Ariſtotle. We ſhall not enter into this diſpute; but proceed to obſerve, that the epithets of *pure* and *modal* are applied to ſyllogiſms as well as to propoſitions. A pure ſyllogiſm is that in which both premiſes are pure propoſitions. A modal ſyllogiſm is that in which either of the premiſes is a modal propoſition.

The ſyllogiſms, of which we have already ſaid ſo much, are thoſe only which are pure as well as categorical. But when we conſider, that through all the figures and modes, a ſyllogiſm may have one premiſe modal of any of the four modes, while the other is pure, or it may have both premiſes modal, and that they may be either of the ſame mode or of different modes; what prodigious variety ariſes from all theſe combinations? Now it

is the buſineſs of a logician, to ſhew how the concluſion is affected in all this variety of caſes. Ariſtotle has done this in his Firſt Analytics, with immenſe labour; and it will not be thought ſtrange, that when he had employed only four chapters in diſcuſſing one hundred and ninety-two modes, true and falſe, of pure ſyllogiſms, he ſhould employ fifteen upon modal ſyllogiſms.

I am very willing to excuſe myſelf from entering upon this great branch of logic, by the judgment and example of thoſe who cannot be charged either with want of reſpect to Ariſtotle, or with a low eſteem of the ſyllogiſtic art.

Keckerman, a famous Dantzican profeſſor, who ſpent his life in teaching and writing logic, in his huge folio ſyſtem of that ſcience, publiſhed *anno* 1600, calls the doctrine of the modals the *crux logicorum*. With regard to the ſcholaſtic doctors, among whom this was a proverb, *De modalibus non guſtabit aſinus*, he thinks it very dubious, whether they tortured moſt the modal ſyllogiſms, or were moſt tortured by them. But thoſe crabbed geniuſes, ſays he, made this doctrine ſo very thorny, that it is fitter to tear a man's wits in pieces than to give them ſolidity. He deſires it to be obſerved, that the doctrine of the modals is adapted to the Greek language. The modal terms were frequently uſed by the Greeks in their diſputations; and, on that account, are ſo fully handled by Ariſtotle: but in the Latin tongue you ſhall hardly ever

ever meet with them. Nor do I remember, in all my experience, fays he, to have obferved any man in danger of being foiled in a difpute, through his ignorance of the modals.

This author, however, out of refpect to Ariftotle, treats pretty fully of modal propofitions, fhewing how to diftinguifh their fubject and predicate, their quantity and quality. But the modal fyllogifms he paffes over altogether.

Ludovicus Vives, whom I mention, not as a devotee of Ariftotle, but on account of his own judgment and learning, thinks that the doctrine of modals ought to be banifhed out of logic, and remitted to grammar; and that if the grammar of the Greek tongue had been brought to a fyftem in the time of Ariftotle, that moft acute philofopher would have faved the great labour he has beftowed on this fubject.

Burgerfdick, after enumerating five claffes of modal fyllogifms, obferves, that they require many rules and cautions, which Ariftotle hath handled diligently; but that, as the ufe of them is not great, and their rules difficult, he thinks it not worth while to enter into the difcuffion of them; recommending to thofe who would underftand them, the moft learned paraphrafe of Joannes Monlorius upon the firft book of the Firft Analytics.

All the writers of logic for two hundred years back that have fallen into my hands, have paffed over the rules of modal fyllogifms with as little

ceremony. So that this great branch of the doctrine of ſyllogiſm, ſo diligently handled by Ariſtotle, fell into neglect, if not contempt, even while the doctrine of pure ſyllogiſms continued in the higheſt eſteem. Moved by theſe authorities, I ſhall let this doctrine reſt in peace, without giving the leaſt diſturbance to its aſhes.

Sect. 7. *On Syllogiſms that do not belong to Figure and Mode.*

Ariſtotle gives ſome obſervations upon imperfect ſyllogiſms: ſuch as, the Enthimema, in which one of the premiſes is not expreſſed, but underſtood: Induction, wherein we collect an univerſal from a full enumeration of particulars: and Examples, which are an imperfect induction. The logicians have copied Ariſtotle upon theſe kinds of reaſoning, without any conſiderable improvement. But to compenſate the modal ſyllogiſms, which they have laid aſide, they have given rules for ſeveral kinds of ſyllogiſm, of which Ariſtotle takes no notice. Theſe may be reduced to two claſſes.

The firſt claſs comprehends the ſyllogiſms into which any excluſive, reſtrictive, exceptive, or reduplicative propoſition enters. Such propoſitions are by ſome called *exponible*, by others *imperfectly modal*. The rules given with regard to theſe are obvious, from a juſt interpretation of the propoſitions.

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The ſecond claſs is that of hypothetical ſyllogiſms, which take that denomination from having a hypothetical propoſition for one or both premiſes. Moſt logicians give the name of *hypothetical* to all complex propoſitions which have more terms than one ſubject and one predicate. I uſe the word in this large ſenſe; and mean by hypothetical ſyllogiſms, all thoſe in which either of the premiſes conſiſts of more terms than two. How many various kinds there may be of ſuch ſyllogiſms, has never been aſcertained. The logicians have given names to ſome; ſuch as, the copulative, the conditional, by ſome called hypothetical, and the disjunctive.

Such ſyllogiſms cannot be tried by the rules of figure and mode. Every kind would require rules peculiar to itſelf. Logicians have given rules for ſome kinds; but there are many that have not ſo much as a name.

The Dilemma is conſidered by moſt logicians as a ſpecies of the disjunctive ſyllogiſm. A remarkable property of this kind is, that it may ſometimes be happily retorted: it is, it ſeems, like a hand-grenade, which by dextrous management may be thrown back, ſo as to ſpend its force upon the aſſailant. We ſhall conclude this tedious account of ſyllogiſms, with a dilemma mentioned by *A. Gellius*, and from him by many logicians, as inſoluble in any other way.

' Euathlus, a rich young man, desirous of learning the art of pleading, applied to Protagoras, a celebrated sophist, to instruct him, promising a great sum of money as his reward; one-half of which was paid down; the other half he bound himself to pay as soon as he should plead a cause before the judges, and gain it. Protagoras found him a very apt scholar; but, after he had made good progress, he was in no haste to plead causes. The master, conceiving that he intended by this means to shift off his second payment, took, as he thought, a sure method to get the better of his delay. He sued Euathlus before the judges; and, having opened his cause at the bar, he pleaded to this purpose. O most foolish young man, do you not see, that, in any event, I must gain my point? for if the judges give sentence for me, you must pay by their sentence; if against me, the condition of our bargain is fulfilled, and you have no plea left for your delay, after having pleaded and gained a cause. To which Euathlus answered. O most wise master, I might have avoided the force of your argument, by not pleading my own cause. But, giving up this advantage, do you not see, that whatever sentence the judges pass, I am safe? If they give sentence for me, I am acquitted by their sentence; if against me, the condition of our bargain is not fulfilled, by my pleading a cause, and losing it. The judges, thinking the

" arguments

" arguments unanſwerable on both ſides, put off " the cauſe to a long day."

CHAP. V.

ACCOUNT OF THE REMAINING BOOKS OF THE ORGANON.

SECT. I. *Of the Laſt Analytics.*

IN the Firſt Analytics, ſyllogiſms are conſidered in reſpect of their form; they are now to be conſidered in reſpect of their matter. The form lies in the neceſſary connection between the premiſes and the concluſion; and where ſuch a connection is wanting, they are ſaid to be informal, or vicious in point of form.

But where there is no fault in the form, there may be in the matter; that is, in the propoſitions of which they are compoſed, which may be true or falſe, probable or improbable.

When the premiſes are certain, and the concluſion drawn from them in due form, this is demonſtration, and produces ſcience. Such ſyllogiſms

giſms are called *apodictical;* and are handled in the two books of the Laſt Analytics. When the premiſes are not certain, but probable only, ſuch ſyllogiſms are called *dialectical;* and of them he treats in the eight books of the Topics. But there are ſome ſyllogiſms which ſeem to be perfect both in matter and form, when they are not really ſo; as, a face may ſeem beautiful which is but painted. Theſe being apt to deceive, and produce a falſe opinion, are called *ſophiſtical;* and they are the ſubject of the book concerning Sophiſms.

To return to the Laſt Analytics, which treat of demonſtration and of ſcience: We ſhall not pretend to abridge theſe books; for Ariſtotle's writings do not admit of abridgment: no man in fewer words can ſay what he ſays; and he is not often guilty of repetition. We ſhall only give ſome of his capital concluſions, omitting his long reaſonings and nice diſtinctions, of which his genius was wonderfully productive.

All demonſtration muſt be built upon principles already known; and theſe upon others of the ſame kind; until we come at laſt to firſt principles, which neither can be demonſtrated, nor need to be, being evident of themſelves.

We cannot demonſtrate things in a circle, ſupporting the concluſion by the premiſes, and the premiſes by the concluſion. Nor can there be an infinite number of middle terms between the firſt principle and the concluſion.

In

In all demonſtration, the firſt priciples, the concluſion, and all the intermediate propoſitions, muſt be neceſſary, general, and eternal truths: for of things fortuitous, contingent, or mutable, or of individual things, there is no demonſtration.

Some demonſtrations prove only, that the thing is thus affected; others prove, why it is thus affected. The former may be drawn from a remote cauſe, or from an effect: but the latter muſt be drawn from an immediate cauſe; and are the moſt perfect.

The firſt figure is beſt adapted to demonſtration, becauſe it affords concluſions univerſally affirmative; and this figure is commonly uſed by the mathematicians.

The demonſtration of an affirmative propoſition is preferable to that of a negative; the demonſtration of an univerſal to that of a particular; and direct demonſtration to that *ad abſurdum*.

The principles are more certain than the concluſion.

There cannot be opinion and ſcience of the ſame thing at the ſame time.

In the ſecond book we are taught, that the queſtions that may be put with regard to any thing, are four: 1. Whether the thing be thus affected. 2. Why it is thus affected. 3. Whether it exiſts. 4. What it is.

The laſt of theſe queſtions Ariſtotle, in good Greek, calls the *What is it* of a thing. The ſchoolmen,

men, in very barbarous Latin, called this, the *quiddity* of a thing. This quiddity, he proves by many arguments, cannot be demonſtrated, but muſt be fixed by a definition. This gives occaſion to treat of definition, and how a right definition ſhould be formed. As an example, he gives a definition of the number *three*, and defines it to be the firſt odd number.

In this book he treats alſo of the four kinds of cauſes; efficient, material, formal, and final.

Another thing treated of in this book is, the manner in which we acquire firſt principles, which are the foundation of all demonſtration. Theſe are not innate, becauſe we may be for a great part of life ignorant of them: nor can they be deduced demonſtratively from any antecedent knowledge, otherwiſe they would not be firſt principles. Therefore he concludes, that firſt principles are got by induction, from the informations of ſenſe. The ſenſes give us informations of individual things, and from theſe by induction we draw general concluſions: for it is a maxim with Ariſtotle, That there is nothing in the underſtanding which was not before in ſome ſenſe.

The knowledge of firſt principles, as it is not acquired by demonſtration, ought not to be called ſcience: and therefore he calls it *intelligence*.

SECT. 2. *Of the Topics.*

The profeſſed deſign of the Topics is, to ſhew a method by which a man may be able to reaſon with probability and conſiſtency upon every queſtion that can occur.

Every queſtion is either about the genus of the ſubject, or its ſpecific difference, or ſomething proper to it, or ſomething accidental.

To prove that this diviſion is complete, Ariſtotle reaſons thus: Whatever is attributed to a ſubject, it muſt either be, that the ſubject can be reciprocally attributed to it, or that it cannot. If the ſubject and attribute can be reciprocated, the attribute either declares what the ſubject is, and then it is a definition; or it does not declare what the ſubject is, and then it is a property. If the attribute cannot be reciprocated, it muſt be ſomething contained in the definition, or not. If it be contained in the definition of the ſubject, it muſt be the genus of the ſubject, or its ſpecific difference; for the definition conſiſts of theſe two. If it be not contained in the definition of the ſubject, it muſt be an accident.

The furniture proper to fit a man for arguing dialectically may be reduced to theſe four heads: 1. Probable propoſitions of all ſorts, which may on occaſion be aſſumed in an argument. 2. Diſtinctions of words which are nearly of the ſame ſignification. 3. Diſtinctions of things which are not

not ſo far aſunder but that they may be taken for one and the ſame. 4. Similitudes.

The ſecond and the five following books are taken up in enumerating the topics or heads of argument that may be uſed in queſtions about the genus, the definition, the properties, and the accidents of a thing; and occaſionally he introduces the topics for proving things to be the ſame, or different; and the topics for proving one thing to be better or worſe than another.

In this enumeration of topics, Ariſtotle has ſhewn more the fertility of his genius, than the accuracy of method. The writers of logic ſeem to be of this opinion: for I know none of them that has followed him cloſely upon this ſubject. They have conſidered the topics of argumentation as reducible to certain axioms. For inſtance, when the queſtion is about the genus of a thing, it muſt be determined by ſome axiom about genus and ſpecies; when it is about a definition, it muſt be determined by ſome axiom relating to definition, and things defined: and ſo of other queſtions. They have therefore reduced the doctrine of the topics to certain axioms or canons, and diſpoſed theſe axioms in order under certain heads.

This method ſeems to be more commodious and elegant than that of Ariſtotle. Yet it muſt be acknowledged, that Ariſtotle has furniſhed the materials from which all the logicians have borrowed their doctrine of topics: and even Cicero, Quinctilian,

Quinctilian, and other rhetorical writers, have been much indebted to the Topics of Ariſtotle.

He was the firſt, as far as I know, who made an attempt of this kind: and in this he acted up to the magnanimity of his own genius, and that of ancient philoſophy. Every ſubject of human thought had been reduced to ten categories; every thing that can be attributed to any ſubject, to five predicables: he attempted to reduce all the forms of reaſoning to fixed rules of figure and mode, and to reduce all the topics of argumentation under certain heads; and by that means to collect as it were into one ſtore all that can be ſaid on one ſide or the other of every queſtion, and to provide a grand arſenal, from which all future combatants might be furniſhed with arms offenſive and defenſive in every cauſe, ſo as to leave no room to future generations to invent any thing new.

The laſt book of the Topics is a code of the laws according to which a ſyllogiſtical diſputation ought to be managed, both on the part of the aſſailant and defendant. From which it is evident, that this philoſopher trained his diſciples to contend, not for truth merely, but for victory.

SECT. 3. *Of the book concerning Sophiſms.*

A ſyllogiſm which leads to a falſe concluſion, muſt be vicious, either in matter or form: for from true principles nothing but truth can be juſtly

juſtly deduced. If the matter be faulty, that is, if either of the premiſes be falſe, that premiſe muſt be denied by the defendant. If the form be faulty, ſome rule of ſyllogiſm is tranſgreſſed; and it is the part of the defendant to ſhew, what general or ſpecial rule it is that is tranſgreſſed. So that, if he be an able logician, he will be impregnable in the defence of truth, and may reſiſt all the attacks of the ſophiſt. But as there are ſyllogiſms which may ſeem to be perfect both in matter and form, when they are not really ſo, as a piece of money may ſeem to be good coin when it is adulterate; ſuch fallacious ſyllogiſms are conſidered in this treatiſe, in order to make a defendant more expert in the uſe of his defenſive weapons.

And here the author, with his uſual magnanimity, attempts to bring all the fallacies that can enter into a ſyllogiſm under thirteen heads; of which ſix lie in the diction or language, and ſeven not in the diction.

The fallacies in diction are, 1. When an ambiguous word is taken at one time in one ſenſe, and at another time in another. 2. When an ambiguous phraſe is taken in the ſame manner. 3. and 4. are ambiguities in ſyntax; when words are conjoined in ſyntax that ought to be disjoined; or disjoined when they ought to be conjoined. 5. Is an ambiguity in proſody, accent, or pronunciation. 6. An ambiguity ariſing from ſome figure of ſpeech.

When

When a ſophiſm of any of theſe kinds is tranſlated into another language, or even rendered into unambiguous expreſſions in the ſame language, the fallacy is evident, and the ſyllogiſm appears to have four terms.

The ſeven fallacies which are ſaid not to be in the diction, but in the thing, have their proper names in Greek and in Latin, by which they are diſtinguiſhed. Without minding their names, we ſhall give a brief account of their nature.

1. The firſt is, Taking an accidental conjunction of things for a natural or neceſſary connection: as, when from an accident we infer a property; when from an example we infer a rule; when from a ſingle act we infer a habit.

2. Taking that abſolutely which ought to be taken comparatively, or with a certain limitation. The conſtruction of language often leads into this fallacy: for in all languages, it is common to uſe abſolute terms to ſignify things that carry in them ſome ſecret compariſon; or to uſe unlimited terms, to ſignify what from its nature muſt be limited.

3. Taking that for the cauſe of a thing which is only an occaſion, or concomitant.

4. Begging the queſtion. This is done, when the thing to be proved, or ſome thing equivalent, is aſſumed in the premiſes.

5. Miſtaking the queſtion. When the concluſion of the ſyllogiſm is not the thing that ought

to be proved, but ſomething elſe that is miſtaken for it.

6. When that which is not a conſequence is miſtaken for a conſequence; as if, becauſe all Africans are black, it were taken for granted that all blacks are Africans.

7. The laſt fallacy lies in propoſitions that are complex, and imply two affirmations, whereof one may be true, and the other falſe; ſo that whether you grant the propoſition, or deny it, you are entangled: as when it is affirmed, that ſuch a man has left off playing the fool. If it be granted, it implies, that he did play the fool formerly. If it be denied, it implies, or ſeems to imply, that he plays the fool ſtill.

In this enumeration, we ought, in juſtice to Ariſtotle, to expect only the fallacies incident to categorical ſyllogiſms. And I do not find, that the logicians have made any additions to it when taken in this view; although they have given ſome other fallacies that are incident to ſyllogiſms of the hypothetical kind, particularly the fallacy of an incomplete enumeration in disjunctive ſyllogiſms and dilemmas.

The different ſpecies of ſophiſms above mentioned are not ſo preciſely defined by Ariſtotle, or by ſubſequent logicians, but that they allow of great latitude in the application; and it is often dubious under what particular ſpecies a ſophiſtical ſyllogiſm ought to be claſſed. We even find the ſame example brought under one ſpecies by one author,

author, and under another ſpecies by another. Nay, what is more ſtrange, Ariſtotle himſelf employs a long chapter in proving by a particular induction, that all the ſeven may be brought under that which we have called *miſtaking the queſtion*, and which is commonly called *ignoratio elenchi*. And indeed the proof of this is eaſy, without that laborious detail which Ariſtotle uſes for the purpoſe: for if you lop off from the concluſion of a ſophiſtical ſyllogiſm all that is not ſupported by the premiſes, the concluſion, in that caſe, will always be found different from that which ought to have been proved; and ſo it falls under the *ignoratio elenchi*.

It was probably Ariſtotle's aim, to reduce all the poſſible variety of ſophiſms, as he had attempted to do of juſt ſyllogiſms, to certain definite ſpecies: but he ſeems to be ſenſible that he had fallen ſhort in this laſt attempt. When a genus is properly divided into its ſpecies, the ſpecies ſhould not only, when taken together, exhauſt the whole genus; but every ſpecies ſhould have its own precinct ſo accurately defined, that one ſhall not encroach upon another. And when an individual can be ſaid to belong to two or three different ſpecies, the diviſion is imperfect; yet this is the caſe of Ariſtotle's diviſion of the ſophiſms, by his own acknowledgment. It ought not therefore to be taken for a diviſion ſtrictly logical. It may rather be compared to the ſeveral ſpecies or forms of action invented in law for the redreſs of wrongs.

For every wrong there is a remedy in law by one action or another: but ſometimes a man may take his choice among ſeveral different actions. So every ſophiſtical ſyllogiſm may, by a little art, be brought under one or other of the ſpecies mentioned by Ariſtotle, and very often you may take your choice of two or three.

Beſides the enumeration of the various kinds of ſophiſms, there are many other things in this treatiſe concerning the art of managing a ſyllogiſtical diſpute with an antagoniſt. And indeed, if the paſſion for this kind of litigation, which reigned for ſo many ages, ſhould ever again lift up its head, we may predict, that the Organon of Ariſtotle will then become a faſhionable ſtudy: for it contains ſuch admirable materials and documents for this art, that it may be ſaid to have brought it to a ſcience.

The concluſion of this treatiſe ought not to be overlooked: it manifeſtly relates, not to the preſent treatiſe only, but alſo to the whole analytics and topics of the author. I ſhall therefore give the ſubſtance of it.

" Of thoſe who may be called inventers, ſome " have made important additions to things long be- " fore begun, and carried on through a courſe of " ages; others have given a ſmall beginning to " things which, in ſucceeding times, will be " brought to greater perfection. The beginning " of a thing, though ſmall, is the chief part of it,

" and

" and requires the greateſt degree of invention;
" for it is eaſy to make additions to inventions
" once begun. Now with regard to the dialecti-
" cal art, there was not ſomething done, and ſome-
" thing remaining to be done. There was abſo-
" lutely nothing done: for thoſe who profeſſed the
" art of diſputation, had only a ſet of orations com-
" poſed, and of arguments, and of captious que-
" ſtions, which might ſuit many occaſions. Theſe
" their ſcholars ſoon learned, and fitted to the oc-
" caſion. This was not to teach you the art, but
" to furniſh you with the materials produced by
" the art: as if a man profeſſing to teach you the
" art of making ſhoes, ſhould bring you a parcel
" of ſhoes of various ſizes and ſhapes, from which
" you may provide thoſe who want. This may
" have its uſe; but it is not to teach the art of
" making ſhoes. And indeed, with regard to rhe-
" torical declamation, there are many precepts
" handed down from ancient times; but with
" regard to the conſtruction of ſyllogiſms, not
" one.

" We have therefore employed much time and
" labour upon this ſubject; and if our ſyſtem ap-
" pear to you not to be in the number of thoſe
" things, which, being before carried a certain
" length, were left to be perfected; we hope for
" your favourable acceptance of what is done,
" and your indulgence in what is left imper-
" fect."

CHAP. VI.

REFLECTIONS ON THE UTILITY OF LOGIC, AND THE MEANS OF ITS IMPROVEMENT.

SECT. I. *Of the Utility of Logic.*

MEN rarely leave one extreme, without running into the contrary. It is no wonder, therefore, that the exceſſive admiration of Ariſtotle, which continued for ſo many ages, ſhould end in an undue contempt; and that the high eſteem of logic as the grand engine of ſcience, ſhould at laſt make way for too unfavourable an opinion, which ſeems now prevalent, of its being unworthy of a place in a liberal education. Thoſe who think according to the faſhion, as the greateſt part of men do, will be as prone to go into this extreme, as their grandfathers were to go into the contrary.

Laying aſide prejudice, whether faſhionable or unfaſhionable, let us conſider whether logic is, or may be made, ſubſervient to any good purpoſe.

Its

Its profeſſed end is, to teach men to think, to judge, and to reaſon, with preciſion and accuracy. No man will ſay that this is a matter of no importance; the only thing therefore that admits of doubt, is, whether it can be taught.

To reſolve this doubt, it may be obſerved, that our rational faculty is the gift of God, given to men in very different meaſure. Some have a large portion, ſome a leſs; and where there is a remarkable defect of the natural power, it cannot be ſupplied by any culture. But this natural power, even where it is the ſtrongeſt, may lie dead for want of the means of improvement: a ſavage may have been born with as good faculties as a Bacon or a Newton: but his talent was buried, being never put to uſe; while theirs was cultivated to the beſt advantage.

It may likewiſe be obſerved, that the chief mean of improving our rational power, is the vigorous exerciſe of it, in various ways and in different ſubjects, by which the habit is acquired of exerciſing it properly. Without ſuch exerciſe, and good ſenſe over and above, a man who has ſtudied logic all his life, may after all be only a petulant wrangler, without true judgment or ſkill of reaſoning in any ſcience.

I take this to be Locke's meaning, when in his Thoughts on Education he ſays, "If you would "have your ſon to reaſon well, let him read Chil-"lingworth." The ſtate of things is much alter-

ed ſince Locke wrote. Logic has been much improved, chiefly by his writings; and yet much leſs ſtreſs is laid upon it, and leſs time conſumed in it. His counſel, therefore, was judicious and ſeaſonable; to wit, That the improvement of our reaſoning power is to be expected much more from an intimate acquaintance with the authors who reaſon the beſt, than from ſtudying voluminous ſyſtems of logic. But if he had meant, that the ſtudy of logic was of no uſe nor deſerved any attention, he ſurely would not have taken the pains to have made ſo conſiderable an addition to it, by his *Eſſay on the Human Underſtanding*, and by his *Thoughts on the Conduct of the Underſtanding*. Nor would he have remitted his pupil to Chillingworth, the acuteſt logician as well as the beſt reaſoner of his age; and one who, in innumerable places of his excellent book, without pedantry even in that pedantic age, makes the happieſt application of the rules of logic, for unravelling the ſophiſtical reaſoning of his antagoniſt.

Our reaſoning power makes no appearance in infancy; but as we grow up, it unfolds itſelf by degrees, like the bud of a tree. When a child firſt draws an inference, or perceives the force of an inference drawn by another, we may call this *the birth of his reaſon;* but it is yet like a newborn babe, weak and tender; it muſt be cheriſhed, carried in arms, and have food of eaſy digeſtion, till it gather ſtrength.

I believe no man remembers the birth of his reaſon: but it is probable that his deciſions are at firſt weak and wavering; and, compared with that ſteady conviction which he acquires in ripe years, are like the dawn of the morning compared with noon-day. We ſee that the reaſon of children yields to authority, as a reed to the wind; nay, that it clings to it, and leans upon it, as if conſcious of its own weakneſs.

When reaſon acquires ſuch ſtrength as to ſtand on its own bottom, without the aid of authority, or even in oppoſition to authority, this may be called its *manly age*. But in moſt men, it hardly ever arrives at this period. Many, by their ſituation in life, have not the opportunity of cultivating their rational powers. Many, from the habit they have acquired of ſubmitting their opinions to the authority of others, or from ſome other principle which operates more powerfully than the love of truth, ſuffer their judgment to be carried along to the end of their days, either by the authority of a leader, or of a party, or of the multitude, or by their own paſſions. Such perſons, however learned, however acute, may be ſaid to be all their days children in underſtanding. They reaſon, they diſpute, and perhaps write: but it is not that they may find the truth; but that they may defend opinions which have deſcended to them by inheritance, or into which they have fallen by accident, or been led by affection.

I agree with Mr Locke, that there is no ſtudy better fitted to exerciſe and ſtrengthen the reaſoning powers, than that of the mathematical ſciences; for two reaſons; firſt, Becauſe there is no other branch of ſcience which gives ſuch ſcope to long and accurate trains of reaſoning; and, ſecondly, Becauſe in mathematics there is no room for authority, nor for prejudice of any kind, which may give a falſe bias to the judgment.

When a youth of moderate parts begins to ſtudy Euclid, every thing at firſt is new to him. His apprehenſion is unſteady: his judgment is feeble; and reſts partly upon the evidence of the thing, and partly upon the authority of his teacher. But every time he goes over the definitions, the axioms, the elementary propoſitions, more light breaks in upon him: the language becomes familiar, and conveys clear and ſteady conceptions: the judgment is confirmed: he begins to ſee what demonſtration is; and it is impoſſible to ſee it without being charmed with it. He perceives it to be a kind of evidence that has no need of authority to ſtrengthen it. He finds himſelf emancipated from that bondage; and exults ſo much in this new ſtate of independence, that he ſpurns at authority, and would have demonſtration for every thing; until experience teaches him, that this is a kind of evidence that cannot be had in moſt things; and that in his moſt important concerns, he muſt reſt contented with probability.

As

As he goes on in mathematics, the road of demonſtration becomes ſmooth and eaſy: he can walk in it firmly, and take wider ſteps: and at laſt he acquires the habit, not only of underſtanding a demonſtration, but of diſcovering and demonſtrating mathematical truths.

Thus, a man, without rules of logic, may acquire a habit of reaſoning juſtly in mathematics; and, I believe, he may, by like means, acquire a habit of reaſoning juſtly in mechanics, in juriſprudence, in politics, or in any other ſcience. Good ſenſe, good examples, and aſſiduous exerciſe, may bring a man to reaſon juſtly and acutely in his own profeſſion, without rules.

But if any man think, that from this conceſſion he may infer the inutility of logic, he betrays a great want of that art by this inference: for it is no better reaſoning than this, That becauſe a man may go from Edinburgh to London by the way of Paris, therefore any other road is uſeleſs.

There is perhaps no practical art which may not be acquired, in a very conſiderable degree, by example and practice, without reducing it to rules. But practice, joined with rules, may carry a man on in his art farther and more quickly, than practice without rules. Every ingenious artiſt knows the utility of having his art reduced to rules, and by that means made a ſcience. He is thereby enlightened in his practice, and works with more aſſurance. By rules, he ſometimes corrects his own errors,

errors, and often detects the errors of others: he finds them of great use to confirm his judgment, to justify what is right, and to condemn what is wrong.

Is it of no use in reasoning, to be well acquainted with the various powers of the human understanding, by which we reason? Is it of no use, to resolve the various kinds of reasoning into their simple elements; and to discover, as far as we are able, the rules by which these elements are combined in judging and in reasoning? Is it of no use, to mark the various fallacies in reasoning, by which even the most ingenious men have been led into error? It must surely betray great want of understanding, to think these things useless or unimportant. These are the things which logicians have attempted; and which they have executed; not indeed so completely as to leave no room for improvement, but in such a manner as to give very considerable aid to our reasoning powers. That the principles laid down with regard to definition and division, with regard to the conversion and opposition of propositions and the general rules of reasoning, are not without use, is sufficiently apparent from the blunders committed by those who disdain any acquaintance with them.

Although the art of categorical syllogism is better fitted for scholastic litigation, than for real improvement in knowledge, it is a venerable piece of antiquity, and a great effort of human genius. We admire

admire the pyramids of Egypt, and the wall of China, though uſeleſs burdens upon the earth. We can bear the moſt minute deſcription of them, and travel hundreds of leagues to ſee them. If any perſon ſhould with ſacrilegious hands deſtroy or deface them, his memory would be had in abhorrence. The predicaments and predicables, the rules of ſyllogiſm, and the topics, have a like title to our veneration as antiquities: they are uncommon efforts, not of human power, but of human genius; and they make a remarkable period in the progreſs of human reaſon.

The prejudice againſt logic has probably been ſtrengthened by its being taught too early in life. Boys are often taught logic as they are taught their creed, when it is an exerciſe of memory only, without underſtanding. One may as well expect to underſtand grammar before he can ſpeak, as to underſtand logic before he can reaſon. It muſt even be acknowledged, that commonly we are capable of reaſoning in mathematics more early than in logic. The objects preſented to the mind in this ſcience, are of a very abſtract nature, and can be diſtinctly conceived only when we are capable of attentive reflection upon the operations of our own underſtanding, and after we have been accuſtomed to reaſon. There may be an elementary logic, level to the capacity of thoſe who have been but little exerciſed in reaſoning; but the moſt important parts of this ſcience require a ripe underſtanding,

ſtanding, capable of reflecting upon its own operations. Therefore to make logic the firſt branch of ſcience that is to be taught, is an old error that ought to be corrected.

Sect. 2. *Of the Improvement of Logic.*

In compoſitions of human thought expreſſed by ſpeech or by writing, whatever is excellent and whatever is faulty, fall within the province, either of grammar, or of rhetoric, or of logic. Propriety of expreſſion is the province of grammar; grace, elegance, and force, in thought and in expreſſion, are the province of rhetoric; juſtneſs and accuracy of thought are the province of logic.

The faults in compoſition, therefore, which fall under the cenſure of logic, are obſcure and indiſtinct conceptions, falſe judgment, inconcluſive reaſoning, and all improprieties in diſtinctions, definitions, diviſion, or method. To aid our rational powers, in avoiding theſe faults and in attaining the oppoſite excellencies, is the end of logic; and whatever there is in it that has no tendency to promote this end, ought to be thrown out.

The rules of logic being of a very abſtract nature, ought to be illuſtrated by a variety of real and ſtriking examples taken from the writings of good authors. It is both inſtructive and entertaining, to obſerve the virtues of accurate compoſition in writers of fame. We cannot ſee them, without being drawn to the imitation of them, in a more powerful

powerful manner than we can be by dry rules. Nor are the faults of ſuch writers, leſs inſtructive or leſs powerful monitors. A wreck, left upon a ſhoal or upon a rock, is not more uſeful to the ſailor, than the faults of good writers, when ſet up to view, are to thoſe who come after them. It was a happy thought in a late ingenious writer of Engliſh grammar, to collect under the ſeveral rules, examples of bad Engliſh found in the moſt approved authors. It were to be wiſhed that the rules of logic were illuſtrated in the ſame manner. By theſe means, a ſyſtem of logic would become a repoſitory; wherein whatever is moſt acute in judging and in reaſoning, whatever is moſt accurate in dividing, diſtinguiſhing, and defining, ſhould be laid up and diſpoſed in order for our imitation; and wherein the falſe ſteps of eminent authors ſhould be recorded for our admonition.

After men had laboured in the ſearch of truth near two thouſand years by the help of ſyllogiſms, Lord Bacon propoſed the method of induction, as a more effectual engine for that purpoſe. His *Novum Organum* gave a new turn to the thoughts and labours of the inquiſitive, more remarkable and more uſeful than that which the *Organum* of Ariſtotle had given before; and may be conſidered as a ſecond grand æra in the progreſs of human reaſon.

The art of ſyllogiſm produced numberleſs diſputes; and numberleſs ſects who fought againſt each

each other with much animoſity, without gaining or loſing ground, but did nothing conſiderable for the benefit of human life. The art of induction, firſt delineated by Lord Bacon, produced numberleſs laboratories and obſervatories; in which Nature has been put to the queſtion by thouſands of experiments, and forced to confeſs many of her ſecrets, that before were hid from mortals. And by theſe, arts have been improved, and human knowledge wonderfully increaſed.

In reaſoning by ſyllogiſm, from general principles we deſcend to a concluſion virtually contained in them. The proceſs of induction is more arduous; being an aſcent from particular premiſes to a general concluſion. The evidence of ſuch general concluſions is probable only, not demonſtrative: but when the induction is ſufficiently copious, and carried on according to the rules of art, it forces conviction no leſs than demonſtration itſelf does.

The greateſt part of human knowledge reſts upon evidence of this kind. Indeed we can have no other for general truths which are contingent in their nature, and depend upon the will and ordination of the Maker of the world. He governs the world he has made, by general laws. The effects of theſe laws in particular phenomena, are open to our obſervation; and by obſerving a train of uniform effects with due caution, we may at laſt

decypher

decypher the law of nature by which they are regulated.

Lord Bacon has displayed no less force of genius in reducing to rules this method of reasoning, than Aristotle did in the method of syllogism. His *Novum Organum* ought therefore to be held as a most important addition to the ancient logic. Those who understand it, and enter into its spirit will be able to distinguish the chaff from the wheat in philosophical disquisitions into the works of God. They will learn to hold in due contempt all hypotheses and theories, the creatures of human imagination; and to respect nothing but facts sufficiently vouched, or conclusions drawn from them by a fair and chaste interpretation of nature.

Most arts have been reduced to rules, after they had been brought to a considerable degree of perfection by the natural sagacity of artists; and the rules have been drawn from the best examples of the art, that had been before exhibited: but the art of philosophical induction was delineated by Lord Bacon in a very ample manner, before the world had seen any tolerable example of it. This, although it adds greatly to the merit of the author, must have produced some obscurity in the work, and a defect of proper examples for illustration. This defect may now be easily supplied, from those authors who, in their philosophical disquisitions, have the most strictly pursued the path pointed out in the *Novum Organum*. Among these Sir Isaac

Newton appears to hold the firſt rank; having, in the third book of his *Principia* and in his Optics, had the rules of the *Novum Organum* conſtantly in his eye.

I think Lord Bacon was alſo the firſt who endeavoured to reduce to a ſyſtem the prejudices or biaſſes of the mind, which are the cauſes of falſe judgments and which he calls *the idols of the human underſtanding*. Some late writers of logic have very properly introduced this into their ſyſtem; but it deſerves to be more copiouſly handled, and to be illuſtrated by real examples.

It is of great conſequence to accurate reaſoning, to diſtinguiſh firſt principles which are to be taken for granted, from propoſitions which require proof. All the real knowledge of mankind may be divided into two parts: the firſt conſiſting of ſelf-evident propoſitions; the ſecond, of thoſe which are deduced by juſt reaſoning from ſelf-evident propoſitions. The line that divides theſe two parts ought to be marked as diſtinctly as poſſible; and the principles that are ſelf-evident reduced, as far as can be done, to general axioms. This has been done in mathematics from the beginning, and has tended greatly to the advancement of that ſcience. It has lately been done in natural philoſophy: and by this means that ſcience has advanced more in an hundred and fifty years, than it had done before in two thouſand. Every ſcience is in an unformed ſtate until its firſt principles are aſcertained:

ed: after which, it advances regularly, and ſecures the ground it has gained.

Although firſt principles do not admit of direct proof, yet there muſt be certain marks and characters, by which thoſe that are truly ſuch may be diſtinguiſhed from counterfeits. Theſe marks ought to be deſcribed, and applied, to diſtinguiſh the genuine from the ſpurious.

In the ancient philoſophy, there is a redundance, rather than a defect of firſt principles. Many things were aſſumed under that character without a juſt title: That nature abhors a *vacuum;* That bodies do not gravitate in their proper place; That the heavenly bodies undergo no change; That they move in perfect circles, and with an equable motion. Such principles as theſe were aſſumed in the Peripatetic philoſophy, without proof, as if they were ſelf-evident.

Des Cartes, ſenſible of this weakneſs in the ancient philoſophy, and deſirous to guard againſt it in his own ſyſtem, reſolved to admit nothing until his aſſent was forced by irreſiſtible evidence. The firſt thing that he found to be certain and evident was, that he thought, and reaſoned, and doubted. He found himſelf under a neceſſity of believing the exiſtence of thoſe mental operations of which he was conſcious: and having thus found ſure footing in this one principle of conſciouſneſs, he reſted ſatisfied with it, hoping to be able to build the whole fabric of his knowledge upon it;

like Archimedes, who wanted but one fixed point to move the whole earth. But the foundation was too narrow; and in his progreſs he unawares aſſumes many things leſs evident than thoſe which he attempts to prove. Although he was not able to ſuſpect the teſtimony of conſciouſneſs; yet he thought the teſtimony of ſenſe, of memory, and of every other faculty, might be ſuſpected, and ought not to be received until proof was brought that they are not fallacious. Therefore he applies theſe faculties, whoſe character is yet in queſtion, to prove, That there is an infinitely perfect Being, who made him, and who made his ſenſes, his memory, his reaſon, and all his faculties; That this Being is no deceiver, and therefore could not give him faculties that are fallacious; and that on this account they deſerve credit.

It is ſtrange, that this philoſopher, who found himſelf under a neceſſity of yielding to the teſtimony of conſciouſneſs, did not find the ſame neceſſity of yielding to the teſtimony of his ſenſes, his memory, and his underſtanding: and that while he was certain that he doubted, and reaſoned, he was uncertain whether two and three made five, and whether he was dreaming or awake. It is more ſtrange, that ſo acute a reaſoner ſhould not perceive, that his whole train of reaſoning to prove that his faculties were not fallacious, was mere ſophiſtry; for if his faculties were fallacious, they might deceive him in this train of reaſoning; and

ſo

ſo the concluſion, That they were not fallacious, was only the teſtimony of his faculties in their own favour, and might be a fallacy.

It is difficult to give any reaſon for diſtruſting our other faculties, that will not reach conſciouſneſs itſelf. And he who diſtruſts the faculties of judging and reaſoning which God hath given him, muſt even reſt in his ſcepticiſm, till he come to a ſound mind, or until God give him new faculties to ſit in judgment upon the old. If it be not a firſt principle, That our faculties are not fallacious, we muſt be abſolute ſceptics: for this principle is incapable of proof; and if it is not certain, nothing elſe can be certain.

Since the time of Des Cartes, it has been faſhionable with thoſe who dealt in abſtract philoſophy, to employ their invention in finding philoſophical arguments, either to prove thoſe truths which ought to be received as firſt principles, or to overturn them: and it is not eaſy to ſay, whether the authority of firſt principles is more hurt by the firſt of theſe attempts, or by the laſt: for ſuch principles can ſtand ſecure only upon their own bottom; and to place them upon any other foundation than that of their intrinſic evidence, is in effect to overturn them.

I have lately met with a very ſenſible and judicious treatiſe, wrote by Father Buffier about fifty years ago, concerning firſt principles and the ſource of human judgments, which, with great propriety,

he prefixed to his treatiſe of logic. And indeed I apprehend it is a ſubject of ſuch conſequence, that if inquiſitive men can be brought to the ſame unanimity in the firſt principles of the other ſciences, as in thoſe of mathematics and natural philoſophy, (and why ſhould we deſpair of a general agreement in things that are ſelf-evident?), this might be conſidered as a third grand æra in the progreſs of human reaſon.

SKETCH II.

PRINCIPLES AND PROGRESS OF MORALITY.

THE principles of morality are little underſtood among ſavages: and if they arrive at maturity among enlightened nations, it is by ſlow degrees. This progreſs points out the hiſtorical part, as firſt in order: but as that hiſtory would give little ſatisfaction, without a rule for comparing the morals of different ages, and of different nations, I begin with the principles of morality, ſuch as ought to govern at all times, and in all nations. The preſent ſketch accordingly is divided into two parts. In the firſt, the principles are unfolded; and the ſecond is altogether hiſtorical.

PART

PART I.

PRINCIPLES OF MORALITY.

SECT. I.

Human actions analyſed.

THE hand of God is no where more viſible, than in the nice adjuſtment of our internal frame to our ſituation in this world. An animal is endued with a power of ſelf-motion; and in performing animal functions, requires no external aid. This in particular is the caſe of man, the nobleſt of terreſtrial beings. His heart beats, his blood circulates, his ſtomach digeſts, &c. &c. By what means? Not ſurely by the laws of mechaniſm, which are far from being adequate to ſuch operations. They are effects of an internal power, beſtowed on man for preſerving life. The power is exerted uniformly, and without interruption, independent of will, and without conſciouſneſs.

Man is a being ſuſceptible of pleaſure and pain: theſe generate deſire to attain what is agreeable, and to ſhun what is diſagreeable; and he is poſſeſſed of other powers which enable him to gratify his deſires. One power, termed *inſtinct*, is exerted indeed with conſciouſneſs; but without will, and conſequently without deſiring or intending to produce any effect. Brute animals act for the moſt part by inſtinct: hunger prompts them to eat, and cold to take ſhelter; knowingly indeed, but without

out exerting any act of will, and without foreſight of what will happen. Infants of the human ſpecies are, like brutes, governed by inſtinct: they apply to the nipple, without knowing that ſucking will ſatisfy their hunger; and they weep when pained, without any view of relief. But men commonly are governed by deſire and intention. In the progreſs from infancy to maturity, the mind opens to objects without end, agreeable and diſagreeable, which raiſe in us a deſire to attain the former and avoid the latter. The will is influenced by deſire; and the actions thus performed are termed *voluntary*.

But to have an accurate conception of human nature, it is neceſſary to be more particular. To incline, to intend, to conſent, to reſolve, to will, are acts of the mind preparatory to external action. Theſe ſeveral acts are well underſtood, though they cannot be defined, being perfectly ſimple. As every act implies a power to act, the acts mentioned muſt be the effects of mental powers. The mind cannot determine without having a power to determine, nor will without having a power to will.

Inſtinctive actions are exerted without any previous deſire or motive, and without any previous act of will. Actions influenced by deſire or motives are very different. In ſuch actions, will is eſſential to connect the deſire or motive with the external act. A man who deſires or is moved to perform an external act in view, muſt have a power to determine

termine himſelf: that power is termed *will;* and the determination is an act of will. With reſpect to external acts influenced by deſire, we cannot even move a finger, without a previous act of will directing that motion. We are very ſenſible of this determination or act of will, when we deliberate upon motives that tend to different ends. The mind for ſome time is ſuſpended, deliberates, and at laſt determines according to the ſtrongeſt motive. But there muſt alſo be a determination where there is but a ſingle motive, though not ſo perceptible. Being called to dinner when hungry, I inſtantly obey the call. I cannot go to dinner without firſt determining to riſe from my ſeat. And it is this determination that entitles it to be called a voluntary act, as much as where the determination is the reſult of the moſt anxious deliberation.

Some effects require a train of actions; walking, reading, ſinging. Where theſe actions are uniform, as in walking, or nearly ſo, as in playing on a muſical inſtrument, an act of will is only neceſſary at the commencement: the train proceeds by habit without any new act of will. The body is antecedently adjuſted to the uniform progreſs; and is diſturbed if any thing unexpected happen: in walking, for example, a man feels a ſhock if he happen to tread on ground higher or lower than his body was prepared for. The power thus acquired by habit of acting without will, is an illuſtrious

luſtrious branch of our nature; for upon it depend all the arts, both the fine and the uſeful. To play on the violin, requires wonderful ſwiftneſs of fingers, every motion of which in a learner is preceded by an act of will: and yet by habit ſolely, an artiſt moves his fingers with no leſs accuracy than celerity. Let the moſt handy perſon try for the firſt time to knit a ſtocking: every motion of the needle demands the ſtricteſt attention; and yet a girl of nine or ten will move the needle ſo ſwiftly as almoſt to eſcape the eye without once looking on her work. If every motion in the arts required a new act of will, they would remain in infancy for ever; and what would man be in that caſe? In the foregoing inſtances, we are conſcious of the external operation without being conſcious of a cauſe. But there are various internal operations of which we have no conſciouſneſs; and yet that they have exiſted is made known by their effects. Often have I gone to bed with a confuſed notion of what I was ſtudying; and have awaked in the morning completely maſter of the ſubject. I have heard a new tune of which I carried away but an imperfect conception. A week or perhaps a fortnight after, the tune has occurred to me in perfection; recollecting with difficulty where I heard it. Such things have happened to me frequently, and probably alſo to others. My mind muſt have been active in theſe inſtances, though I knew nothing of it.

There

There ſtill remains another ſpecies of actions, termed *involuntary*. Strictly ſpeaking, every action influenced by a motive is *voluntary*, becauſe no ſuch action can be done but by an antecedent act of will. But in a leſs ſtrict ſenſe, actions done contrary to deſire are termed *involuntary ;* and they have more or leſs of that character according to the ſtrength of the motive. A man to free himſelf from torture, reveals the ſecrets of his party: his confeſſion is in a degree involuntary, being extorted from him with great reluctance. But let us ſuppoſe, that after the firmeſt reſolution to reveal nothing, his mind is unhinged by exquiſite torture: the diſcovery he makes is in the higheſt degree *involuntary.*

Man is by his nature an accountable being, anſwerable for his conduct to God and man. In doing any action that wears a double face, he is prompted by his nature to explain the ſame to his relations, his friends, his acquaintance ; and above all, to thoſe who have authority over him. He hopes for praiſe for every right action, and dreads blame for every one that is wrong. But for what ſort of actions does he hold himſelf accountable? Not ſurely for an inſtinctive action, which is done blindly, without intention and without will: neither for an involuntary action, becauſe it is extorted from him reluctantly, and contrary to his deſire ; and leaſt of all, for actions done without conſciouſneſs. What only remain are voluntary actions proceeding from deſire, which are done as we ſay wittingly

wittingly and willingly: for theſe we muſt account, if at all accountable; and for theſe every man in conſcience holds himſelf bound to account.

Further upon voluntary actions. To intend and to will, though commonly held ſynonymous, ſignify different acts of the mind. Intention reſpects the effect: Will reſpects the action that is exerted for producing the effect. It is my intention, for example, to relieve my friend from diſtreſs: upon ſeeing him, it is my will to give him a ſum for his relief: the external act of giving follows; and my friend is relieved, which is the effect intended. But theſe internal acts are always united: I cannot will the means, without intending the effect; and I cannot intend the effect, without willing the means.

Some effects of voluntary action follow neceſſarily: A wound is an effect that neceſſarily follows the ſtabbing a perſon with a dagger: death is a neceſſary effect of throwing one down from the battlements of a high tower. Some effects are probable only: I labour in order to provide for my family; fight for my country to reſcue it from oppreſſors; take phyſic for my health. In ſuch caſes, the event intended does not neceſſarily nor always follow.

A man, when he wills to act, muſt intend the neceſſary effect: a perſon who ſtabs, certainly intends to wound. But where the effect is probable only,

only, one may act without intending the effect that follows: a ſtone thrown by me at random into the market-place, may happen to wound a man without my intending it. One acts by inſtinct, without either will or intention: voluntary actions, that neceſſarily produce their effect, imply intention: voluntary actions, when the effect is probable only, are ſometimes intended, ſometimes not.

Human actions are diſtinguiſhed from each other by certain *qualities*, termed *right* and *wrong*. But as theſe make the corner-ſtone of morality, they are reſerved to the following ſection.

SECT. II.

DIVISION OF HUMAN ACTIONS INTO RIGHT, WRONG, AND INDIFFERENT.

THE qualities of right and wrong in voluntary actions, are univerſally acknowledged as the foundation of morality; and yet philoſophers have been ſtrangely perplexed about them. The hiſtory of their various opinions, would ſignify little but to darken the ſubject: the reader will have more ſatisfaction in ſeeing theſe qualities explained, without entering at all into controverſy.

No perſon is ignorant of primary and ſecondary qualities, a diſtinction much inſiſted on by philoſophers. Primary qualities, ſuch as figure, coheſion, weight, are permanent qualities, that exiſt in a ſubject

ſubject whether perceived or not. Secondary qualities, ſuch as colour, taſte, ſmell, depend on the percipient as much as on the ſubject, being nothing when not perceived. Beauty and uglineſs are qualities of the latter ſort: they have no exiſtence but when perceived; and, like all other ſecondary qualities, they are perceived intuitively; having no dependence on reaſon nor on judgment, more than colour has, or ſmell, or taſte *.

The qualities of right and wrong in voluntary actions, are ſecondary, like beauty and uglineſs and the other ſecondary qualities mentioned. Like them, they are objects of intuitive perception, and depend not in any degree on reaſon. No argument is requiſite to prove, that to reſcue an innocent babe from the jaws of a wolf, to feed the hungry, to clothe the naked, are right actions: they are perceived to be ſo intuitively. As little is an argument requiſite to prove, that murder, deceit, perjury, are wrong actions: they are perceived to be ſo intuitively. The Deity has beſtowed on man different faculties for different purpoſes. Truth and falſehood are inveſtigated by the reaſoning faculty. Beauty and uglineſs are objects of a ſenſe, known by the name of *taſte*. Right and wrong are objects of a ſenſe termed the *moral ſenſe* or *conſcience*. And ſuppoſing theſe qualities to be hid from our perception, in vain would we try

* Elements of Criticiſm, vol. 1. p. 207. edit. 5.

try to diſcover them by any argument or proceſs of reaſoning: the attempt would be abſurd; no leſs ſo than an attempt to diſcover by reaſoning colour, or taſte, or ſmell *.

Right and wrong, as mentioned above, are qualities of voluntary actions, and of no other kind. An inſtinctive action may be agreeable, may be diſagreeable; but it cannot properly be denominated either right or wrong. An involuntary act is hurtful to the agent, and diſagreeable to the ſpectator; but it is neither right nor wrong. Theſe qualities alſo depend in no degree on the event. Thus, if to ſave my friend from drowning I plunge into a river, the action is right, though I happen to come too late. And if I aim a ſtroke at a man behind his back, the action is wrong, though I happen not to touch him.

The qualities of right and of agreeable, are inſeparable;

* Every perception muſt proceed from ſome faculty or power of perception, termed *ſenſe*. The moral ſenſe, by which we perceive the qualities of right and wrong, may be conſidered either as a branch of the ſenſe of ſeeing, by which we perceive the actions to which theſe qualities belong, or as a ſenſe diſtinct from all others. The ſenſes by which objects are perceived, are not ſeparated from each other by diſtinct boundaries: the ſorting or claſſing them, ſeems to depend more on taſte and fancy, than on nature. I have followed the plan laid down by former writers; which is, to conſider the moral ſenſe as a ſenſe diſtinct from others, becauſe it is the eaſieſt and cleareſt manner of conceiving it.

ſeparable; and ſo are the qualities of wrong and of diſagreeable. A right action is agreeable, not only in the direct perception, but equally ſo in every ſubſequent recollection. And in both circumſtances equally, a wrong action is diſagreeable.

Right actions are diſtinguiſhed by the moral ſenſe into two kinds, what *ought* to be done, and what *may* be done, or left undone. Wrong actions admit not that diſtinction: they are all prohibited to be done. To ſay that an action ought to be done, means that we are tied or obliged to perform; and to ſay that an action ought not to be done, means that we are reſtrained from doing it. Though the neceſſity implied in the being tied or obliged, is not phyſical, but only what is commonly termed *moral;* yet we conceive ourſelves deprived of liberty or freedom, and neceſſarily bound to act or to forbear acting, in oppoſition to every other motive. The neceſſity here deſcribed is termed *duty*. The moral neceſſity we are under to forbear harming the innocent, is a proper example: the moral ſenſe declares the reſtraint to be our duty, which no motive whatever will excuſe us for tranſgreſſing.

The duty of performing or forbearing any action, implies a *right* in ſome perſon to exact performance of that duty; and accordingly, a duty or obligation neceſſarily infers a correſponding right. My promiſe to pay L. 100 to John, confers a right on him to demand performance. The man

man who commits an injury, violates the *right* of the perſon injured; which entitles that perſon to demand reparation of the wrong.

Duty is twofold; duty to others, and duty to ourſelves. With reſpect to the former, the doing what we ought to do, is termed *juſt*: the doing what we ought not to do, and the omitting what we ought to do, are termed *unjuſt*. With reſpect to ourſelves, the doing what we ought to do, is termed *proper*: the doing what we ought not to do, and the omitting what we ought to do, are termed *improper*. Thus, *right*, ſignifying a quality of certain actions, is a genus; of which *juſt* and *proper* are ſpecies: *wrong* ſignifying a quality of other actions, is a genus; of which *unjuſt* and *improper* are ſpecies.

Right actions left to our free will, to be done or left undone, come next in order. They are, like the former, right when done; but they differ, in not being wrong when left undone. To remit a juſt debt for the ſake of a growing family, to yield a ſubject in controverſy rather than go to law with a neighbour, generouſly to return good for ill, are examples of this ſpecies. They are univerſally approved as right actions: but as no perſon has a right or title to oblige us to perform ſuch actions, the leaving them undone is not a wrong: no perſon is injured by the forbearance. Actions that come under this claſs, ſhall be termed

arbitrary or *diſcretionary*, for want of a more proper deſignation.

So much for right actions, and their diviſions. Wrong actions are of two kinds, *criminal* and *culpable*. What are done intentionally to produce miſchief, are *criminal*: raſh or ungarded actions that produce miſchief without intention, are *culpable*. The former are reſtrained by puniſhment, to be handled in the 5th ſection; the latter by reparation, to be handled in the 6th.

The diviſions of voluntary actions are not yet exhauſted. Some there are that, properly ſpeaking, cannot be denominated either right or wrong. Actions done merely for amuſement or paſtime, without intention to produce good or ill, are of that kind; leaping, for example, running, jumping over a ſtick, throwing a ſtone to make circles in the water. Such actions are neither approved nor diſapproved: they may be termed *indifferent*.

There is no cauſe for doubting the exiſtence of the moral ſenſe, more than for doubting the exiſtence of the ſenſe of beauty, of ſeeing, or of hearing. In fact, the perception of right and wrong as qualities of actions, is no leſs diſtinct and clear, than that of beauty, of colour, or of any other quality; and as every perception is an act of ſenſe, the ſenſe of beauty is not with greater certainty evinced from the perception of beauty, than the moral ſenſe is from the perception of right and wrong.

wrong. We find this ſenſe diſtributed among individuals in different degrees of perfection; but there perhaps never exiſted any one above the condition of an idiot, who poſſeſſed it not in ſome degree; and were any man entirely deſtitute of it, the terms *right* and *wrong* would be to him no leſs unintelligible, than the term colour is to one born blind.

That every individual is endued with a ſenſe of right and wrong, more or leſs diſtinct, will probably be granted; but whether there be among men what may be termed a *common ſenſe* of right and wrong, producing uniformity of opinion as to right and wrong, is not ſo evident. There is no abſurdity in ſuppoſing the opinions of men about right and wrong, to be as various as about beauty and deformity. And that the ſuppoſition is not deſtitute of foundation, we are led to ſuſpect, upon diſcovering that in different countries, and even in the ſame country at different times, the opinions publicly eſpouſed with regard to right and wrong, are extremely various; that among ſome nations it was held lawful for a man to ſell his children for ſlaves, and in their infancy to abandon them to wild beaſts; that it was held equally lawful to puniſh children, even capitally, for the crime of their parent; that the murdering an enemy in cold blod, was once a common practice; that human ſacrifices, impious no leſs than immoral according to our notions, were of

old univerſal; that even in later times, it has been held meritorious, to inflict cruel torments for the ſlighteſt deviations from the religious creed of the plurality; and that among the moſt enlightened nations, there are at this day conſiderable differences with reſpect to the rules of morality.

Theſe facts tend not to diſprove the reality of a common ſenſe in morals: they only prove, that the moral ſenſe has not been equally perfect at all times, nor in all countries. This branch of the hiſtory of morality, is reſerved for the ſecond part. To give ſome interim ſatisfaction, I ſhall ſhortly obſerve, that the ſavage ſtate is the infancy of man; during which, the more delicate ſenſes lie dormant, leaving nations to the authority of cuſtom, of imitation, and of paſſion, without any juſt taſte of morals more than of the fine arts. But a nation, like an individual, ripens gradually, and acquires a refined taſte in morals as well as in the fine arts: after which we find great uniformity of opinion about the rules of right and wrong; with few exceptions, but what may proceed from imbecillity, or corrupted education. There may be found, it is true, even in the moſt enlightened ages, men who have ſingular notions in morality, and in many other ſubjects; which no more affords an argument againſt a common ſenſe or ſtandard of right and wrong, than a monſter doth againſt the ſtandard that regulates our external form, or than an

exception

exception doth againſt the truth of a general propoſition.

That there is in mankind an uniformity of opinion with reſpect to right and wrong, is a matter of fact of which the only infallible evidence is obſervation and experience: and to that evidence I appeal; entering only a caveat, that, for the reaſon above given, the inquiry may be confined to enlightened nations. In the mean time, I take liberty to ſuggeſt an argument from analogy, That if there be great uniformity among the different tribes of men in ſeeing and hearing, in pleaſure and pain, in judging of truth and error, the ſame uniformity ought to be expected with reſpect to right and wrong. Whatever minute differences there may be to diſtinguiſh one perſon from another, yet in the general principles that conſtitute our nature, internal and external, there is wonderful uniformity.

This uniformity of ſentiment, which may be termed *the common ſenſe of mankind with reſpect to right and wrong*, is eſſential to ſocial beings. Did the moral ſentiments of men differ as much as their faces, they would be unfit for ſociety: diſcord and controverſy would be endleſs, and *major vis* would be the only rule of right and wrong.

But ſuch uniformity of ſentiment, though general, is not altogether univerſal: men there are, as above mentioned, who differ from the common ſenſe of mankind with reſpect to various points of

morality. What ought to be the conduct of ſuch men; ought they to regulate their conduct by that ſtandard, or by their private conviction? There will be occaſion afterward to obſerve, that we judge of others as we believe they judge of themſelves; and that private conviction is the ſtandard for rewards and puniſhments *. But with reſpect to every controverſy about property and pecuniary intereſt, and, in general, about every civil right and obligation, the common ſenſe of mankind is to every individual the ſtandard, and not private conviction or conſcience; for proof of which take what follows.

We have an innate ſenſe of a common nature, not only in our own ſpecies, but in every ſpecies of animals. And that our perception holds true in fact, is verified by experience; for there appears a remarkable uniformity in creatures of the ſame kind, and a deformity, no leſs remarkable, in creatures of different kinds. It is accordingly a ſubject of wonder to find an individual deviating from the common nature of the ſpecies, whether in its internal or external ſtructure: a child born with averſion to its mother's milk, is a wonder, no leſs than if born without a mouth, or with more than one.

Secondly, this ſenſe dictates, that the common nature of man in particular, is invariable as well as univerſal; that it will be the ſame hereafter as it

* Sect. 5.

it is at preſent, and as it was in time paſt; the ſame among all nations, and in all corners of the earth: nor are we deceived, becauſe, allowing for ſlight differences occaſioned by culture and other accidental circumſtances, the fact correſponds to our perception.

Thirdly, We perceive that this common nature is *right* and *perfect*, and that it *ought* to be a model or ſtandard for every human being. Any remarkable deviation from it in the ſtructure of an individual, appears imperfect or irregular; and raiſes a painful emotion: a monſtrous birth, exciting curioſity in a philoſopher, fails not at the ſame time to excite averſion in every ſpectator.

This ſenſe of perfection in the common nature of man, comprehends every branch of his nature, and particularly the common ſenſe of right and wrong; which accordingly is perceived by all to be perfect, having authority over every individual as the ultimate and unerring ſtandard of morals, even in contradiction to private conviction. Thus, a law in our nature binds us to regulate our conduct by that ſtandard: and its authority is univerſally acknowledged; as nothing is more ordinary in every diſpute about *meum et tuum*, than an appeal to common ſenſe as the ultimate and unerring ſtandard.

At the ſame time, as that ſtandard, through infirmity or prejudice, is not conſpicuous to every individual; many are miſled into erroneous opi-

nions, by miſtaking a falſe ſtandard for that of nature. And hence a diſtinction between a right and a wrong ſenſe in morals; a diſtinction which every one underſtands, but which, unleſs for the conviction of a moral ſtandard, would have no meaning.

The final cauſe of this branch of our Nature is conſpicuous. Were there no ſtandard of right and wrong for determining endleſs controverſies about matters of intereſt, the ſtrong would have recourſe to force, the weak to cunning, and ſociety would diſſolve. Courts of law could afford no remedy; for without a ſtandard of morals, their deciſions would be arbitrary, and of no authority. Happy it is for men to be provided with ſuch a ſtandard: it is neceſſary in ſociety that our actions be uniform with reſpect to right and wrong; and in order to uniformity of action, it is neceſſary that our perceptions of right and wrong be alſo uniform: to produce ſuch uniformity, a ſtandard of morals is indiſpenſable. Nature has provided us with that ſtandard, which is daily applied by courts of law with ſucceſs *.

In reviewing what is ſaid, it muſt afford great ſatisfaction, to find morality eſtabliſhed upon the ſolid foundations of intuitive perception; which is a ſingle mental act complete in itſelf, having no dependence on any antecedent propoſition. The moſt accurate reaſoning affords not equal conviction;

* See Elements of Criticiſm, vol. ii. p. 490. edit. 5.

tion; for every ſort of reaſoning, as explained in the ſketch immediately foregoing, requires not only ſelf-evident truths or axioms to found upon, but employs over and above various propoſitions to bring out its concluſions. By intuitive perception ſolely, without reaſoning, we acquire knowledge of right and wrong; of what we may do, of what we ought to do, and of what we ought to abſtain from: and conſidering that we have thus greater certainty of moral laws than of any propoſition diſcoverable by reaſoning, man may well be deemed a favourite of Heaven, when he is ſo admirably qualified for doing his duty. The moral ſenſe or conſcience is the voice of God within us; conſtantly admoniſhing us of our duty, and requiring from us no exerciſe of our faculties but attention merely. The celebrated Locke ventured what he thought a bold conjecture, That moral duties are ſuſceptible of demonſtration: how agreeable to him would have been the diſcovery, that they are founded upon intuitive perception, ſtill more convincing and authoritative!

By one branch of the moral ſenſe, we are taught what we ought to do; and what we ought not to do; and by another branch, what we may do, or leave undone. But ſociety would be imperfect, if the moral ſenſe ſtopped here. There is a third branch that makes us accountable for our conduct to our fellow-creatures; and it will be made evident afterward in the third ſketch, that we are accountable

accountable to our Maker, as well as to our fellow-creatures.

It follows from the ſtandard of right and wrong, that an action is right or wrong, independent of what the agent may think. Thus, when a man, excited by friendſhip or pity, reſcues a heretic from the flames, the action is right, even though he think it wrong, from a conviction that hereties ought to be burnt. But we apply a different ſtandard to the agent: a man is approved and held to be innocent in doing what he himſelf thinks right: he is diſapproved and held to be guilty in doing what he himſelf thinks wrong, Thus, to aſſaſſinate an atheiſt for the ſake of religion, is a wrong action; and yet the enthuſiaſt who commits that wrong, may be innocent: and one is guilty, who againſt conſcience eats meat in Lent, though the action is not wrong. In ſhort, an action is perceived to be right or wrong, independent of the actor's own opinion: but he is approved or diſapproved, held to be innocent or guilty, according to his own opinion.

SECT. III.

Laws of Nature reſpecting our Moral Conduct in Society.

A STANDARD being thus eſtabliſhed for regulating our moral conduct in ſociety, we proceed to inveſtigate the laws that reſult from it.

But

But firſt we take under conſideration, what other principles concur with the moral ſenſe to qualify men for ſociety.

When we reflect on the different branches of human knowledge, it might ſeem, that of all ſubjects human nature ſhould be the beſt underſtood; becauſe every man has daily opportunities to ſtudy it, in his own paſſions and in his own actions. But human nature, an intereſting ſubject, is ſeldom left to the inveſtigation of philoſophy. Writers of a ſweet diſpoſition and warm imagination, hold, that man is a benevolent being, and that every man ought to direct his conduct for the good of all, without regarding himſelf but as one of the number *. Thoſe of a cold temperament and contracted mind, hold him to be an animal entirely ſelfiſh; to evince which, examples are accumulated without end †. Neither of theſe ſyſtems is that of nature. The ſelfiſh ſyſtem is contradicted by the experience of all ages, affording the cleareſt evidence, that men frequently act for the ſake of others, without regarding themſelves, and ſometimes in direct oppoſition to their own intereſt ‡.

And

* Lord Shafteſbury. † Helvetius.

‡ Whatever wiredrawn arguments may be urged for the ſelfiſh ſyſtem, as if benevolence were but refined ſelfiſhneſs, the emptineſs of ſuch arguments will clearly appear when applied to children, who know no refinement. In them, the rudiments of the ſocial principle are no leſs viſible than of the ſelfiſh

And however much ſelfiſhneſs may prevail in action; man cannot be an animal entirely ſelfiſh, when all men conſpire to put a high eſtimation upon generoſity, benevolence, and other ſocial virtues: even the moſt ſelfiſh are diſguſted with ſelfiſhneſs in others, and endeavour to hide it in themſelves. The moſt zealous patron of the ſelfiſh principle, will not venture to maintain, that it renders us altogether indifferent about our fellow-creatures. Laying aſide ſelf-intereſt with every connection of love and hatred, good fortune happening to any one gives pleaſure to all, and bad fortune happening to any one is painful to all. On the other hand, the ſyſtem of univerſal benevolence, is no leſs contradictory to experience; from which we learn, that men commonly are diſpoſed to prefer their own intereſt before that of others, eſpecially where there is no ſtrict connection: nor do we find that ſuch bias is condemned by the moral ſenſe. Man in fact is a complex being, compoſed of principles, ſome benevolent, ſome ſelfiſh: and theſe principles are ſo juſtly blended in his nature, as to fit him for acting a proper part in ſociety. It would indeed be loſing time to prove, that without ſome affection for his fellow-creatures, he would be ill qualified for

ſelfiſh principle. Nothing is more common, than mutual good-will and fondneſs between children: which muſt be the work of nature; for to reflect upon what is one's intereſt, is far above the capacity of children.

for ſociety. And it will be made evident afterward *, that univerſal benevolence would be more hurtful to ſociety, than even abſolute ſelfiſhneſs †.

We are now prepared for inveſtigating the laws that reſult from the foregoing principles. The ſeveral duties we owe to others ſhall be firſt diſcuſſed, taking them in order according to the extent of their influence. And for the ſake of perſpicuity, I ſhall firſt preſent them in a general view, and then proceed to particulars. Of our duties to others, one there is ſo extenſive, as to have for its object all the innocent part of mankind. It is the duty that prohibits us to hurt others: than which no law is more clearly dictated by the moral ſenſe; nor is the tranſgreſſion of any other law more deeply ſtamped with the character of wrong. A man may be hurt externally

* Sect. 4.

† "Many moraliſts enter ſo deeply into one paſſion or bias "of human nature, that, to uſe the painter's phraſe, they "quite overcharge it. Thus I have ſeen a whole ſyſtem of "morals founded upon a ſingle pillar of the inward frame; "and the entire conduct of life and all the characters in it "accounted for, ſometimes from ſuperſtition, ſometimes from "pride, and moſt commonly from intereſt. They forget "how various a creature it is they are painting; how many "ſprings and weights, nicely adjuſted and balanced, enter "into the movement, and require allowance to be made for "their ſeveral clogs and impulſes, ere you can define its ope-"ration and effects." *Enquiry into the life and writings of Homer.*

nally in his goods, in his perſon, in his relations, and in his reputation. Hence the laws, Do not ſteal; Defraud not others; Do not kill nor wound; Be not guilty of defamation. A man may be hurt internally, by an action that occaſions to him diſtreſs of mind, or by being impreſſed with falſe notions of men and things. Therefore conſcience dictates, that we ought not to treat men diſreſpectfully; that we ought not cauſeleſsly to alienate their affections from others; and, in general, that we ought to forbear whatever may tend to break their peace of mind, or tend to unqualify them for being good men and good citizens.

The duties mentioned are duties of reſtraint. Our active duties regard particular perſons; ſuch as our relations, our friends, our benefactors, our maſters, our ſervants. It is our duty to honour and obey our parents; and to eſtabliſh our children in the world, with all advantages internal and external: we ought to be faithful to our friends, grateful to our benefactors, ſubmiſſive to our maſters, kind to our ſervants; and to aid and comfort every one of theſe perſons when in diſtreſs. To be obliged to do good to others beyond theſe bounds, muſt depend on poſitive engagement; for, as will appear afterward, univerſal benevolence is not a duty.

This general ſketch will prepare us for particulars. The duty of reſtraint comes firſt in view, that

that which bars us from harming the innocent; and to it correſponds a right in the innocent to be ſafe from harm. This is the great law preparatory to ſociety; becauſe without it, ſociety could never have exiſted. Here the moral ſenſe is inflexible: it dictates, that we ought to ſubmit to any diſtreſs, even death itſelf, rather than procure our own ſafety by laying violent hands upon an innocent perſon. And we are under the ſame reſtraint with reſpect to the property of another; for robbery and theft are never upon any pretext indulged. It is indeed true, that in extreme hunger I may lawfully take food where it can be found; and may freely lay hold of my neighbour's horſe, to carry me from an enemy who threatens death. But it is his duty as a fellow-creature to aſſiſt me in diſtreſs; and when there is no time for delay, I may lawfully uſe what he ought to offer were he preſent, and what I may preſume he would offer. For the ſame reaſon, if in a ſtorm my ſhip be driven among the anchor-ropes of another ſhip, I may lawfully cut the ropes to get free. But in every caſe of this kind, it would be a wrong in me to uſe my neighbour's property, without reſolving to pay the value. If my neighbour be bound to aid me in diſtreſs, conſcience binds me to make up his loſs *.

The

* This doctrine is obviouſly founded on juſtice; and yet, in the Roman law, there are two paſſages which deny any recompence in ſuch caſes. " Item Labeo ſcribit, ſi cum " vi

The prohibition of hurting others internally, is perhaps not eſſential to the formation of ſocieties, becauſe

" vi ventorum navis impulſa eſſet in funes anchorarum " alterius, et nautæ funes præcidiſſent; ſi nullo alio modo, " niſi præciſis funibus, explicare ſe potuit, nullam actio- " nem dandam;" *l.* 29. § 3. *ad leg. Aquil.* " Quod dici- " tur *damnum injuria datum Aquilia perſequi*, ſic erit ac- " cipiendum, ut videatur damnum injuria datum quod cum " damno injuriam attulerit; niſi magna vi cogente, fuerit " factum. Ut Celſus ſcribit circa eum, qui incendii ar- " cendi gratia vicinas ædes intercidit; et ſive pervenit ig- " nis, ſive antea extinctus eſt, exiſtimat legis Aquiliæ ac- " tionem ceſſare;" *l.* 49. § 1. *eod.* — [*In Engliſh thus:* " In the opinion of Labeo, if a ſhip is driven by the vio- " lence of a tempeſt among the anchor-ropes of another " ſhip, and the ſailors cut the ropes, having no other means " of getting free, there is no action competent.—The A- " quilian law muſt be underſtood to apply only to ſuch da- " mage as carries the idea of an injury along with it, un- " leſs ſuch injury has not been wilfully done, but from " neceſſity. Thus Celſus puts the caſe of a perſon who, " to ſtop the progreſs of a fire, pulls down his neighbour's " houſe; and whether the fire had reached that houſe " which is pulled down, or was extinguiſhed before it got " to it, in neither caſe, he thinks, will an action be com- " petent from the Aquilian law."]—Theſe opinions are undoubtedly erroneous. And it is not difficult to ſay what has occaſioned the error: the caſes mentioned are treated as belonging to the *lex Aquilia;* which being confined to the reparation of wrongs, lays it juſtly down for a rule, That no action for reparation can lie, where there is no

becauſe the tranſgreſſion of that law doth not much alarm plain people: but where manners and refined ſentiments prevail, the mind is ſuſceptible of more grievous wounds than the body; and therefore, without that law, a poliſhed ſociety could have no long endurance.

By adultery, miſchief is done both external and internal. Each ſex is ſo conſtituted, as to require ſtrict fidelity and attachment in a mate. The breach of theſe duties is the greateſt external harm that can befal them: it harms them alſo internally, by breaking their peace of mind. It has indeed been urged, that no harm will enſue, if the adultery be kept ſecret; and conſequently, that there can be no crime where the fact is kept ſecret. But ſuch as reaſon thus do not advert, that to declare ſecret adultery to be lawful, is in effect to overturn every foundation of mutual truſt and fidelity in the matrimonial ſtate. It is clear beyond all doubt, ſays a reputable writer, that no man is permitted to violate his faith; and that the man is unjuſt and barbarous who deprives his wife of the only reward ſhe has for adhering to the auſtere duties of her ſex. But an unfaithful

no *culpa*. But had Labeo and Celſus adverted, that theſe caſes belong to a different head, viz. the duty of recompence, where one ſuffers loſs by benefiting another, they themſelves would have no difficulty of ſuſtaining a claim or making up that loſs.

wife is ſtill more criminal, by diſſolving the whole ties of nature: in giving to her huſband children that are not his, ſhe betrays both, and joins perfidy to infidelity. *

Veracity is commonly ranked among the active duties; but erroneouſly: for if a man be not bound to ſpeak, he cannot be bound to ſpeak truth. It is therefore only a reſtraining duty, prohibiting us to deceive others, by affirming what is not true. Among the many correſponding principles in the human mind that in conjunction tend to make ſociety comfortable, a principle of veracity †, and a principle that leads us to rely on human teſtimony, are two: without the latter, the former would be an uſeleſs principle; and without the former, the latter would lay us open to fraud and treachery. The moral ſenſe accordingly dictates, that we ought

* Emile, liv. 5.

† Truth is always uppermoſt, being the natural iſſue of the mind: it requires no art nor training, no inducement nor temptation, but only that we yield to natural impulſe. Lying, on the contrary, is doing violence to our nature; and is never practiſed, even by the worſt of men, without ſome temptation. Speaking truth is like uſing our natural food, which we would do from appetite although it anſwered no end: lying is like taking phyſic, which is nauſeous to the taſte, and which no man takes but for ſome end which he cannot otherwiſe attain. *Dr Reid's Inquiry into the human mind.*

ought to adhere ſtrictly to truth, without regard to conſequences.

It muſt not be inferred, that we are bound to explain our thoughts, when truth is demanded from us by unlawful means. Words uttered voluntarily, are naturally relied on, as expreſſing the ſpeaker's mind; and if his mind differ from his words, he tells a lie, and is guilty of deceit. But words drawn from a man by torture, are no indication of his mind; and he is not guilty of deceit in uttering whatever words may be agreeable, however alien from his thoughts: if the author of the unlawful violence ſuffer himſelf to be deceived, he ought to blame himſelf, not the ſpeaker.

It need ſcarce be mentioned, that the duty of veracity excludes not fable, nor any liberty of ſpeech intended for amuſement only.

Active duties, as hinted above, are all of them directed to particular perſons. And the firſt I ſhall mention, is that between parent and child. The relation of parent and child, the ſtrongeſt that can exiſt between individuals, binds theſe perſons to exert their utmoſt powers in mutual good offices. Benevolence among other blood-relations, is alſo a duty; but not ſo indiſpenſable, being proportioned to the inferior degree of relation.

Gratitude is a duty directed to our benefactors. But though gratitude is ſtrictly a duty, the meaſure of performance, and the kind, are left moſtly to our own choice. It is ſcarce neceſſary to add,

that the active duties now mentioned, are acknowledged by all to be abſolutely inflexible, perhaps more ſo than the reſtraining duties: many find excuſes for doing harm; but no one hears with patience an excuſe for deviating from truth, friendſhip, or gratitude.

Diſtreſs, though it has a tendency to convert benevolence into a duty, is not ſufficient without other concurring circumſtances; for to relieve every perſon in diſtreſs, is beyond the power of any human being. Our relations in diſtreſs claim that duty from us, and even our neighbours: but diſtant diſtreſs, without a particular connection, ſcarce rouſes our ſympathy, and never is an object of duty. Many other connections, too numerous for this ſhort eſſay, extend the duty of relieving others from diſtreſs; and theſe make a large branch of equity. Though in various inſtances benevolence is converted into a duty by diſtreſs, it follows not, that the duty is always proportioned to the degree of diſtreſs. Nature has more wiſely provided for the ſupport of virtue: a virtuous perſon in diſtreſs commands our pity: a vicious perſon in diſtreſs has much leſs influence; and if by vice he have brought on the diſtreſs, indignation is raiſed, not pity *.

One great advantage of ſociety, is the co-operation of many to accompliſh ſome uſeful work, where a ſingle hand would be inſufficient. Arts, manufactures,

* See Elements of Criticiſm, vol. i. p. 187. edit. 5.

manufactures, and commerce, require many hands: but as hands cannot be ſecured without a previous engagement, the performance of promiſes and covenants is, upon that account, a capital duty in ſociety. In their original occupations of hunting and fiſhing, men living ſcattered and diſperſed, have ſeldom opportunity to aid and benefit each other; and in that ſituation, covenants, being of little uſe, are little regarded: but huſbandry, requiring the co-operation of many hands, draws men together for mutual aſſiſtance; and then covenants make a figure: arts and commerce make them more and more neceſſary; and in a poliſhed ſociety great regard is paid to them.

But contracts and promiſes are not confined to commercial dealings: they ſerve alſo to make benevolence a duty; and are even extended to connect the living with the dead: a man would die with regret, if he thought his friends were not bound by their promiſes to fulfil his will after his death: and to quiet the minds of men with reſpect to futurity, the moral ſenſe makes the performing ſuch promiſes our duty. Thus, if I promiſe to my friend to erect a monument for him after his death, conſcience binds me, even though no perſon alive be entitled to demand performance: every one perceives this to be my duty; and I muſt expect to ſuffer reproach and blame, if I neglect my engagement.

To fulfil a rational promiſe or covenant, deliberately made, is a duty no leſs inflexible than thoſe duties are which ariſe independent of conſent. But as man is fallible, often miſled by ignorance, and liable to be deceived, his condition would be deplorable, did the moral ſenſe compel him to fulfil every engagement, however imprudent or irrational. Here the moral ſenſe gives way to human infirmity: it relieves from deceit, from impoſition, from ignorance, from error; and binds a man by no engagement but what anſwers the end fairly intended. There is ſtill leſs doubt that it will relieve us from an engagement extorted by external violence, or by overbearing paſſion. The dread of torture will force moſt men to ſubmit to any terms; and a man in imminent hazard of drowning, will voluntarily promiſe all he has in the world to ſave him. The moral ſenſe would be ill ſuited to the imbecillity of our nature, did it bind men in conſcience to fulfil engagements made in ſuch circumſtances.

The other branch of duties, thoſe we owe to ourſelves, ſhall be diſcuſſed in a few words. *Propriety*, a branch of the moral ſenſe, regulates our conduct with reſpect to ourſelves; as *Juſtice*, another branch of the moral ſenſe, regulates our conduct with reſpect to others. Propriety dictates, that we ought to act up to the dignity of our nature, and to the ſtation allotted us by Providence: it dictates in particular, that temperance, prudence, modeſty,

modeſty, and uniformity of conduct, are ſelf-duties. Theſe duties contribute to private happineſs, by preſerving health, peace of mind, and ſelf-eſteem; which are ineſtimable bleſſings: they contribute no leſs to happineſs in ſociety, by gaining the love and eſteem of others, and aid and ſupport in time of need.

Upon reviewing the foregoing duties reſpecting others, we find them more or leſs extenſive; but none ſo extenſive as to have for their end the good of mankind in general. The moſt extenſive duty is that of reſtraint, prohibiting us to harm others: but even that duty has a limited end; for its purpoſe is only to protect others from miſchief, not to do them any poſitive good. The active duties of doing poſitive good are circumſcribed within ſtill narrower bounds, requiring ſome relation that connects us with others; ſuch as thoſe of parent, child, friend, benefactor. The ſlighter relations, unleſs in peculiar circumſtances, are not the foundation of any active duty: neighbourhood, for example, does not alone make benevolence a duty: but ſuppoſing a neighbour to be in diſtreſs, relief becomes our duty, if it can be done without diſtreſs to ourſelves. The duty of relieving from diſtreſs, ſeldom goes farther; for though we always ſympathize with our relations, and with thoſe under our eye, the diſtreſſes of the remote and unknown affect us very little. Pactions and agreements become neceſſary, if we would extend the duty of benevo-

lence beyond the limits mentioned. Men, it is true, are capable of doing more good than is required of them as a duty; but every ſuch good muſt be a free-will offering.

And this leads to arbitrary or diſcretionary actions, ſuch as may be done or left undone; which make the ſecond general head of moral actions. With reſpect to theſe, the moral ſenſe leaves us at freedom: a benevolent act is approved, but the omiſſion is not condemned. This holds ſtrictly in ſingle acts; but in viewing the whole of a man's conduct, the moral ſenſe appears to vary a little. As the nature of man is complex, partly ſocial, partly ſelfiſh, we have an intuitive perception, that our conduct ought to be conformable to our nature; and that in advancing our own intereſt, we ought not altogether to neglect that of others. The man accordingly who confines his whole time and thoughts within his own little ſphere, is condemned by all the world as guilty of wrong conduct; and the man himſelf, if his moral perceptions be not blunted by ſelfiſhneſs, muſt be ſenſible that he deſerves to be condemned. On the other hand, it is poſſible that free benevolence may be extended beyond proper bounds: where it prevails, it commonly leads to exceſs, by prompting a man to ſacrifice a great intereſt of his own to a ſmall intereſt of others; and the moral ſenſe dictates, that ſuch conduct is wrong. The juſt

temperament,

temperament, is a ſubordination of benevolence to ſelf-love.

Thus, moral actions are divided into two claſſes: the firſt regards our duty, containing actions that ought to be done, and actions that ought not to be done; the other regards arbitrary or diſcretionary actions, containing actions that are right when done, but not wrong when left undone. Society is indeed promoted by the latter; but it can ſcarce ſubſiſt, unleſs the former be made our duty. Hence it is, that actions only of the firſt claſs are made indiſpenſable; thoſe of the other claſs being left to our free-will. And hence alſo it is, that the various propenſities that diſpoſe us to actions of the firſt claſs, are diſtinguiſhed by the name of *primary virtues;* leaving the name of *ſecondary virtues* to thoſe propenſities which diſpoſe us to actions of the other claſs *.

The deduction above given makes it evident, that the general tendency of right actions is to promote the good of ſociety, and of wrong actions, to obſtruct that good. Univerſal benevolence is indeed not required of man; becauſe to put it in practice, is beyond his utmoſt abilities. But for promoting the general good, every thing is

* Virtue ſignifies that diſpoſition of mind which gives the aſcendant to moral principles. Vice ſignifies that diſpoſition of mind which gives little or no aſcendant to moral principles.

is required of him that he can accompliſh; which will appear from reviewing the foregoing duties. The prohibition of harming others is an eaſy taſk; and upon that account is made univerſal. Our active duties are very different: man is circumſcribed both in capacity and power: he cannot do good but in a ſlow ſucceſſion; and therefore it is wiſely ordered, that his obligation to do good ſhould be confined to his relations, his friends, his benefactors. Even diſtreſs makes not benevolence a general duty: all a man can readily do, is to relieve thoſe at hand; and accordingly we hear of diſtant misfortunes with little or no concern.

But let not the moral ſyſtem be miſapprehended, as if it were our duty, or even lawful, to proſecute what upon the whole we reckon the moſt beneficial to ſociety, balancing ill with good. The moral ſenſe permits not a violation of any perſon's right, however trivial, whatever benefit may thereby accrue to another, A man for example in low circumſtances, by denying a debt he owes to a rich miſer, ſaves himſelf and a hopeful family from ruin. In that caſe, the good effect far outweighs the ill, or rather has no counterbalance: but the moral ſenſe permits not the debtor to balance ill with good; nor gives countenance to an unjuſt act, whatever benefit it may produce. And hence a maxim in which all moraliſts agree, That we muſt

muſt not do ill to bring about good; the final cauſe of which ſhall be given below *.

SECT. IV.

Principles of Duty and of Benevolence.

HAVING thus ſhortly delineated the moral laws of our nature, we proceed to an article of great importance, which is, to inquire into the means provided by our Maker for compelling obedience to theſe laws. The moral ſenſe is an unerring guide; but the moſt expert guide will not profit thoſe who are not diſpoſed to be led. This conſideration makes it evident, that to complete the moral ſyſtem, man ought to be endued with ſome principle or propenſity, ſome impulſive power, to enforce obedience to the laws dictated by the moral ſenſe.

The author of our nature leaves none of his works imperfect. In order to render us obſequious to the moral ſenſe as our guide, he hath implanted in our nature the principles of duty, of benevolence, of rewards and puniſhments, and of reparation. It may poſſibly be thought, that rewards and puniſhments, of which afterward, are ſufficient of themſelves to enforce the laws of nature, without neceſſity of any other principle.

Human

* Sect. 7.

Human laws, it is true, are enforced by theſe means; becauſe no higher ſanction is under command of a terreſtrial legiſlator. But the celeſtial legiſlator, with power that knows no control, and benevolence that knows no bounds, hath enforced his laws by means no leſs remarkable for mildneſs than for efficacy: he employs no external compulſion; but, in order to engage our will on the right ſide, hath in the breaſt of individuals eſtabliſhed the principles of duty and of benevolence, which efficaciouſly excite them to obey the dictates of the moral ſenſe.

The reſtraining and active duties being both of them eſſential to ſociety, our Maker has wiſely ordered, that the principle which enforces theſe duties, ſhould be the moſt cogent of all that belong to our nature. Other principles may ſolicit, allure, or terrify; but the principle of duty aſſumes authority, commands, and inſiſts to be obeyed, without giving ear to any oppoſing motive.

As one great purpoſe of ſociety, is to furniſh opportunities of mutual aid and ſupport; nature ſeconding that purpoſe, hath provided the principle of benevolence, which excites us to be kindly, beneficent, and generous. Nor ought it to eſcape obſervation, that the author of nature, attentive to our wants and to our well-being, hath endued us with a liberal portion of that principle. It excites us to be kind, not only to thoſe we are connected with, but to our neighbours, and even to thoſe

thoſe we are barely acquainted with. Providence is peculiarly attentive to objects in diſtreſs, who require immediate aid and relief. To the principle of benevolence, it hath ſuperadded the paſſion of pity, which in every feeling heart is irreſiſtible. To make benevolence more extenſive, would be fruitleſs; becauſe here are objects in plenty to fill the moſt capacious mind. It would not be fruitleſs only, but hurtful to ſociety: I ſay hurtful; becauſe frequent diſappointments in attempting to gratify our benevolence, would render it a troubleſome gueſt, and make us cling rather to ſelfiſhneſs, which we can always gratify. At the ſame time, though there is not room for a more extenſive liſt of particular objects, yet the faculty we have of uniting numberleſs individuals into one complex object, enlarges greatly the ſphere of benevolence. By that faculty, our country, our government, our religion, become objects of public ſpirit, and of a lively affection. The individuals that compoſe the group, conſidered apart, may be too minute, or too diſtant, for our benevolence: but when united into one whole, accumulation makes them great, greatneſs makes them conſpicuous; and affection, preſerved entire and undivided, is beſtowed upon an abſtract object, as upon one that is ſingle and viſible; but with energy proportioned to its greater dignity and importance. Thus the principle of benevolence is not too ſparingly ſcattered among men. It is indeed made ſubordinate to ſelf-intereſt,

reſt, which is wiſely ordered, as will afterwards be made evident*: but its power and extent are nicely proportioned to the limited capacity of man, and to his ſituation in this world; ſo as better to fulfil its deſtination, than if it were an overmatch for ſelf-intereſt, and for every other principle.

SECT. V.

Laws reſpecting Rewards and Puniſhments.

REFLECTING on the moral branch of our nature qualifying us for ſociety in a manner ſuited to our capacity, we cannot overlook the hand of our Maker; for means ſo finely adjuſted to an important end, never happen by chance. It muſt however be acknowledged, that in many individuals, the principle of duty has not vigour nor authority ſufficient to ſtem every tide of unruly paſſion: by the vigilance of ſome paſſions, we are taken unguarded; deluded by the ſly inſinuations of others; or overwhelmed with the ſtormy impetuoſity of a third ſort. Moral evil is thus introduced, and much wrong is done. This new ſcene ſuggeſts to us, that there muſt be ſome article ſtill wanting to complete the moral ſyſtem; ſome means for redreſſing ſuch wrongs, and for preventing

* Sect. 7.

preventing the reiteration of them. To accompliſh theſe important ends, there are added to the moral ſyſtem, laws relative to rewards and puniſhments, and to reparation; of which in their order.

Many animals are qualified for ſociety by inſtinct merely; ſuch as beavers, ſheep, monkeys, bees, rooks. But men are ſeldom led by inſtinct: their actions are commonly prompted by paſſions; of which there is an endleſs variety, ſocial and ſelfiſh, benevolent and malevolent. And were every paſſion equally entitled to gratification, man would be utterly unqualified for ſociety: he would be a ſhip without a rudder, obedient to every wind, and moving at random without any ultimate deſtination. The faculty of reaſon would make no oppoſition; for were there no ſenſe of wrong, it would be reaſonable to gratify every deſire that harms not ourſelves: and to talk of puniſhment would be abſurd; for puniſhment, in its very idea, implies ſome wrong that ought to be redreſſed. Hence the neceſſity of the moral ſenſe, to qualify us for ſociety: by inſtructing us in our duty, it renders us accountable for our conduct, and makes us ſuſceptible of rewards and puniſhments. The moral ſenſe fulfils another valuable purpoſe: it erects in man an unerring ſtandard for the application and meaſure of rewards and puniſhments.

To

To complete the ſyſtem of rewards and puniſhments, it is neceſſary that a proviſion be made, both of power and of willingneſs to reward and puniſh. The Author of our nature hath provided amply for the former, by entitling every man to reward and puniſh as his native privilege. And he has provided for the latter, by a noted principle in our nature, prompting us to exerciſe the power. Impelled by that principle, we reward the virtuous with approbation and eſteem, and puniſh the vicious with diſapprobation and contempt. And there is an additional motive for exerciſing that principle, which is, that we have great ſatisfaction in rewarding, and no leſs in puniſhing.

As to puniſhment in particular, an action done intentionally to produce miſchief, is criminal, and merits puniſhment. Such an action, being diſagreeable, raiſes my reſentment, even where I have no connection with the perſon injured; and the principle mentioned impels me to chaſtiſe the delinquent with indignation and hatred. An injury done to myſelf raiſes my reſentment to a higher tone: I am not ſatisfied with ſo ſlight a puniſhment as indignation and hatred: the author muſt by my hand ſuffer miſchief, as great as he has made me ſuffer.

Even the moſt ſecret crime eſcapes not puniſhment. The delinquent is tortured with remorſe: he even deſires to be puniſhed, ſometimes ſo ardently

dently as to puniſh himſelf*. There cannot be imagined a contrivance more effectual to deter one from

* Mr John Kello, miniſter of Spot, in Eaſt Lothian, had an extraordinary talent for preaching, and was univerſally held a man of ſingular piety. His wife was handſome, cheerful, tender-hearted, and in a word poſſeſſed all the qualities that can endear a woman to her huſband. A pious and rich widow in the neighbourhood tempted his avarice. She clung to him as a ſpiritual guide; and but for his little wife, he had no doubt of obtaining her in marriage He turned gradually peeviſh and diſcontented. His change of behaviour made a deep impreſſion on his wife, for ſhe loved him dearly; and yet ſhe was anxious to conceal her treatment from the world. Her meekneſs, her ſubmiſſion, her patience, tended but to increaſe his ſullenneſs. Upon a Sunday morning, when on her knees, ſhe was offering up her devotions, he came ſoftly behind her, put a rope about her neck, and hung her up to the ceiling. He bolted his gate, creeped out at a window, walked demurely to church, and charmed his hearers with a moſt pathetic ſermon. After divine ſervice, he invited two or three of his neighbours to paſs the evening, at his houſe, telling them that his wife was indiſpoſed, and of late inclined to melancholy; but that ſhe would be glad to ſee them. It ſurpriſed them to find the gate bolted, and none to anſwer: much more when upon its being forced open, they found her in the poſture mentioned. The huſband ſeemed to be ſtruck dumb; and counterfeited ſorrow ſo much to the life, that his gueſts, forgetting the deceaſed, were wholly intereſted about the living. His feigned tears, however, became real: his ſoul was oppreſſed with the weight of his guilt. Finding no relief from agonizing remorſe, and from the image of

from vice, than remorſe, which itſelf is a grievous puniſhment. Self-puniſhment goes ſtill farther: every criminal, ſenſible that he ought to be puniſhed, dreads puniſhment from others; and this dread, however ſmothered during proſperity, breaks out in adverſity, or in depreſſion of mind: his crime ſtares him in the face, and every accidental misfortune is in his diſturbed imagination interpreted to be a puniſhment: "And they ſaid one "to another, We are very guilty concerning our "brother, in that we ſaw the anguiſh of his ſoul, "when he beſought us; and we would not hear: "therefore is this diſtreſs come upon us. And "Reuben anſwered them, ſaying, Spake I not un-"to you, ſaying, Do not ſin againſt the child? "and ye would not hear; therefore behold alſo "his blood is required * †."

The

of his murdered wife conſtantly haunting him, he about ſix weeks after the horrid deed went to Edinburgh, and delivered himſelf up to juſtice. He was condemned upon his own confeſſion, and executed 4th October 1570.

* Geneſis xlii. 21.

† John, Duke of Britany, commonly termed *the Good Duke*, illuſtrious for generoſity, clemency, and piety, reigned forty-three years, wholly employed about the good of his ſubjects. He was ſucceeded by his eldeſt ſon Francis, a prince weak and ſuſpicious, and conſequently liable to be miſled by favourites. Arthur of Montauban, in love with the wife of Gilles, brother

The Uſurper, Oliver Cromwell, found to his dire experience, that the grandeur which he had attained with ſo much cunning and courage, did not contribute to his happineſs; for with happineſs

 guilt

ther to the Duke, perſuaded the Duke that his brother was laying plots to dethrone him. Gilles being impriſoned, the Duke's beſt friends conjured him to pity his unhappy brother, who might be imprudent, but aſſuredly was innocent;—all in vain. Gilles being proſecuted before the three eſtates of the province for high-treaſon, was unanimouſly abſolved; which irritated the Duke more and more. Arthur of Montauban artfully ſuggeſted to his maſter to try poiſon; which having miſcarried, they next reſolved to ſtarve the priſoner to death. The unfortunate Prince, through the bars of a window, cried aloud for bread; but the paſſengers durſt not ſupply him. One poor woman only had courage more than once to ſlip ſome bread within the window. He charged a prieſt, who had received his confeſſion, to declare to the Duke, "That ſeeing "juſtice was refuſed him in this world, he appealed to Heaven; "and called upon the Duke to appear before the judgment-"ſeat of God in forty days." The Duke and his favourite, amazed that the Prince lived ſo long without nouriſhment, employed aſſaſſins to ſmother him with his bed clothes. The prieſt, in obedience to the orders he had received, preſented himſelf before the Duke, and with a loud voice cited him in name of the deceaſed Lord Gilles to appear before God in forty days. Shame and remorſe verified the prediction. The Duke was ſeized with a ſudden terror; and the image of his brother, expiring by his orders, haunted him day and night. He decayed daily without any marks of a regular diſeaſe, and died within the forty days in frightful agony.

See this ſubject further illuſtrated in the Sketch, *Principles and Progreſs of Theology*, chap. 1.

guilt is inconſiſtent. Conſcious that he deſerved puniſhment for his crimes, and dreading its being inflicted upon him, all around appeared to him treacherous friends or bitter enemies. Death, which with intrepidity he had braved in the field, was now timorouſly apprehended from aſſaſſins. With a piercing and anxious eye he ſurveyed every new face. He wore armour under his clothes, and never moved a ſtep without his guards. Seldom he ſlept three nights together in the ſame chamber; nor in any but what had a back-door, at which centinels were placed. Society terrified him by reflecting on his unknown enemies, numerous and implacable. Solitude aſtoniſhed him by leaving him without protection. Can all the glory and power that this earth can afford be a counterbalance for ſuch miſery?

No tranſgreſſion of ſelf-duty eſcapes puniſhment, more than tranſgreſſion of duty to others. The puniſhments, though not the ſame, differ in degree more than in kind. Injuſtice is puniſhed with remorſe: impropriety with ſhame, which is remorſe in a lower degree. Injuſtice raiſes indignation in the beholder, and ſo doth every flagrant impropriety: ſlighter improprieties receive a milder puniſhment, being rebuked with ſome degree of contempt, and commonly with deriſion *.

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* See Elements of Criticiſm, chap. 10.

So far we have been led in a beaten track; but in attempting to proceed, we are entangled in mazes and intricacies. An action well intended may happen to produce no good; and an action ill intended may happen to produce no miſchief: a man overawed by fear, may be led to do miſchief againſt his will; and a perſon, miſtaking the ſtandard of right and wrong, may be innocently led to do acts of injuſtice. By what rule, in ſuch caſes, are rewards and puniſhments to be applied? Ought a man to be rewarded when he does no good, or puniſhed when he does no miſchief: ought he to be puniſhed for doing miſchief againſt his will, or for doing miſchief when he thinks he is acting innocently? Theſe queſtions ſuggeſt a doubt, whether the ſtandard of right and wrong be applicable to rewards and puniſhments.

We have ſeen that there is an invariable ſtandard of right and wrong, which depends not in any degree on private opinion or conviction. By that ſtandard, all pecuniary claims are judged, all claims of property, and, in a word, every demand founded on intereſt, not excepting reparation, as will afterward appear. But with reſpect to the moral characters of men, and with reſpect to rewards and puniſhments, a different ſtandard is erected in the common ſenſe of mankind, neither rigid nor inflexible; which is, the opinion that men have of their own actions. It is mentioned above, that a man is eſteemed innocent in doing what he himſelf thinks right, and guilty in doing

what he himſelf thinks wrong. In applying this ſtandard to rewards and puniſhments, we reward thoſe who in doing wrong are however convinced that they are innocent; and puniſh thoſe who in doing right are however convinced that they are guilty *. Some, it is true, are ſo perverted by improper education or by ſuperſtition, as to eſpouſe numberleſs abſurd tenets, contradictory to the ſtandard of right and wrong; and yet ſuch men are no exception from the general rule: if they act according to conſcience, they are innocent, and ſafe againſt puniſhment however wrong the action may be; and if they act againſt conſcience, they are guilty and puniſhable however right the action may be: it is abhorrent to every moral perception, that a guilty perſon be rewarded, or an innocent perſon puniſhed. Further, if miſchief be done contrary to will, as where a man is compelled by fear or by torture, to reveal the ſecrets of his party; he may be grieved for yielding to the weakneſs of his nature, contrary to his firmeſt reſolves; but he has no check of conſcience, and upon that account is not liable to puniſhment. And laſtly, in order that perſonal merit and demerit may not in any meaſure depend on chance, we

* Virtuous and vicious, innocent and guilty, ſignify qualities both of men and of their actions. Approbation and diſapprobation, praiſe and blame, ſignify certain emotions or ſentiments of thoſe who ſee or contemplate men and their actions.

we are ſo conſtituted as to place innocence and guilt, not on the event, but on the intention of doing right or wrong; and accordingly, whatever be the event, a man is praiſed for an action well-intended, and condemned for an action ill-intended.

But what if a man intending a certain wrong happen by accident to do a wrong he did not intend; as, for example, intending to rob a warren by ſhooting the rabbits, he accidentally wounds a child unſeen behind a buſh? The delinquent ought to be puniſhed for intending to rob; and he is alſo ſubjected to repair the hurt done to the child: but he cannot be puniſhed for the accidental wound; becauſe our nature regulates puniſhment by the intention, and not by the event *.

* During the infancy of nations, pecuniary compoſitions for crimes were univerſal; and during that long period, very little weight was laid upon intention. This proceeded from the cloudineſs and obſcurity of moral perceptions among barbarians, making no diſtinction between reparation and pecuniary puniſhment. Where a man does miſchief intentionally, or is *verſans in illicito*, as expreſſed in the Roman law, he is juſtly bound to repair all the harm that enſues, however accidentally; and from the reſemblance of pecuniary puniſhment to reparation, the rule was childiſhly extended to puniſhment. But this rule, ſo little conſiſtent with moral principles, could not long ſubſiſt after pecuniary compoſitions gave place to corporal puniſhment; and accordingly, among civilized nations, the law of nature is reſtored, which prohibits puniſhment for any miſchief that is not intentional.

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A crime againſt any primary virtue is attended with ſevere and never-failing puniſhment, more efficacious than any that have been invented to enforce municipal laws: on the other hand, the preſerving primary virtues inviolate, is attended with little merit. The ſecondary virtues are directly oppoſite: the neglecting them is not attended with any puniſhment; but the practice of them is attended with illuſtrious rewards. Offices of undeſerved kindneſs, returns of good for ill, generous toils and ſufferings for our friends or for our country, are attended with conſciouſneſs of ſelf-merit, and with univerſal praiſe and admiration;

The Engliſh muſt be excepted, who, remarkably tenacious of their original laws and cuſtoms, preſerve in force, even as to capital puniſhment, the above-mentioned rule that obtained among barbarians, when pecuniary compoſitions were in vigour. The following paſſage is from Hales, (Pleas of the Crown, chap. 39.) "Regularly he that voluntarily and "knowingly intends hurt to the perſon of a man, as for ex- "ample to beat him, though he intend not death, yet if death "enſues, it excuſeth not from the guilt of murder, or man- "ſlaughter at leaſt, as the circumſtances of the caſe happen." And Foſter, in his Crown law, teaches the ſame doctrine, never once ſuſpecting in it the leaſt deviation from moral principles. "A ſhooteth at the poultry of B, and by accident "killeth a man: if his intention was to ſteal the poultry, "which muſt be collected from circumſtances, it will be mur- "der, by reaſon of that felonious intent; but if it was done "wantonly and without that intention, it will be barely man- "ſlaughter." (P. 259.)

ration; the higheſt rewards a generous mind is ſuſceptible of.

From what is ſaid, the following obſervation will occur: The pain of tranſgreſſing juſtice, fidelity, or any duty, is much greater than the pleaſure of performing: but the pain of neglecting a generous action, or any ſecondary virtue, is as nothing compared with the pleaſure of performing. Among the vices oppoſite to the primary virtues, the moſt ſtriking moral deformity is found; among the ſecondary virtues, the moſt ſtriking moral beauty.

SECT. VI.

Laws reſpecting Reparation.

THE principle of reparation is made a branch of the moral ſyſtem for accompliſhing two ends: which are, to repreſs wrongs that are not criminal, and to make up the loſs ſuſtained by wrongs of whatever kind. With reſpect to the former, reparation is a ſpecies of puniſhment: with reſpect to the latter, it is an act of juſtice. Theſe ends will be better underſtood, after aſcertaining the nature and foundation of reparation; to which the following diviſion of actions is neceſſary. Firſt, actions that we are bound to perform. Second, actions that we perform in proſecution

cution of a right or privilege. Third, indifferent actions, deſcribed above. Actions of the firſt kind ſubject not a man to reparation, whatever damage enſues; becauſe it is his duty to perform them, and it would be inconſiſtent with morality that a man ſhould be ſubjected to reparation for doing his duty. The laws of reparation that concern actions of the ſecond kind, are more complex. The ſocial ſtate, highly beneficial by affording opportunity for mutual good offices, is attended with ſome inconveniences; as where a perſon happens to be in a ſituation of neceſſarily harming others by exerciſing a right or privilege. If the foreſight of harming another reſtrain me not from exerciſing my right, the intereſt of that other is made ſubſervient to mine: on the other hand, if ſuch foreſight reſtrain me from exerciſing my right, my intereſt is made ſubſervient to his. What doth the moral ſenſe provide in that caſe? To preſerve as far as poſſible an equality among perſons born free and by nature equal in rank, the moral ſenſe dictates a rule, no leſs beautiful than ſalutary; which is, That the exerciſing a right will not juſtify me for doing direct miſchief; but will juſtify me, though I foreſee that miſchief may poſſibly happen. The firſt branch of the rule reſolves into a propoſition eſtabliſhed above, That no intereſt of mine, not even life itſelf, will authoriſe me to hurt an innocent perſon. The other branch is ſupported by expediency: for if the

the bare poſſibility of hurting others were ſufficient to reſtrain a man from proſecuting his rights and privileges; men would be too much cramped in action, or rather would be reduced to a ſtate of abſolute inactivity. With reſpect to the firſt branch, I am criminal, and liable even to puniſhment: with reſpect to the other, I am not even culpable, nor bound to repair the miſchief that happens to enſue. But this propoſition admits a temperament, which is, that if any danger be foreſeen, I am in ſome degree culpable, if I be not at due pains to prevent it. For example, where in pulling down an old houſe I happen to wound one paſſing accidentally, without calling aloud to beware.

With reſpect to indifferent actions, the moral ſenſe dictates, that we ought carefully to avoid doing miſchief, either direct or conſequential. As we ſuffer no loſs by forbearing actions that are done for paſtime merely, ſuch an action is *culpable* or *faulty*, if the conſequent miſchief was foreſeen or might have been foreſeen; and the actor of courſe is ſubjected to reparation. As this is a cardinal point in the doctrine of reparation, I ſhall endeavour to explain it more fully. Without intending any harm, a man may foreſee, that what he is about to do will probably or poſſibly produce miſchief; and ſometimes miſchief follows that was neither intended nor foreſeen. The action in the former caſe is not criminal; becauſe

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ill intention is eſſential to a crime; but it is culpable or faulty; and if miſchief enſue, the actor blames himſelf, and is blamed by others, for having done what he ought not to have done. Thus, a man who throws a large ſtone among a crowd of people, is highly culpable; becauſe he muſt foreſee that miſchief will probably enſue, though he has no intention to hurt any perſon. As to the latter caſe, though miſchief was neither intended nor foreſeen, yet if it might have been foreſeen, the action is raſh or uncatious, and conſequently culpable or faulty in ſome degree. Thus, if a man, ſhooting at a mark for recreation near a high road, happen to wound one paſſing accidentally, without calling aloud to keep out of the way, the action is in ſome degree culpable, becauſe the miſchief might have been foreſeen. But though miſchief enſue, an action is not culpable or faulty if all reaſonable precaution have been adhibited: the moral ſenſe declares the author to be innocent * and blameleſs: the miſchief is accidental; and the action may be termed *unlucky*, but comes not under the denomination of either right or wrong. In general, when we act merely for amuſement, our nature makes us anſwerable for the harm that enſues, if it was either foreſeen or might

* *Innocent* here is oppoſed to *culpable:* in a broader ſenſe it is oppoſed to *criminal.* With reſpect to puniſhment, an action though culpable is innocent, if it be not criminal: with reſpect to reparation, it is not innocent if it be culpable.

might with due attention have been foreſeen. But our rights and privileges would profit us little, if their exerciſe were put under the ſame reſtraint: it is more wiſely ordered, that the probability of miſchief, even foreſeen, ſhould not reſtrain a man from proſecuting his concerns, which may often be of conſequence to him; provided that he act with due precaution. He proceeds accordingly with a ſafe conſcience, and is not afraid of being blamed either by God or man.

With reſpect to raſh or uncautious actions, where the miſchief might have been foreſeen though not actually foreſeen; it is not ſufficient to eſcape blame, that a man, naturally raſh or inattentive, acts according to his character: a degree of precaution is required, both by himſelf and by others, ſuch as is natural to the generality of men: he perceives that he might and *ought* to have acted more cautiouſly; and his conſcience reproaches him for his inattention, no leſs than if he were naturally more ſedate and attentive. Thus the circumſpection natural to mankind in general, is applied as a ſtandard to every individual; and if a man fall ſhort of that ſtandard, he is culpable and blameable, however unforeſeen by him the miſchief may have been.

What is ſaid upon culpable actions, is equally applicable to culpable omiſſions; for by theſe alſo miſchief may be occaſioned, entitling the ſufferer to reparation. If we forbear to do our duty with

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an intention to occaſion miſchief, the forbearance is criminal. The only queſtion is, how far forbearance without ſuch intention is culpable: ſuppoſing the probability of miſchief to have been foreſeen, though not intended, the omiſſion is highly culpable; and though neither intended nor foreſeen, yet the omiſſion is culpable in a lower degree, if there have been leſs care and attention than are proper in performing the duty required. But ſuppoſing all due care, the omiſſion of extreme care and diligence is not culpable *.

By aſcertaining what acts and omiſſions are culpable or faulty, the doctrine of reparation is rendered extremely ſimple; for it may be laid down as a rule without a ſingle exception, That every culpable act, and every culpable omiſſion, binds us in conſcience to repair the miſchief occaſioned by it. The moral ſenſe binds us no farther; for it loads not with reparation the man who is blameleſs and innocent: the harm is accidental; and we are

* *Culpa lata æquiparatur dolo*, ſays the Roman law. They are equal with reſpect to reparation and to every civil conſequence; but they are certainly not equal in a criminal view. The eſſence of a crime conſiſts in the intention to do miſchief; upon which account no fault or *culpa*, however groſs, amounts to a crime. But may not groſs negligence be a ſubject of puniſhment? A jailor ſees a ſtate-priſoner taking ſteps to make his eſcape; and yet will not give himſelf the trouble to prevent it; and ſo the priſoner eſcapes. Damages cannot be qualified, becauſe no perſon is hurt; and if the jailor cannot be puniſhed, he eſcapes free.

are ſo conſtituted as not to be reſponſible in conſcience for what happens by accident. But here it is requiſite, that the man be in every reſpect innocent: for if he intend harm, though not what he has done, he will find himſelf bound in conſcience to repair the accidental harm he has done; as, for example, when aiming a blow unjuſtly at one in the dark, he happens to wound another whom he did not ſuſpect to be there. And hence it is a rule in all municipal laws, That one *verſans in illicito* is liable to repair every conſequent damage. That theſe particulars are wiſely ordered by the Author of our nature for the good of ſociety, will appear afterward *. In general, the rules above mentioned are dictated by the moral ſenſe; and we are compelled to obey them by the principle of reparation.

We are now prepared for a more particular inſpection of the two ends of reparation above mentioned, The repreſſing wrongs that are not criminal, and the making up what loſs is ſuſtained by wrongs of whatever kind. With reſpect to the firſt, it is clear, that puniſhment in its proper ſenſe cannot be inflicted for a wrong that is culpable only; and if nature did not provide ſome means for repreſſing ſuch wrongs, ſociety would ſcarce be a comfortable ſtate. Laying conſcience aſide, pecuniary reparation is the only remedy that can be provided againſt culpable omiſſions: and with reſpect

* Sect. 7.

ſpect to culpable commiſſions, the neceſſity of reparation is ſtill more apparent; for conſcience alone, without the ſanction of reparation, would ſeldom have authority ſufficient to reſtrain us from acting raſhly or uncautiouſly, even where the poſſibility of miſchief is foreſeen, and far leſs where it is not foreſeen.

With reſpect to the ſecond end of reparation, my conſcience dictates to me, that if a man ſuffer by my fault, whether the miſchief was foreſeen or not foreſeen, it is my duty to make up his loſs; and I perceive intuitively, that the loſs ought to reſt ultimately upon me, and not upon the ſufferer, who has not been culpable in any degree.

In every caſe where the miſchief done can be eſtimated by a pecuniary compenſation, the two ends of reparation coincide. The ſum is taken from the one as a ſort of puniſhment for his fault, and is beſtowed on the other to make up the loſs he has ſuſtained. But in numberleſs caſes where miſchief done cannot be compenſated with money, reparation is in its nature a ſort of puniſhment. Defamation, contemptuous treatment, perſonal reſtraint, the breaking one's peace of mind, are injuries that cannot be repaired with money; and the pecuniary reparation decreed againſt the wrong-doer, can only be conſidered as a puniſhment inflicted in order to deter him from reiterating ſuch injuries: the ſum, it is true, is awarded to the perſon injured; but not as ſufficient to make

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up his loſs, which money cannot do, but only as a *ſolatium* for what he has ſuffered.

Hitherto it is ſuppoſed, that the man who intends a wrong action, is at the ſame time conſcious of its being ſo. But a man may intend a wrong action, thinking erroneouſly that it is right; or a right action, thinking erroneouſly that it is wrong; and the queſtion is, What ſhall be the conſequence of ſuch errors with reſpect to reparation. The latter caſe is clear: the perſon who occaſionally ſuffers loſs by a right action, has not a claim for reparation, becauſe he has no juſt cauſe of complaint. On the other hand, if the action be wrong, the innocence of the author, for which he is indebted to an error in judgment, will not relieve him from reparation. When he is made ſenſible of his error, he feels himſelf bound in conſcience to repair the harm he has done by a wrong action: and others, ſenſible of his error from the beginning, have the ſame feeling: nor will his obſtinacy in reſiſting conviction, nor his dulneſs in not apprehending his error, mend the matter: it is well that theſe defects relieve him from puniſhment, without wronging others by denying a claim for reparation. A man's errors ought to affect himſelf only, and not thoſe who have not erred. Hence in general, reparation always follows wrong; and is not affected by any erroneous opinion of a wrong action being right, more than of a right action being wrong.

But this doctrine ſuffers an exception with reſpect to one who, having undertaken a truſt, is bound in duty to act. A judge is in that ſtate: it is his duty to pronounce ſentence in every caſe that comes before him; and if he judge according to his knowledge, he is not liable for conſequences. A judge cannot be ſubjected to reparation, unleſs the judgment he gave was intentionally wrong. An officer of the revenue is in the ſame predicament. Led by a doubtful clauſe in a ſtatute, he makes a ſeizure of goods as forfeited to the crown, which afterward, in the proper court, are found not to be ſeizable: he ought not to be ſubjected to reparation, if he have acted to the beſt of his judgment. This rule however muſt be taken with a limitation: a public officer who is groſsly ignorant, will not be excuſed; for he ought to know better.

Reparation is due, though the immediate act be involuntary, provided it be connected with a preceding voluntary act. Example: "If A ride an "unruly horſe in Lincolns-Inn Fields, to tame him, "and the horſe breaking from A, run over B and "grievouſly hurt him; B ſhall have an action "againſt A: for though the miſchief was done "againſt the will of A, yet ſince it was his fault "to bring a wild horſe into a frequented place "where miſchief might enſue, he muſt anſwer for "the conſequences." Gaius ſeems to carry this rule ſtill farther, holding in general, that if a horſe,

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by the weakneſs or unſkilfulneſs of the rider, break away and do miſchief, the rider is liable *. But Gaius probably had in his eye a frequented place, where the miſchief might have been foreſeen. Thus in general, a man is made liable for the miſchief occaſioned by his voluntary deed, though the immediate act that occaſioned the miſchief be involuntary.

SECT. VII.

Final Cauſes of the foregoing Laws of Nature.

SEVERAL final cauſes have been already mentioned, which could not conveniently be reſerved for the preſent ſection, being neceſſary for explaining the ſubjects to which they relate; the final cauſe for inſtance of erecting a ſtandard of morals upon the common ſenſe of mankind. I proceed now to what have not been mentioned, or but ſlightly mentioned.

The final cauſe that preſents itſelf firſt to view, reſpects man conſidered as an accountable being. The ſenſe of being accountable, is one of our moſt vigilant guards againſt the ſilent attacks of vice. When a temptation moves me it immediately occurs, What will the world ſay? I imagine my friends expoſtulating, my enemies reviling—it would

* L. 8. § 1. ad leg. Aquil.

would be in vain to diſſemble—my ſpirits ſink—the temptation vaniſhes. 2dly, Praiſe and blame, eſpecially from thoſe we regard, are ſtrong incentives to virtue: but if we were not accountable for our conduct, praiſe and blame would ſeldom be well directed; for how ſhall a man's intentions be known, without calling him to account? And praiſe or blame, frequently ill-directed, would loſe their influence. 3dly, This branch of our nature, is the corner-ſtone of the criminal law. Did not a man think himſelf accountable to all the world, and to his judge in a peculiar manner, it would be natural for him to think, that the juſteſt ſentence pronounced againſt him, is oppreſſion, not juſtice. 4thly, It promotes ſociety. If we were not accountable beings, thoſe connected by blood, or by country, would be no leſs ſhy and reſerved, than if they were utter ſtrangers to each other.

The final cauſe that next occurs, being ſimple and obvious, is mentioned only that it may not ſeem to have been overlooked. All right actions are agreeable, all wrong actions, diſagreeable. This is a wiſe appointment of Providence. We meet with ſo many temptations againſt duty, that it is not always eaſy to perſevere in the right path: would we perſevere, were duty diſagreeable? And were acts of pure benevolence diſagreeable, they would be rare, however worthy of praiſe.

Another final cauſe reſpects duty, in contradiſtinction to pure benevolence. All the moral laws

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are founded on intuitive perception; and are ſo ſimple and plain, as to be perfectly apprehended by the moſt ignorant. Were they in any degree complex or obſcure, they would be perverted by ſelfiſhneſs and prejudice. No conviction inferior to what is afforded by intuitive perception, could produce in mankind a common ſenſe in moral duties. Reaſon would afford no general conviction; becauſe that faculty is diſtributed in portions ſo unequal, as to bar all hopes from it of uniformity either in practice or in opinion. We are taught beſide, by woful experience, that reaſon, even the moſt convincing, has no commanding influence over the greater part of men. Reaſon, it is true, aided by experience, ſupports morality; by convincing us, that we cannot be happy if we abandon duty for any other intereſt. But conviction ſeldom weighs much againſt imperious paſſion; to control which the vigorous and commanding principle of duty is requiſite, directed by the ſhining light of intuition.

A propoſition laid down above, appears a ſort of myſtery in the moral ſyſtem, That though evidently all moral duties are contrived for promoting the general good, yet that a choice is not permitted among different goods, or between good and ill; but that we are ſtrictly tied down to perform or forbear certain particular acts, without regard to conſequences; or, in other words, that we muſt not do wrong, whatever good it may produce. The

final cauſe I am about to unfold, will clear this myſtery, and ſet the beauty of the moral ſyſtem in a conſpicuous light. I begin with obſerving, that as the general good of mankind, or even of the ſociety we live in, reſults from many and various circumſtances intricately combined; it is far above the capacity of man, to judge in every inſtance what particular action will tend the moſt to that end. The authoriſing, therefore, a man to trace out his duty, by weighing endleſs circumſtances, good and ill, would open a wide door to partiality and paſſion, and often lead him unwittingly to prefer the preponderating ill, under a falſe appearance of being the greater good. At that rate, the opinions of men about right and wrong, would be as various as their faces; which, as obſerved above, would totally unhinge ſociety. It is better ordered by Providence even for the general good, that, avoiding complex and obſcure objects, we are directed by the moral ſenſe to perform certain plain and ſimple acts, which admit no ambiguity.

In the next place, To permit ill in order to produce greater good, may ſuit a being of univerſal benevolence; but is repugnant to the nature of man, compoſed of ſelfiſh and benevolent principles. We have ſeen above, that the true moral balance depends on a ſubordination of ſelf-love to duty, and of diſcretionary benevolence to ſelf-love; and accordingly every man is ſenſible of in-

juſtice,

juſtice, when he is hurt in order to benefit another. Were it a rule in ſociety, That a greater good to any other would make it an act of juſtice to deprive me of my life, of my reputation, or of my property, I ſhould renounce the ſociety of men, and aſſociate with more harmleſs animals.

Thirdly, The true moral ſyſtem, that which is diſplayed above, is not only better ſuited to the nature of man and to his limited capacity, but contributes more to the general good, which I now proceed to demonſtrate. It would be loſing time to prove, that one entirely ſelfiſh is ill fitted for ſociety; and we have ſeen *, that univerſal benevolence, were it a duty, would contribute to the general good perhaps leſs than abſolute ſelfiſhneſs. Man is too limited in capacity and in power for univerſal benevolence. Even the greateſt monarch has not power to exerciſe his benevolence, but within a very narrow ſphere; and if ſo, how unfit would ſuch a duty be for private perſons, who have very little power? Serving only to diſtreſs them by inability of performance, they would endeavour to ſmother it altogether, and give full ſcope to ſelfiſhneſs. Man is much better qualified for doing good, by a conſtitution in which benevolence is duly blended with ſelf-love. Benevolence as a duty, takes place of ſelf-love; a regulation eſſential to ſociety: benevolence as a virtue, not a duty, gives place to ſelf-love; becauſe as every

* Sect. 4.

man has more power, knowledge and opportunity, to promote his own good than that of others, a greater quantity of good is produced, than if benevolence were our only principle of action. This holds, even ſuppoſing no harm done to any perſon: much more would it hold, were we permitted to hurt ſome, in order to produce more good to others.

The foregoing final cauſes reſpect morality in general. We now proceed to particulars; and the firſt and moſt important is the law of reſtraint. Man is evidently framed for ſociety: and as there can be no ſociety among creatures who prey upon each other, it was neceſſary to provide againſt mutual injuries; which is effectually done by this law. Its neceſſity with reſpect to perſonal ſecurity is ſelf-evident; and with reſpect to property, its neceſſity will appear from what follows. In the nature of every man there is a propenſity to hoard or ſtore up things uſeful to himſelf and family. But this natural propenſity would be rendered ineffectual, were he not ſecured in the poſſeſſion of what he thus ſtores up; for no man will toil to accumulate what he cannot ſecurely poſſeſs. This ſecurity is afforded by the moral ſenſe, which dictates, that the firſt occupant of goods provided by nature for the ſubſiſtence of man, ought to be protected in the poſſeſſion, and that ſuch goods ought to be inviolably his property. Thus, by the great law of reſtraint, men have a protection for their

their goods, as well as for their perſons; and are no leſs ſecure in ſociety, than if they were ſeparated from each other by impregnable walls.

Several other duties are little leſs eſſential than that of reſtraint, to the exiſtence of ſociety. Mutual truſt and confidence, without which ſociety would be an uncomfortable ſtate, enter into the character of the human ſpecies; to which the duties of veracity and fidelity correſpond. The final cauſe of theſe correſponding duties is obvious: the latter would be of no uſe in ſociety without the former; and the former, without the latter, would be hurtful, by laying men open to fraud and deceit.

With reſpect to veracity in particular, man is ſo conſtituted, that he muſt be indebted to information for the knowledge of moſt things that benefit or hurt him; and if he could not depend upon information, ſociety would be very little beneficial. Further, it is wiſely ordered, that we ſhould be bound by the moral ſenſe to ſpeak truth, even where we perceive no harm in tranſgreſſing that duty; becauſe it is ſufficient that harm may enſue, though not foreſeen. At the ſame time, falſehood always does miſchief: it may happen not to injure us externally in our reputation, or in our goods; but it never fails to injure us internally: the ſweeteſt and moſt refined pleaſure of ſociety, is a candid intercourſe of ſentiments, of opinions,

of

of defires, and wiſhes; and it would be poiſonous to indulge any falſehood in ſuch intercourſe.

Becauſe man is the weakeſt of all animals in a ſtate of ſeparation, and the very ſtrongeſt in ſociety by mutual aid and ſupport; covenants and promiſes, which greatly contribute to theſe, are made binding by the moral ſenſe.

The final cauſe of the law of propriety, which enforces the duty we owe to ourſelves, comes next in order. In diſcourſing upon thoſe laws of nature which concern ſociety, there is no occaſion to mention any ſelf-duty but what relates to ſociety; of which kind are prudence, temperance, induſtry, firmneſs of mind. And that ſuch qualities ſhould be made our duty, is wiſely ordered in a double reſpect; firſt, as qualifying us to act a proper part in ſociety; and next, as entitling us to good-will from others. It is the intereſt, no doubt, of every man, to ſuit his behaviour to the dignity of his nature, and to the ſtation allotted him by Providence; for ſuch rational conduct contributes to happineſs, by preſerving health, procuring plenty, gaining the eſteem of others, and, which of all is the greateſt bleſſing, by gaining a juſtly-founded ſelf-eſteem. But here intereſt ſolely is not relied on: the powerful authority of duty is added, that in a matter of the utmoſt importance to ourſelves, and of ſome importance to the ſociety we live in, our conduct may be regular and ſteady. Theſe duties tend not only to render a man happy in himſelf; but alſo

by

by procuring the good-will and eſteem of others, to command their aid and aſſiſtance in time of need.

I proceed to the final cauſes of natural rewards and puniſhments. It is laid down above, that controverſies about property and about other matters of intereſt, muſt be adjuſted by the ſtandard of right and wrong. But to bring rewards and puniſhments under the ſame ſtandard, without regard to private conſcience, would be a plan unworthy of our Maker. It is clear, that to reward one who is not conſcious of merit, or to puniſh one who is not conſcious of demerit, cannot anſwer any good end; and in particular, cannot tend either to improvement or to reformation of manners. How much more like the Deity is the plan of nature, which rewards no man who is not conſcious that he merits reward, and puniſhes no man who is not conſcious that he merits puniſhment! By that plan, and by that only, rewards and puniſhments accompliſh every good end, a final cauſe moſt illuſtrious!

The rewards and puniſhments that attend the primary and ſecondary virtues, are finely contrived for ſupporting the diſtinction between them ſet forth above. Puniſhment muſt be confined to the tranſgreſſion of primary virtues, it being the intention of nature that ſecondary virtues be entirely free. On the other hand, ſecondary virtues are more highly rewarded than primary: generoſity, for

for example, makes a greater figure than juſtice; and magnanimity, heroiſm, undaunted courage, a ſtill greater figure. One would imagine at firſt view, that the primary virtues, being more eſſential, ſhould be entitled to the firſt place in our eſteem, and be more amply rewarded than the ſecondary; and yet in elevating the latter above the former, peculiar wiſdom and foreſight are conſpicuous. Puniſhment is appropriated to enforce primary virtues; and if theſe virtues were alſo attended with the higheſt rewards, ſecondary virtues, degraded to a lower rank, would be deprived of that enthuſiaſtic admiration which is their chief ſupport: ſelf-intereſt would univerſally prevail over benevolence; and would baniſh thoſe numberleſs favours we receive from each other in ſociety, which are beneficial in point of intereſt, and ſtill more ſo by generating affection and friendſhip.

In our progreſs through final cauſes, we come at laſt to reparation, one of the principles deſtined by Providence for redreſſing wrongs committed, and for preventing reiteration. The final cauſe of this principle, where the miſchief ariſes from intention, is clear: for to protect individuals in ſociety, it is not ſufficient that the delinquent be puniſhed; it is neceſſary over and above, that the miſchief be repaired.

Secondly, Where the act is wrong or unjuſt, though not underſtood by the author to be ſo, it is wiſely ordered that reparation ſhould follow; which will

will thus appear. Conſidering the fallibility of man, it would be too ſevere never to give any allowance for error. On the other hand, to make it a law in our nature, never to take advantage of error, would be giving too much indulgence to indolence and remiſſion of mind, tending to make us neglect the improvement of our rational faculties. Our nature is ſo happily framed, as to avoid theſe extremes by diſtinguiſhing between gain and loſs. No man is conſcious of wrong, when he takes advantage of an error committed by another to ſave himſelf from loſs: if there muſt be a loſs, common ſenſe dictates, that it ought to reſt upon the perſon who has erred, however innocently, rather than upon the perſon who has not erred. Thus, in a competition among creditors about the eſtate of their bankrupt debtor, every one is at liberty to avail himſelf of an error committed by his competitor, in order to recover payment. But *in lucro captando*, the moral ſenſe teacheth a different leſſon; which is, that no man ought to lay hold of another's error to make gain by it. Thus, an heir finding a rough diamond in the repoſitories of his anceſtor, gives it away, miſtaking it for a common pebble: the purchaſer is in conſcience and equity bound to reſtore, or to pay a juſt price.

Thirdly, The following conſiderations reſpecting the precaution that is neceſſary in acting, unfold a final cauſe, no leſs beautiful than that laſt mentioned. Society could not ſubſiſt in any tolerable

lerable manner, were full ſcope given to raſhneſs and negligence, and to every action that ſtrictly ſpeaking is not criminal; whence it is a maxim, founded no leſs upon utility than upon juſtice, That men in ſociety ought to be extremely circumſpect, as to every action that may poſſibly do harm. On the other hand, it is alſo a maxim, That as the proſperity and happineſs of man depend on action, activity ought to be encouraged, inſtead of being diſcouraged by dread of conſequences. Theſe maxims, ſeemingly in oppoſition, have natural limits that prevent their encroaching one upon the other. There is a certain degree of attention and circumſpection that men generally beſtow upon affairs, proportioned to their importance: if that degree were not ſufficient to defend againſt a claim of reparation, individuals would be too much cramped in action; which would be a great diſcouragement to activity: if a leſs degree were ſufficient, there would be too great ſcope for raſh or remiſs conduct; which would prove the bane of ſociety. Theſe limits, which evidently tend to the good of ſociety, are adjuſted by the moral ſenſe; which dictates, as laid down in the ſection of Reparation, that the man who acts with foreſight of the probability of miſchief, or acts raſhly and uncautiouſly without ſuch foreſight, ought to be liable for conſequences; but that the man who acts cautiouſly, without foreſeeing or ſuſpecting any

any miſchief, ought not to be liable for conſequences.

In the ſame ſection it is laid down, that the moral ſenſe requires from every man, not his own degree of vigilance and attention, which may be very ſmall, but that which belongs to the common nature of the ſpecies. The final cauſe of that regulation will appear upon conſidering, that were reparation to depend upon perſonal circumſtances, there would be a neceſſity of inquiring into the character of individuals, their education, their manner of living, and the extent of their underſtanding; which would render judges arbitrary, and ſuch law-ſuits inextricable. But by aſſuming the common nature of the ſpecies as a ſtandard, by which every man in conſcience judges of his own actions, law-ſuits about reparation are rendered eaſy and expeditious.

SECT. VIII.

Liberty and Neceſſity conſidered with reſpect to Morality.

HAVING, in the foregoing ſections, aſcertained the reality of a moral ſenſe, with its ſentiments of approbation and diſapprobation, praiſe and blame; the purpoſe of the preſent ſection is, to ſhew, that theſe ſentiments are conſiſtent with the

the laws that govern the actions of man as a rational being. In order to which, it is firſt neceſſary to explain theſe laws; for there has been much controverſy about them, eſpecially among divines of the Arminian and Calviniſt ſects.

Human actions, as laid down in the firſt ſection, are of three kinds: one, where we act by inſtinct, without any view to conſequences; one, where we act by will, in order to produce ſome effect; and one, where we act againſt will. With reſpect to the firſt, the agent acts blindly, without deliberation or choice; and the external act follows neceſſarily from the inſtinctive impulſe *. Voluntary actions done with a view to an end, are in a very different condition: into theſe, deſire and will, enter: deſire to accompliſh the end goes firſt; the will to act in order to accompliſh the end is next;

* A ſtonechatter makes its neſt on the ground or near it; and the young, as ſoon as they can ſhift for themſelves, leave the neſt inſtinctively. An egg of that bird was laid in a ſwallow's neſt, fixed to the roof of a church. The ſwallow fed all the young equally, without diſtinction. The young ſtonechatter left the neſt at the uſual time before it could fly; and falling to the ground, it was taken up dead. Here is inſtinct in purity, exerting itſelf blindly without regard to variation of circumſtances. The ſame is obſervable in our dunghil-fowl. They feed on worms, corn, and other ſeeds dropt on the ground. In order to diſcover their food, nature has provided them with an inſtinct to ſcrape with the foot; and the inſtinct is ſo regularly exerciſed, that they ſcrape even when they are ſet upon a heap of corn.

next; and the external act follows of courſe. Deſire conſidered as what influences the will, is termed a *motive*. Thus, hearing that my friend is in the hands of robbers, I burn with deſire to free him: deſire influences my will to arm my ſervants, and to fly to his relief. Actions done againſt will come in afterward.

But what is it that raiſes deſire? The anſwer is ready: it is the proſpect of attaining ſome agreeable end, or of avoiding one that is diſagreeable. And if it be inquired, What makes an object agreeable or diſagreeable; the anſwer is equally ready, that our nature makes it ſo. Certain viſible objects are agreeable, certain ſounds, and certain ſmells: other objects of theſe ſenſes are diſagreeable. But there we muſt ſtop; for we are far from being ſo intimately acquainted with our own nature as to aſſign the cauſes. Theſe hints are ſufficient for my preſent purpoſe: if one be curious to know more, the theory of deſire, and of agreeableneſs and diſagreeableneſs, will be found in Elements of Criticiſm *.

With reſpect to inſtinctive actions, no perſon, I preſume, thinks that there is any freedom: an infant applies to the nipple, and a bird builds a neſt, no leſs neceſſarily than a ſtone falls to the ground. With reſpect to voluntary actions, done in order to produce ſome effect, the neceſſity is the ſame, though leſs apparent at firſt view.

* Chap. 2.

The external action is determined by the will: the will is determined by desire: and desire by what is agreeable or disagreeable. Here is a chain of causes and effects, not one link of which is arbitrary, or under command of the agent: he cannot will but according to his desire: he cannot desire but according to what is agreeable or disagreeable in the objects perceived: nor do these qualities depend on his inclination or fancy; he has no power to make a beautiful woman appear ugly, nor to make a rotten carcase smell sweetly.

Many good men apprehending danger to morality from holding our actions to be necessary, endeavour to break the chain of causes and effects above mentioned, maintaining, "That whatever "influence desire or motives may have, it is the "agent himself who is the cause of every action; "that desire may advise, but cannot command; "and therefore that a man is still free to act in "contradiction to desire, and to the strongest motives." That a being may exist, which in every case acts blindly and arbitrarily, without having any end in view, I can make a shift to conceive: but it is difficult for me even to imagine a thinking and rational being, that has affections and passions, that has a desirable end in view, that can easily accomplish this end; and yet, after all, can fly off, or remain at rest, without any cause, reason, or motive, to sway it. If such a whimsical being can possibly exist, I am certain that man is

not

not the being. There is perhaps not a perſon above the condition of a changeling, but can ſay why he did ſo and ſo, what moved him, what he intended. Nor is a ſingle fact ſtated to make us believe, that ever a man acted againſt his own deſire, who was not compelled by external force. On the contrary, conſtant and univerſal experience proves, that human actions are governed by certain inflexible laws; and that a man cannot exert his ſelf-motive power, but in purſuance of ſome deſire or motive.

Had a motive always the ſame influence, actions proceeding from it would appear no leſs neceſſary than the actions of matter. The various degrees of influence that motives have on different men at the ſame time, and on the ſame man at different times, occaſion a doubt by ſuggeſting a notion of chance. Some motives however have ſuch influence, as to leave no doubt: a timid female has a phyſical power to throw herſelf into the mouth of a lion, roaring for food; but ſhe is withheld by terror no leſs effectually than by cords: if ſhe ſhould ruſh upon the lion, would not every one conclude that ſhe was frantic? A man, though in a deep ſleep, retains a phyſical power to act, but he cannot exert it. A man, though deſperately in love, retains a phyſical power to refuſe the hand of his miſtreſs; but he cannot exert that power in contradiction to his own ardent deſire, more than if he were faſt aſleep. Now if a

ſtrong motive have a neceſſary influence, there is no reaſon for doubting, but that a weak motive muſt alſo have its influence, the ſame in kind, though not in degree. Some actions indeed are ſtrangely irregular: but let the wildeſt action be ſcrutinized, there will always be diſcovered ſome motive or deſire, which, however whimſical or capricious, was what influenced the perſon to act. Of two contending motives, is it not natural to expect that the ſtronger will prevail, however little its exceſs may be? If there be any doubt, it muſt ariſe from a ſuppoſition that a weak motive can be reſiſted arbitrarily. Where then are we to fix the boundary between a weak and a ſtrong motive? If a weak motive can be reſiſted, why not one a little ſtronger, and why not the ſtrongeſt? In Elements of Criticiſm * the reader will find many examples of contrary motives weighing againſt each other. Let him ponder theſe with the ſtricteſt attention: his concluſion will be, that between two motives, however nearly balanced, a man has not an arbitrary choice, but muſt yield to the ſtronger. The mind indeed fluctuates for ſome time, and feels itſelf in a meaſure looſe: at laſt, however, it is determined by the more powerful motive, as a balance is by the greater weight after many vibrations.

Such then are the laws that govern our voluntary actions. A man is abſolutely free to act according

* Chap. 2. Part 4.

cording to his own will; greater freedom than which is not conceivable. At the ſame time, as man is made accountable for his conduct, to his Maker, to his fellow-creatures, and to himſelf, he is not left to act arbitrarily; for at that rate he would be altogether unaccountable: his will is regulated by deſire; and deſire by what pleaſes or diſpleaſes him. Where we are ſubjected to the will of another, would it be our wiſh, that his will ſhould be under no regulation? And where we are guided by our own will, would it be reaſonable to wiſh, that it ſhould be under no regulation, but be exerted without reaſon, without any motive, and contrary to common ſenſe? Thus, with regard to human conduct, there is a chain of laws eſtabliſhed by nature, no one link of which is left arbitrary. By that wiſe ſyſtem, man is made accountable: by it, he is made a fit ſubject for divine and human government: by it, perſons of ſagacity foreſee the conduct of others: and by it, the preſence of the Deity with reſpect to human actions, is clearly eſtabliſhed.

The abſurd figure that a man would make acting in contradiction to motives, ſhould be ſufficient to open our eyes without an argument. What a deſpicable figure does a perſon make, upon whom the ſame motive has great influence at one time, and very little at another? He is a bad member of ſociety, and cannot be relied on as a friend or as an aſſociate. But how highly rational is this

ſuppoſed perſon, compared with one who can act in contradiction to every motive? The former may be termed whimſical or capricious: the latter is worſe; he is abſolutely unaccountable, and cannot be the ſubject of government, more than a lump of matter unconſcious of its own motion.

Let the faculty of acting be compared with that of reaſoning: the compariſon will reconcile every unbiaſſed mind to the neceſſary influence of motives. A man is tied by his nature to form concluſions upon what appears to him true at the time. This indeed does not always ſecure him againſt error; but would he be more ſecure by a power to form concluſions contrary to what appears true? Such a power would make him a moſt abſurd reaſoner. Would he be leſs abſurd in acting, if he had a power to act againſt motives, and contrary to what he thinks right or eligible? To act in that manner, is inconſiſtent with any notion we can form of a ſenſible being. Nor do we ſuppoſe that man is ſuch a being; in accounting for any action, however whimſical, we always aſcribe it to ſome motive; never once dreaming that there was no motive.

And after all, where would be the advantage of ſuch an arbitrary power? Can a rational man wiſh ſeriouſly to have ſuch a power? or can he ſeriouſly think, that God would make man ſo whimſical a being? To endue man with a degree of ſelf-command ſufficient to reſiſt every vitious motive, without

without any power to reſiſt thoſe that are virtuous, would indeed be a valuable gift; too valuable indeed for man, becauſe it would exalt him to be an angel. But ſuch ſelf-command as to reſiſt both equally, which is the preſent ſuppoſition, would be a great curſe, as it would unqualify us for being governed either by God or by man. Better far to be led as rational creatures by the proſpect of good, however erroneous our judgment may ſometimes be.

While all other animals are ſubjected to divine government and unerringly fulfil their deſtination, and conſidering that man is the only terreſtrial being who is formed to know his Maker and to worſhip him; will it not ſound harſh that he alone ſhould be withdrawn from divine government? The power of reſiſting the ſtrongeſt motives, whether of religion or of morality, would render him independent of the Deity.

This reaſoning is too diffuſe: if it can be comprehended in a ſingle view, it will make the deeper impreſſion. There may be conceived different ſyſtems for governing man as a thinking and rational being. One is, That virtuous motives ſhould always prevail over every other motive. This, in appearance, would be the moſt perfect government: but man is not ſo conſtituted; and there is reaſon to doubt, whether ſuch perfection would in his preſent ſtate correſpond to the other branches of his nature *. Another ſyſtem is, that virtuous

* See book 2. ſketch 1. at the end.

motives ſometimes prevail, ſometimes vitious; and that we are always determined by the prevailing motive. This is the true ſyſtem of nature; and hence great variety of character and of conduct among men. A third ſyſtem is, That motives have influence; but that one can act in contradiction to every motive. This is the ſyſtem I have been combating. Obſerve only what it reſolves into. How is an action to be accounted for that is done in contradiction to every motive? It wanders from the region of common ſenſe into that of mere chance. If ſuch were the nature of man, no one could rely on another: a promiſe or an oath would be a rope of ſand: the utmoſt cordiality between two friends would be no ſecurity to either againſt the other: the firſt weapon that comes in the way might be lethal. Would any man wiſh to have been formed according to ſuch a model? He would probably wiſh to have been formed according to the model firſt mentioned: but that is denied him, virtuous motives ſometimes prevailing, ſometimes vitious; and from the wiſdom of Providence we have reaſon to believe, that this law is of all the beſt fitted for man in his preſent ſtate.

To conclude this branch of the ſubject: In none of the works of Providence, as far as we can penetrate, is there diſplayed a deeper reach of art and wiſdom, than in the laws of action peculiar to man as a thinking and rational being. Were he

let

let loose to act in contradiction to motives, there would be no place for prudence, foresight, nor for adjusting means to an end: It could not be foreseen by others what a man would do the next hour; nay it could not be foreseen even by himself. Man would not be capable of rewards and punishments: he would not be fitted, either for divine or for human government: he would be a creature that has no resemblance to the human race. But man is not left loose; for though he is at liberty to act according to his own will, yet his will is regulated by desire, and desire by what pleases and displeases. This connection preserves uniformity of conduct, and confines human actions within the great chain of causes and effects. By this admirable system, liberty and necessity, seemingly incompatible, are made perfectly concordant, fitting us for society, and for government both human and divine.

Having explained the laws that govern human actions; we proceed to what is chiefly intended in the present section, which is, to examine how far the moral sentiments handled in the foregoing sections are consistent with these laws. Let it be kept in view, that the perception of a right and a wrong in actions, is founded entirely upon the moral sense. And that upon the same sense are founded the sentiments of approbation and praise when a man does right, and of disapprobation and blame when he does wrong. Were we destitute of the moral sense, right and wrong, praise and blame, would

would be as little underſtood as colours are by one born blind *.

The formidable argument urged to prove that our moral ſentiments are inconſiſtent with the ſuppoſed neceſſary influence of motives, is what follows. "If motives have a neceſſary influence on "our actions, there can be no good reaſon to "praiſe a man for doing right, nor to blame him "for doing wrong. What foundation can there "be either for praiſe or blame, when it was not "in a man's power to have acted otherwiſe. A "man commits murder, inſtigated by a ſudden fit "of revenge: why ſhould he be puniſhed, if he "acted neceſſarily, and could not reſiſt the vio-"lence of the paſſion?" Here it is ſuppoſed, that a power of reſiſtance is eſſential to praiſe and blame. But upon examination it will be found, that this ſuppoſition has not any ſupport in the moral

* In an intricate ſubject like the preſent, great care ſhould be taken to avoid ambiguities. The term *praiſe* has two different ſignifications: in one ſenſe it is oppoſed to *blame*; in another, to *diſpraiſe*. In the former ſenſe, it expreſſes a moral ſentiment: in the latter, it expreſſes only the approving any object that pleaſes me. I praiſe one man for his candour, and blame another for being a double-dealer. Theſe, both of them, imply will and intention. I praiſe a man for being acute; but for being dull, I only diſpraiſe him. I praiſe a woman for beauty; but blame not any for uglineſs, I only diſpraiſe them. None of theſe particulars imply will or intention.

moral ſenſe, nor in reaſon, nor in the common ſenſe of mankind.

With reſpect to the firſt, the moral ſenſe, as we have ſeen above, places innocence and guilt, and conſequently praiſe and blame, entirely upon will and intention. The connection between the motive and the action, ſo far from diminiſhing, enhances the praiſe or blame. The greater influence a virtuous motive has, the greater is the virtue of the actor, and the more warm our praiſe. On the other hand, the greater influence a vitious motive has, the greater is the vice of the actor, and the more violently do we blame him. As this is the cardinal point, I wiſh to have it conſidered in a general view. It is eſſential both to human and divine government, that the influence of motives ſhould be neceſſary. It is equally eſſential, that that neceſſary influence ſhould not have the effect to leſſen guilt in the eſtimation of men. To fulfil both ends, guilt is placed by the moral ſenſe entirely upon will and intention: a man accordingly blames himſelf for doing miſchief willingly and intentionally, without once conſidering whether he acted neceſſarily or not. And his ſentiments are adopted by all the world: they pronounce the ſame ſentence of condemnation that he himſelf does. A man put to the torture, yields to the pain, and with bitter reluctance reveals the ſecrets of his party: another does the ſame, yielding to a tempting bribe. The latter only is blamed as guilty

guilty of a crime; and yet the bribe perhaps operated as ſtrongly on the latter, as torture did on the former. But the one was compelled reluctantly to reveal the ſecrets of his party; and therefore is innocent: the other acted willingly, in order to procure a great ſum of money; and therefore is guilty.

With reſpect to reaſon, I obſerve, that the moral ſenſe is the only judge in this controverſy, not the faculty of reaſon. I ſhould, however, not be afraid of a ſentence againſt me, were reaſon to be the judge. For would not reaſon dictate, that the leſs a man wavers about his duty, or, in other words, the leſs influence vitious motives have, the more praiſe-worthy he is; and the more blameable, the leſs influence virtuous motives have?

Nor are we led by common ſenſe to differ from reaſon or from the moral ſenſe. A man commits murder, overcome by a ſudden fit of revenge which he could not reſiſt: do we not reflect, even at firſt view, that the man did not deſire to reſiſt; and that he would have committed the murder, though he had not been under any neceſſity? a perſon of plain underſtanding will ſay, What ſignifies it whether the criminal could reſiſt it or no, when he committed the murder wittingly and willingly? A man gives poiſon privately out of revenge. Does any one doubt of his guilt, when he never once repented; though after adminiſtering the poiſon it no longer was in his power to draw back? A

man

man may be guilty and blame-worthy, even where there is external compulſion that he cannot reſiſt. With ſword in hand I run to attack an enemy: my foot ſlipping, I fall headlong upon him, and by that accident the ſword is puſhed into his body. The external act was not the effect of Will, but of accident: but my intention was to commit murder, and I am guilty. All men acknowledge, that the Deity is neceſſarily good. Does that circumſtance detract from his praiſe in common apprehenſion? On the contrary, he merits from us the higheſt praiſe on that very account.

It is commonly ſaid, that there can be no virtue where there is no ſtruggle. Virtue, it is true, is beſt known from a ſtruggle: a man who has never met with a temptation, can be little confident of his virtue. But the obſervation taken in a ſtrict ſenſe, is undoubtedly erroneous. A man, tempted to betray his truſt, wavers; but, after much doubting, refuſes at laſt the bribe. Another heſitates not a moment, but rejects the bribe with diſdain: duty is obſtinate, and will not ſuffer him even to deliberate. Is there no virtue in the latter? Undoubtedly more than in the former.

Upon the whole, it appears that praiſe and blame reſt ultimately upon the diſpoſition or frame of mind *. Nor is it obvious, that a power to act againſt

* Malice and reſentment, though commonly joined together, have no reſemblance but in producing miſchief. Malice is

againſt motives, could vary in any degree theſe moral ſentiments. When a man commits a crime, let it be ſuppoſed that he could have reſiſted the prevailing motive. Why then did he not reſiſt, inſtead of bringing upon himſelf ſhame and miſery? The anſwer muſt be, for no other can be given, that his diſpoſition is vicious, and that he is a deteſtable creature. Further, it is not a little difficult to conceive, how a man can reſiſt a prevailing motive, without having any thing in his mind that ſhould engage him to reſiſt it. But letting that paſs, I make the following ſuppoſition. A man is tempted by avarice to accept a bribe: if he reſiſt upon the principle of duty, he is led by the prevailing motive: if he reſiſt without having any reaſon or motive for reſiſting, I cannot diſcover any merit in ſuch reſiſtance: it ſeems to reſolve into a matter of chance or accident, whether he reſiſt or do not reſiſt. Where can the merit lie of reſiſting a vicious motive, when reſiſtance happens by mere chance? and where the demerit of reſiſting a virtuous motive, when it is owing to the ſame chance? If a man, actuated by no principle, good or bad, and having no end or purpoſe in view, ſhould kill his neighbour, I ſee not that he

is a propenſity of nature that operates deliberately without paſſion: reſentment is a paſſion to which even good-natured people are ſubject. A malicious character is eſteemed much more vitious than one that is iraſcible. Does not this ſhew that virtue and vice conſiſt more in diſpoſition than in action?

he would be more accountable, than if he had acted in his ſleep, or were mad.

Human puniſhments are perfectly conſiſtent with the neceſſary influence of motives, without ſuppoſing a power to withſtand them. If it be urged, That a man ought not to be puniſhed for committing a crime when he could not reſiſt: the anſwer is, That as he committed the crime intentionally and with his eyes open, he is guilty in his own opinion, and in the opinion of all men. Here is a juſt foundation for puniſhment. And its utility is great; being intended to deter people from committing crimes. The dread of puniſhment is a weight in the ſcale on the ſide of virtue, to counterbalance vitious motives.

The final cauſe of this branch of our nature is admirable. If the neceſſary influence of motives had the effect either to leſſen the merit of a virtuous action, or the demerit of a crime, morality would be totally unhinged. The moſt virtuous action would of all be the leaſt worthy of praiſe; and the moſt vitious be of all the leaſt worthy of blame. Nor would the evil ſtop there: inſtead of curbing inordinate paſſions, we ſhould be encouraged to indulge them, as an excellent excuſe for doing wrong. Thus, the moral ſentiments of approbation and diſapprobation, of praiſe and blame, are found perfectly conſiſtent with the laws above mentioned that govern human actions, without

out neceſſity of recurring to an imaginay power of acting againſt motives.

The only plauſible objection I have met with againſt the foregoing theory, is the remorſe a man feels for a crime he ſuddenly commits, and as ſuddenly repents of. During a fit of bitter remorſe for having ſlain my favourite ſervant in a violent paſſion, without juſt provocation, I accuſe myſelf for having given way to paſſion; and acknowledge that I could and ought to have reſtrained it. Here we find remorſe founded on a ſyſtem directly oppoſite to that above laid down; a ſyſtem that acknowledges no neceſſary connection between an action and its motive; but, on the contrary, ſuppoſes that it is in a man's power to reſiſt his paſſion, and that he ought to reſiſt it. What ſhall be ſaid upon this point? Can a man be a neceſſary agent, when he is conſcious of the contrary, and is ſenſible that he can act in contradiction to motives? This objection is ſtrong in appearance; and would be invincible, were we not happily relieved of it by a doctrine laid down in Elements of Criticiſm * concerning the irregular influence of paſſion on our opinions and ſentiments. Upon examination, it will be found, that the preſent caſe may be added to the many examples there given of that irregular influence. In a peeviſh fit, I take exception at ſome ſlight word or geſture of my friend, which I interpret as if he doubted of my veracity.

* Chap. 2. Part 5.

veracity. I am inſtantly in a flame: in vain he proteſts that he had no meaning, for impatience will not ſuffer me to liſten. I bid him draw, which he does with reluctance; and before he is well prepared, I give him a mortal wound. Bitter remorſe and anguiſh ſucceed inſtantly to rage. "What have "I done? I have murdered my innocent, my beſt "friend; and yet I was not mad—with that hand "I did the horrid deed; why did not I rather "turn it againſt my own heart?" Here every impreſſion of neceſſity vaniſhes: my mind informs me that I was abſolutely free, and that I ought to have ſmothered my paſſion. I put an oppoſite caſe. A brutal fellow treats me with great indignity, and proceeds even to a blow. My paſſion riſes beyond the poſſibility of reſtraint: I can ſcarce forbear ſo long as to bid him draw; and that moment I ſtab him to the heart. I am ſorry for having been engaged with a ruffian; but have no contrition nor remorſe. In this caſe, I never once dream that I could have reſiſted the impulſe of paſſion: on the contrary, my thoughts and words are, "That fleſh and blood could not "bear the affront; and that I muſt have been "branded for a coward, had I not done what I "did." In reality, both actions were equally neceſſary. Whence then opinions and ſentiments ſo oppoſite to each other? The irregular influence of paſſion on our opinions and ſentiments, will ſolve the queſtion. All violent paſſions are prone to their own gratification. A man who has done

an action that he repents of and that affects him with anguish, abhors himself, and is odious in his own eyes: he wishes to find himself guilty; and the thought that his guilt is beyond the possibility of excuse, gratifies the passion. In the first case, accordingly, remorse forces upon me a conviction that I might have restrained my passion, and ought to have restrained it. I will not give way to any excuse; because in a severe fit of remorse, it gives me pain to be excused. In the other case, as there is no remorse, things appear in their true light without disguise. To illustrate this reasoning, I observe, that passion warps my judgment of the actions of others, as well as of my own. Many examples are given in the chapter above quoted: join to these the following. My servant aiming at a partridge, happens to shoot a favourite spaniel crossing the way unseen. Inflamed with anger, I storm at his rashness, pronounce him guilty, and will listen to no excuse. When passion subsides, I become sensible that the action was merely accidental, and that the man is absolutely innocent. The nurse overlays my only child, the long-expected heir to a great estate. With difficulty I refrain from putting her to death: "The wretch "has murdered my infant: she ought to be torn "to pieces." When I turn calm, the matter appears to me in a very different light. The poor woman is inconsolable, and can scarce believe that she is innocent: she bitterly reproaches herself for

for want of care and concern. But, upon cool reflection, both ſhe and I become ſenſible, that no perſon in ſound ſleep has any ſelf-command, and that we cannot be anſwerable for any action of which we are not conſcious. Thus, upon the whole, we diſcover, that any impreſſion we occaſionally have of being able to act in contradiction to motives, is the reſult of paſſion, not of ſound judgment.

The reader will obſerve, that this ſection is copied from Eſſays on Morality and Natural Religion. The ground-work is the ſame: the alterations are only in the ſuperſtructure; and the ſubject is abridged, in order to adapt it to its preſent place. The preceding parts of the Sketch were publiſhed in the ſecond edition of the Principles of Equity. But as law-books have little currency, the publiſhing the whole in one eſſay, will not, I hope, be thought improper.

APPENDIX.

Upon Chance and Contingency.

I Hold it to be an intuitive propoſition, That the Deity is the primary cauſe of all things, that with conſummate wiſdom he formed the

great plan of government, which he carries on by laws ſuited to the different natures of animate and inanimate beings; and that theſe laws, produce a regular chain of cauſes and effects in the moral as well as the material world, admitting no events but what are comprehended in the original plan *. Hence it clearly follows, that chance is excluded out of this world, that nothing can happen by accident, and that no event is arbitrary or contingent. This is the doctrine of the eſſay quoted; and, in my apprehenſion, well founded. But I cannot ſubſcribe to what follows, "That we have an im-" preſſion of chance and contingency, which con-" ſequently muſt be deluſive." I would not willingly admit any deluſion in the nature of man, unleſs it were made evident beyond contradiction; and I now ſee clearly, that the impreſſion we have of chance and contingency, is not deluſive, but perfectly conſiſtent with the eſtabliſhed plan.

The explanation of chance and contingency in the ſaid eſſay, ſhall be given in the author's own words, as a proper text to reaſon upon. "In our " ordinary train of thinking, it is certain that all " events appear not to us as neceſſary. A multi-" tude of events ſeem to be under our power to " cauſe or to prevent; and we readily make a di-" ſtinction betwixt events that are *neceſſary, i. e.* " that muſt be; and events that are *contingent, i. e.* that

* See Eſſays on Morality and Natural Religion, Part i. Eſſay 3.

" that may be, or may not be. This diſtinction
" is void of truth: for all things that fall out ei-
" ther in the material or moral world, are, as we
" have ſeen, alike neceſſary, and alike the reſult
" of fixed laws. Yet, whatever conviction a phi-
" loſopher may have of this, the diſtinction be-
" twixt things neceſſary and things contingent,
" poſſeſſes his ordinary train of thought, as much
" as it poſſeſſes the moſt illiterate. We act uni-
" verſally upon that diſtinction: nay it is in truth
" the cauſe of all the labour, care, and induſtry
" of mankind. I illuſtrate this doctrine by an
" example. Conſtant experience hath taught us,
" that death is a neceſſary event. The human
" frame is not made to laſt for ever in its preſent
" condition; and no man thinks of more than a
" temporary exiſtence upon this globe. But the
" particular time of our death appears a contin-
" gent event. However certain it be, that the
" time and manner of the death of each individual
" is determinined by a train of preceding cauſes,
" and is no leſs fixed than the hour of the ſun's
" riſing or ſetting; yet no perſon is affected by
" this doctrine. In the care of prolonging life,
" we are directed by the ſuppoſed contingency of
" the time of death, which, to a certain term of
" years, we conſider as depending in a great mea-
" ſure on ourſelves, by caution againſt accidents,
" due uſe of food, exerciſe, &c. Theſe means are
" proſecuted with the ſame diligence as if there

" were in fact no neceſſary train of cauſes to fix " the period of life. In ſhort, whoever attends to " his own practical ideas, whoever reflects upon " the meaning of the following words, which oc- " cur in all languages, of things *poſſible*, *contingent*, " *that are in our power to cauſe or prevent;* who- " ever, I ſay, reflects upon theſe words, will clear- " ly ſee, that they ſuggeſt certain perceptions or " notions repugnant to the doctrine above eſta- " bliſhed of univerſal neceſſity."

In order to ſhow that there is no repugnance, I begin with defining *chance* and *contingency*. The former is applied to events that have happened; the latter to future events. When we ſay a thing has happened by *chance*, we ſurely do not mean that *chance* was the cauſe; for no perſon ever imagined that *chance* is a thing that can act, and by acting produce events: we only mean, that we are ignorant of the cauſe, and that, for ought we ſee, it might have happened or not happened, or have happened differently. Aiming at a bird, I ſhoot *by chance* a favourite ſpaniel: the meaning is not, that chance killed the dog, but that as to me the dog's death was accidental. With reſpect to contingency, future events that are variable and the cauſe unknown, are ſaid to be contingent; changes of the weather, for example, whether it will be froſt or thaw to-morrow, whether fair or foul. In a word, chance and contingency applied to events, mean not that ſuch events happen without

out any cauſe, but only that we are ignorant of the cauſe.

It appears to me, that there is no ſuch thing in human nature, as a ſenſe that any thing happens without a cauſe: ſuch a ſenſe would be groſsly deluſive. It is indeed true, that our ſenſe of a cauſe is not always equally diſtinct: with reſpect to an event that happens regularly, ſuch as ſummer, winter, riſing or ſetting of the ſun, we have a diſtinct ſenſe of a cauſe: our ſenſe is leſs diſtinct with reſpect to events leſs regular, ſuch as alterations of the weather; and extremely indiſtinct with reſpect to events that ſeldom happen, and that happen without any known cauſe. But with reſpect to no event whatever does our ſenſe of a cauſe vaniſh altogether, and give place to a ſenſe of things happening without a cauſe.

Chance and contingency thus explained, ſuggeſt not any perception or notion repugnant to the doctrine of univerſal neceſſity; for my ignorance of a cauſe, does not, even in my own apprehenſion, exclude a cauſe. Deſcending to particulars, I take the example mentioned in the text, namely, the uncertainty of the time of my death. Knowing that my life depends in ſome meaſure on myſelf, I uſe all means to preſerve it, by proper food, exerciſe, and care to prevent accidents. Nor is there any deluſion here. I am moved to uſe theſe means by the deſire I have to live: theſe means accordingly prove effectual to carry on my preſent

exiſtence to the appointed period; and in that view are ſo many links in the great chain of cauſes and effects. A burning coal falling from the grate upon the floor, wakes me from a ſound ſleep. I ſtart up to extinguiſh the fire. The motive is irreſiſtible: nor have I reaſon to reſiſt, were it in my power; for I conſider the extinction of the fire by my hand, to be one of the means choſen by Providence for prolonging my life to its deſtined period.

Were there a chain of cauſes and effects eſtabliſhed entirely independent on me, and were my life in no meaſure under my own power, it would indeed be fruitleſs for me to act; and the abſurdity of knowingly acting in vain, would be a prevailing motive for remaining at reſt. Upon that ſuppoſition, the *ignava ratio* of Chryſippus might take place; *cui ſi pareamus, nihil omnino agamus in vita* *. But I act neceſſarily when influenced by motives; and I have no reaſon to forbear, conſidering that my actions, by producing their intended effects, contribute to carry on the great chain.

PART

* "The indolent principle; which if we were to follow, "we ſhould do nothing in life."

PART II.

PROGRESS OF MORALITY.

HAVING unfolded the principles of morality, the next ſtep is to trace out its gradual progreſs, from its infancy among ſavages to its maturity among poliſhed nations. The hiſtory of opinions concerning the foundation of morality, falls not within my plan; and I am glad to be relieved from an article that is executed in perfection by more able hands *.

An animal is brought forth with every one of its external members: and completes its growth, not by production of any new member, but by addition of matter to thoſe originally formed. The ſame holds with reſpect to internal members; the ſenſes, for example, inſtincts, powers and faculties, principles and propenſities: theſe are coeval with the individual, and are gradually unfolded, ſome early, ſome late. The external ſenſes, being neceſſary for ſelf-preſervation, ſoon arrive at maturity. Some internal ſenſes, of order for example, of propriety, of dignity, of grace, being of no uſe during infancy, are not only ſlow in their progreſs toward maturity, but require much culture. Among ſavages they are ſcarce perceptible.

The

* Dr Cudworth and Dr Smith.

The moral ſenſe, in its progreſs, differs from thoſe laſt mentioned; being frequently diſcovered, even in childhood. It is however ſlow of growth, and ſeldom arrives at perfection without culture and experience.

The moral ſenſe not only ripens gradually with the other internal ſenſes mentioned, but from them acquires force and additional authority: a ſavage makes no difficulty to kill an enemy in cold blood: bloody ſcenes are familiar to him, and his moral ſenſe is not ſufficiently vigorous to give him compunction. The action appears in a different light to a perſon of delicate feelings; and accordingly, the moral ſenſe has much more authority over thoſe who have received a refined education, than over ſavages.

It is pleaſant to trace the progreſs of morality in members of a poliſhed nation. Objects of external ſenſe make the firſt impreſſions; and from them are derived a ſtock of ſimple ideas. Affection, accompanying ideas, is firſt directed to particular objects, ſuch as my father, my brother, my companion. The mind, opening by degrees, takes in complex objects, ſuch as my country, my religion, the government under which I live; and theſe alſo become objects of affection. Our connections multiply; and the moral ſenſe, acquiring ſtrength as the mind opens, regulates our duty to every connected object. Objects of hatred multiply as well as objects of affection, and give full

ſcope

ſcope to diſſocial paſſions, the moſt formidable antagoniſts that morality has to encounter. But nature hath provided a remedy: the perſon who indulges malice or revenge, is commonly the greateſt ſufferer by the indulgence: men become wiſe by experience, and have more peace and ſatisfaction in foſtering kindly affection: ſtormy paſſions are ſubdued, or brought under rigid diſcipline; and benevolence triumphs over ſelfiſhneſs. We refine upon the pleaſures of ſociety: we learn to ſubmit our opinions: we affect to give preference to others; and readily fall in with whatever ſweetens ſocial intercourſe: we carefully avoid cauſes of diſcord; and overlooking trivial offences, we are ſatisfied with moderate reparation, even for groſs injuries.

A nation from its original ſavage ſtate, grows to maturity like the individuals above deſcribed, and the progreſs of morality is the ſame in both. The ſavage ſtate is the infancy of a nation, during which the moral ſenſe is feeble, yielding to cuſtom, to imitation, to paſſion. But a nation, like a member of a poliſhed ſociety, ripens gradually, and acquires a taſte in the fine arts, with acuteneſs of ſenſe in matters of right and wrong. Hatred and revenge, the great obſtacles to moral duty, raged without controul, while the privilege of avenging wrongs was permitted to individuals *. But hatred and revenge yielded gradually to the pleaſures

* See Hiſtorical Law Tracts, tract 1.

pleaſures of ſociety, and to the growing authority of the moral ſenſe; and benevolent affections prevailed over diſſocial paſſions. In that comfortable period, we hear no more of cruelty as a national character: on the contrary, the averſion we have to an enemy, is even in war exerciſed with moderation. Nor do the ſtormy paſſions ever again revive; for after a nation begins to decline from its meridian height, the paſſions that prevail are not of the violent kind, but ſelfiſh, timorous, and deceitful.

Morality however has not to this day arrived to ſuch maturity, as to operate between nations with equal ſteadineſs and vigour, as between individuals. Ought this to be regretted as an imperfection in our nature? I think not: had we the ſame compunction of heart for injuring a nation as for injuring an individual, and were injuſtice equally blameable as to both; war would ceaſe, and a golden age enſue, than which a greater misfortune could not befal the human race *.

In the progreſs from maturity to a declining ſtate, a nation differs widely from an individual. Old age puts an end to the latter: there are many cauſes that weaken the former; but old age is none of them, if it be not in a metaphorical ſenſe. Riches, ſelfiſhneſs, and luxury, are the diſeaſes that weaken proſperous nations: theſe diſeaſes, following each other in a train, corrupt the heart, dethrone

* Book 2. ſketch 1.

dethrone the moral ſenſe, and make an anarchy in the ſoul: men ſtick at no expence to purchaſe pleaſure; and they ſtick at no vice to ſupply that expence.

Such are the outlines of morality in its progreſs from birth to burial; and theſe outlines I purpoſe to fill up with an induction of particulars. Looking back to the commencement of civil ſociety, when no wants were known but thoſe of nature, and when ſuch wants were amply provided for; we find individuals of the ſame tribe living innocently and cordially together: they had no irregular appetites, nor any ground for ſtrife. In that ſtate, moral principles joined their influence with that of national affection, to ſecure individuals from harm. Savages accordingly, who have plenty of food and are ſimple in habitation and clothing, ſeldom tranſgreſs the rules of morality within their own tribe. Diodorus Siculus, who compoſed his hiſtory recently after Cæſar's expedition into Britain, ſays, that the inhabitants dwelt in mean cottages covered with reeds or ſticks; that they were of much ſincerity and integrity, contented with plain and homely fare; and were ſtrangers to the exceſs and luxury of rich men. In Frieze-land, in Holland, and in other maritime provinces of the Netherlands, locks and keys were unknown, till the inhabitants became rich by commerce: they contented themſelves with bare neceſſaries, which every one had in plenty. The Laplanders have

have no notion of theft. When they make an excurſion into Norway, which is performed in the ſummer months, they leave their huts open, without fear that any thing will be purloined. Formerly they were entirely upright in their only commerce, that of bartering the ſkins of wild beaſts for tobacco, brandy, and coarſe cloth. But being often cheated by ſtrangers, they begin to be more cunning. Theft was unknown among the Caribbees till Europeans came among them. When they loſt any thing, they ſaid innocently, "The "Chriſtians have been here." Crantz, deſcribing the inhabitants of Iceland before they were corrupted by commerce with ſtrangers, ſays, that they lived under the ſame roof with their cattle; that every thing was common among them except their wives and children; and that they were ſimple in their manners, having no appetite but for what nature requires. In the reign of Edwin King of Northumberland, a child, as hiſtorians report, might have travelled with a purſe of gold, without hazard of robbery: in our days of luxury, want is ſo intolerable, that even fear of death is not ſufficient to deter us. All travellers agree, that the native Canadians are perfectly diſintereſted, abhorring deceit and lying. The Californians are fond of iron and ſharp inſtruments; and yet are ſo ſtrictly honeſt, that carpenter-tools left open during night, were ſafe. The ſavages of North America had no locks for their goods: they probably

bably have learned from Europeans to be more circumſpect. Procopius bears teſtimony *, that the Sclavi, like the Huns, were innocent people, free of malice. Plan Carpin, the Pope's ambaſſador to the Cham of Tartary, *anno* 1246, ſays, that the Tartars are not addicted to thieving; and that they leave their goods open without a lock. Nicholas Damaſcenus reports the ſame of the Celtæ. The original inhabitants of the iſland Borneo, expelled by the Mahometans from the ſea-coaſt to the centre of the country, are honeſt, induſtrious, and kindly to each other: they have ſome notion of property, but not ſuch as to render them covetous. Pagans in Siberia are numerous; and, though groſsly ignorant, eſpecially in matters of religion, they are a good moral people. It is rare to hear among them of perjury, thieving, fraud, or drunkenneſs; if we except thoſe who live among the Ruſſian Chriſtians, with whoſe vices they are tainted. Strahlenberg † bears teſtimony to their honeſty. Having employed a number of them in a long navigation, he ſlept in the ſame boat with men whoſe names he knew not, whoſe language he underſtood not, and yet loſt not a particle of his baggage. Being obliged to remain a fortnight among the Oſtiacs, upon the river Oby, his baggage lay open in a hut inhabited by a large family, and yet nothing was purloined. The following

* Hiſtoria Gothica, lib. 3.

† Deſcription of Ruſſia, Siberia, &c.

lowing incident, which he alſo mentions, is remarkable. A Ruſſian of Tobolſki, in the courſe of a long journey, lodged one night in an Oſtiac's hut, and the next day on the road miſſed his purſe with a hundred rubles. His landlord's ſon, hunting at ſome diſtance from the hut, found the purſe, but left it there. By his father's order, he covered it with branches, to ſecure it in caſe an owner ſhould be found. After three months, the Ruſſian returning, lodged with the ſame Oſtiac; and mentioning occaſionally the loſs of his purſe, the Oſtiac, who at firſt did not recollect his face, cried out with joy, "Art thou the man who loſt that purſe? "my ſon ſhall go and ſhow thee where it lies, "that thou mayeſt take it up with thine own "hand." The Hottentots* have not the leaſt notion of theft: though immoderately fond of tobacco and brandy, they are employed by the Dutch for tending warehouſes full of theſe commodities. Here is an inſtance of probity above temptation, even among ſavages in the firſt ſtage of ſocial life. Some individuals are more liberally endued than others with virtuous principles: may it not be thought, that in that reſpect nature has been more kind to the Hottentots than to many other tribes? Spaniards, ſettled on the ſea-coaſt of Chili, carry on a commerce with neighbouring ſavages, for bridles, ſpurs, knives, and other manufactures of iron; and in return receive oxen, horſes,

* Kolben.

horſes, and even children for ſlaves. A Spaniard carries his goods there; and after obtaining liberty to diſpoſe of them, he moves about, and delivers his goods, without the leaſt reſerve, to every one who bargains with him. When all is ſold, he intimates his departure; and every purchaſer hurries with his goods to him; and it is not known that any one Indian ever broke his engagement. They give him a guard to carry him ſafe out of their territory, with all the ſlaves, horſes, and cattle he has purchaſed. The ſavages of Brazil are faithful to their promiſes, and to the treaties they make with the Portugueſe. Upon ſome occaſions, they may be accuſed of error and wrong judgment, but never of injuſtice nor of duplicity.

While the earth was thinly peopled, plenty of food, procured by hunting and fiſhing, promoted population; but as population leſſens the ſtock of animal food, a ſavage nation, increaſing in numbers, muſt ſpread wider and wider for more game. Thus tribes, at firſt widely ſeparated from each other, approach gradually till they become neighbours. Hence a new ſcene with reſpect to morality. Differences about their hunting-fields, about their game, about perſonal injuries, multiply between neighbours; and every quarrel is blown into a flame, by the averſion men naturally have to ſtrangers. Anger, hatred, and revenge, now find vent, which formerly lay latent without an object: diſſocial paſſions prevail without con-

trol, becauſe among ſavages morality is no match for them; and cruelty becomes predominant in the human race. Ancient hiſtory accordingly is full of enormous cruelties; witneſs the incurſions of the northern barbarians into the Roman empire; and the incurſions of Genhizcan and Tamerlane into the fertile countries of Aſia, ſpreading deſtruction with fire and ſword, and ſparing neither man, woman, nor infant.

Malevolent paſſions, acquiring ſtrength by daily exerciſe againſt perſons of a different tribe, came to be vented againſt perſons even of the ſame tribe; and the privilege long enjoyed by individuals of avenging the wrongs done to them, beſtowed irreſiſtible force upon ſuch paſſions *. The hiſtory of ancient Greece preſents nothing to the reader but uſurpations, aſſaſſinations, and other horrid crimes. The names of many famous for wickedneſs, are ſtill preſerved; Atreus, for example, Eteocles, Alcmeon, Phedra, Clytemneſtra. The ſtory of Pelops and his deſcendants, is a chain of criminal horrors: during that period, parricide and inceſt were ordinary incidents. Euripides repreſents Medea vowing revenge againſt her huſband Jaſon, and laying a plot to poiſon him. Of that infamous plot the chorus expreſs their approbation, juſtifying every woman who, in like circumſtances, acts the ſame part.

The

* See Hiſtorical Law Tracts, tract 1.

The frequent incurſions of northern barbarians into the Roman empire, ſpread deſolation and ruin through the whole. The Romans, from the higheſt poliſh degenerating into ſavages, aſſumed by degrees the cruel and bloody manners of their conquerors; and the conquerors and conquered, blended into one maſs, equalled the groſſeſt barbarians of ancient times in ignorance and brutality. Clovis, King of the Franks, even after his converſion to Chriſtianity, aſſaſſinated without remorſe his neareſt kinſman. The children of Clodomir, *ann.* 530, were aſſaſſinated by their two uncles. In the thirteenth century, Ezzelino de Aromano obtained the ſovereignty of Padua, by maſſacring 12,000 of his fellow-citizens. Galeas Sforza, Duke of Milan, was aſſaſſinated *ann.* 1476 in the cathedral church of Milan, after the aſſaſſins had put up their prayers for courage to perpetrate the deed. It is a ſtill ſtronger proof how low morality was in thoſe days, that the Pope himſelf, Sextus IV. attempted to aſſaſſinate the two brothers, Laurent and Julien de Medicis; chuſing the elevation of the hoſt as a proper time, when the people would be buſy about their devotions. Nay more, that very Pope, with unparalleled impudence, excommunicated the Florentines for doing juſtice upon the intended aſſaſſins. The moſt ſacred oaths were in vain employed as a ſecurity againſt that horrid crime. Childebert II. King of the Franks, enticed Magnovald

to his court, by a ſolemn oath that he ſhould receive no harm; and yet made no difficulty to aſſaſſinate him during the gaiety of a banquet. But theſe inſtances, however horrid, make no figure compared with the maſſacre of St Bartholomew, where many thouſands were inhumanly and treacherouſly butchered. Even ſo late as the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, aſſaſſination was not held in every caſe to be criminal. Many ſolicitous applications were made to general councils of Chriſtian clergy, to declare it criminal in every caſe; but without ſucceſs. Ferdinand, King of Aragon and Navarre, after repeated aſſaſſinations and acts of perfidy, obtained the appellation of *Great*: ſo little authority had the moral ſenſe, during theſe dark and ſanguinary ages.

But it is ſcarce neceſſary to mention particular inſtances of the overbearing power of malevolent paſſions during theſe ages. An opinion, once univerſal, that the innocent may be juſtly involved in the ſame puniſhment with the guilty, is of itſelf irrefragable evidence, that morality formerly had very little influence when oppoſed by revenge. There is no moral principle more evident, than that puniſhment cannot be inflicted with juſtice but upon the guilty; and yet in Greece, the involving of the innocent with the guilty in the ſame puniſhment, was authoriſed even by poſitive law. By an Athenian law, a man committing ſacrilege, or betraying his country, was baniſhed with all his

his children *. And when a tyrant was put to death, his children ſuffered the ſame fate †. The puniſhment of treaſon in Macedon, was extended againſt the criminal's relations ‡. Hanno, a citizen of Carthage, formed a plot to enſlave his country, by poiſoning the whole ſenate at a banquet. He was tortured to death; and his children, with all his relations, were cut off without mercy, though they had no acceſſion to his guilt. Among the Japaneſe, a people remarkably ferocious, it is the practice to involve children and relations in the puniſhment of capital crimes. Even Cicero, the chief man for learning in the moſt enlightened period of the Roman republic, and a celebrated moraliſt, approves that practice: "Nec vero me "fugit, quam ſit acerbum parentum ſcelera filio- "rum pœnis lui: ſed hoc præclare legibus com- "paratum eſt, ut caritas liberorum amiciores pa- "rentes reipublicæ redderet § ‖." In Britain,

* Meurſius de legibus Atticis, lib. 2. cap. 2.

† Eod. lib. 2. cap. 15.

‡ Quintus Curtius, lib. 6. cap. 11.

§ "I am ſenſible of the hardſhip of puniſhing the child for "the crime of the parent: this, however, is a wiſe enactment "of our laws; for hereby the parent is bound to the intereſt "of the ſtate by the ſtrongeſt of all ties, the affection to his "offspring."

‖ Ep. 12. ad Brutum.

every one knows, that murder was retaliated, not only upon the criminal and his relations, but upon his whole clan; a practice ſo common as to be diſtinguiſhed by a peculiar name, that of *deadly feud*. As late as the days of King Edmund, a law was made in England, prohibiting deadly feud, except between the relations of the perſon murdered and the murderer himſelf.

I embrace the preſent opportunity to honour the Jews, by obſerving, that they were the firſt people we read of, who had correct notions of morality with reſpect to the preſent point. The following law is expreſs: "The fathers ſhall not be put "to death for the children, neither ſhall the chil-"dren be put to death for the fathers: every man "ſhall be put to death for his own ſin *." Amaziah, King of Judah, gave ſtrict obedience to that law, in avenging his father's death: "And it "came to paſs as ſoon as the kingdom was con-"firmed in his hand, that he ſlew his ſervants "which had ſlain the king his father. But the "children of the murderers he ſlew not; accord-"ing to that which is written in the book of the "law of Moſes †." There is an elegant paſſage in Ezekiel to the ſame purpoſe ‡: "What mean "ye, that ye uſe this proverb concerning the land "of Iſrael, ſaying, The fathers have eaten ſour "grapes,

* Deuteronomy xxiv. 16.

† 2 Kings, chap. xiv. ‡ Chap. xviii.

" grapes, and the children's teeth are ſet on edge?
" As I live, ſaith the Lord God, ye ſhall not have
" occaſion any more to uſe this proverb in Iſrael.
" The ſoul that ſinneth, it ſhall die: the ſon ſhall
" not bear the iniquity of the father, neither ſhall
" the father bear the iniquity of the ſon; the
" righteouſneſs of the righteous ſhall be upon him,
" and the wickedneſs of the wicked ſhall be upon
" him." Among the Jews, however, as among other nations, there are inſtances without number, of involving innocent children and relations in the ſame puniſhment with the guilty. Such power has revenge, as to trample upon conſcience, and upon the moſt expreſs laws. Inſtigated with rage for Nabal's ingratitude, King David made a vow to God, not to leave alive of all who pertained to Nabal any that piſſeth againſt the wall. And it was not any compunction of conſcience that diverted him from his cruel purpoſe, but Nabal's beautiful wife, who pacified him *. But ſuch contradiction between principle and practice, is not peculiar to the Jews. We find examples of it in the laws of the Roman empire. The true principle of puniſhment is laid down in an edict of the Emperors Arcadius and Honorius †. " Sancimus, ibi eſſe pœnam, ubi et noxia eſt. Pro-
" pinquos, notos, familiares, procul à calumnia ſub-
" movemus, quos reos ſceleris ſocietas non facit.

* 1 Samuel, chap. xxv.

† L. 22. Cod. de pœnis.

" Nec enim adfinitas vel amicitia nefarium cri-
" men admittunt. Peccata igitur ſuos teneant auc-
" tores: nec ulterius progrediatur metus quam
" reperiatur delictum. Hoc ſingulis quibuſque
" judicibus intimetur *." Theſe very Emperors, with reſpect to treaſon, which touched them nearer than other crimes, talk a very different language. After obſerving, that will and purpoſe alone without an overt act, is treaſon, ſubjecting the criminal to capital puniſhment and to forfeiture of all that belongs to him, they proceed in the following words †. " Filii vero ejus, quibus vitam Impera-
" toria ſpecialiter lenitate concedimus, (paterno
" enim deberent perire ſupplicio, in quibus pater-
" ni, hoc eſt, hæreditarii criminis exempla me-
" tuuntur), a materna, vel avita, omnium etiam
" proximorum hæreditate ac ſucceſſione, habe-
" antur alieni: teſtamentis extraneorum nihil ca-
" peant: ſint perpetuo egentes et pauperes, infa-
" mia eos paterna ſemper comitetur, ad nullos
" prorſus honores, ad nulla ſacramenta perveni-
" ant: ſint poſtremo tales, ut his, perpetua egeſta-
" te

* " We ordain, that the puniſhment of the crime ſhall ex-
" tend to the criminal alone. We hold his relations, his
" friends, and his acquaintances, unſuſpected; for intimacy,
" friendſhip, or connection, are no proof or argument of
" guilt. The conſequences of the crime ſhall purſue only
" its perpetrator. Let this ſtatute be intimated to all our
" judges."

† L. 5. Cod. ad leg. Jul. majeſt.

" te ſordentibus, ſit et mors ſolatium et vita ſup-
" plicium *."

Human nature is not ſo perverſe, as without veil or diſguiſe to puniſh a perſon acknowledged to be innocent. An irregular bias of imagination, which extends the qualities of the principal to its acceſſories, paves the way to that unjuſt practice †. That bias, ſtrengthened by indignation againſt an atrocious criminal, leads the mind haſtily to conclude, that all his connections are partakers of his guilt. In an enlightened age, the clearneſs of moral principles fetters the imagination from confounding the innocent with the guilty. There remain traces however of that bias, though not carried ſo far as murder. The ſentence pronounced againſt Ravilliac for aſſaſſinating Henry IV. of France,

* " By a ſpecial extenſion of our imperial clemency, we " allow the ſons of the criminal to live; although, from a rea-
" ſonable ſuſpicion of their inheriting his vicious nature, it
" were not unwiſe to doom them to ſuffer the puniſhment of
" their father. But it is our will, that they ſhall be incapable
" of all inheritance, either from the mother, the grandfather,
" or any of their kindred; that they ſhall be deprived of the
" power of inheriting by the teſtament of a ſtranger; that
" they ſhall be abandoned to the extreme of poverty and per-
" petual indigence; that the infamy of their father ſhall ever
" attend them, incapable of honours, and excluded from the
" participation of religious rites; that ſuch, in fine, ſhall be
" the miſery of their condition, that life ſhall be a puniſhment,
" and death a comfort."

† Elements of Criticiſm, chap. 2. ſect. 5.

France, ordains, "That his houſe be erazed to "the ground, and that no other building be ever "erected upon that ſpot." Was not this in imagination puniſhing a houſe for the proprietor's crime?

Murder and aſſaſſination are not only deſtructive in themſelves, but, if poſſible, ſtill more deſtructive in their conſequences. The practice of ſhedding blood unjuſtly and often wantonly, blunts conſcience, and paves the way to every crime. This obſervation is verified in the ancient Greeks: their cruel and ſanguinary character, rendered them little regardful of the ſtrict rules of juſtice. Right was held to depend on power, among men as among wild beaſts: it was conceived to be the will of the gods, that ſuperior force ſhould be a lawful title to dominion; "for what right can "the weak have to what they cannot defend?" Were that maxim to obtain, a weak man would have no right to liberty nor to life. That impious doctrine was avowed by the Athenians, and publicly aſſerted by their ambaſſadors in a conference with the Melians, reported by Thucydides*. Many perſons act as if force and right were the ſame; but a barefaced profeſſion of ſuch a doctrine is uncommon. In the Eumenides, a tragedy of Eſchylus, Oreſtes is arraigned in the Areopagus for killing his mother. Minerva, preſident of the court, decrees in favour of the Oreſtes: and for what reaſon?

* Lib. 5.

ſon? "Having no mother myſelf, the murder of "a mother toucheth not me *." In the tragedy of Electra, Oreſtes, conſulting the Delphic oracle about means to avenge his father's murder, was enjoined by Apollo to forbear force, but to employ fraud and guile. Obedient to that injunction, Oreſtes commands his tutor to ſpread in Argos the news of his death, and to confirm the ſame with a ſolemn oath. In Homer, even the great Jupiter makes no difficulty to ſend a lying dream to Agamemnon, chief of the Greeks. Diſſimulation is recommended by the goddeſs Minerva †. Ulyſſes declares his deteſtation at uſing freedom with truth ‡: and yet no man deals more in feigned ſtories §. In the 22d book of the Iliad, Minerva is guilty of groſs deceit and treachery to Hector. When he flies from Achilles, ſhe appears to him in the ſhape of his brother Deiphobus, exhorts him

* Athens, from the nature of its government, as eſtabliſhed by Solon, was rendered uncapable of any regular or conſiſtent body of laws. In every caſe, civil and criminal, the whole people were judges in the laſt reſort. And what ſort of judges will an ignorant multitude make, who have no guide but paſſion and prejudice? It is vain to make good laws, when ſuch judges are the interpreters. Anacharſis, the Scythian, being preſent at an aſſembly of the people, ſaid, "It "was ſingular, that in Athens, wiſe men pleaded cauſes, and "fools determined them."

† Odyſſey, Book 13.

‡ Book 14. § Book 14. Book 15.

him to turn upon Achilles, and promiſes to aſſiſt him. Hector accordingly, returning to the fight, darts his lance; which rebounds from the ſhield of Achilles, for by Vulcan it was made impenetrable. Hector calls upon his brother for another lance; but in vain, for Deiphobus was not there. The Greeks in Homer's time muſt have been ſtrangely deformed in their morals, when ſuch a ſtory could be reliſhed *. A nation begins not to poliſh nor to advance in morality, till writing be common; and writing was not known among the Greeks at the ſiege of Troy. Nor were the morals of that people, as we ſee, much purified for a long time after writing became common. When Plautus wrote, the Roman ſyſtem of morals muſt have been extremely impure. In his play termed *Menæchmi*, a gentleman of faſhion having accidentally got into his hands a lady's robe with a gold claſp; inſtead of returning them to the owner, endeavours to ſell them without ſhame or remorſe. Such a ſcene would not be endured at preſent, except among pickpockets. Both the Greeks and Carthaginians

* Upon the ſtory of Jupiter being deceived by Juno, in the 14th book of the Iliad, Pope ſays, "That he knows not a "bolder fiction in all antiquity, nor one that has a greater air "of impiety." Pope it would ſeem was little acquainted with antiquity: for ſuch acts of impiety were common among the Greeks; and in particular the incident mentioned in the text, is not only more impious, but alſo a more groſs violation of the laws of morality.

thaginians were held by the Romans to be artful and cunning. The Romans continued a plain people, with much ſimplicity of manners, when the nations mentioned had made great progreſs in the arts of life; and it is a ſad truth, that morality declines in proportion as a nation poliſhes. But if the Romans were later than the Greeks and Carthaginians in the arts of life, they ſoon ſurpaſſed them in every ſort of immorality. For this change of manners, they were indebted to their rapid conqueſts. The ſanguinary diſpoſition both of the Greeks and Romans, appears from another practice, that of expoſing their infant children, which continued till humanity came in ſome meaſure to prevail. The practice continues in China to this day, the populouſneſs of the country throwing a veil over the cruelty; but from the humanity of the Chineſe, I conjecture, that the practice is rare. The Jews, a cloudy and peeviſh tribe, much addicted to bloodſhed, were miſerably defective in moral principles. Take the following examples out of an endleſs number recorded in the books of the Old Teſtament. Jael, wife of Heber, took under her protection Siſera, general of the Canaanites, and engaged her faith for his ſecurity. She put him treacherouſly to death when aſleep; and was applauded by Deborah the propheteſs for the meritorious action *. That horrid deed would probably have appeared to her in a different light, had it

* Judges iv. 5.

it been committed againſt Barac, general of the Iſraelites. David, flying from Saul, took refuge with Achiſh, King of Gath; and, though protected by that King, made war againſt the King's allies, ſaying, that it was againſt his own countrymen of Judah. "And David ſaved neither man nor woman alive to bring tidings to "Gath. And Achiſh believed David, ſaying, He "hath made his people Iſrael utterly to abhor "him; therefore he ſhall be my ſervant for ever*." This was a complication of ingratitude, lying and treachery. Ziba, by preſents to King David, and by defaming his maſter Mephiboſheth, procured from the King a gift of his maſter's inheritance; though Mephiboſheth had neither trimmed his beard, nor waſhed his clothes, from the day the King departed till he returned in peace. "And it came to paſs, when Mephiboſheth was "come to Jeruſalem to meet the king, that the "king ſaid unto him, Wherefore wenteſt thou not "with me, Mephiboſheth? And he anſwered, My "lord, O king, my ſervant deceived me; for thy "ſervant ſaid, I will ſaddle me an aſs, that I may "ride thereon, and go to the king; becauſe thy "ſervant is lame, and he hath ſlandered thy ſervant "unto my lord the king. But my lord the king "is as an angel of God: do therefore what is good "in thine eyes. For all my father's houſe were "but dead men before my lord the king: yet "didſt

* 1 Samuel xxvii. 11.

" didſt thou ſet thy ſervant among them that did " eat at thine own table: what right therefore " have I to cry any more unto the king?" David could not poſſibly atone for his raſhneſs, but by reſtoring Mephiboſheth his inheritance, and puniſhing Ziba in an exemplary manner. But hear the ſentence: " And the king ſaid unto him, Why " ſpeakeſt thou any more of thy matters? I have " ſaid, Thou and Ziba divide the land *." The ſame king, after pardoning Shimei for curſing him, and ſwearing that he ſhould not die; yet upon deathbed enjoined his ſon Solomon to put Shimei to death: " Now, therefore, hold him not guiltleſs; " but his hoary head bring thou down to the " grave with blood †." I wiſh not to be miſapprehended, as intending to cenſure David in particular. If the beſt king the Jews ever had, was ſo miſerably deficient in morality, what muſt be thought of the nation in general? When David was lurking to avoid the wrath of Saul, he became acquainted with Nabal, who had a great ſtock of cattle. " He diſcharged his followers," ſays Joſephus ‡, " either for avarice, or hunger, or any " pretext whatever, to touch a ſingle hair of " them; preaching ſtill on the text of doing juſ- " tice to all men, in conformity to the will of " God, who is not pleaſed with any man that co- " vets or lays violent hands on the goods of his " neighbour."

* 2 Samuel xix. 24. † 1 Kings ii. 9.

‡ Antiquities, book vi.

" neighbour." Our author proceeds to acquaint us, that Nabal having refuſed to ſupply David with proviſions, and having ſent back the meſſengers with a ſcoffing anſwer, David, in rage made a vow, that he would deſtroy Nabal with his houſe and family. Our author obſerves, that David's indignation againſt Nabal, was not ſo much for his ingratitude, as for the virulence of an inſolent outrage againſt one who had never injured him. And what was the outrage? It was, ſays our author, that Nabal, inquiring who the ſaid David was, and being told that he was one of the ſons of Jeſſe, " Yes, yes", ſays Nabal, " your run-away ſer-" vants look upon themſelves to be brave fellows, " I warrant you." Strange looſeneſs of morals! I mean not David, who was in wrath, but Joſephus writing ſedately in his cloſet. He every where celebrates David for his juſtice and piety, compoſes for him the very warm exhortation mentioned above: and yet thinks him not guilty of any wrong, in vowing to break every rule of juſtice and humanity, upon ſo ſlight a provocation as a ſcoffing expreſſion, ſuch as no man of temper will regard.

European nations, who originally were fierce and ſanguinary like the Greeks and Jews, had the ſame cloudy and incorrect notions of right and wrong. It is ſcarce neceſſary to give inſtances, the low ſtate of morality during the dark ages of Chriſtianity being known to all. In the time of Louis

Louis XI. of France, promiſes and engagements were utterly diſregarded, till they were ſanctified by a ſolemn oath: nor were ſuch oaths long regarded; they loſt their force, and were not relied on more than ſimple promiſes. All faith among men ſeemed to be at an end. Even thoſe who appeared the moſt ſcrupulous about character, were however ready to graſp at any ſubterfuge to excuſe their breach of engagement. And it is a ſtill clearer proof of ſelf-deceit, that ſuch ſubterfuges were frequently prepared beforehand, in order to furniſh an excuſe. It was a common practice ſome ages ago, to make private proteſtations, which were thought ſufficient to relieve men in conſcience from being bound by a ſolemn treaty. The Scotch nation, as an ally of France, being comprehended in a treaty of peace between the French King and Edward I. of England, the latter ratified publicly the treaty, after having ſecretly proteſted before notaries againſt the article that comprehended Scotland. Charles, afterward Emperor of Germany, during his minority, gave authority to declare publicly his acceſſion to a treaty of peace, between his grandfather Maximilian and the King of France: but at the ſame time proteſted privately, before a notary and witneſſes, "That, not-
"withſtanding his public acceſſion to the ſaid
"treaty, it was not his intention to be bound by
"every article of it; and particularly, that the
"clauſe reſerving to the King of France the ſo-

" vereignty of certain territories in the Nether-" lands, ſhould not be binding." Is it poſſible Charles could be ſo blind as not to ſee, that ſuch a proteſtation, if ſufficient to relieve from an engagement, muſt deſtroy all faith among men? Francis I. of France, while priſoner in Spain, engaged Henry VIII. of England in a treaty againſt the Emperor, ſubmitting to very hard terms in order to gain Henry's friendſhip. The King's miniſters proteſted privately againſt ſome of the articles; and the proteſt was recorded in the ſecret regiſter of the parliament of Paris, to ſerve as an excuſe in proper time, for breaking the treaty. At the marriage of Mary Queen of Scotland to the Dauphin of France, the King of France ratified every article inſiſted on by the Scotch parliament, for preſerving the independence of the nation, and for ſecuring the ſucceſſion of the crown to the houſe of Hamilton; confirming them by deeds in form and with the moſt ſolemn oaths. But Mary previouſly had been perſuaded to ſubſcribe privately three deeds, in which, failing heirs of her body, ſhe gifted the kingdom of Scotland to the King of France; declaring all promiſes to the contrary that had been extorted from her by her ſubjects, to be void. What better was this than what was practiſed by Robert, King of France, in the tenth century, to free his ſubjects from the guilt of perjury? They ſwore upon a box of relics, out of which the relics had been privately taken. Correa,

rea, a Portugueſe general, made a treaty with the King of Pegu; and it was agreed, that each party ſhould ſwear to obſerve the treaty, laying his hand upon the ſacred book of his religion. Correa ſwore upon a collection of ſongs; and thought that by that vile ſtratagem he was free from his engagement. The inhabitants of Britain were ſo looſe formerly, that a man was not reckoned ſafe in his own houſe, without a maſtiff to protect him from violence. Maſtiffs were permitted even to thoſe who dwelt within the king's foreſts; and to prevent danger to the deer, there was in England a court for *lawing* or *expeditation* of maſtives, *i. e.* for cutting off the claws of their fore-feet to prevent them from running *. The trial and condemnation of Charles I. in a pretended court of juſtice, however audacious and unconſtitutional, was an effort toward regularity and order. In the preceding age, the king would have been taken off by aſſaſſination or poiſon. Every prince in Europe had an officer, whoſe province it was to ſecure his maſter againſt poiſon. A lady was appointed to that office by Queen Elizabeth of England; and the form was, to give to each of the ſervants a mouthful to eat of the diſh he brought in. Poiſon muſt have been frequent in thoſe days, to make ſuch a regulation neceſſary. To vouch ſtill more clearly, the low ebb of morality during that period, ſeldom it happened that a man of

* Carta de Foreſta, cap. 6.

figure died ſuddenly, or of an unuſual diſeaſe, but poiſon was ſuſpected. Men conſcious of their own vitious diſpoſition, are prone to ſuſpect others. The Dauphin, ſon to Francis I. of France, a youth of about eighteen, having overheated himſelf at play, took a great draught of iced water, and died of a pleuriſy in five days. The death was ſudden, but none is more natural. The ſuſpicion however of poiſon was univerſal; and Montecuculi, who attended the young prince, was formally condemned to death for it, and executed; for no better reaſon than that he had at all times ready acceſs to the prince.

Conſidering the low ſtate of morality where diſſocial paſſions bear rule, as in the ſcenes now diſplayed, one would require a miracle to recover mankind out of ſo miſerable a ſtate. But, as obſerved above *, Providence brings order out of confuſion. The intolerable diſtreſs of a ſtate of things where a promiſe or even an oath, is a rope of ſand, and where all are ſet againſt all †, made people at laſt ſenſible, that they muſt either renounce ſociety altogether, or qualify themſelves for it by checking their diſſocial paſſions. Finding from experience, that the gratification of ſocial affections exceeds greatly that of cruelty and revenge; men endeavouring to acquire a habit of ſelf-command, and of reſtraining their ſtormy paſſions. The neceſſity of fulfilling every moral duty was

* Book 2. Sketch 1. † Hobbes.

was recognized: men liſtened to conſcience, the voice of God in their hearts: and the moral ſenſe was cordially ſubmitted to, as the ultimate judge in all matters of right and wrong. Salutary laws and ſteady government contributed to perfect that glorious revolution: private conviction alone would not have been effectual, not at leaſt in many ages.

From that revolution is derived what is termed *the law of nations*, meaning certain regulations dictated by the moral ſenſe in its maturity. The laws of our nature refine gradually as our nature refines. From the putting an enemy to death in cold blood, improved nature is averſe, though ſuch practice was common while barbarity prevailed. It is held infamous to uſe poiſoned weapons, though the moral ſenſe made little oppoſition while rancour and revenge were ruling paſſions. Averſion to ſtrangers is taught to vary its object, from individuals, to the nation that is our enemy: I bear enmity againſt France; but diſlike not any one Frenchman, being conſcious that it is the duty of ſubjects to ſerve their king and country *. In diſtributing juſtice, we make no diſtinction between natives and foreigners: if any partiality be indulged, it is in favour of the helpleſs ſtranger.

* In one of our ill-concerted deſcents upon France during the late war, ſignal humanity appeared, in forbearing to burn a manufactory of ſails and ropes, belonging to the king; becauſe it would have deſtroyed an adjoining building of the ſame kind belonging to a private manufacturer.

But cruelty is not the only antagoniſt to morality. There is another, leſs violent indeed, but more cunning and undermining; and that is, the hoarding appetite. Before money was introduced, that appetite was extremely faint: in the firſt ſtage of civil ſociety, men are ſatisfied with plain neceſſaries; and having theſe in plenty, they think not of providing againſt want. But money is a ſpecies of property, ſo univerſal in operation, and ſo permanent in value, as to rouſe the appetite for hoarding: love of money excites induſtry; and the many beautiful productions of induſtry, magnificent houſes, ſplendid gardens, rich garments, inflame the appetite to an extreme. The people of Whidah, in Guinea, are much addicted to pilfering. Bozman was told by the king, "That his "ſubjects were not like thoſe of Ardrah, who on "the ſlighteſt umbrage will poiſon an European. "This, ſays he, you have no reaſon to apprehend "here: but take care of your goods; for ſo ex-"pert are my people at thieving, that they will "ſteal from you while you are looking on." In the thirteenth century, ſo obſcured was the moral ſenſe by rapacity and avarice, that robbery on the highway, and the coining falſe money, were in Germany held to be privileges of great lords. Cicero ſomewhere talks of banditti who infeſted the roads near Rome, and made travelling extremely dangerous. In the days of Henry III. of England, the Chronicle of Dunſtable reports, that the country

country was in great diſorder by theft and robbery, that men were not ſecure in their own houſes, and that whole villages were often plundered by bands of robbers, though the kingdom was otherwiſe at peace. Many of the King's own houſehold were found to be robbers; and excuſed themſelves, that having received no wages from the King, they were obliged to rob for ſubſiſtence. That perjury was common in the city of London, eſpecially among jurymen, makes a preamble in more than one ſtatute of Henry VII. In *the Dance of Death*, tranſlated from the French in the ſaid king's reign with additions adapted to Engliſh manners, a juryman is introduced, who, influenced by bribes, had frequently given a falſe verdict. And the Sheriff was often ſuſpected as acceſſory to the crime, by returning for jurymen perſons of a bad character. Carew, in his account of Cornwall, ſays, that it was an ordinary article in an attorney's bill, to charge *pro amicitia vicecomitis* *. Perjury in jurors of the city of London is greatly complained of. Stow informs us, that, in the year 1468, many jurors of that city were puniſhed; and papers fixed on their heads declaring their offence of being corrupted by the parties to the ſuit. He complains of that corruption as flagrant in the reign of Elizabeth, when he wrote his account of London. Fuller, in his Engliſh Worthies, mentions it as a proverbial ſaying,

* "For the friendſhip of the ſheriff."

ing, "That London juries hang half, and ſave "half." Grafton, in his Chronicle, mentions, that the chancellor of the Biſhop of London being indicted for murder, the Biſhop wrote a letter to Cardinal Wolſey, begging his interpoſition for having the proſecution ſtopt, "becauſe London "juries were ſo corrupted, that they would find "Abel guilty of the murder of Cain." Mr Hume, in the firſt volume of his Hiſtory of England, (page 417. edition 1762), cites many inſtances from Madox of bribes given for perverting juſtice. In that period, the morals of the low people were in other particulars equally looſe. We learn from Strype's Annals *, that in the county of Somerſet alone, forty perſons were executed in one year for robbery, theft, and other felonies, thirty-five burnt in the hand, thirty-ſeven whipped, one hundred and eighty-three diſcharged, though moſt wicked and deſperate perſons; and yet that the fifth part of the felonies committed in that county were not brought to trial, either from cunning in the felons, indolence in the magiſtrate, or fooliſh lenity in the people; that other counties were in no better condition, and many in a worſe; and that commonly there were three or four hundred able-bodied vagabonds in every county, who lived by theft and rapine. Harriſon computes, that in the reign of Henry VIII. ſeventy-two thouſand thieves and rogues were hanged; and that in Elizabeth's time there

* Vol. iv.

there were only hanged yearly between three and four hundred for theft and robbery. At preſent, there are not forty hanged in a year for theſe crimes. The ſame author reports, that in the reign of Elizabeth, there were computed to be in England ten thouſand gypſies. In the year 1601, complaints were made in parliament, of the rapine of the juſtices of peace; and a member ſaid, that this magiſtrate was an animal, who, for half-a-dozen of chickens, would dipenſe with a dozen of penal ſtatutes. The low people in England are greatly improved in their morals ſince the days of Elizabeth. Laying aſide London, there are few places in the world where the common people are more orderly and honeſt. But we muſt not conclude, that England has gained much in point of morality. It has loſt more by the luxury and looſe manners of its nobles, than it has gained by good diſcipline among their inferiors. The undiſciplined manners of our forefathers in Scotland, made a law neceſſary, that whoever intermeddled irregularly with the goods of a deceaſed perſon, ſhould be ſubjected to pay all his debts, however extenſive. A due ſubmiſſion to legal authority, has in effect abrogated that ſevere law; and it is now ſcarce ever heard of.

To control the hoarding-appetite, which when inflamed is the bane of civil ſociety, the God of nature has provided two efficacious principles; the moral ſenſe, and the ſenſe of property. The hoarding-

ing-appetite, it is true, is more and more inflamed by beautiful productions in the progreſs of art: but, on the other hand, the ſenſes mentioned, arrived at maturity, have a commanding influence over the actions of men; and, when cheriſhed in a good government, are a ſufficient counterbalance to the hoarding-appetite. The ancient Egyptians enjoyed for ages the bleſſings of good government; and moral principles were among them carried to a greater degree of refinement than at preſent even in our courts of equity. It was made the duty of every one, to ſuccour thoſe who were unjuſtly attacked: even paſſengers were not exempted. A regulation among them, that a man could not be impriſoned for debt, was well ſuited to the tenor of their laws and manners: it could not have taken place but among an honeſt and induſtrious people. In old Rome, though remarkable for temperance and auſterity of manners, a debtor could be impriſoned, and even ſold as a ſlave, for payment of the debt; but the Patricians were the creditors, and the poor Plebeians were held in woful ſubjection*. The moderation of the

* A bankrupt in England who pays three-fourths of his debt, and obtains a certificate of his good behaviour, is diſcharged of all the debts contracted by him before his bankruptcy. Such regulation was perhaps not unſuitable to the moderation and frugality of the period when it was made. But luxury and external ſhow, have now become our ruling paſſions; and to ſupply our extravagance, money muſt be procured

the inhabitants of Hamburgh, and their public ſpirit kept in vigour by a free government, preſerve morality

procured at any rate. Trade in particular has degenerated into a ſpecies of gaming; men venturing their all, in hopes of a lucky hit to elevate them above their neighbours. And did they only venture their own, the caſe would not be deplorable: they venture all they can procure upon credit; and by that means, reduce to beggary many an innocent family: with reſpect to themſelves, they know the worſt, which is to be cleared from their debts by a certificate. The morals of our people are indeed at ſo low an ebb, as to require the moſt ſevere laws againſt bankruptcy. When a man borrows a ſum, it is implied in the covenant, that all his effects, preſent and future, ſhall lie open to the creditor; for which reaſon, it is contradictory to juſtice, that the creditor ſhould be forced to diſcharge the debt, without obtaining complete payment. Many debtors, it is true, deſerve favour; but it ought to be left to the humanity of creditors, and not be forced from them by law. A debtor, at the ſame time, may be ſafely left to the humanity of his creditors: for if he have conducted his affairs with ſtrict integrity, and with any degree of prudence, there will ſcarce be found one man ſo hard hearted, as to ſtand out againſt the laudable and benevolent intentions of his fellow-creditors. Nay, if he have any regard to character, he dare not ſtand out: he would be held as a monſter, and be abhorred by all the world. To leave a bankrupt thus to the mercy of his creditors, would produce the moſt ſalutary effects. It would excite men to be ſtrictly juſt in their dealings, and put an end to gaming, ſo deſtructive to credit; becauſe miſbehaviour in any of theſe particulars would ſet the whole creditors againſt their debtor, and leave him no hope of favour. In the late bankrupt-ſtatute for Scotland, accordingly, the clauſe concerning the certificate was wiſely left out, as unſuitable to the depraved manners of the preſent time.

morality among them entire from taint or corruption. I give an illuſtrious inſtance. Inſtead of a tax upon trade or riches, every merchant puts privately into the public cheſt, what he thinks ought to be his contribution: the total ſum ſeldom falls ſhort of expectation; and among that numerous body of men, not one is ſuſpected of contributing leſs than his proportion. But luxury has not yet got footing in that city. A climate not kindly and a ſoil not fertile, enured the Swiſs to temperance and to virtue. Patriotiſm continues their ruling paſſion: they are fond of ſerving their country; and are honeſt and faithful to each other: a law-ſuit among them is a wonder; and a door is ſeldom ſhut, unleſs to keep out cold.

The hurtful effects of the hoarding-appetite upon individuals, make no figure compared with what it has upon the public, in every ſtate enriched by conqueſt or by commerce; which I have had more than one opportunity to mention. Overflowing riches unequally diſtributed, multiply artificial wants beyond all bounds: they eradicate patriotiſm: they foſter luxury, ſenſuality, and ſelfiſhneſs, which are commonly gratified at the expence even of juſtice and honour. The Athenians were early corrupted by opulence; to which every thing was made ſubſervient. "It is an oracle," ſays the chorus in the Agamemnon of Eſchylus, "that is not purchaſed with money." During the infancy of a nation, vice prevails from imbecillity

cillity in the moral ſenſe: in the decline of a nation, it prevails from the corruption of affluence.

In a ſmall ſtate, there is commonly much virtue at home, and much violence abroad. The Romans were to their neighbours more baneful than famine or peſtilence; but their patriotiſm produced great integrity at home. An oath, when given to fortify an engagement with a fellow-citizen, was more ſacred at Rome than in any other part of the world *. The cenſorian office cannot ſucceed but among a virtuous people; becauſe its rewards and puniſhments have no influence but upon thoſe who are aſhamed of vice †. As ſoon as Aſiatic opulence and luxury prevailed in Rome, ſelfiſhneſs, ſenſuality, and avarice, formed the character of the Romans; and the cenſorian power was at an end. Such relaxation of morals enſued, as to make a law neceſſary, prohibiting the cuſtody of an infant to be given to the heir, for fear of murder. And for the ſame reaſon, it was held unlawful to make a covenant *de hæreditate viventis*. Theſe regulations prove the Romans to have been groſsly corrupt. Our law is different in both articles; becauſe

* L'Eſprit des loix, liv. 8. ch. 13.

† In the fifteenth century, the French clergy from the pulpit cenſured public tranſactions, and even the conduct of their king, as our Britiſh clergy did in the days of Charles I. and II. They aſſumed the privilege of a Roman cenſor; but they were not men of ſuch authority as to do any good in a corrupted nation.

becauſe it entertains not the ſame bad opinion of the people whom it governs *. Domitius Enobarbus and Appius Pulcher were conſuls of Rome in the 699th year; and Memmius and Calvinus were candidates for ſucceeding them in that office. It was agreed among theſe four worthy gentlemen, that they ſhould mutually aſſiſt each other. The conſuls engaged to promote the election of Memmius and Calvinus: and they, on the other hand, ſubſcribed a bond, obliging themſelves, under a penalty of about L. 3000 Sterling, to procure three augurs, who ſhould atteſt, that they were preſent in the comitia when a law paſſed inveſting the conſuls with military command in their provinces; and alſo obliging themſelves to produce three perſons of conſular rank, to depoſe, that they were in the number of thoſe who ſigned a decree, conferring on the conſuls the uſual proconſular appointments. And yet the law made in the comitia, and the decree in the ſenate, were pure fictions. Infamous as this tranſaction was, Memmius, to anſwer ſome political purpoſe, was not aſhamed to divulge it to the ſenate. This ſame

* In the beginning of the preſent century, attorneys and agents were ſo little relied on for honeſty and integrity, as to be diſqualified by the Court of Seſſion from being factors on the eſtates of bankrupts, (Act of Sederunt, 23d November 1710). At preſent, the factors choſen are commonly of that profeſſion, writers or agents; and it appears from experience, that they make the beſt factors. Such improvement in morals, in ſo ſhort a time, has not many parallels.

ſame Memmius, however, continued to be Cicero's correſpondent, and his profeſſed friend. *Proh tempora! proh mores!* But the paſſion for power and riches was at that time prevalent; and the principles of morality were very little regarded.

It cannot be diſſembled, that ſelfiſhneſs, ſenſuality, and avarice, muſt in England be the fruits of great opulence, as in every other country; and that morality cannot maintain its authority againſt ſuch undermining antagoniſts. Cuſtomhouſe-oaths have become ſo familiar among us, as to be ſwallowed without a wry face; and is it certain, that bribery and perjury in electing parliament-members, are not approaching to the ſame cool ſtate? In the infancy of morality, a promiſe makes but a ſlight impreſſion: to give it force, it is commonly accompanied with many ceremonies*; and in treaties between ſovereigns, even theſe ceremonies are not relied on without a ſolemn oath. When morality arrives at maturity, the oath is thought unneceſſary; and at preſent, morality is ſo much on the decline, that a ſolemn oath is no more relied on, than a ſimple promiſe was originally. Laws have been made to prevent ſuch immorality, but in vain: becauſe none but patriots have an intereſt to ſupport them; and when patriotiſm is baniſhed by corruption, there is no remaining ſpring in government to make them effectual. The ſtatutes made againſt gaming, and againſt bribery and

* See Hiſtorical Law Tracts, Tract ii.

corruption in elections, have no authority over a degenerate people. Nothing is ſtudied, but how to evade the penalties; and ſuppoſing ſtatutes to be made without end for preventing known evaſions, new evaſions will ſpring up in their ſtead. The miſery is, that ſuch laws, if they prove abortive, are never innocent with regard to conſequences; for nothing is more ſubverſive of morality as well as of patriotiſm, than a habit of diſregarding the laws of our country *.

But

* Lying and perjury are not in every caſe equally criminal; at leaſt are not commonly reckoned ſo. Lying or perjury, in order to injure a man, is held highly criminal; and the greater the hurt, the greater the crime. To relieve from puniſhment, few boggle at a lie or at perjury; ſincerity is not even expected; and hence the practice of torture. Many men are not ſcrupulous about oaths, when they have no view but to obtain juſtice to themſelves: the Jacobites, that they might not be deprived of their privileges as Britiſh ſubjects, made no great difficulty to ſwallow oaths to the preſent government, though in them it was perjury. It is dangerous to withdraw the ſmalleſt peg in the moral edifice; for the whole will totter and tumble. Men creep on to vice by degrees. Perjury, in order to ſupport a friend, has become cuſtomary of late years; witneſs fictitious qualifications in the electors of parliament-men which are made effectual by perjury; yet ſuch is the degeneracy of the preſent times, that no man is the worſe thought of upon that account. We muſt not flatter ourſelves that the poiſon will reach no farther. A man, who boggles not at perjury to ſerve a friend, will in time become ſuch an adept, as to commit perjury in order to ruin a friend when he becomes an enemy.

But pride ſometimes happily interpoſes to ſtem the tide of corruption. The poor are not aſhamed to take a bribe from the rich; nor weak ſtates from thoſe that are powerful, diſguiſed only under the name of *ſubſidy* or *penſion*. Both France and England have been in the practice of ſecuring the alliance of neighbouring princes by penſions; and it is natural in the miniſters of a penſioned prince, to receive a gratification for keeping their maſter to his engagement. England never was at any time ſo inferior to France, as to ſuffer her king openly to accept a penſion from the French king, whatever private tranſactions might be between the kings themſelves. But the miniſters of England thought it no diſparagement, to receive penſions from France. Every miniſter of Edward IV. of England received a penſion from Louis XI.; and they made no difficulty of granting a receipt for the ſum. The old Earl of Warwick, ſays Commines, was the only exception: he took the money, but refuſed a receipt. Cardinal Wolſey had a penſion both from the Emperor and from the King of France: and his maſter Henry was vain to find his miniſter ſo much regarded by the firſt powers in Europe. During the reigns of Charles II. and of his brother James, England made ſo deſpicable a figure, that the miniſters accepted penſions from Louis XIV. A king deficient in virtue, is never well ſerved. King Charles, moſt diſgracefully, accepted a penſion from France:

what ſcruple could his miniſters have? Britain, governed by a king eminently virtuous and patriotic, makes at preſent ſo great a figure, that even the loweſt miniſter would diſdain a penſion from any foreign prince. Men formerly were ſo blind, as not to ſee that a penſion creates a bias in a miniſter, againſt his maſter and his country. At preſent, men clearly ſee, that a foreign penſion to a miniſter is no better than a bribe; and it would be held ſo by all the world.

In a nation enriched by conqueſt or commerce, where ſelfiſh paſſions always prevail, it is difficult to ſtem the tide of immorality: the decline of virtue may be retarded by wholeſome regulations; but no regulations will ever reſtore it to its meridian vigour. Marcus Aurelius, Emperor of Rome, cauſed ſtatues to be made of all the brave men who figured in the Germanic war. It has long been a practice in China, to honour perſons eminent for virtue, by feaſting them annually at the Emperor's expence. A late Emperor made an improvement; he ordered reports to be ſent him annually, of men and women, who when alive had been remarkable for public ſpirit or private virtue, in order that monuments might be erected to their memory. The following report is one of many that were ſent to the Emperor. "Accord-
"ing to the order of your Majeſty, for erecting
"monuments to the honour of women, who have
"been celebrated for continence, for filial piety,
"or

" or for purity of manners, the viceroy of Can-
" ton reports, that in the town of Sinhoei, a beau-
" tiful young woman, named *Leang*, ſacrificed her
" life to ſave her chaſtity. In the fifteenth year
" of our Emperor Canghi, ſhe was dragged by
" pirates into their ſhip; and having no other
" way to eſcape their brutal luſt, ſhe threw herſelf
" headlong into the ſea. Being of opinion, that
" to prefer honour before life is an example wor-
" thy of imitation, we purpoſe, according to your
" Majeſty's order, to erect a triumphal arch for
" that young woman, and to engrave her ſtory
" upon a large ſtone, that it may be preſerved in
" perpetual remembrance." At the foot of the report is written, *The Emperor approves.* Pity it is, that ſuch regulations ſhould ever prove abortive, for their purpoſe is excellent. But they would need angels to carry them on. Every deviation from a juſt ſelection enervates them; and frequent deviations render them a ſubject of ridicule. But how are deviations to be prevented, when men are the judges? Thoſe who diſtribute the rewards have friends or flatterers; and thoſe of greater merit will be neglected. Like the cenſorian power in Rome, ſuch regulations, after many abuſes, will ſink into contempt.

Two errors, which infeſted morality in dark times, have occaſioned much injuſtice; and I am not certain, that they are yet entirely eradicated. The firſt is an opinion, That an action derives its

quality of right and wrong from the event, without regard to intention. The other is, That the end juſtifies the means; or, in other words, That means otherwiſe unlawful, may be lawfully employed to bring about a good end. With an account of theſe two errors, I ſhall cloſe the preſent hiſtorical ſketch.

That intention is the circumſtance which qualifies an action and its author, to be criminal or innocent, is made evident in the firſt part of the preſent ſketch; and is now admitted to be ſo by every moral writer. But rude and barbarous nations ſeldom carry their thoughts beyond what falls under their external ſenſes: they conclude an action to be right that happens to do good, and an action to be wrong that happens to do harm; without ever thinking of motives, of will, of intention, or of any circumſtance that is not obvious to eye-ſight. From many paſſages in the Old Teſtament it appears, that the external act only, with its conſequences, was regarded. Iſaac, imitating his father Abraham, made his wife Rebecca paſs for his ſiſter. Abimelech, King of the Philiſtines, having diſcovered the impoſture, ſaid to Iſaac, "What is this thou haſt done unto us? One of "the people might lightly have lain with thy "wife, and thou ſhouldeſt have brought guiltineſs "upon us*." Jonathan was condemned to die for tranſgreſſing a prohibition he had never heard of.

* Geneſis, chap. xxvi.

of *. A ſin of ignorance, *i. e.* an action done without ill intention, required a ſacrifice of expiation †. Saul, defeated by the Philiſtines, fell on his own ſword: the wound not being mortal, he prevailed on a young Amalekite, to pull out the ſword, and to diſpatch him with it. Joſephus ‡ ſays, that David ordered the criminal to be delivered up to juſtice as a regicide.

The Greeks appear to have wavered greatly about intention, ſometimes holding it eſſential to a crime, and ſometimes diſregarding it as a circumſtance of no moment. Of theſe contradictory opinions, we have pregnant evidence in the two tragedies of Oedipus; the firſt taking it for granted, that a crime conſiſts entirely in the external act and its conſequences; the other holding intention to be indiſpenſable. Oedipus had killed his father Laius, and married his mother Jocaſta; but without any criminal intention, being ignorant of his relation to them. And yet hiſtory informs us, that the gods puniſhed the Thebans with peſtilence, for ſuffering a wretch ſo groſsly criminal to live. Sophocles, author of both tragedies, puts the following words in the mouth of Tireſias the prophet.

——— Know then,
That Oedipus, in ſhameful bonds united,
With

* 1 Samuel, xiv. 44. † Leviticus, chap. iv.

‡ Book 3. of Antiquities.

With thoſe he loves, unconſcious of his guilt,
Is yet moſt guilty.

And that doctrine is eſpouſed by Ariſtotle in a later period; who holding Oedipus to have been deeply criminal, though without intention, is of opinion, that a more proper ſubject for tragedy never was brought upon the ſtage. Nay, as a philoſopher he talks currently of any involuntary crime. Oreſtes, in Euripides, acknowledges himſelf to be guilty in killing his mother; yet aſſerts with the ſame breath, that his crime was inevitable, a neceſſary crime, a crime commanded by religion.

In Oepidus Coloneus, the other tragedy mentioned, a very different opinion is maintained. A defence is made for that unlucky man, agreeable to ſound moral principles; that, having had no bad intention, he was entirely innocent; and that his misfortunes ought to be aſcribed to the wrath of the gods.

Thou who upbraid'ſt me thus for all my woes,
Murder and inceſt, which againſt my will,
I had committed; ſo it pleas'd the gods,
Offended at my race for former crimes.
But I am guiltleſs: can'ſt thou name a fault
Deſerving this? For, tell me, was it mine,
When to my father, Phœbus did declare,
That he ſhould one day periſh by the hand
Of his own child; was Oedipus to blame,

Who

Who had no being then? If, born at length
To wretchedneſs, he met his ſire unknown,
And ſlew him; that involuntary deed
Can'ſt thou condemn? And for my fatal marriage,
Doſt thou not bluſh to name it? was not ſhe
Thy ſiſter, ſhe who bore me, ignorant
And guiltleſs woman! afterwards my wife,
And mother to my children? What ſhe did, ſhe did unknowing.
But, not for that, nor for my murder'd father,
Have I deſerv'd thy bitter taunts: for, tell me,
Thy life attack'd, wouldſt thou have ſtaid to aſk
Th' aſſaſſin, if he were thy father? No;
Self-love would urge thee to revenge the inſult.
Thus was I drove to ill by th' angry gods;
This, ſhould my father's ſoul reviſit earth,
Himſelf would own, and pity Oedipus.

Again, in the fourth act, the following prayer is put up for Oepidus by the chorus:

——— O grant,
That not oppreſs'd by tort'ring pain,
Beneath the ſtroke of death he linger long;
But ſwift, with eaſy ſteps, deſcend to Styx's drear abode;
For he hath led a life of toil and pain;
May the juſt gods repay his undeſerved woe.

The audience was the ſame in both plays. Did they think Oepidus to be guilty in the one play, and innocent in the other? If they did not, how could both plays be reliſhed? if they did, they muſt have been groſsly ſtupid.

The ſtatues of a Roman Emperor were held ſo ſacred, that to treat them with any contempt was high treaſon. This ridiculous opinion was carried ſo far out of common ſenſe, that a man was held guilty of high treaſon, if a ſtone thrown by him happened accidentally to touch one of theſe ſtatues. And the law continued in force till abrogated by a reſcript of Severus Antoninus*.

In England, ſo little was intention regarded, that caſual homicide, and even homicide in ſelf-defence, were capitally puniſhed. It requires ſtrong evidence to vouch ſo abſurd a law; and I have the ſtrongeſt, viz. the act 52d Henry III. cap. 26. converting the capital puniſhment into a forfeiture of moveables. The ſame abſurdity continued much longer to be law in Scotland. By act 19. Parl. 1649, renewed act 22. Parl. 1661, the capital puniſhment is converted to impriſonment, or a fine to the wife and children. In a period ſo late as the Reſtoration, ſtrange blindneſs it was, not to be ſenſible, that homicide in ſelf-defence, being a lawful act juſtified by the ſtricteſt rules of morality, ſubjects not a man to puniſhment, more than the defending his property againſt a robber; and that caſual homicide, meaning homicide committed innocently without ill intention, may ſubject him to reparation, but never to any puniſhment, mild or ſevere.

The

* L. 5. ad Leg. Jul. Majeſt.

The Jeſuits in their doctrines ſeem to reſt on the external act, diſregarding intention. It is with them a matter of perfect indifference, from what motive men obey the laws of God; conſequently that the ſervice of thoſe who obey from fear of puniſhment, is no leſs acceptable to the Deity, than of thoſe who obey from a principle of love.

The other error mentioned above, is, That the end juſtifies the means. In defence of that propoſition, it is urged, that the character of the means is derived from the end; that every action muſt be right which contributes to a good end; and that every action muſt be wrong which contributes to an ill end. According to this reaſoning, it is right to aſſaſſinate a man who is a declared or concealed enemy to his country. It is right to rob a rich man, in order to relieve a perſon in want. What becomes then of property, which by all is held inviolable? It is totally unhinged. The propoſition then is untenable as far as light can be drawn from reaſon. At the ſame time, the tribunal of reaſon may be juſtly declined in this caſe. Reaſon is the only touchſtone of truth and falſehood: but the moral ſenſe is the only touchſtone of right and wrong. And to maintain, that the qualities of right and wrong are diſcoverable by reaſon, is no leſs abſurd than that truth and falſehood are diſcoverable by the moral ſenſe. The moral ſenſe dictates, that on no pretext whatever is it lawful

to

to do an act of injuſtice, or any wrong*: and men, conſcious that the moral ſenſe governs in matters of right and wrong, ſubmit implicitly to its dictates. Influenced, however, by the reaſoning mentioned, men, during the nonage of the moral ſenſe, did wrong currently in order to bring about a good end; witneſs pretended miracles and forged writings, urged without reſerve by every ſect of Chriſtians againſt their antagoniſts. And I am ſorry to obſerve, that the error is not entirely eradicated: miſſionaries employed in converting infidels to the true faith, are little ſcrupulous about the means: they make no difficulty to feign prodigies, in order to convert thoſe who are not moved by argument. Such pious frauds tend to ſap the very foundations of morality.

* See the firſt part of this Sketch, Sect. 3. at the end.

SKETCH

SKETCH III.

PRINCIPLES AND PROGRESS OF THEOLOGY.

AS no other ſcience can vie with theology, either in dignity or importance, it juſtly claims to be a favourite ſtudy with every perſon endued with true taſte and ſolid judgment. From the time that writing was invented, natural religion has employed pens without number; and yet in no language is there found a connected hiſtory of it. The preſent work will only admit a ſlight ſketch: which I ſhall glory in, however imperfect, if it excite any one of ſuperior talents to undertake a complete hiſtory.

CHAP. I.

Exiſtence of a Deity.

THAT there exiſt beings, one or many, powerful above the human race, is a propoſition univerſally admitted as true, in all ages, and among all

all nations. I boldly call it univerſal, notwithſtanding what is reported of ſome groſs ſavages; for reports that contradict what is acknowledged to be general among men, require more able vouchers than a few illiterate voyagers. Among many ſavage tribes, there are no words but for objects of external ſenſe: is it ſurpriſing, that ſuch people are incapable to expreſs their religious perceptions, or any perception of internal ſenſe? and from their ſilence can it be fairly preſumed, that they have no ſuch perception *? The conviction that men have of ſuperior powers in every country where there are words to expreſs it, is ſo well vouched, that in fair reaſoning it ought to be taken for granted among the few tribes where language is deficient. Even the groſſeſt idolatry affords evidence of that conviction. No nation can be ſo brutiſh as to worſhip a ſtock or a ſtone, merely as ſuch: the viſible object is always imagined to be connected with ſome inviſible power; and the worſhip paid to the former, is as repreſenting the latter, or as in ſome manner connected with it. Every family among

* In the language even of Peru, there is not a word for expreſſing an abſtract idea, ſuch as *time*, *endurance*, *ſpace*, *exiſtence*, *ſubſtance*, *matter*, *body*. It is no leſs defective in expreſſing moral ideas, ſuch as *virtue*, *juſtice*, *gratitude*, *liberty*. The Yameos, a tribe on the river Oroonoko, deſcribed by Condamine, uſed the word *poettarraroincouroac* to expreſs the number three, and have no word for a greater number. The Braſilian language is nearly as barren.

among the ancient Lithuanians, entertained a real ſerpent as a houſehold-god; and the ſame practice is at preſent univerſal among the Negroes in the kingdom of Whidah: it is not the ſerpent that is worſhipped, but ſome deity imagined to reſide in it. The ancient Egyptians were not idiots, to pay divine honours to a bull or a cat, as ſuch: the divine honours were paid to a deity, as reſiding in theſe animals. The ſun is to man a familiar object: being frequently obſcured by clouds, and totally eclipſed during night, a ſavage naturally conceives it to be a great fire, ſometimes flaming bright, ſometimes obſcured, and ſometimes extinguiſhed. Whence then ſun-worſhip, once univerſal among ſavages? Plainly from the ſame cauſe: it is not properly the ſun that is worſhipped, but a deity who is ſuppoſed to dwell in that luminary.

Taking it then for granted, that our conviction of ſuperior powers has been long univerſal, the important queſtion is, From what cauſe it proceeds. A conviction ſo univerſal and ſo permanent, cannot proceed from chance; but muſt have a cauſe operating conſtantly and invariably upon all men in all ages. Philoſophers, who believe the world to be eternal and ſelf-exiſtent, and imagine it to be the only deity, though without intelligence, endeavour to account for our conviction of ſuperior powers, from the terror that thunder and other elementary convulſions raiſe in ſavages; and

and thence conclude that ſuch belief is no evidence of a deity. Thus Lucretius *,

Prætèrea, cui non animus formidine divum
Contrahitur? cui non conripunt membra pavore,
Fulminis horribili cum plaga torrida tellus
Contremit, et magnum percurrunt murmura cœlum †?

And Petronius Arbiter,

Primus in orbe deos fecit timor: ardua cœlo
Fulmina quum caderent diſcuſſaque mœnia flammis,
Atque ictus flagraret Athos ‡.

It will readily be yielded to theſe gentlemen, that ſavages, groſsly ignorant of cauſes and effects, are apt to take fright at every unuſual appearance, and to think that ſome malignant being is the cauſe. And if they mean only, that the firſt perception of deity among ſavages is occaſioned by fear, I heartily ſubſcribe to their opinion. But if they mean, that ſuch perceptions proceed from fear ſolely,

* Lib. 5.

† What man can boaſt that firm undaunted ſoul,
That hears, unmov'd, when thunder ſhakes the pole;
Nor ſhrinks with fear of an offended pow'r,
When lightnings flaſh, and ſtorms and tempeſts roar?

‡ When dread convulſions rock'd the lab'ring earth,
And livid clouds firſt gave the thunder birth,
Inſtinctive fear within the human breaſt
The firſt ideas of a God impreſs'd.

ſolely, without having any other cauſe, I wiſh to be informed from what ſource is derived the belief we have of benevolent deities. Fear cannot be the ſource: and it will be ſeen anon, that tho' malevolent deities were firſt recogniſed among ſavages, yet that in the progreſs of ſociety, the exiſtence of benevolent deities was univerſally believed. The fact is certain; and therefore fear is not the ſole cauſe of our believing the exiſtence of ſuperior beings.

It is beſide to me evident, that the belief even of malevolent deities, once univerſal among all the tribes of men, cannot be accounted for from fear ſolely. I obſerve, firſt, That there are many men, to whom an eclipſe, an earthquake, and even thunder, are unknown: Egypt, in particular, though the country of ſuperſtition, is little or not at all acquainted with the two latter; and in Peru, though its government was a theocracy, thunder is not known. Nor do ſuch appearances ſtrike terror into every one who is acquainted with them. The univerſality of the belief, muſt then have ſome cauſe more univerſal than fear. I obſerve next, That if the belief were founded ſolely on fear, it would die away gradually as men improve in the knowledge of cauſes and effects: inſtruct a ſavage, that thunder, an eclipſe, an earthquake, proceed from natural cauſes, and are not threatenings of an incenſed deity; his fear of malevolent beings will vaniſh; and with it his belief in them,

them, if founded ſolely on fear. Yet the direct contrary is true: in proportion as the human underſtanding ripens, our conviction of ſuperior powers, or of a Deity, turns more and more firm and authoritative; which will be made evident in the chapter immediately following.

Philoſophers of more enlarged views and of deeper penetration, may be inclined to think, that the operations of nature and the government of this world, which loudly proclaim a Deity, may be ſufficient to account for the univerſal belief of ſuperior powers. And to give due weight to the argument, I ſhall relate a converſation between a Greenlander and a Daniſh miſſionary, mentioned by Crantz in his Hiſtory of Greenland. "It is true," ſays the Greenlander, "we were ignorant Hea-
"thens, and knew little of a God, till you came.
"But you muſt not imagine, that no Greenlander
"thinks about theſe things. A kajak *, with all
"its tackle and implements, cannot exiſt but by
"the labour of man; and one who does not un-
"derſtand it, would ſpoil it. But the meaneſt
"bird requires more ſkill than the beſt kajak;
"and no man can make a bird. There is ſtill
"more ſkill required to make a man: by whom
"then was he made? He proceeded from his pa-
"rents, and they from their parents. But ſome
"muſt have been the firſt parents: whence did
"they proceed? Common report ſays, that they
"grew

* A Greenland boat.

" grew out of the earth: if ſo, why do not men " ſtill grow out of the earth? And from whence " came the earth itſelf, the ſun, the moon, the " ſtars? Certainly there muſt be ſome being who " made all theſe things, a being more wiſe than " the wiſeſt man." The reaſoning here from effects to their cauſes is ſtated with great preciſion; and were all men equally penetrating with the Greenlander, ſuch reaſoning might perhaps be ſufficient to account for the conviction of a Deity, univerſally ſpread among ſavages. But ſuch penetration is a rare quality among ſavages; and yet the conviction of ſuperior powers is univerſal, not excepting even the groſſeſt ſavages, who are altogether incapable of reaſoning like our Greenland philoſopher. Natural hiſtory has made ſo rapid a progreſs of late years, and the finger of God is ſo viſible to us in the various operations of nature, that we do not readily conceive how even ſavages can be ignorant: but it is a common fallacy in reaſoning, to judge of others by what we feel in ourſelves. And to give juſter notions of the condition of ſavages, I take liberty to introduce the Wogultzoi, a people in Siberia, exhibiting a ſtriking picture of ſavages in their natural ſtate. That people were baptized at the command of Prince Gagarin, governor of the province; and Laurent Lange, in his relation of a journey from Peterſburgh to Pekin *anno* 1715, gives the following account of their converſion. " I had

" curioſity," ſays he, " to queſtion them about " their worſhip before they embraced Chriſtianity. " They ſaid, that they had an idol hung upon a " tree, before which they proſtrated themſelves, " raiſing their eyes to heaven, and howling with " a loud voice. They could not explain what " they meant by howling; but only, that every " man howled in his own faſhion. Being interro- " gated, Whether, in raiſing their eyes to heaven, " they knew that a god is there, who ſees all the " actions, and even the thoughts of men; they " anſwered ſimply, That heaven is too far above " them to know whether a god be there or not; " and that they had no care but to provide meat " and drink. Another queſtion being put, Whe- " ther they had not more ſatisfaction in worſhip- " ping the living God, than they formerly had in " the darkneſs of idolatry; they anſwered, We " ſee no great difference, and we do not break our " heads about ſuch matters." Judge how little capable ſuch ignorant ſavages are, to reaſon from effects to their cauſes, and to trace a Deity from the operations of nature. It may be added with great certainty, that could they be made in any degree to conceive ſuch reaſoning, yet ſo weak and obſcure would their conviction be, as to reſt there without moving them to any ſort of worſhip; which however among ſavages goes hand in hand with the conviction of ſuperior powers.

If

If fear be a cauſe altogether inſufficient for our conviction of a Deity, univerſal among all tribes; and if reaſoning from effects to their cauſes can have no influence upon ignorant ſavages; what other cauſe is there to be laid hold of? One ſtill remains, and imagination cannot figure another: to make this conviction univerſal, the image of the Deity muſt be ſtamped upon the mind of every human being, the ignorant equally with the knowing: nothing leſs is ſufficient. And the original perception we have of Deity, muſt proceed from an internal ſenſe, which may be termed the *ſenſe of Deity*.

Included in the ſenſe of Deity, is the duty we are under to worſhip him. And to enforce that duty, the principle of devotion is made a part of our nature. All men accordingly agree in worſhipping ſuperior beings, however they may differ in the mode of worſhip. And the univerſality of ſuch worſhip, proves devotion to be an innate principle *.

The perception we have of being accountable agents, ariſes from another branch of the ſenſe of Deity. We expect approbation from the Deity when we do right; and dread puniſhment from him when guilty of any wrong; not excepting the moſt occult crimes, hid from every mortal eye.

* See this principle beautifully explained and illuſtrated in a ſermon upon the love of God, by Dr Butler, Biſhop of Durham, a writer of the firſt rank.

From what cauſe can dread proceed in that caſe, but from conviction of a ſuperior being, avenger of wrongs? The dread, when immoderate, diſorders the mind, and makes every unuſual misfortune paſs for a puniſhment inflicted by an inviſible hand. "And they ſaid one to another, We "are verily guilty concerning our brother, in that "we ſaw the anguiſh of his ſoul, when he be-"ſought us, and we would not hear: there-"fore is this diſtreſs come upon us. And Reu-"ben anſwered them, ſaying, Spake I not unto "you, ſaying, Do not ſin againſt the child; and "ye would not hear? therefore behold alſo his "blood is required*." Alphonſus, King of Naples, was a cruel and tyrannical prince. He drove his people to deſpair with oppreſſive taxes, treacherouſly aſſaſſinated ſeveral of his barons, and loaded others with chains. During proſperity, his conſcience gave him little diſquiet; but in adverſity, his crimes ſtared him in the face, and made him believe that his diſtreſſes proceeded from the hand of God, as a juſt puniſhment. He was terrified to diſtraction, when Charles VIII. of France approached with a numerous army: he deſerted his kingdom; and fled to hide himſelf, from the face of God and of man.

But admitting a ſenſe of Deity, is it evidence to us that a Deity actually exiſts? It is complete evidence. So framed is man as to rely on the evidence

* Geneſis xlii. 21, 22.

evidence of his ſenſes *; which evidence he may reject in words; but he cannot reject in thought, whatever bias he may have to ſcepticiſm. And experience confirms our belief; for our ſenſes, when in order, never deceive us.

The foregoing ſenſe of Deity is not the only evidence we have of his exiſtence: there is additional evidence from other branches of our nature. Inherent in the nature of man are two paſſions, devotion to an inviſible Being, and dread of puniſhment from him, when one is guilty of any crime. Theſe paſſions would be idle and abſurd, were there no Deity to be worſhipped or to be dreaded. Man makes a capital figure; and is the moſt perfect being that inhabits this earth: and yet were he endowed with paſſions or principles that have no end nor purpoſe, he would be the moſt irregular and abſurd of all Beings. Theſe paſſions both of them, direct us to a Deity, and afford us irreſiſtible evidence of his exiſtence.

Thus our Maker has revealed himſelf to us, in a way perfectly analogous to our nature: in the mind of every human creature, he has lighted up a lamp, which renders him viſible even to the weakeſt ſight. Nor ought it to eſcape obſervation, that here, as in every other caſe, the conduct of Providence to man, is uniform. It leaves him to be directed by reaſon, where liberty of choice

* See Eſſays on Morality and Natural Religion, Part II. ſect. 3.

is permitted; but in matters of duty, he is provided with guides leſs fallible than reaſon: in performing his duy to man, he is guided by the moral ſenſe; in performing his duty to God, he is guided by the ſenſe of Deity. In theſe mirrors, he perceives his duty intuitively.

It is no ſlight ſupport to this doctrine, that if there really be a Deity, it is highly preſumable, that he will reveal himſelf to man, fitted by nature to adore and worſhip him. To other animals, the knowledge of a Deity is of no importance: to man, it is of high importance. Were we totally ignorant of a Deity, this world would appear to us a mere chaos: under the government of a wiſe and benevolent Deity, chance is excluded; and every event appears to be the reſult of eſtabliſhed laws: good men ſubmit to whatever happens, without repining; knowing that every event is ordered by divine Providence: they ſubmit with entire reſignation; and ſuch reſignation is a ſovereign balſam for every misfortune.

The ſenſe of Deity reſembles our other ſenſes, which are quieſcent till a proper object be preſented. When all is ſilent about us, the ſenſe of hearing lies dormant; and if from infancy a man were confined to a dark room, he would be as ignorant of his ſenſe of ſeeing, as one born blind. Among ſavages, the objects that rouſe the ſenſe of Deity, are uncommon events above the power of man. A ſavage, if acquainted with no events but what

are

are familiar, has no perception of ſuperior powers; but a ſudden eclipſe of the ſun, thunder rattling in his ears, or the convulſion of an earthquake, rouſes his ſenſe of Deity, and directs him to ſome ſuperior being as the cauſe of theſe dreadful effects. The ſavage, it is true, errs in aſcribing to the immediate operation of a Deity, things that have a natural cauſe: his error however is evidence that he has a ſenſe of Deity, no leſs pregnant, than when he more juſtly attributes to the immediate operation of Deity, the formation of man, of this earth, of all the world.

The ſenſe of Deity, like the moral ſenſe, makes no capital figure among ſavages; the perceptions of both ſenſes being in them faint and obſcure. But in the progreſs of nations to maturity, theſe ſenſes become and more vigorous, ſo as among enlightened nations to acquire a commanding influence; leaving no doubt about right and wrong, and as little about the exiſtence of a Deity.

The obſcurity of the ſenſe of Deity among ſavages, has encouraged ſome ſceptical philoſophers to deny its exiſtence. It has been urged, That God does nothing by halves; and that if he had intended to make himſelf known to men, he would have afforded them conviction equal to that from ſeeing or hearing. When we argue thus about the purpoſes of the Almighty, we tread on ſlippery ground, where we ſeldom fail to ſtumble. What if it be the purpoſe of the Deity, to afford

us but an obſcure glimpſe of his being and attributes? We have reaſon from analogy to conjecture, that this may be the caſe. From ſome particulars mentioned above*, it appears at leaſt probable, that entire ſubmiſſion to the moral ſenſe, would be ill ſuited to man in his preſent ſtate; and would prove more hurtful than beneficial. And to me it appears evident, that to be conſcious of the preſence of the Great God, as I am of a friend whom I hold by the hand, would be inconſiſtent with the part that Providence has deſtined me to act in this life. Reflect only on the reſtraint one is under, in preſence of a ſuperior, ſuppoſe the King himſelf: how much greater our reſtraint, with the ſame lively impreſſion of God's awful preſence! Humility and veneration would leave no room for other paſſions: man would be no longer man; and the ſyſtem of our preſent ſtate would be totally ſubverted. Add another reaſon: Such a conviction of future rewards and puniſhments as to overcome every inordinate deſire, would reduce us to the condition of a traveller in a paltry inn, having no wiſh but for day-light to proſecute his journey. For that very reaſon, it appears evidently the plan of Providence, that we ſhould have but an obſcure glimpſe of futurity. As the ſame plan of Providence is viſible in all, I conclude with aſſurance, that a certain degree of obſcurity, weighs nothing againſt

* Book ii. Sketch 1.

againſt the ſenſe of Deity, more than againſt the moral ſenſe, or againſt a future ſtate of rewards and puniſhments. Whether all men might not have been made angels, and whether more happineſs might not have reſulted from a different ſyſtem, lie far beyond the reach of human knowledge. From what is known of the conduct of Providence, we have reaſon to preſume, that our preſent ſtate is the reſult of wiſdom and benevolence. So much we know with certainty, that the ſenſe we have of Deity and of moral duty, correſpond accurately to the nature of man as an imperfect being; and that theſe ſenſes, were they abſolutely perfect, would convert him into a very different being.

A doctrine eſpouſed by ſeveral writers ancient and modern, pretends to compoſe the world without a Deity; that the world, compoſed of animals, vegetables, and brute matter, is ſelf-exiſtent and eternal; and that all events happen by a neceſſary chain of cauſes and effects. It will occur even at firſt view, that this theory is at leaſt improbable: can any ſuppoſition be more improbable than that the great work of planning and executing this univerſe, beautiful in all its parts, and bound together by the moſt perfect laws, ſhould be a blind work, performed without intelligence or contrivance? It would therefore be a ſufficient anſwer to obſerve, that this doctrine, though highly improbable, is however given to the public, like

a foundling, without cover or ſupport. But affirmatively I urge, that it is fundamentally overturned by the knowledge we derive of Deity from our own nature: if a Deity exiſt, ſelf-exiſtence muſt be his peculiar attribute; and we cannot heſitate in rejecting the ſuppoſition of a ſelf-exiſtent world, when it is ſo natural to ſuppoſe that the whole is the operation of a ſelf-exiſtent Being, whoſe power and wiſdom are adequate to that great work. I add, that this rational doctrine is eminently ſupported from contemplating the endleſs number of wiſe and benevolent effects, diſplayed every where on the face of this globe; which afford complete evidence of a wiſe and benevolent cauſe. As theſe effects are far above the power of man, we neceſſarily aſcribe them to a ſuperior Being, or in other words to the Deity*.

Some philoſophers there are, not indeed ſo hardened in ſcepticiſm as to deny the exiſtence of a Deity: They acknowledge a ſelf-exiſtent Being; and ſeem willing to beſtow on that Being power, wiſdom, and every other perfection. But then they maintain, that the world, or matter at leaſt, muſt alſo be ſelf-exiſtent. Their argument is, that *ex nihilo nihil fit*, that it is inconſiſtent for any thing to be made out of nothing, out of a *nonens*. To conſider nothing or a *nonens* as a material or ſubſtance out of which things can be formed, like a ſtatue out of ſtone or a ſword out of iron, is I acknowledge

* Firſt ſketch of this third book, ſect. 1.

knowledge a groſs abſurdity. But I perceive no abſurdity nor inconſiſtence in ſuppoſing that matter was brought into exiſtence by Almighty power; and the popular expreſſion, that God made the world out of nothing, has no other meaning. It is true, that in the operations of men nothing can be produced but from antecedent materials; and ſo accuſtomed are we to ſuch operations, as not readily to conceive how a thing can be brought into exiſtence without antecedent materials, or made out of nothing, as commonly expreſſed. But will any man in ſober ſenſe venture to ſet bounds to Almighty power, where he cannot point out a clear inconſiſtence? It is indeed difficult to conceive a thing ſo remote from common apprehenſion; but is there leſs difficulty in conceiving matter to exiſt without a cauſe, and to be entitled to the awful appellation of ſelf-exiſtent, like the Lord of the Univerſe, to whom a more exalted appellation cannot be given? Now, if it be within the utmoſt verge of poſſibility for matter to have been created, I conclude with the higheſt probability, that it owes its exiſtence to Almighty power. The neceſſity of one ſelf-exiſtent being is intuitively certain; but I perceive no neceſſity, nor indeed probability, that there ſhould be more than one. Difficulties about the creation of matter, teſtify our ignorance; but to argue from our ignorance that a thing cannot be, has always been held very weak reaſoning. Our faculties are adapted to our preſent

ſent ſtate, and perform their office in perfection. But to complain that they do not reach the origin of things, is no leſs abſurd than to complain that we cannot aſcend to the moon in order to be acquainted with its inhabitants. At the ſame time, it is a comfortable reflection, that the queſtion, whether matter was created or no, is a pure ſpeculation, and that either ſide may be adopted without impiety. To me it appears more ſimple and more natural to hold it to be a work of creation, than to be ſelf-exiſtent, and conſequently independent of the Almighty either to create or to annihilate. I cheerfully make the former an article of my Creed; but without anathematiſing thoſe who adopt the latter. I would however have it underſtood, that I limit my conceſſion to matter in its original rude ſtate. I cannot poſſibly carry my complaiſance ſo far as to comprehend the world in its preſent perfection. That immenſe machine compoſed of parts without number ſo artfully combined as to fulfil the intention of the maker, muſt be the production of a great being, omniſcient as well as omnipotent. To aſſign blind fatality as the cauſe, is an inſufferable abſurdity.

Many groſs and abſurd conceptions of Deity that have prevailed among rude nations, are urged by ſome writers as an objection againſt a ſenſe of Deity. That objection ſhall not be overlooked; but it will be anſwered to better purpoſe, after theſe

theſe groſs and abſurd conceptions are examined in the chapter immediately following.

The proof of a Deity from the innate ſenſe here explained, differs materially from what is contained in eſſays on morality and natural religion*. The proof there given is founded on a chain of reaſoning, altogether independent on the innate ſenſe of Deity. Both equally produce conviction; but as ſenſe operates intuitively without reaſoning, the ſenſe of Deity is made a branch of human nature, in order to enlighten thoſe who are incapable of a long chain of reaſoning; and to ſuch, who make the bulk of mankind, it is more convincing, than the moſt perſpicuous reaſoning to a philoſopher.

CHAP. II.

Progreſs of Opinions with reſpect to Deity.

THE ſenſe of Deity, like many other delicate ſenſes, is in ſavages ſo faint and obſcure as eaſily to be biaſſed from truth. Among them, the belief of many ſuperior beings, is univerſal. And two cauſes join to produce that belief. The firſt is,

* Part ii. ſect. 7.

is, that being accuſtomed to a plurality of viſible objects, men, mountains, trees, cattle, and ſuch like, they are naturally led to imagine a like plurality in things not viſible; and from that ſlight bias, ſlight indeed but natural, is partly derived the ſyſtem of Polytheiſm, univerſal among ſavages. The other is, that ſavages know little of the connection between cauſes and effects, and ſtill leſs of the order and government of the world: every event that is not familiar, appears to them ſingular and extraordinary; and if ſuch event exceed human power, it is without heſitation aſcribed to a ſuperior being. But as it occurs not to a ſavage, nor to any perſon who is not a philoſopher, that the many various events exceeding human power and ſeemingly unconnected, may all proceed from the ſame cauſe; they are readily aſcribed to different beings. Pliny aſcribes Polytheiſm to the conſciouſneſs men have of their imbecillity: "Our "powers are confined within narrow bounds: we "do not readily conceive powers in the Deity "much more extenſive: and we ſupply by num-"ber what is wanting in power *." Polytheiſm, thus founded, is the firſt ſtage in the progreſs of theology; for it is embraced by the rudeſt ſavages, who have neither capacity nor inclination to pierce deeper into the nature of things.

This

* Plurality of heads or of hands in one idol, is ſometimes made to ſupply plurality of different idols. Hence among ſavages the groteſque figure of ſome of their idols.

This ſtage is diſtinguiſhable from others, by a belief that all ſuperior beings are malevolent. Man, by nature weak and helpleſs, is prone to fear, dreading every new object and every unuſual event. Savages, having no protection againſt ſtorms, tempeſts, nor other external accidents, and having no pleaſures but in gratifying hunger, thirſt, and animal love; have much to fear, and little to hope. In that diſconſolate condition, they attribute the bulk of their diſtreſſes to inviſible beings, who in their opinion muſt be malevolent. This ſeems to have been the opinion of the Greeks in the days of Solon; as appears in a converſation between him and Crœſus King of Lydia, mentioned by Herodotus in the firſt book of his hiſtory. "Crœſus, ſaid Solon, you aſk me about human "affairs; and I anſwer as one who thinks, that "all the gods are envious and diſturbers of man-"kind." The negroes on the coaſt of Guinea, dread their deities as tyrants and oppreſſors: having no conception of a good deity, they attribute the few bleſſings they receive, to the ſoil, to the rivers, to the trees, and to the plants. The Lithuanians continued Pagans down to the fourteenth century; and worſhipped in gloomy woods, where their deities were held to reſide. Their worſhip probably was prompted by fear, which is allied to gloomineſs. The people of Kamſkatka acknowledge to this day many malevolent deities, having little or no notion of a good deity. They believe the

the air, the water, the mountains, and the woods, to be inhabited by malevolent ſpirits, whom they fear and worſhip. The ſavages of Guiana aſcribe to the devil even their moſt common diſeaſes; nor do they ever think of another remedy, but to apply to a ſorcerer to drive him away. Such negroes as believe in the devil, paint his images white. Beſide the Eſquimaux, there are many tribes in the extenſive country of Labrador, who believe the Deity to be malevolent, and worſhip him out of fear. When they eat, they throw a piece of fleſh into the fire as an offering to him; and when they go to ſea in a canoe, they throw ſomething on the ſhore to render him propitious. Sometimes, in a capricious fit, they go out with guns and hatchets to kill him; and on their return boaſt that they have done ſo.

Conviction of ſuperior beings, who, like men, are of a mixed nature, ſometimes doing good, ſometimes miſchief, conſtitutes the ſecond ſtage. This came to be the ſyſtem of theology in Greece. The introduction of writing among the Greeks, while they were little better than ſavages, produced a compound of character and manners, that has not a parallel in any other nation. They were acute in ſcience, ſkilful in fine arts, extremely deficient in morals, groſs beyond conception in theology, and ſuperſtitious to a degree of folly; a ſtrange jumble of exquiſite ſenſe and abſurd nonſenſe. They held their gods to reſemble men in their external

ternal figure, and to be corporeal. In the 21ſt book of the Iliad, Minerva with a huge ſtone beats Mars to the ground, whoſe monſtrous body covered ſeven broad acres. As corporeal beings, they were ſuppoſed to require the nouriſhment of meat, drink, and ſleep. Homer mentions more than once the inviting of gods to a feaſt: and Pauſanias reports, that in the temple of Bacchus at Athens, there were figures of clay, repreſenting a feaſt given by Amphyction to Bacchus and other deities. The inhabitants of the iſland Java are not ſo groſs in their conceptions, as to think that the gods eat the offerings preſented to them: but it is their opinion, that a deity brings his mouth near the offering, ſucks out all its ſavour, and leaves it taſteleſs like water*. The Grecian gods, as deſcribed by Homer, dreſs, bathe, and anoint, like mortals. Venus, after being detected by her huſband in the embraces of Mars, retires to Paphos,

Where to the pow'r an hundred altars riſe,
And breathing odours ſcent the balmy ſkies;
Conceal'd ſhe bathes in conſecrated bow'rs,
The Graces unguents ſhed, ambroſial ſhow'rs,
Unguents that charm the gods! She laſt aſſumes
Her wond'rous robes; and full the goddeſs blooms.

ODYSSEY, *Book* VIII.

* All Greek writers, and thoſe in their neighbourhood, form the world out of a chaos. They had no ſuch exalted notion of a deity as to believe, that he could make the world out of nothing.

Juno's dreſs is moſt poetically deſcribed, Iliad, Book xiv. It was alſo univerſally believed, that the gods were fond of women, and had many children by them. The ancient Germans thought more ſenſibly, that the gods were too high to reſemble men in any degree, or to be confined within the walls of a temple. The Greeks ſeem to have thought, that the gods did not much exceed themſelves in knowledge. When Ageſilaus journeyed with his private retinue, he uſually lodged in a temple; making the gods witneſſes, ſays Plutarch, of his moſt ſecret actions. The Greeks thought, that a god, like a man, might know what paſſed within his own houſe; without knowing any thing paſſing at a diſtance. "If it be true," ſays Ariſtotle, (Rhetoric, Book II.) "that even the "gods do not know every thing, there is little "reaſon to expect great knowledge among men." Agamemnon in Eſchylus, putting off his travelling habit, and dreſſing himſelf in ſplendid purple, is afraid of being ſeen and envied by ſome jealous god. We learn from Seneca, that people ſtrove for the ſeat next to the image of the deity, that their prayers might be the better heard. But what we have chiefly to remark upon this head, is, that the Grecian gods were, like men, held capable of doing both good and ill. Jupiter, their higheſt deity, was a raviſher of women, and a notorious adulterer. In the ſecond book of the Iliad, he ſends a lying dream to deceive Agamemnon.

Mars

Mars ſeduces Venus by bribes to commit adultery *. In the Rheſus of Euripides, Minerva, diſguiſed like Venus, deceives Paris by a groſs lie. The ground-work of the tragedy of Xuthus is a lying oracle, declaring Ion, ſon of Apollo and Creuſa, to be the ſon of Xuthus. Oreſtes in Euripides, having ſlain his mother Clytemneſtra, excuſes himſelf as having been miſled by Apollo to commit the crime. "Ah!" ſays he, "had I conſult-"ed the ghoſt of my father, he would have diſ-"ſuaded me from a crime that has proved my "ruin, without doing him any good." He concludes with obſerving, that having acted by Apollo's command, Apollo is the only criminal. In a tragedy of Sophocles, Minerva makes no difficulty to cheat Ajax, promiſing to be his friend, while underhand ſhe is ſerving Ulyſſes, his bitter enemy. Mercury, in revenge for the murder of his ſon Myrtilus, entails curſes on Pelops the murderer, and on all his race †. In general, the gods, every where in Greek tragedies, are partial, unjuſt, tyrannical and revengeful. The Greeks accordingly have no reſerve in abuſing their gods. In the tragedy of Prometheus, Jupiter, without the leaſt ceremony, is accuſed of being an uſurper.

* Odyſſey, Book viii.

† The Engliſh tranſlator of that tragedy, obſerves it to be remarkable in the Grecian creed, that the gods puniſh not only the perſons guilty, but their innocent poſterity.

Eſchylus proclaims publicly on the ſtage, that Jupiter, a jealous, cruel, and implacable tyrant, had overturned every thing in heaven: and that the other gods were reduced to be his ſlaves. In the Iliad, Book XIII., Menelaus addreſſes Jupiter in the following words: "O Father Jove! in wiſdom, "they ſay, thou excelleſt both men and gods. Yet "all theſe ills proceed from thee; for the wicked "thou doſt aid in war. Thou art a friend to the "Trojans, whoſe ſouls delight in force, who are "never glutted with blood." The gods were often treated with a ſort of contemptuous familiarity, and employed in very low offices. Nothing is more common, than to introduce them as actors in Greek tragedies; frequently for trivial purpoſes: Apollo comes upon the ſtage moſt courteouſly to acquaint the audience with the ſubject of the play. Why is this not urged by our critics, as claſſical authority againſt the rule of Horace, *Nec deus interſit niſi dignus vindice nodus* *. Homer makes very uſeful ſervants of his gods. Minerva in particular, is a faithful attendant upon Ulyſſes. She acts the herald, and calls the chiefs to council †. She marks the place where a great ſtone fell that was thrown by Ulyſſes ‡. She aſſiſts Ulyſſes

* Nor let a god in perſon ſtand diſplay'd,
Unleſs the labouring plot deſerve his aid.
FRANCIS.

† Odyſſey, Book VIII. ‡ Book VIII.

Ulyſſes to hide his treaſure in a cave *, and helps him to wreſtle with the beggar †. Ulyſſes being toſt with cares in bed, ſhe deſcends from heaven to make him fall aſleep ‡. This laſt might poſſibly be ſqueezed into an allegory, if Minerva were not frequently introduced where there is no place for an allegory. Jupiter, Book xvii. of the Iliad, is introduced comforting the ſteeds of Achilles for the death of Patroclus. Creuſa keeps it a profound ſecret from her huſband, that ſhe had a child by Apollo. It was held as little honourable in Greece to commit fornication with a god as with a man. It appears from Cicero §, that when Greek philoſophers began to reaſon about the deity, their notions were wonderfully crude. One of the hardeſt morſels to digeſt in Plato's philoſophy, was a doctrine, That God is incorporeal; which by many was thought abſurd, for that, without a body, he could not have ſenſes, nor prudence, nor pleaſure. The religious creed of the Romans ſeems to have been little leſs impure than that of the Greeks. It was a ceremony of theirs, in beſieging a town, to evocate the tutelar deity, and to tempt him by a reward to betray his friends and votaries. In that ceremony, the name of the tutelar deity was thought of importance; and for that reaſon, the tutelar deity of Rome was a profound ſecret.

* Odyſſey, Book xiii.

† Book xviii.

† Book xx.

§ Lib. i. De natura deorum.

cret*. Appian of Alexandria, in his book of the Parthian war, reports, that Anthony, reduced to extremity

* The form of the *evocatio* follows. " Tuo ductu, inquit, " Pythie Apollo, tuoque numine inſtinctus, pergo ad delen- " dam urbem Veios: tibique hinc decimam partem prædæ " voveo. Te ſimul, Juno Regina, quæ nunc Veios colis, pre- " cor, ut nos victores in noſtram tuamque mox futuram ur- " bem ſequare: ubi te, dignum amplitudine tua, templum " accipiat." *Titus Livius, lib. 5. cap. 21.*——[*In Engliſh thus:* " Under thy guidance and divine inſpiration, O Pythian A- " pollo, I march to the deſtruction of *Veii;* and to thy ſhrine " I devote a tenth of the plunder. Imperial Juno, guardian " of Veii, deign to proſper our victorious arms, and a temple " ſhall be erected to thy honour, ſuitable to the greatneſs and " majeſty of thy name."]—But it appears from Macrobius, that they uſed a form of evocation even when the name of the tutelar deity was unknown to them. " Si deus, ſi dea " eſt, cui populus civitaſque Carthaginienſis eſt in tutela, te- " que maxime ille qui urbis hujus populique tutelam reci- " piſti, precor, venerorque, veniamque a vobis peto, ut vos " populum civitatemque Carthaginienſem deſeratis, loca, tem- " pla, ſacra, urbemque eorum relinquiatis, abſque his abeatis, " eique populo, civitatique metum, formidinem, oblivionem, " injiciatis, proditique Romam ad me meoſque veniatis, noſ- " traque vobis loca, templa, ſacra, urbs, acceptior probatior- " que ſit, mihique populoque Romano militibuſque meis præ- " poſiti ſitis, ut ſciamus intelligamuſque. Si ita feceritis, vo- " veo vobis templa ludoſque facturum." *Saturnal. lib. 3. cap. 9.*——[*In Engliſh thus.* " That divinity, whether god or " goddeſs, who is the guardian of the ſtate of Carthage, " that divinity I invoke, I pray and ſupplicate, that he will " deſert that perfidious people. Honour not with thy pre- " ſence

extremity by the Parthians, lifted up his eyes to heaven, and beſought the gods, that if any of them were jealous of his former happineſs, they would pour their vengeance upon his head alone, and ſuffer his army to eſcape. The ſtory of Paris and the three goddeſſes gives no favourable impreſſion, either of the morals or religion of the Romans. Juno, and her two ſiſter-deities ſubmit their diſpute about beauty to the ſhepherd Paris, who conſcientiouſly pronounces in favour of Venus. But

——— *manet alta mente repoſtum*
Judicium Paridis, ſpretæque injuria formæ.

Juno, not ſatisfied with wreaking her malice againſt the honeſt ſhepherd, declares war againſt his whole nation. Not even Eneas, though a fugitive in foreign lands, eſcapes her fury. Their great god Jupiter is introduced on the ſtage by Plautus, to deceive Alcmena, and to lie with her in the ſhape of her huſband. Nay, it was the opinion of the Romans, that this play made much for the honour

" fence their temples, their ceremonies, nor their city; aban-
" don them to all their fears, leave them to infamy and ob-
" livion. Fly hence to Rome, where, in my country, and
" among my fellow-citizens, thou ſhalt have nobler temples,
" and more acceptable ſacrifices; thou ſhalt be the tutelar
" deity of this army, and of the Roman ſtate. On this con-
" dition, I here vow to erect temples and inſtitute games to
" thine honour."]

of Jupiter; for in times of national troubles and calamities, it was commonly acted to appeaſe his anger;—a pregnant inſtance of the groſs conceptions of that warlike people in morality, as well as in religion.

A diviſion of inviſible beings into benevolent and malevolent, without any mixture of theſe qualities, makes the third ſtage. The talents and feelings of men, refine gradually under good government: ſocial amuſements begin to make a figure: benevolence is highly regarded; and ſome men are found without gall. Having thus acquired a notion of pure benevolence, and finding it exemplified in ſome eminent perſons, it was an eaſy ſtep in the progreſs of theological opinions, to beſtow the ſame character upon ſome ſuperior beings. This led men to diſtinguiſh their gods into two kinds, eſſentially different, one entirely benevolent, another entirely malevolent; and the difference between good and ill, which are diametrically oppoſite, favoured that diſtinction. Fortunate events out of the common courſe of nature, were accordingly aſcribed to benevolent deities; and unfortunate events of that kind to malevolent. In the time of Pliny the elder, malevolent deities were worſhipped at Rome. He mentions a temple dedicated to *Bad Fortune*, another to the diſeaſe termed a *Fever*. The Lacedemonians worſhipped *Death* and *Fear*; and the people of Cadiz *Poverty* and *Old Age*; in order to deprecate

deprecate their wrath. Such gods were by the Romans termed *Averrunci*, as putting away evil.

Conviction of one ſupreme benevolent Deity, and of inferior deities, ſome benevolent, ſome malevolent, is the fourth ſtage. Such conviction, which gains ground in proportion as morality ripens, ariſes from a remarkable difference between gratitude and fear. Willing to ſhow my gratitude for ſome kindneſs proceeding from an unknown hand, ſeveral perſons occur to my conjectures; but I always fix at laſt upon one perſon as the moſt likely. Fear is of an oppoſite nature: it expands itſelf upon every ſuſpicious perſon, and blackens them all. Thus, upon providential good fortune above the power of man, we naturally reſt upon one benevolent Deity as the cauſe; and to him we confine our gratitude and veneration. When, on the other hand, we are ſtruck with an uncommon calamity, every thing that poſſibly may be the cauſe raiſes terror. Hence the propenſity in ſavages to multiply objects of fear; but to confine their gratitude and veneration to a ſingle object. Gratitude and veneration, at the ſame time, are of ſuch a nature, as to raiſe a high opinion of the perſon who is their object; and when a ſingle inviſible being is underſtood to pour out bleſſings with a liberal hand, good men, inflamed with gratitude, put no bounds to the power and benevolence of that being. And thus one ſupreme benevolent Deity comes

comes to be recognized among the more enlightened ſavages. With reſpect to malevolent deities, as they are ſuppoſed to be numerous, and as there is no natural impulſe for elevating one above another; they are all of them held to be of an inferior rank, ſubordinate to the ſupreme Deity.

Unity in the ſupreme Being hath, among philoſophers, a more ſolid foundation, namely, unity of deſign and of order in the creation and government of this world *. At the ſame time, the paſſion of gratitude, which leads even ſavages to the attribute of unity in the ſupreme Being, prepares the mind for reliſhing the proof of that unity, founded on the unity of his works.

The belief of one ſupreme benevolent Deity, and of ſubordinate deities benevolent and malevolent, is and has been more univerſal than any other religious creed. I confine myſelf to a few inſtances; for a complete enumeration would be endleſs. The different ſavage tribes in Dutch Guiana, agree pretty much in their articles of faith.

* All things in the univerſe are evidently of a piece. Every thing is adjuſted to every thing; one deſign prevails through the whole: and this uniformity leads the mind to acknowledge one author; becauſe the conception of different authors without diſtinction of attributes or operations, ſerves only to perplex the imagination, without beſtowing any ſatisfaction on the underſtanding. *Natural Hiſtory of Religion, by David Hume, Eſquire.*

faith. They hold the exiſtence of one ſupreme Deity, whoſe chief attribute is benevolence; and to him they aſcribe every good that happens. But as it is againſt his nature to do ill, they believe in ſubordinate malevolent beings, like our devil, who occaſion thunder, hurricanes, earthquakes, and who are the authors of death, diſeaſes, and of every misfortune. To theſe devils, termed in their language *Yowahoos*, they direct every ſupplication, in order to avert their malevolence; while the ſupreme Deity is entirely neglected: ſo much more powerful among ſavages, is fear than gratitude. The North American ſavages have all of them a notion of a ſupreme Deity, creator and governor of the world; and of inferior deities, ſome good, ſome ill. Theſe are ſuppoſed to have bodies, and to live much as men do, but without being ſubjected to any diſtreſs. The ſame creed prevails among the negroes of Benin and Congo, among the people of New Zeland, among the inhabitants of Java, of Madagaſcar, of the Molucca iſlands, and of the Caribbee iſlands. The Chinguleſe, a tribe in the iſland of Ceylon, acknowlege one God creator of the univerſe, with ſubordinate deities who act as his deputies: agriculture is the peculiar province of one, navigation of another. The creed of the Tonquineſe is nearly the ſame. The inhabitants of Otaheité, termed *King George's Iſland*, believe in one ſupreme Deity; and in inferior deities without

without end, who preſide over particular parts of the creation. They pay no adoration to the ſupreme Deity, thinking him too far elevated above his creatures to concern himſelf with what they do. They believe the ſtars to be children of the ſun and moon, and an eclipſe to be the time of copulation. The Naudoweſſies are the fartheſt remote from our colonies of any of the North Americans whom we are in any degree acquainted with. They acknowledge one ſupreme Being or giver of life, to whom they look up as the ſource of good, and from whom no evil can proceed. They acknowledge alſo a bad ſpirit of great power, by whom all the evils that befal mankind are inflicted. To him they pray in their diſtreſſes; begging that he will either avert their troubles or mitigate them. They acknowledge beſide good ſpirits of an inferior degree, who in their particular departments contribute to the happineſs of mortals. But they ſeem to have no notion of a ſpirit diveſted of matter. They believe their gods to be of the human form, but of a nature more excellent than man. They believe in a future ſtate; and that their employments will be ſimilar to what they are engaged in here, but without labour or fatigue; in ſhort, that they ſhall live for ever in regions of plenty, and enjoy in a higher degree every gratification they delight in here. According to Arnobius, certain Roman deities preſided over the various operations of men.

men. Venus preſided over carnal copulation; Puta aſſiſted at pruning trees; and Peta in requeſting benefits: Nemeſtrinus was god of the woods, Nodutus ripened corn, and Terenſis helped to thraſh it; Vibilia aſſiſted travellers: orphans were under the care of Orbona, and dying perſons, of Nænia; Oſſilago hardened the bones of infants; and Mellonia protected bees, and beſtowed ſweetneſs on their honey. The inhabitants of the Iſland of Formoſa recognize two ſupreme deities in company; the one a male, god of the men, the other a female, goddeſs of the women. The bulk of their inferior deities are the ſouls of upright men, who are conſtantly doing good, and the ſouls of wicked men, who are conſtantly doing ill. The inland negroes acknowledge one ſupreme Being, creator of all things; attributing to him infinite power, infinite knowledge, and ubiquity. They believe that the dead are converted into ſpirits, termed by them *Ianahini*, or protectors, being appointed to guard their parents and relations. The ancient Goths and ſeveral other northern nations, acknowledged one ſupreme Being; and at the ſame time worſhipped three ſubordinate deities; Thor, reputed the ſame with Jupiter; Oden, or Woden, the ſame with Mars; and Friga, the ſame with Venus *. Socrates

* "Regnator omnium Deus, cætera ſubjecta atque parentia;" *Tacitus de moribus Germanorum, cap.* 39. [*In Engliſh thus*: "One "God the ruler of all; the reſt inferior and ſubordinate."]

crates taking the cup of poiſon from the executioner, held it up toward heaven, and pouring out ſome of it as an oblation to the ſupreme Deity, pronounced the following prayer: "I implore "the immortal God that my tranſlation hence "may be happy." Then turning to Crito, ſaid, "O Crito! I owe a cock to Eſculapius, pay it." From this incident we find that Socrates, ſoaring above his countrymen, had attained to the belief of a ſupreme benevolent Deity. But in that dark age of religion, ſuch purity is not to be expected from Socrates himſelf, as to have rejected ſubordinate deities, even of the mercenary kind.

Different offices being aſſigned to the gods, as above mentioned, proper names followed of courſe. And when a god was aſcertained by a name, the buſy mind would naturally proceed to trace his genealogy.

As unity in the Deity was not an eſtabliſhed doctrine in the countries where the Chriſtian religion was firſt promulgated, Chriſtianity could not fail to prevail over Paganiſm; for improvements in the mental faculties lead by ſure ſteps, though ſlow, to one God.

The fifth ſtage is, the belief of one ſupreme benevolent Deity, as in that immediately foregoing, with many inferior benevolent deities, and one only who is malevolent. As men improve in natural knowledge and become ſkilful in tracing cauſes from effects, they find much leſs malice and ill-

ill-deſign than was imagined: humanity at laſt prevails, which with improved knowledge baniſh the ſuſpicion of ill-deſign, in every caſe where an event can be explained without it. In a word, a ſettled opinion of good prevailing in the world, produced conviction among ſome nations, leſs ignorant than their neighbours and leſs brutal, that there is but one malevolent ſubordinate deity, and good ſubordinate deities without number. The ancient Perſians acknowledged two principles; one all good and all powerful, named *Hormuz*, and by the Greeks corruptly *Oromazes*; the other evil, named *Ahariman*, and by the Greeks *Arimanes*. Some authors aſſert, that the Perſians held theſe two principles to be co-eternal; others that Oromazes firſt ſubſiſted alone, that he created both light and darkneſs, and that he created Arimanes out of darkneſs. That the latter was the opinion of the ancient Perſians, appears from their Bible, termed the *Sadder*; which teaches, That there is one God ſupreme over all, many good angels, and but one evil ſpirit. Plutarch acquaints us, that Hormus and Ahariman, ever at variance, formed each of them creatures of their own ſtamp; that the former created good genii, ſuch as goodneſs, truth, wiſdom, juſtice; and that the latter created evil genii, ſuch as infidelity, falſehood, oppreſſion, theft. This ſyſtem of theology, commonly termed the *Manichean Syſtem*, is ſaid to be alſo the religious creed of Pegu, with the following

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ing addition, that the evil principle only is to be worſhipped; which is abundantly probable, as fear is a predominant paſſion in barbarians. The people of Florida believe a ſupreme benevolent Deity, and a ſubordinate deity that is malevolent: neglecting the former, who, they ſay, does no harm, they bend their whole attention to ſoften the latter, who, they ſay, torments them day and night. The inhabitants of Darien acknowledge but one evil ſpirit, of whom they are deſperately afraid. The Hottentots, mentioned by ſome writers as altogether deſtitute of religion, are on the contrary farther advanced toward its purity, than ſome of their neighbours. Their creed is, That there is a ſupreme Being, who is goodneſs itſelf; of whom they have no occaſion to ſtand in awe, as he is incapable by his nature to hurt them; that there is alſo a malevolent ſpirit, ſubordinate to the former, who muſt be ſerved and worſhipped in order to avert his malice. The Epicurean doctrine with reſpect to the gods in general, That being happy in themſelves they extend not their providential care to men, differs not widely from what the Hottentot believes with reſpect to the ſupreme Being.

Having traced the ſenſe of deity, from its dawn in the groſſeſt ſavages to its approaching maturity among enlightened nations, we proceed to the laſt ſtage of the progreſs, which makes the true ſyſtem of theology; and that is, conviction of a ſupreme

preme Being, boundleſs in every perfection, without ſubordinate deities, benevolent or malevolent. Savages learn early to trace the chain of cauſes and effects, with reſpect to ordinary events: they know that faſting produces hunger, that labour occaſions wearineſs, that fire burns, that the ſun and rain contribute to vegetation. But when they go beyond ſuch familiar events, they loſe ſight of cauſe and effect: the changes of weather, of winds, of heat and cold, impreſs them with a notion of chance: earthquakes, hurricanes, ſtorms of thunder and lightning, which fill them with terror, are aſcribed to malignant beings of greater power than man. In the progreſs of knowledge light begins to break in upon them: they diſcover, that ſuch phenomena, however tremendous, come under the general law of cauſe and effect; and that there is no ground for aſcribing them to malignant ſpirits. At the ſame time, our more refined ſenſes ripen by degrees: ſocial affections come to prevail, and morality makes a deep impreſſion. In maturity of ſenſe and underſtanding, benevolence appears more and more; and beautiful final cauſes are diſcovered in many of nature's productions, that formerly were thought uſeleſs, or perhaps hurtful: and the time may come, we have ſolid ground to hope that it will come, when doubts and difficulties about the government of Providence, will all of them be cleared up; and every event be found conducive

to the general good. Such views of Providence baniſh malevolent deities; and we ſettle at laſt in a moſt comfortable opinion; either that there are no ſuch beings; or that, if they exiſt and are permitted to perpetrate any miſchief, it is in order to produce greater good *. Thus, through a long maze of errors, man arrives at true religon, acknowledging but one Being, ſupreme in power, intelligence, and benevolence, who created all other beings, to whom all other beings are ſubjected, and who directs every event to anſwer the beſt purpoſes. This ſyſtem is true theology †.

Having gone through the different ſtages of religious belief, in its gradual progreſs toward truth and purity, I proceed to a very important article, The hiſtory of tutelar deities. The belief of tutelar deities preceded indeed ſeveral of the ſtages mentioned, witneſs the tutelar deities of Greece and Rome; but as it is not connected with any one of them excluſive of the reſt, the clearneſs of method required it to be poſtponed to all of them. This belief, founded on ſelfiſhneſs, made

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* The Abyſſinians think that the aſcribing to the devil the wicked acts of which the Portugueze declare him to be guilty, is falling into the error of the Manichees, who admit two principles, one good, one evil.

† Pliny ſeems to reliſh the doctrine of unity in the Deity: but is at a loſs about forming any juſt conception of him, ſometimes conſidering the world to be our only deity, ſometimes the ſun.

a rapid progreſs after property in the goods of fortune was eſtabliſhed. The Greeks, the Romans, and indeed moſt nations that were not mere ſavages, appropriated to themſelves tutelar deities, who were underſtood to befriend them upon all occaſions; and, in particular, to fight for them againſt their enemies. The Iliad of Homer is full of miraculous battles between the Greeks and Trojans, the tutelar deities mixing with the contending parties, and partaking of every diſaſter, death only excepted, which immortals could not ſuffer. The *lares*, *penates*, or houſehold-gods, of Indoſtan, of Greece, and of Rome, bear witneſs, that every family, perhaps every perſon, was thought to be under the protection of a tutelar deity. Alexander ab Alexandro gives a liſt of tutelar deities. Apollo and Minerva were the tutelar deities of Athens; Bacchus and Hercules of the Bœotian Thebes; Juno of Carthage, Samos, Sparta, Argos, and Mycené; Venus of Cyprus; Apollo of Rhodes and of Delphos; Vulcan of Lemnos; Bacchus of Naxus; Neptune of Tenedos, &c. The poets teſtify, that even individuals had tutelar deities:

Mulciber in Trojam, pro Troja ſtabat Apollo:
Æqua Venus Teucris, Pallas iniqua fuit.
Oderat Æneam, propior Saturnia Turno;
Ille tamen Veneris numine tutus erat.

Sæpe ferox cautum petiit Neptunus Ulyſſem;
Eripuit patruo ſæpe Minerva ſuo *.

Though the North-American ſavages recognize a ſupreme Being, wiſe and benevolent, and alſo ſubordinate benevolent beings who are entruſted with the government of the world; yet as the great diſtance of theſe ſubordinate beings, and the full occupation they have in general government, are ſuppoſed to make them overlook individuals, every man has a tutelar deity of his own, termed *Manitou*, who is conſtantly invoked during war to give him victory over his enemies. The Natches, bordering on the Miſiſſippi, offer up the ſkulls of their enemies to their god, and depoſite them in his temple. They conſider that Being as their tutelar deity, who aſſiſts them againſt their enemies, and to whom therefore the ſkull of an enemy muſt be an acceptable offering. Though they worſhip the ſun, who impartially ſhines on all mankind; yet ſuch is their partiality, that they conſider themſelves as his choſen people, and that their enemies are his enemies.

A

* "The rage of Vulcan, and the martial maid,
"Purſu'd old Troy; but Phœbus' love repay'd.
"Æneas ſafe, defy'd great Juno's hate,
"For Venus guards her favour'd offspring's fate;
"In vain Ulyſſes Neptune's wrath aſſails,
"O'er winds and waves Minerva's power prevails †."

† Ovid. Triſt. lib. 1. eleg. 2.

A belief ſo abſurd ſhews woful imbecillity in human nature. Is it not obvious, that the great God of heaven and earth governs the world by inflexible laws, from which he never can ſwerve in any caſe, becauſe they are the beſt poſſible in every caſe? To ſuppoſe any family or nation to be an object of his peculiar love, is no leſs impious, than to ſuppoſe any family or nation to be an object of his peculiar hatred: they equally arraign Providence of partiality. Even the Goths had more juſt notions of the Deity. Totila, recommending to his people juſtice and humanity, ſays, "Quare ſic habete, ea quæ amari ab hominibus ſolent ita vobis ſalva fore, ſi juſtitiæ reverentiam ſervaveritis. Si tranſitis in mores alios, etiam Deum ad hoſtes tranſiturum. Neque enim ille, aut omnibus omnino hominibus, aut uni alicui genti, addicit ſe ſocium *."

That God was once the tutelar deity of the Jews, is true; but not in the vulgar acceptation of that term, importing a deity choſen by a people to be their patron and protector. The orthodox

 faith

* "Be aſſured of this, that while ye preſerve your reverence for juſtice, ye will enjoy all the bleſſings which are eſtimable among mankind. If ye refuſe to obey her dictates, and your morals become corrupted, God himſelf will abandon you, and take the part of your enemies. For although the benevolence of that power is not partially confined to tribe or people, yet in the eye of his juſtice all men are not equally the objects of his approbation."

faith is, "That God choſe the Jews as his pecu-
"liar people, not from any partiality to them,
"but that there might be one nation to keep alive
"the knowledge of one ſupreme Deity; which
"ſhould be proſperous while they adhered to him,
"and unproſperous when they declined to ido-
"latry; not only in order to make them perſevere
"in the true faith, but alſo in order to exemplify
"to all nations the conduct of his Providence." It is certain, however, that the perverſe Jews claimed God Almighty as their tutelar deity in the vulgar acceptation of the term. And this error throws light upon an incident related in the Acts of the Apoſtles. There was a prophecy firmly believed by the Jews, that the Meſſiah would come among them in perſon to reſtore their kingdom. The Chriſtians gave a different ſenſe to the prophecy, namely, that the kingdom promiſed was not of this world. And they ſaid, that Chriſt was ſent to pave the way to their heavenly kingdom, by obtaining forgiveneſs of their ſins. At the ſame time, as the Jews held all other nations in abhorrence, it was natural for them to conclude, that the Meſſiah would be ſent to them only, God's choſen people: for which reaſon, even the apoſtles were at firſt doubtful about preaching the goſpel to any but to the Jews*. But the apoſtles reflecting, that it was one great purpoſe of the miſſion, to baniſh from the Jews their grovelling and

* See the xth and xith chapters of the Acts of the Apoſtles.

and impure notion of a tutelar deity, and to proclaim a ſtate of future happineſs to all who believe in Chriſt, they proceeded to preach the goſpel to all men: "Then Peter opened his mouth, "and ſaid, Of a truth I perceive, that God is no "reſpecter of perſons; but in every nation, he "that feareth him, and worketh righteouſneſs, is "accepted with him *." The foregoing reaſoning, however, did not ſatisfy the Jews: they could not digeſt the opinion, that God ſent his Meſſiah to ſave all nations, and that he was the God of the Gentiles as well as of the Jews. They ſtormed againſt Paul in particular, for inculcating that doctrine †.

Conſidering that religion in its purity was eſtabliſhed by the goſpel, is it not amazing, that even Chriſtians fell back to the worſhip of tutelar deities? They did not indeed adopt the abſurd opinion, that the ſupreme Being was their tutelar deity: but they held, that there are divine perſons ſubordinate to the Almighty, who take under their care nations, families, and even individuals; an opinion that differs not eſſentially from that of tutelar deities among the Heathens. That opinion, which flatters ſelf-love, took root in the fifth century, when the deification of ſaints was introduced, ſimilar to the deification of heroes among

* Acts of the Apoſtles, chap. x. 34.

† Acts of the Apoſtles, chap. xiii.

the ancients. People are fond of friends to be their interceſſors; and with regard to the Deity, deified ſaints were thought the propereſt interceſſors. Temples were built and dedicated to them; and ſolemn rites of worſhip inſtituted to render them propitious. It was imagined, that the ſouls of deified ſaints are at liberty to roam where they liſt, and that they love the places where their bodies are interred; which accordingly made the ſepulchres of the ſaints a common rendezvous of ſupplicants. What paved the way to notions ſo abſurd, was the groſs ignorance that clouded the Chriſtian world, after the northern barbarians became maſters of Europe. In the ſeventh century, the biſhops were ſo illiterate, as to be indebted to others for the ſhallow ſermons they preached; and the very few of that order who had any learning, ſatisfied themſelves with compoſing inſipid homilies, collected from the writings of Auguſtin and Gregory. In the ninth century, matters grew worſe and worſe; for theſe ſaints, held at firſt to be mediators for Chriſtians in general, were now converted into tutelar deities in the ſtricteſt ſenſe. An opinion prevailed, that ſuch ſaints as are occupied about the ſouls of Chriſtians in general, have little time for individuals; which led every church and every private Chriſtian, to elect for themſelves a particular ſaint, to be their patron or tutelar deity. That practice made it neceſſary to deify ſaints without end, in order to furniſh a

tutelar

tutelar deity to every individual. The dubbing of ſaints, became a new ſource of abuſes and frauds in the Chriſtian world: lying wonders were invented, and fabulous hiſtories compoſed, to celebrate exploits that never were performed, and to glorify perſons who never had a being. And thus religion among Chriſtians, ſunk down to as low a ſtate as it had been among Pagans.

There ſtill remains upon hand, a capital branch of our hiſtory; and that is idolatry, which properly ſignifies the worſhipping viſible objects as deities. But as idolatry evidently ſprung from religious worſhip, corrupted by the ignorant and brutiſh; it will make its appearance with more advantage in the next chapter, of which religious worſhip is the ſubject.

We have thus traced with wary ſteps, the gradual progreſs of theology through many ſtages, correſponding to the gradual openings and improvements of the human mind. But though that progreſs, in almoſt all countries, appears uniform with reſpect to the order of ſucceſſion, it is far otherwiſe with reſpect to the quickneſs of ſucceſſion: nations, like individuals, make a progreſs from infancy to maturity; but they advance not with an equal pace, ſome making a rapid progreſs toward perfection in knowledge and in religion, while others remain ignorant barbarians. The religion of Hindoſtan, if we credit hiſtory or tradition,

dition, had advanced to a conſiderable degree of purity and refinement, at a very early period. The Hindoſtan Bible, termed *Chatabbbade* or *Shaſtab*, gives an account of the creation, lapſe of the angels, and creation of man; inſtructs us in the unity of the Deity, but denies his preſcience, as being inconſiſtent with free will in man; all of them profound doctrines of an illuminated people, to eſtabliſh which a long courſe of time muſt have been requiſite, after wandering through errors without number. Compared with the Hindoos in theology, even the Greeks were mere ſavages. The Grecian gods were held to be little better than men, and their hiſtory, as above mentioned, correſponds to the notion entertained of them.

In explaining the opinions of men with reſpect to Deity, I have confined my view to ſuch opinions as are ſuggeſted by principles or biaſſes that make a part of common nature; omitting many whimſical notions, no better than dreams of a roving imagination. The plan delineated, ſhows wonderful uniformity in the progreſs of religion through all nations. That irregular and whimſical notions are far otherwiſe, is not wonderful. Take the following ſpecimen. The Kamſkatkans are not ſo ſtupidly ignorant, as to be altogether void of curioſity. They ſometimes think of natural appearances.—Rain, ſay they, is ſome deity piſſing upon them; and they imagine the

the rainbow to be a party-coloured garment, put on by him in preparing for that operation. They believe wind to be produced by a god ſhaking with violence his long hair about his head. Such tales will ſcarce amuſe children in the nurſery. The inhabitants of the iſland Celebes formerly acknowledged no gods but the ſun and the moon, which were held to be eternal. Ambition for ſuperiority made them fall out. The moon being wounded in flying from the ſun, was delivered of the earth.

Hitherto of the gradual openings of the human mind with reſpect to Deity. I cloſe this ſection with an account of ſome unſound notions concerning the conduct of Providence, and concerning ſome ſpeculative matters. I begin with the former.

In days of ignorance, the conduct of Providence is very little underſtood. Far from having any notion, that the government of this world is carried on by general laws, which are inflexible becauſe they are the beſt poſſible, every important event is attributed to an immediate interpoſition of the Deity. As the Grecian gods were thought to have bodies like men, and like men to require nouriſhment; they were imagined to act like men, forming ſhort-ſighted plans of operation, and varying them from time to time, according to exigencies. Even the wiſe Athenians had an utter averſion at philoſophers who attempted to account for

for effects by general laws: such doctrine they thought tended to fetter the gods, and to prevent them from governing events at their pleasure. An eclipse being held a prognostic given by the gods of some grievous calamity, Anaxagoras was accused of Atheism for attempting to explain the eclipse of the moon by natural causes: he was thrown into prison, and with difficulty was relieved by the influence of Pericles. Protagoras was banished Athens for maintaining the same doctrine. Procopius overflows with signal interpositions of Providence; and Agathias, beginning at the battle of Marathon, sagely maintains, that from that time downward, there was not a battle lost but by an immediate judgment of God, for the sins of the commander, or of his army, or of one person or other. Our Saviour's doctrine with respect to those who suffered by the fall of the tower of Siloam, ought to have opened their eyes; but superstitious eyes are never opened by instruction. At the same time, it is deplorable that such belief has no good influence on manners: on the contrary, never doth wickedness so much abound as in dark times. A curious fact is related by Procopius * with respect to that sort of superstition. When Rome was besieged by the Goths and in danger of destruction, a part of the town-wall was in a tottering condition. Belisarius, proposing to fortify it, was opposed by the citizens, affirming,

* Historia Gothica, lib. 1.

ing, that it was guarded by St Peter. Procopius obſerves, that the event anſwered expectation; for that the Goths, during a tedious ſiege, never once attempted that weak part. He adds, that the wall remained in the ſame ruinous ſtate at the time of his writing. Here is a curious conceit,—Peter created a tutelar deity, able and willing to counteract the laws by which God governs the material world. And for what mighty benefit to his votaries? Only to ſave them five or fifty pounds in rebuilding the crazy part of the wall.

It is no leſs inconſiſtent with the regular courſe of Providence, to believe, as many formerly did, that in all doubtful caſes the Almighty, when appealed to, never fails to interpoſe in favour of the right ſide. The inhabitants of Conſtantinople, ann. 1284, being ſplit into parties about two contending patriarchs, the Emperor ordered a fire to be made in the church of St Sophia, and a paper for each party to be thrown into it; never doubting, but that God would ſave from the flames the paper given in for the party whoſe cauſe he eſpouſed. But, to the utter aſtoniſhment of all beholders, the flames paid not the leaſt regard to either. The ſame abſurd opinion gave birth to the trial by fire, by water, and by ſingle combat. And it is not a little remarkable, that ſuch trials were common among many nations that had no intercourſe one with another: even the enlightened people of Indoſtan try crimes by dipping the hand of a ſuſpected

ſpected perſon in boiling oil. In caſes of doubtful proof, they recur in the kingdom of Siam, as in many other countries, to artificial proofs. One is to walk barefoot through fire. As the Siamites are accuſtomed to walk barefooted, their ſoles become hard; and thoſe who have ſkill have a good chance to eſcape without burning. The art is to ſet down their feet on the fire with all their weight, which excludes the air, and prevents the fire from burning. Another proof is by water. The accuſer and accuſed are thrown into a pond; and he who keeps the longeſt under water is declared to be in the right.—Such uniformity is there with reſpect even to ſuperſtitious opinions. Pope Gregory VII. inſiſting that the Kings of Caſtile and Aragon ſhould lay aſide their Gothic liturgy for the Romiſh, the matter was put to trial by ſingle combat; and two champions were choſen to declare by victory the opinion of God Almighty. The Emperor Otho I. obſerving the law-doctors to differ about the right of repreſentation in land-eſtates, appointed a duel; and the right of repreſentation gained the victory. If any thing can render ſuch a doctrine palatable, it is the believing in a tutelar deity, who with leſs abſurdity may interpoſe in behalf of a favourite opinion, or of a favourite people. Appian gravely reports, that when the city of Rhodes was beſieged by Mithridates, a ſtatue of the goddeſs Iſis was ſeen to dart flames of fire upon a bulky engine, raiſed by the beſiegers to overtop the wall.

Hiſtorians

Hiſtorians mention an incident that happened in the iſland Celebes, founded on a belief of the ſame kind with that above mentioned. About two centuries ago, ſome Chriſtian and ſome Mahometan miſſionaries made their way to that iſland. The chief king, ſtruck with the fear of hell taught by both, aſſembled a general council; and ſtretching his hands towards heaven, addreſſed the following prayer to the ſupreme Being. "Great God, from "thee I demand nothing but juſtice, and to me "thou oweſt it. Men of different religions have "come to this iſland, threatening eternal puniſh-"ment to me and my people if we diſobey thy "laws. What are thy laws? Speak, O my God, "who art the author of nature: thou knoweſt the "bottom of our hearts, and that we can never in-"tentionally diſobey thee. But if it be unwor-"thy of thy eſſence to employ the language of "men, I call upon my whole people, the ſun "which gives me light, the earth which bears me, "the ſea which ſurrounds my empire, and upon "thee thyſelf, to bear witneſs for me, that in the "ſincerity of my heart I wiſh to know thy will; "and this day I declare, that I will acknowledge "as the depoſitaries of thy oracles, the firſt mini-"ſters of either religion that ſhall land on this "iſland."

It is equally erroneous to believe, that certain ceremonies will protect one from miſchief. In the dark ages of Chriſtianity, the ſigning with the figure

figure of a croſs, was held not only to be an antidote againſt the ſnares of malignant ſpirits, but to inſpire reſolution for ſupporting trials and calamities: for which reaſon no Chriſtian in thoſe days undertook any thing of moment, till he had uſed that ceremony. It was firmly believed in France, that a gold or ſilver coin of St Louis, hung from the neck, was a protection againſt all diſeaſes: and we find accordingly a hole in every remaining coin of that king, for fixing it to a ribband. In the minority of Charles VIII. of France, the three eſtates, ann. 1484, ſupplicated his Majeſty, that he would no longer defer the being anointed with the holy oil, as the favour of Heaven was viſibly connected with that ceremony. They affirmed, that his grandfather Charles VII. never proſpered till he was anointed; and that Heaven afterward fought on his ſide, till the Engliſh were expelled out of his kingdom *. The high altar of St Margaret's church

* That ridiculous ceremony is kept up to this day: ſuch power has cuſtom. Take the following ſample of it: "The "Grand Prior of St Remi opens the holy phial, and gives "it to the Archbiſhop, who with a golden needle takes "ſome of the precious oil, about the ſize of a grain of "wheat, which he mixes with conſecrated ointment. The "King then proſtrates himſelf before the altar on a violet-"coloured carpet, embroidered with fleurs de lys, while "they pray. Then the King riſes, and the Archbiſhop "anoints him on the crown of the head, on the ſtomach, "on the two elbows, and on the joints of the arms. Af-"ter

church in the iſland of Icolmkill, was covered with a plate of blue marble finely veined; which has ſuffered from a ſuperſtitious conceit, that the ſmalleſt bit of it will preſerve a ſhip from ſinking. It has accordingly been carried off piece-meal; and at preſent there is ſcarce enough left to make an experiment. In the Sadder, certain prayers are enjoined when one ſneezes or piſſes, in order to chaſe away the devil. Cart-wheels in Liſbon, are compoſed of two clumſy boards nailed together in a circular form. Though the noiſe is intolerable, the axles are never greaſed; the noiſe, ſay they, frightens the devil from hurting their oxen.

Nay, ſo far has ſuperſtition been carried, as to found a belief, that the devil by magic can controul the courſe of Providence. A Greek biſhop having dreamed that a certain miracle had failed by magic, the ſuppoſed magician and his ſon were condemned to die, without the leaſt evidence but the dream. Monteſquieu collects a number of circumſtances, each of which, though all extremely improbable, ought to have been clearly made out, in

" ter the ſeveral anointings, the Archbiſhop of Rheims, " the Biſhops of Laon and Beauvais cloſe the openings of the " ſhirt; the High Chamberlain puts on the tunic and the " royal mantle; the King then kneels again, and is a- " nointed in the palms of his hands." Is this farce leſs ludicrous than that of an Engliſh King curing the King's evil with a touch?

in order to prove the crime*. The Emperor Theodore Laſcaris, imagining magic to be the cauſe of his diſtemper, put the perſons ſuſpected to the trial of holding a red-hot iron without being burnt. In the capitularies of Charlemagne, in the canons of ſeveral councils, and in the ancient laws of Norway, puniſhments are enacted againſt thoſe who are ſuppoſed able to raiſe tempeſts, termed *Tempeſtarii*. During the time of Catharine de Medicis, there was in the court of France a jumble of politics, gallantry, luxury, debauchery, ſuperſtition, and atheiſm. It was common to take the reſemblance of enemies in wax, in order to torment them by roaſting the figure at a ſlow fire, and pricking it with needles. If an enemy happened in one inſtance of a thouſand to pine and die, the charm was eſtabliſhed for ever. Sorcery and witchcraft were ſo univerſally believed in England, that in a preamble to a ſtatute of Henry VIII. ann. 1511, it is ſet forth, "That ſmiths, weavers, "and women, boldly take upon them great cures, "in which they partly uſe ſorcery and witch-"craft." The firſt printers, who were Germans, having carried their books to Paris for ſale, were condemned by the parliament to be burnt alive as ſorcerers; and did not eſcape puniſhment but by a precipitate flight. It had indeed much appearance of ſorcery, that a man could write ſo many copies of a book, without the ſlighteſt variation.

Superſtition

* L'Eſprit des loix, lib. 12. ch. 5.

Superſtition flouriſhes in times of danger and diſmay. During the civil wars of France and of England, ſuperſtition was carried to extravagance. Every one believed in magic, charms, ſpells, ſorcery, witchcraft, &c. The moſt abſurd tales paſt current as goſpel truths. Every one is acquainted with the hiſtory of the Ducheſs of Beaufort, who was ſaid to have made a compact with the devil, to procure Henry IV. of France for her lover. This ridiculous ſtory was believed through all France; and is reported as a truth by the Duke de Sully. Muſt not ſuperſtition have been at a high pitch, when that great man was infected with it? James Howel, eminent for knowledge and for the figure he made during the civil wars of England, relates as an undoubted truth an abſurd fiction concerning the town of Hamelen, that the devil with a bagpipe enticed all the rats out of the town, and drowned them in a lake; and becauſe his promiſed reward was denied, that he made the children ſuffer the ſame fate. Upon a manuſcript doubting of the exiſtence of witches, he obſerves, "that there are ſome men of a mere negative genius, who croſs and puzzle the cleareſt truths "with their *but, yet, if:* they will flap the lie in "Truth's teeth, though ſhe viſibly ſtands before "their face without any vizard. Such perverſe "croſs-grained ſpirits are not to be dealt with by "arguments, but palpable proofs: as if one deny "that the fire burns, or that he hath a noſe on his

" face; there is no way to deal with him, but " to pull him by the tip of the one and put his " finger into the other."

In an age of ſuperſtition, men of the greateſt judgment are infected: in an enlightened age, ſuperſtition is confined among the vulgar. Would one imagine that the great Louis of France is an exception. It is hard to ſay, whether his vanity or his ſuperſtition was the moſt eminent. The Duke of Luxembourg was his favourite and his moſt ſucceſsful general. In order to throw the Duke out of favour, his rivals accuſed him of having a compact with the devil. The King permitted him to be treated with great brutality, on evidence no leſs fooliſh and abſurd, than that on which old women were ſome time ago condemned as witches.

There are many examples of the attributing extraordinary virtue to certain things, in themſelves of no ſignificancy. The Hungarians were poſſeſſed of a golden crown, ſent from heaven with the peculiar virtue, as they believed, of beſtowing upon the perſon who wore it, an undoubted title to be their king.

But the moſt extraordinary effort of abſurd ſuperſtition, is a perſuaſion, that one may controul the courſe of Providence, by making a downright bargain with God Almighty to receive from him *quid pro quo*. A herd of Tartars in Siberia, named by the Ruſſians *Baravinſkoi*, have in every hut a wood-

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en idol about eighteen inches high; to which they addreſs their prayers for plenty of game in hunting, promiſing it, if ſucceſsful, a new coat or a new bonnet: a ſort of bargain abundantly brutiſh; and yet more excuſable in mere ſavages, than what is made with the Virgin Mary by enlightened Roman Catholics; who, upon condition of her relieving them from diſtreſs, promiſe her a waxen taper to burn on her altar. Philip II. of Spain made a vow, that, upon condition of gaining the battle of St Quintin, he would build the monaſtery of Eſcurial; as if an eſtabliſhment for ſome idle monks, could be a motive with the Great God to vary the courſe of his Providence *. Beſide the abſurdity of thinking that ſuch vows can have the effect to alter the eſtabliſhed laws of Providence; they betray a moſt contemptible notion of the Deity, as if his favours, like a horſe or a cow, could be purchaſed with money.

But, however looſe and disjointed events appear to the ignorant, when viewed as paſt or as paſſing; future events take on a very different appearance. The doctrine of prognoſtics, is evidently founded

* Having gained the battle of St Quintin on the feſtival of St Laurence, Philip reckoned himſelf obliged to the ſaint for this victory, as much as to God Almighty; and accordingly, he not only built the monaſtery he had vowed, but alſo a church for the ſaint, and a palace for himſelf, all under one roof: and, what is not a little ludicrous, the edifice is built in reſemblance of a gridiron, which, according to the legend, was the inſtrument of Laurence's martyrdom.

upon a ſuppoſition that future events are unalterably fixed; for otherwiſe that doctrine would appear abſurd, even to the ignorant. No bias in human nature has greater influence, than curioſity about futurity; which in dark ages governs without controul: men with no leſs folly than induſtry have ranſacked the earth, the ſea, the air, and even the ſtars, for prognoſtics of future events. The Greeks had their oracles, the Romans their augurs, and all the world their omens. The Grecian oracles and the Roman auguries, are evidently built upon their belief of tutelar deities; and the numberleſs omens that influence weak people in every country, ſeem to reſt upon the ſame foundation *. Ancient hiſtories are ſtuffed with omens, prodigies, and prognoſtics: Livy overflows with fooleries of that kind. Endleſs are the adverſe omens reported by Appian of Alexandria, that are ſaid to have given warning of the defeat of Craſſus by the Parthians; and no fewer in number are thoſe which happened at the death of the Emperor Hadrian, if we believe Spartianus. Lampridius, with great gravity, recites the omens which prognoſticated

* It is no wonder that the Romans were ſuperſtitiouſly addicted to omens and auguries: like mere ſavages, they put no value upon any ſcience but that of war; and, for that reaſon, they baniſhed all philoſophers, as uſeleſs members of ſociety. Thus, that nation, ſo fierce and ſo great in war, ſurrendered themſelves blindly to ſuperſtition, and became ſlaves to imaginary evils. Even their graveſt hiſtorians were deeply tainted with that diſeaſe.

prognoſticated that Alexander Severus would be Emperor: he was born the ſame day on which Alexander the Great died: he was brought forth in a temple dedicated to Alexander the Great: he was named *Alexander*; and an old woman gave to his mother, a pigeon's egg of a purple colour produced on his birth-day. A comet is an infallible prognoſtic of the death of a king. But of what king? Why, of the king who dies next.—Suetonius, with the ſolemnity of a pulpit-inſtructor, informs us, that the death of the Emperor Claudius was predicted by a comet; and of Tiberius, by the fall of a tower during an earthquake *. Such opinions, having a foundation in our nature, take faſt hold of the mind, when invigorated by education and example. Even philoſophy is not ſufficient to eradicate them but by ſlow degrees: witneſs Tacitus, the moſt profound of all hiſtorians, who cannot forbear to uſher in the death of the Emperor Otho, with a fooliſh account of a ſtrange unknown bird appearing at that time. He indeed, with decent reſerve, mentions it only as a fact reported by others; but from the glow of his narrative it is evident, that the ſtory had made an impreſſion upon him. When Onoſander wrote his military inſtitutions, which was in the fourth century, the intrails of an animal ſacrificed were ſtill depended on as a prognoſtic of good or bad

* Charlemagne, though an eminent aſtronomer for his time, was afraid of comets and eclipſes.

fortune. And in chap. 15. he endeavours to account for the misfortunes that ſometimes happened after the moſt favourable prognoſtics; laying the blame, not upon the prognoſtic, but upon ſome croſs accident that was not foreſeen by the tutelar deity. The ancient Germans drew many of their omens from horſes: "Proprium gentis, equorum "præſagia ac monitus experiri. Publicè aluntur "iiſdem nemoribus ac lucis, candidè, et nullo "mortali opere contacti, quos preſſos ſacro curru, "ſacerdos, ac rex, vel princeps civitatis, comitan- "tur, hinnitusque ac fremitus obſervant. Nec "ulli auſpicio major fides, non ſolùm apud ple- "bem, ſed apud proceres, apud ſacerdotes* †." There is ſcarce a thing ſeen or imagined, but what the inhabitants of Madagaſcar conſider as a prognoſtic of ſome future event. The Hindoos rely on the augury of birds, preciſely as the old Romans did. Though there is not the ſlighteſt probability, that an impending misfortune was ever prevented by ſuch prognoſtics; yet the deſire of knowing future events is ſo deeply rooted in our nature,

* "It is peculiar to that people, to deduce omens and pre- "ſages from horſes. Theſe animals are maintained at the "public expence, in groves and foreſts, and are not allowed "to be polluted with any work for the uſe of man; but being "yoked in the ſacred chariot, the prieſt, and the king, or chief "of the ſtate, attend them, and carefully obſerve their neigh- "ings and ſnortings. The greateſt faith is given to this me- "thod of augury, both among the vulgar and the nobles."

† Tacitus De moribus Germanorum, cap. 10.

nature, that omens will always prevail among the vulgar, in ſpite of the cleareſt light of philoſophy *.

With reſpect to prophecies in particular, one apology may be made for them, that no other prognoſtic of futurity is leſs apt to do miſchief. What Procopius † obſerves of the Sybilline oracles, is equally applicable to all prophecies, "That it is "above the ſagacity of man to explain any of "them before the event happen. Matters are "there handled, not in any order, nor in a continued diſcourſe: but after mentioning the diſtreſſes of Africa, for example, they give a ſlight "touch at the Perſians, the Romans, the Aſſyrians; then returning to the Romans, they fall "flap-daſh upon the calamities of Britain." A curious example of this obſervation, is a book of prophecies compoſed in Scotland by Thomas Learmont, commonly called *Thomas the Rhymer*, becauſe the book is in rhyme. Plutarch in the life of Cicero reports, that a ſpectre appeared to Cicero's nurſe, and foretold, that the child would become a great ſupport to the Roman ſtate; and moſt

* Is it not mortifying to human pride, that a great philoſopher [*Bacon*] ſhould think like the vulgar upon this ſubject? With reſpect to rejoicings in London upon the marriage of the daughter of Henry VII. of England to James IV. of Scotland, he ſays, "not from any affection to the Scots, but from "a ſecret inſtinct and inſpiration of the advantages that would "accrue from the match."

† Gothica Hiſtoria, lib. 1.

moſt innocently he makes the following reflection, "This might have paſſed for an idle tale, had not "Cicero demonſtrated the truth of the predic-"tion." At that rate, if a prediction happen to prove true, it is a real prophecy; if otherwiſe, it is an idle tale. There have been prophecies not altogether ſo well guarded as the Sybilline oracles. Napier, inventor of the logarithms, found the day of judgment to be predicted in the Revelation; and named the very day, which unfortunately he ſurvived. He made another prediction, but prudently named a day ſo diſtant as to be in no hazard of bluſhing a ſecond time. Michel Stifels, a German clergyman, ſpent moſt of his life in attempting to diſcover the day of judgment; and at laſt announced to his pariſhioners, that it would happen within a year. The pariſhioners, reſolving to make the beſt of a bad bargain, ſpent their time merrily, taking no care to lay up proviſions for another year; and ſo nice was their computation, as at the end of the year to have not a morſel remaining, either of food or of induſtry. The famous Jurieu has ſhewn great ingenuity in explaining prophecies; of which take the following inſtance. In his book, intituled *Accompliſhment of the Prophecies*, he demonſtrates, that the beaſt in the Apocalypſe, which held the *poculum aureum plenum abominationum* *, is the Pope; and his reaſon is, that the initial letters of theſe four Latin words compoſe

* "The golden cup full of abominations."

compoſe the word *papa*; a very ſingular prophecy indeed, that is a prophecy in Latin, but in no other language. The candid reader will advert, that ſuch prophecies as relate to our Saviour and tend to aſcertain the truth of his miſſion, fall not under the foregoing reaſoning; for they do not anticipate futurity, by producing foreknowledge of future events. They were not underſtood till our Saviour appeared among men; and then they were clearly underſtood as relative to him.

There is no end of ſuperſtition in its various modes. In dark times it was believed univerſally, that by certain forms and invocations, the ſpirits of the dead could be called upon to reveal future events. A lottery in Florence, gainful to the government and ruinous to the people, gives great ſcope to ſuperſtition. A man who purpoſes to purchaſe tickets, muſt faſt ſix and thirty hours, muſt repeat a certain number of Ave Maries and Pater Noſters, muſt not ſpeak to a living creature, muſt not go to bed, muſt continue in prayer to the Virgin and to ſaints, till ſome propitious ſaint appear and declare the numbers that are to be ſucceſsful. The man, fatigued with faſting, praying, and expectation, falls aſleep. Occupied with the thoughts he had when awake, he dreams that a ſaint appears, and mentions the lucky numbers. If he be diſappointed, he is vexed at his want of memory; but truſts in the ſaint as an infallible oracle. Again he

he falls asleep, again sees a vision, and again is disappointed.

Lucky and unlucky days, which were so much relied on as even to be marked in the Greek and Roman kalendars, make an appendix to prophecies. The Tartars never undertake any thing of moment on a Wednesday, being held by them unlucky. The Nogayan Tartars hold every thirteenth year to be unlucky: they will not even wear a sword that year, believing that it would be their death; and they maintain, that none of their warriors ever returned who went upon an expedition in one of these years. They pass that time in fasting and prayer, and during it never marry. —The inhabitants of Madagascar have days fortunate and unfortunate with respect to the birth of children: they destroy without mercy every child that is born on an unfortunate day.

There are unlucky names as well as unlucky days. Julien Cardinal de Medicis, chosen Pope, was inclined to keep his own name. But it being observed to him by the cardinals, says Guichardin, that the popes who retained their own name had all of them died within the year, he took the name of Clement, and was Clement VII. As John was held an unlucky name for a king, John, heir to the Crown of Scotland, was persuaded to change his name into Robert; and he was Robert III.

I close this important article with a reflection that will make an impression upon every rational person.

perſon. The knowledge of future events, as far as it tends to influence our conduct, is inconſiſtent with a ſtate of activity, ſuch as Providence has allotted to man in this life. It would deprive him of hopes and fears, and leave him nothing to deliberate upon, nor any end to proſecute. In a word, it would put an end to his activity, and reduce him to be merely a paſſing being. Providence therefore has wiſely drawn a veil over future events, affording us no light for prying into them but ſagacity and experience.

Theſe are a few of the numberleſs abſurd opinions about the conduct of Providence, that have prevailed among Chriſtians, and ſtill prevail among ſome of them. Many opinions no leſs abſurd have prevailed about ſpeculative points. I confine myſelf to one or two inſtances; for to make a complete liſt would require a volume. The firſt I ſhall mention, and the moſt noted, is tranſubſtantiation; a doctrine in which it is aſſerted, firſt, that the bread and wine in the ſacrament are converted into the body and blood of our Saviour; next, that his body and blood exiſts wholly and entirely in every particular ſacrament adminiſtered in the Chriſtian world even at the ſame inſtant of time. This article of faith, though it has not the leaſt influence on practice, is reckoned ſo eſſential to ſalvation, as to be placed above every moral duty. The following text is appealed to as its ſole foundation. "And as they were eating, Jeſus took

"bread,

" bread, and bleſſed it, and brake it, and gave it to " the diſciples, and ſaid, Take, eat; this is my " body. And he took the cup, and gave thanks, " and gave it to them, ſaying, Drink ye all of it: " for this is my blood of the new teſtament, which " is ſhed for many for the remiſſion of ſins. But " I ſay unto you, I will not drink henceforth of " this fruit of the vine, until that day when I " drink it new with you in my Father's king- " dom *." That this is a metaphor, muſt ſtrike every one: the paſſage cannot even bear a literal meaning, conſidering the final clauſe; for ſurely the moſt zealous Roman Catholic believes not, that Chriſtians are to drink new wine with their Saviour in the kingdom of heaven. At the ſame time, it is not ſo much as inſinuated, that there was here any miraculous tranſubſtantiation of the bread and wine into the body and blood of our Saviour; nor is it inſinuated, that the apoſtles believed they were eating the fleſh of their maſter, and drinking his blood. St John, the favourite apoſtle, mentions not a word of this ceremony, which he certainly would not have omitted, had he imagined it an eſſential article of faith.

But ſuppoſing tranſubſtantiation were clearly expreſſed in this text, yet men of underſtanding will be loth to admit a meaning that contradicts their five ſenſes. They will reflect, that no man now living ever ſaw the original books of the New Teſtament;

* St Matthew, xxvi. 26. &c.

Teſtament; nor are they certain, that the editions we have, are copied directly from the originals. Every remove from them is liable to errors, which may juſtly create a ſuſpicion of texts that contradict reaſon and common ſenſe. Add, that the bulk of Chriſtians have not even a copy from the original to build their faith upon; but only a tranſlation into another language. But the ſecond branch of this article is obvious to a ſtill ſtronger objection than of its contradicting our ſenſes: it is a direct inconſiſtence, as we cannot even conceive it poſſible that the ſame body or thing can be in two different places at the ſame time.

And this leads to what chiefly determined me to ſelect that inſtance. God and nature have beſtowed upon us the faculty of reaſon, for diſtinguiſhing truth from falſehood. If, by reaſoning with candour and impartiality, we diſcover a propoſition to be true or falſe, it is not in our power to remain indifferent: we muſt judge, and our belief muſt be regulated by our judgment. I ſay more, to judge is a duty we owe our Maker; for to what purpoſe has he beſtowed reaſon upon us, but in order to direct our judgment? At the ſame time, we may depend on it as an intuitive truth, that God will never impoſe any belief on us, contradictory, not only to our reaſon, but to our ſenſes.

The following objection however will perhaps reliſh more with people of plain underſtanding. Tranſubſtantiation

Tranſubſtantiation is a very extraordinary miracle, reiterated every day and in every corner of the earth, by prieſts not always remarkable either for piety or for morality. Now I demand an anſwer to the following plain queſtion: To what good end or purpoſe is ſuch a profuſion of miracles ſubſervient? I ſee none. But I diſcover a very bad one, if they have any influence; which is, that they accuſtom the Roman Catholics to more cruelty and barbarity, than even the groſſeſt ſavages are ever guilty of: ſome of theſe indeed devour the fleſh of their enemies; but none of them the fleſh of their friends, eſpecially of their greateſt friend. But to do juſtice to people of that religion, I am confident, that this ſuppoſed miracle has no influence whatever upon their manners: to me it appears impoſſible for any man ſeriouſly to believe, that the bread and wine uſed at the Lord's ſupper, is actually converted into the body and blood of our Saviour. The Romiſh church requires the belief of tranſubſtantiation; and a zealous Catholic, out of pure obedience, thinks he believes it. Convince once a man that ſalvation depends on belief, and he will believe any thing; that is, he will imagine that he believes: *Credo quia impoſſibile eſt* *.

That

* A traveller deſcribing the Virgin Mary's houſe at Loretto, has the following reflection. "When there are ſo many ſaints "endued with ſuch miraculous powers, ſo many relics, and "ſo

That our firſt reformers, who were prone to differ from the Romiſh faith, ſhould adopt this doctrine, ſhews the ſupreme influence of ſuperſtition. The Lutherans had not even the excuſe of inattention: after ſerious examination, they added one abſurdity more; teaching, that the bread and wine are converted into the body and blood of our Saviour, and yet remain bread and wine as at firſt; which is termed by them *conſubſtantiation*. I am perſuaded, that at this time not a ſingle man of them harbours ſuch a thought.

Many

" ſo many impregnated wells, each of them able to cure the " moſt dangerous diſeaſes; one would wonder, that phyſi- " cians could live there, or others die. But people die here as " elſewhere; and even churchmen, who preach upon the " miracles wrought by relics, grow ſick and die like other " men." It is one thing to believe: it is another thing to fancy that we believe. In the year 1666 a Jew named *Sabatai Levi* appeared at Smyrna, pretending to be the true Meſſiah, and was acknowledged to be ſo by many. The Grand Signior, for proof of his miſſion, inſiſted for a miracle; propoſing that he ſhould preſent himſelf as a mark to be ſhot at, and promiſing to believe that he was the Meſſiah, if he remained unwounded. Sabatai, declining the trial, turned Mahometan to ſave his life. But obſerve the blindneſs of ſuperſtition: though Sabatai was ſeen every day walking the ſtreets of Conſtantinople in the Turkiſh habit, many Jews inſiſted that the true Sabatai was taken up into heaven, leaving only behind him his ſhadow; and probably they moſt piouſly fancied that they believed ſo.

Many perſons, impenetrable by a ſerious argument, can diſcover falſehood when put in a ridiculous light. It requires, I am ſenſible, a very delicate hand to attack a grave ſubject with ridicule as a teſt of truth; and for that reaſon, I forbear to offer any thing of my own. But I will ſet before my readers ſome excerpts from a book of abſolute authority with Roman Catholics. Though tranſubſtantiation be there handled in the moſt ſerious manner, with all the ceremonies and punctilios that naturally flow from it, yet in my judgment it is happily contrived to give it a moſt ridiculous appearance. The book is the Roman Miſſal, from which the following is a literal tranſlation.

" Maſs may be deficient in the matter, in the " form, in the miniſter, or in the action. Firſt, " in the matter. If the bread be not of wheat, " or if there be ſo great a mixture of other grain " that it cannot be called wheat-bread, or if any " way corrupted, it does not make a ſacrament. " If it be made with roſe-water, or any other " diſtilled water, it is doubtful whether it make a " ſacrament or not. Though corruption have " begun, or though it be leavened, it makes a ſa- " crament, but the celebrator ſins grievouſly.

" If the celebrator, before conſecration, ob- " ſerve that the hoſt is corrupted, or is not " of wheat, he muſt take another hoſt: if af- " ter conſecration, he muſt ſtill take another and

" ſwallow

" ſwallow it, after which he muſt alſo ſwallow the " firſt, or give it to another, or preſerve it in ſome " place with reverence. But if he have ſwal- " lowed the firſt before obſerving its defects, he " muſt nevertheleſs ſwallow alſo the perfect hoſt; " becauſe the precept about the perfection of the " ſacrament, is of greater weight than that of ta- " king it faſting. If the conſecrated hoſt diſap- " pear by an accident, as by wind, by a miracle, " or by ſome animal, another muſt be conſecra- " ted.

" If the wine be quite ſour or putrid, or made " of unripe grapes, or be mixed with ſo much " water as to ſpoil the wine, it is no ſacrament. " If the wine have begun to ſour or to be cor- " rupted, or be quite new, or not mixed with " water, or mixed with roſe-water or other di- " ſtilled water, it makes a ſacrament, but the ce- " lebrator ſins grievouſly.

" If the prieſt, before conſecration, obſerve that " the materials are not proper, he muſt ſtop, if " proper materials cannot be got; but after con- " ſecration, he muſt proceed, to avoid giving ſcan- " dal. If proper materials can be procured by " waiting, he muſt wait for them, that the ſacri- " fice may not remain imperfect.

" Second, in form. If any of the words of " conſecration be omitted, or any of them be " changed into words of a different meaning, it " is no ſacrament: if they be changed into words

" of the ſame meaning, it makes a ſacrament;
" but the celebrator ſins grievouſly.

" Third, in the miniſter. If he does not in-
" tend to make a ſacrament, but to cheat; if
" there be any part of the wine, or any wafer that
" he has not in his eye, and does not intend to
" conſecrate; if he have before him eleven wafers,
" and intends to conſecrate only ten, not deter-
" mining what ten he intends: in theſe caſes the
" conſecration does not hold, becauſe intention
" is requiſite. If he think there are ten only,
" and intends to conſecrate all before him, they
" are all conſecrated; therefore prieſts ought al-
" ways to have ſuch intention. If the prieſt,
" thinking he has but one wafer, ſhall, after the
" conſecration, find two ſticking together, he muſt
" take them both. And he muſt take off all the
" remains of the conſecrated matter; for they all
" belong to the ſame ſacrifice. If in conſecra-
" ting, the intention be not actual by wandering
" of mind, but virtual in approaching the altar,
" it makes a ſacrament: though prieſts ſhould be
" careful to have intention both virtual and ac-
" tual.

" Beſide intention, the prieſt may be deficient
" in diſpoſition of mind. If he be ſuſpended, or
" degraded, or excommunicated, or under mortal
" ſin, he makes a ſacrament, but ſins grievouſly.
" He may be deficient alſo in diſpoſition of body.
" If he have not faſted from midnight, if he have
" taſted

" taſted water, or any other drink or meat, even " in the way of medicine, he cannot celebrate " nor communicate. If he have taken meat or " drink before midnight, even though he have not " ſlept nor digeſted it, he does not ſin. But on " account of the perturbation of mind, which bars " devotion, it is prudent to refrain.

" If any remains of meat, ſticking in the mouth, " be ſwallowed with the hoſt, they do not prevent " communicating, provided they be ſwallowed, " not as meat, but as ſpittle. The ſame is to " be ſaid, if in waſhing the mouth a drop of " water be ſwallowed, provided it be againſt our " will.

" Fourth, in the action. If any requiſite be " wanting, it is no ſacrament; for example, if it " be celebrated out of holy ground, or upon an " altar not conſecrated, or not covered with three " napkins: if there be no wax candles; if it be " not celebrated between day-break and noon; " if the celebrator have not ſaid matins with " lauds; if he omit any of the ſacerdotal robes; " if theſe robes and the napkins be not bleſſed by " a biſhop; if there be no clerk preſent to ſerve, " or one who ought not to ſerve, a woman, for " example; if there be no chalice, the cup of " which is gold, or ſilver, or pewter; if the veſt- " ment be not of clean linen adorned with ſilk " in the middle, and bleſſed by a biſhop; if " the prieſt celebrate with his head covered; if

" there be no miſſal preſent, though he have it by " heart.

" If a gnat or ſpider fall into the cup after con- " ſecration, the prieſt muſt ſwallow it with the " blood, if he can: otherwiſe, let him take it " out, waſh it with wine, burn it, and throw it " with the waſhings into holy ground. If poiſon " fall into the cup, the blood muſt be poured on " tow or on a linen cloth, remain till it be dry, " then be burnt, and the aſhes be thrown upon " holy ground. If the hoſt be poiſoned, it muſt " be kept in a tabernacle till it be corrupted.

" If the blood freeze in winter, put warm cloths " about the cup: if that be not ſufficient, put the " cup in boiling water.

" If any of Chriſt's blood fall on the ground by " negligence, it muſt be licked up with the tongue, " and the place ſcraped: the ſcrapings muſt be " burnt, and the aſhes buried in holy ground.

" If the prieſt vomit the euchariſt, and the ſpe- " cies appear entire, it muſt be licked up moſt re- " verently. If a nauſea prevent that to be done, " it muſt be kept till it be corrupted. If the " ſpecies do not appear, let the vomit be burnt, " and the aſhes thrown upon holy ground."

As the foregoing article has beyond intention ſwelled to an enormous ſize, I ſhall add but one other article, which ſhall be extremely ſhort; and that is the creed of Athanaſius. It is a heap of unintelligible jargon; and yet we are appointed

to

to believe every article of it, under the pain of eternal damnation. As it enjoins belief of rank contradictions, it ſeems purpoſely calculated to be a teſt of ſlaviſh ſubmiſſion to the tyrannical authority of a proud and arrogant prieſt *.

CHAP. III.

Religious Worſhip.

IN the foregoing chapter are traced the gradual advances of the ſenſe of Deity, from its imperfect ſtate among ſavages to its maturity among enlightened nations; diſplaying to us one great Being, to whom all other beings owe their exiſtence, who made the world, and who governs it by perfect laws. And our perception of Deity, ariſing from that ſenſe, is fortified by an intuitive propoſition, that there neceſſarily muſt exiſt ſome being who had no beginning. Conſidering the Deity as the author of our exiſtence, we owe him gratitude;

* Biſhop Burnet ſeems doubtful whether this creed was compoſed by Athanaſius. His doubts, in my apprehenſion, are ſcarce ſufficient to weigh againſt the unanimous opinion of the Chriſtian church.

tude; conſidering him as governor of the world, we owe him obedience: and upon theſe duties is founded the obligation we are under to worſhip him. Further, God made man for ſociety, and implanted in his nature the moral ſenſe to direct his conduct in that ſtate. From theſe premiſes, may it not with certainty be inferred to be the will of God, that men ſhould obey the dictates of the moral ſenſe in fulfilling every duty of juſtice and benevolence? Theſe moral duties, it would appear, are our chief buſineſs in this life; being enforced not only by a moral but by a religious principle.

Morality, as laid down in a former ſketch, conſiſts of two great branches, the moral ſenſe which unfolds the duty we owe to our fellow-creatures, and an active moral principle which prompts us to perform that duty. Natural religion conſiſts alſo of two great branches, the ſenſe of Deity which unfolds our duty to our Maker, and the active principle of devotion which prompts us to perform our duty to him. The univerſality of the ſenſe of Deity proves it to be innate; the ſame reaſon proves the principle of devotion to be innate; for all men agree in worſhipping ſuperior beings, whatever difference there may be in the mode of worſhip.

Both branches of the duty we owe to God, that of worſhipping him, and that of obeying his will with reſpect to our fellow-creatures, are ſummed

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up by the Prophet Micah in the following emphatic words: "He hath ſhewed thee, O man, what "is good: and what doth the Lord require of "thee, but to do juſtly, to love mercy, and to "walk humbly with thy God?" The two articles firſt mentioned, are moral duties regarding our fellow-creatures: and as to ſuch, what is required of us is to do our duty to others; not only as directed by the moral ſenſe, but as being the will of our Maker, to whom we owe abſolute obedience. That branch of our duty is reſerved for a ſecond ſection: at preſent we are to treat of religious worſhip, included in the third article, the walking humbly with our God.

SECT. I.

Religious Worſhip reſpecting the Deity ſingly.

THE obligation we are under to worſhip God, or to walk humbly with him, is, as obſerved above, founded on the two great principles of gratitude and obedience; both of them requiring fundamentally a pure heart, and a well-diſpoſed mind. But heart-worſhip is alone not ſufficient: there are over and above required external ſigns, teſtifying to others the ſenſe we have of theſe duties, and a firm reſolution to perform them. That

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ſuch is the will of God, will appear as follows. The principle of devotion, like moſt of our other principles, partakes of the imperfection of our nature: yet, however faint originally, it is capable of being greatly invigorated by cultivation and exerciſe. Private exerciſe is not ſufficient. Nature, and conſequently the God of nature, require public exerciſe or public worſhip: for devotion is communicative, like joy or grief*; and by mutual communication in a numerous aſſembly, is greatly invigorated. A regular habit of expreſſing publicly our gratitude and reſignation, never fails to purify the mind, tending to wean it from every unlawful purſuit. This is the true motive of public worſhip; not what is commonly inculcated, That it is required from us, as a teſtimony to our Maker of our obedience to his laws: God, who knows the heart, needs no ſuch teſtimony†.

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* Elements of Criticiſm, vol. i. p. 180. edit. 5.

† Arnobius *(Adverſus gentes, lib. 1.)* accounts rationally for the worſhip we pay to the Deity: "Huic omnes ex more "proſternimur, hunc collatis precibus adoramus, ab hoc juſta, "et honeſta, et auditu ejus condigna depoſcimus. Non quo "ipſe deſideret ſupplices nos eſſe, aut amet ſubſterni tot mil-"lium venerationem videre. Utilitas hæc noſtra eſt, et com-"modi noſtri rationem ſpectans. Nam quia proni ad culpas, "et ad libidinis varios appetitus, vitio ſumus infirmitatis in-"genitæ, patitur ſe ſemper noſtris cogitationibus concipi: ut "dum illum oramus, et mereri ejus contendimus munera, ac-"cipiamus

The ſetting apart one day in ſeven for public worſhip is not a pious inſtitution merely, but highly moral. With regard to the latter, all men are equal in the preſence of God; and when a congregation pray for mercy and protection, every one muſt be inflamed with good-will and brotherly love to every one.

In the next place, the ſerious and devout tone of mind inſpired by public worſhip, ſuggeſts naturally ſelf-examination. Retired from the buſtle of the world on that day of reſt, the errors we have been guilty of are recalled to memory: we are afflicted for theſe errors, and are firmly reſolved to be more on our guard in time coming. In ſhort, Sunday is only a day of reſt from worldly concerns, in order to be more uſefully employed upon thoſe that are internal. Sunday accordingly is a day of account; and a candid account every

" cipiamus innocentiæ voluntatem, et ab omni nos labe de-
" lictorum omnium amputatione purgemus."—[*In Engliſh thus:* " It is our cuſtom, to proſtrate ourſelves before him;
" and we aſk of him ſuch gifts only as are conſiſtent with
" juſtice and with honour, and ſuitable to the character of
" the Being whom we adore. Not that he receives pleaſure
" or ſatisfaction from the humble veneration of thouſands of
" his creatures. From this we ourſelves derive benefit and
" advantage; for being the ſlaves of appetite, and prone to
" err from the weakneſs of our nature, when we addreſs our-
" ſelves to God in prayer, and ſtudy by our actions to merit
" his approbation, we gain at leaſt the wiſh, and the inclina-
" tion, to be virtuous."]

every ſeventh day, is the beſt preparation for the great day of account. A perſon who diligently follows out this preparatory diſcipline, will ſeldom be at a loſs to anſwer for his conduct, called upon by God or man. This conſideration leads me neceſſarily to condemn a practice authoriſed among Chriſtians with very few exceptions, that of abandoning to diverſion and merriment what remains of Sunday after public worſhip, parties of pleaſure, dancing, gaming, any thing that trifles away the time without a ſerious thought; as if the purpoſe were to cancel every virtuous impreſſion made at public worſhip.

Unhappily, this ſalutary inſtitution can only be preſerved in vigour during the days of piety and virtue. Power and opulence are the darling objects of every nation; and yet in every nation poſſeſſed of power and opulence virtue ſubſides, ſelfiſhneſs prevails, and ſenſuality becomes the ruling paſſion. Then it is, that the moſt ſacred inſtitutions, firſt, loſe their hold, next, are diſregarded, and at laſt are made a ſubject for ridicule.

I ſhall only add upon the general head, that lawgivers ought to avoid with caution the enforcing public worſhip by rewards and puniſhments: human laws cannot reach the heart, in which the eſſence of worſhip conſiſts: they may indeed bring on a liſtleſs habit of worſhip, by ſeparating the external act from the internal affection, than which nothing is more hurtful to true religion. The utmoſt

moſt that can be ſafely ventured, is to bring public worſhip under cenſorian powers, as a matter of police, for preſerving good order, and for preventing bad example.

The religion of Confucius, profeſſed by the *literati* and perſons of rank in China and Tonquin, conſiſts in a deep inward veneration for the God or King of heaven, and in the practice of every moral virtue. They have neither temples, nor prieſts, nor any ſettled form of external worſhip: every one adores the ſupreme Being in the manner he himſelf thinks beſt. This is indeed the moſt refined ſyſtem of religion that ever took place among men; but it is not fitted for the human race; an excellent religion it would be for angels; but is far too refined even for ſages and philoſophers.

Proceeding to deviations from the genuine worſhip required by our Maker, and groſs deviations there have been, I begin with that ſort of worſhip which is influenced by fear, and which for that reaſon is univerſal among ſavages. The American ſavages believe, that there are inferior deities without end, moſt of them prone to miſchief; they neglect the ſupreme Deity becauſe he is good; and direct their worſhip to ſoothe the malevolent inferior deities from doing harm. The inhabitants of the Molucca iſlands, who believe the exiſtence of malevolent beings ſubordinate to the ſupreme benevolent Being, confine their worſhip

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to the former, in order to avert their wrath; and one branch of their worſhip is, to ſet meat before them, hoping that when the belly is full, there will be leſs inclination to miſchief. The worſhip of the inhabitants of Java is much the ſame. The Negroes of Benin worſhip the devil, as Drapper expreſſes it, and ſacrifice to him both men and beaſts. They acknowledge indeed a ſupreme Being, who created the univerſe, and governs it by his providence: but they regard him not: "for," ſay they, "it is needleſs, if not impertinent, to "invoke a being, who, good and gracious, is in-"capable of injuring or moleſting us." Gratitude, it would appear, is not a ruling principle among ſavages.

The auſterities and penances that are practiſed in almoſt all religions, ſpring from the ſame root. One way to pleaſe inviſible malignant powers, is to make ourſelves as miſerable as poſſible. Hence the horrid penances of the Faquirs in Hindoſtan, who outdo in mortification whatever is reported of the ancient Chriſtian Anchorites. Some of theſe Faquirs continue for life in one poſture: ſome never lie down: ſome have always their arms raiſed above their head: and ſome mangle their bodies with knives and ſcourges. The town of Jagrenate in Hindoſtan is frequented by pilgrims, ſome of them from places 300 leagues diſtant; and they travel, not by walking or riding, but by meaſuring the road with the length of their bodies;

bodies; in which mode of loco-motion, ſome of them conſume years before they complete their pilgrimage. A religious ſect made its way ſome centuries ago into Japan, termed *Bubſdoiſts*, from *Bubs*, the founder. This ſect has prevailed over the ancient ſect of the Sintos, chiefly by its auſterity and mortifications. The ſpirit of this ſect inſpires nothing but exceſſive fear of the gods, who are painted prone to vengeance and always offended. Theſe ſectaries paſs moſt of their time in tormenting themſelves, in order to expiate imaginary faults; and they are treated by their prieſts with a degree of deſpotiſm and cruelty, that is not paralleled but by the inquiſitors of Spain. Their manners are fierce, cruel, and unrelenting, derived from the nature of their ſuperſtition. The notion of inviſible malevolent powers, formerly univerſal, is not to this hour eradicated, even among Chriſtians; for which I appeal to the faſtings and flagellations among Roman Catholics, held by them to be an eſſential part of religion. People infected with religious horrors, are never ſeriouſly convinced that an upright heart and ſound morality make the eſſence of religion. The doctrine of the Janſeniſts concerning repentance and mortification, ſhows evidently, however they may deceive themſelves, that they have an impreſſion of the Deity as a malevolent being. They hold the guilt contracted by Adam's fall to be a heinous ſin, which ought to be expiated by acts of mortification,

mortification, ſuch as the torturing and macerating the body with painful labour, exceſſive abſtinence, continual prayer and contemplation. Their penances, whether for original or voluntary ſin, are carried to extravagance; and thoſe who put an end to their lives by ſuch ſeverities, are termed the ſacred victims of repentance, conſumed by the fire of divine love. Such ſuicides are eſteemed peculiarly meritorious in the eye of Heaven; and it is thought, that their ſufferings cannot fail to appeaſe the anger of the Deity. That celibacy is a ſtate of purity and perfection, is a prevailing notion in many countries: among the Pagans, a married man was forbidden to approach the altar, for ſome days after knowing his wife; and this ridiculous notion of pollution, contributed to introduce celibacy among the Roman Catholic prieſts *. The Emperor Otho, *anno* 1218, became a ſignal penitent: but inſtead of atoning for his ſins by repentance and reſtitution, he laid himſelf down to be trodden under foot by the boys of his kitchen; and frequently ſubmitted to the diſcipline of the whip, inflicted by monks. The Emperor Charles V. toward the end of his days, was ſorely depreſſed in ſpirit with fear of hell. Monks were his only companions, with whom he ſpent his time in chanting hymns.

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* Faſting and celibacy were by Zoroaſter condemned with abhorrence, as a criminal rejection of the beſt gifts of Providence.

As an expiation for his ſins, he in private diſciplined himſelf with ſuch ſeverity, that his whip, found after his death, was tinged with his blood. Nor was he ſatisfied with theſe acts of mortification: timorous and illiberal ſolicitude ſtill haunting him, he aimed at ſomething extraordinary, at ſome new and ſingular act of piety, to diſplay his zeal, and to merit the favour of heaven. The act he fixed on, was as wild as any that ſuperſtition ever ſuggeſted to a diſtempered brain: it was to celebrate his own obſequies. He ordered his tomb to be erected in the chapel of the monaſtery: his domeſtics marched there in funeral proceſſion, holding black tapers: he followed in his ſhroud: he was laid in his coffin with much ſolemnity: the ſervice of the dead was chanted; and he himſelf joined in the prayers offered up for his *requiem*, mingling his tears with thoſe of his attendants. The ceremony cloſed with ſprinkling holy water upon the coffin; and the aſſiſtants retiring, the doors of the chapel were ſhut. Then Charles roſe out of the coffin, and ſtole privately to his apartment.

The hiſtory of ancient ſacrifices is not ſo accurate, as in every inſtance to aſcertain upon what principle they were founded, whether upon fear, upon gratitude for favours received, or to ſolicit future favour. Human ſacrifices undoubtedly belong to the preſent head: for being calculated to deprecate the wrath of a malevolent deity, they

could have no other motive but fear; and indeed they are a moſt direful effect of that paſſion *. It is needleſs to loſe time in mentioning inſtances, which are well known to thoſe who are acquainted with ancient hiſtory. A number of them are collected in Hiſtorical Law-tracts †: and to theſe I take the liberty of adding, that the Cimbrians, the Germans, the Gauls, particularly the Druids, practiſed human ſacrifices; for which we have the authority of Julius Cæſar, Strabo, and other authors. A people on the bank of the Miſiſſippi, named *Tenſas*, worſhip the ſun; and, like the Natches their neighbours, have a temple for that luminary, with a ſacred fire in it, continually burning. The temple having been ſet on fire by thunder, was all in flames when ſome French travellers ſaw them throw children into the fire, one after another, to appeaſe the incenſed deity. The Prophet Micah ‡, in a paſſage partly quoted above, inveighs bitterly againſt ſuch ſacrifices: "Wherewith ſhall I come before the Lord, and "bow myſelf before the high God; ſhall I come "before him with burnt-offerings, with calves of "a year old? will the Lord be pleaſed with "thouſands of rams, or with ten thouſands of "rivers

* The Abbé de Boiſſy derives human ſacrifices from the hiſtory of Abraham preparing to ſacrifice his ſon Iſaac, which, ſays he, was imitated by others. A man who is ſo unlucky at gueſſing had better be ſilent.

† Tract 1. ‡ Chap. vi.

" rivers of oil? ſhall I give my firſt-born for my
" tranſgreſſion, the fruit of my body for the ſin
" of my ſoul? He hath ſhewed thee, O man,
" what is good: and what doth the Lord require
" of thee, but to do juſtly, to love mercy, and to
" walk humbly with thy God!"

The ancient Perſians acknowledged Oromazes and Arimanes as their great deities, authors of good and ill to men. But I find not that Arimanes, the evil principle, was ever an object of any religious worſhip. The Gaures, who profeſs the ancient religion of Perſia, addreſs no worſhip but to one God, all-good and all-powerful.

Next, of worſhipping the Deity in the character of a mercenary being. Under that head come ſacrifices and oblations, whether prompted by gratitude for favours received, or by ſelf-intereſt to procure future favours: which, for the reaſon mentioned, I ſhall not attempt to diſtinguiſh. As the deities of early times were thought to reſemble men, it was a natural endeavour in men to conciliate their favour by ſuch offerings as were the moſt reliſhed by themſelves. It is probable, that the firſt ſacrifices of that kind, were of ſweet-ſmelling herbs, which in the fire emitted a flavour that might reach the noſtrils of a deity, even at a diſtance. The burning incenſe to their gods, was practiſed in Mexico and Peru; and at preſent is practiſed in the peninſula of Corea. An opportunity ſo favourable for making religious zeal a

fund of riches to the prieſthood, is ſeldom neglected. There was no difficulty to perſuade ignorant people, that the gods could eat as well as ſmell: what was offered to a deity for food, being carried into the temple, was underſtood to be devoured by him.

With reſpect to the Jewiſh ſacrifices of burnt-offerings, meat-offerings, ſin-offerings, peace-offerings, heave-offerings, and wave-offerings, theſe were appointed by God himſelf, in order to keep that ſtiff-necked people in daily remembrance of their dependance on him, and to preſerve them if poſſible from idolatry. But that untractable race did not adhere to the purity of the inſtitution: they inſenſibly degenerated into the notion that their God was a mercenary being; and in that character only, was the worſhip of ſacrifices performed to him. The offerings mentioned were liberally beſtowed on him, not ſingly as a token of their dependance, but chiefly in order to avert his wrath, or to gain his favour *.

The religious notions of the Greeks were equally impure: they could not think of any means for

* There is no mention in ancient authors of fiſh being offered to the gods in ſacrifice. The reaſon I take to be, that the moſt ſavoury food of man was reckoned the moſt agreeable to their gods; that ſavages never thought of fiſh till land-animals became ſcarce; and that the matter as well as form of ſacrifices were eſtabliſhed in practice, long before men had recourſe to fiſh for food.

for conciliating the favour of their gods, more efficacious than gifts. Homer paints his gods as exceſſively mercenary. In the fourth book of the Iliad, Jupiter ſays, "Of theſe cities, honoured the "moſt by the ſoul of Jove, is ſacred Troy. Ne-"ver ſtands the altar empty before me, oblations "poured forth in my preſence, ſavour that aſ-"cends the ſkies." Speaking in the fifth book of a warrior, known afterward to be Diomedes, "Some god he is, ſome power againſt the Tro-"jans enraged for vows unpaid: deſtructive is "the wrath of the gods." Diomedes prays to Minerva, "With thine arm ward from me the "foe: a year-old heifer, O Queen, ſhall be thine, "broad-fronted, unbroken, and wild: her to thee "I will offer with prayer, gilding with gold her "horns." Preciſely of the ſame kind, are the offerings made by ſuperſtitious Roman Catholics to the Virgin Mary, and to ſaints. Electra, in the tragedy of that name, ſupplicates Apollo in the following terms:

——— O! hear Electra too,
Who, with unſparing hand, her choiceſt gifts
Hath never fail'd to lay before thy altars;
Accept the little All that now remains
For me to give.

The people of Hindoſtan, as mentioned above, atone for their ſins by auſtere penances; but they

have no notion of preſenting gifts to the Deity, nor of deprecating his wrath by the fleſh of animals. On the contrary, they reckon it a ſin to ſlay any living creature; which reduces them to vegetable food. This is going too far; for the Deity could never mean to prohibit animal food, when originally man's chief dependance was upon it. The abſtaining however from animal food, ſhows greater humanity in the religion of Hindoſtan, than of any other known country. The inhabitants of Madagaſcar are in a ſtage of religion, common among many nations, which is, the acknowledging one ſupreme benevolent deity, and many malevolent inferior deities. Moſt of their worſhip is indeed addreſſed to the latter; but they have ſo far advanced before ſeveral other nations, as to offer ſacrifices to the ſupreme Being, without employing either idols or temples.

Philoſophy and ſound ſenſe in poliſhed nations, have purified religious worſhip, by baniſhing the profeſſion, at leaſt, of oblations and ſacrifices. The Being that made the world, governs it by laws that are inflexible, becauſe they are the beſt; and to imagine that he can be moved by prayers, oblations, or ſacrifices, to vary his plan of government, is an impious thought, degrading the Deity to a level with ourſelves: "Hear O my people, "and I will teſtify againſt thee: I am God, even "thy God. I will take no bullock out of thy "houſe, nor he-goat out of thy fold: for every "beaſt

" beaſt of the foreſt is mine, and the cattle upon " a thouſand hills. Will I eat the fleſh of bulls, " or drink the blood of goats? Offer unto God " thankſgiving, and pay thy vows to the Moſt " High. Call upon me in the day of trouble: I " will deliver thee, and thou ſhalt glorify me *." " Thou deſireſt not ſacrifice, elſe would I give it; " thou delighteſt not in burnt-offering. The ſa- " crifices of God are a broken ſpirit: a broken " and a contrite heart, O God, thou wilt not de- " ſpiſe †." " For I deſired mercy, and not ſacri- " fice; and the knowledge of God more than " burnt-offerings ‡." In dark ages, there is a great ſhew of religion, with little heart-worſhip: in ages of philoſophy, warm heart-worſhip, with little ſhew §.

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* Pſalm l. † Pſalm li. ‡ Hoſea vi. 6.

§ Agathias urges a different reaſon againſt ſacrifices.— " Ego nullam naturam eſſe exiſtimo, cui voluptati ſint fœda- " ta ſanguine altaria, et animantium lanienæ. Quod ſi qua " tamen eſt cui iſta ſint cordi, non ea mitis et benigna eſt ali- " qua, ſed fera ac rabida, qualem pavorem poëtæ fingunt, et " Metum, et Bellonum, et Malam Fortunam, et Diſcordiam, " quam indomitam appellant."—[*In Engliſh thus:* " I cannot " conceive, that there ſhould exiſt a ſuperior being, who takes " delight in the ſacrifice of animals, or in altars ſtained with " blood. If ſuch there be, his nature is not benevolent, but " barbarous and cruel. Such indeed were the gods whom " the poets have created: ſuch were Fear and Terror, the " goddeſs

This is a proper place for the hiſtory of idolatry; which, as will anon appear, ſprung from religious worſhip corrupted by men of ſhallow underſtanding and groſs conceptions, upon whom things inviſible make little impreſſion.

Savages, even of the loweſt claſs, have an impreſſion of inviſible powers, though they cannot form any diſtinct notion of them. But ſuch impreſſion is too faint for the exerciſe of devotion. Whether inſpired

" goddeſs of War, of Evil Fortune, and of Diſcord."]—Arnobius batters down bloody ſacrifices with a very curious argument. " Ecce ſi bos aliquis, aut quodlibet ex his ani-" mal, quod ad placandas cæditur mitigandasque numinum " furias, vocem hominis ſumat, eloquaturque his verbis: Er-" gone, O Jupiter, aut quis alius deus es, humanum eſt iſtud " et rectum, aut æquitatis alicujus in æſtimatione ponendum, " ut cùm alius peccaverit, ego occidar, et de meo ſanguine " fieri tibi patiaris ſatis, qui nunquam te læſerim, nunquam " ſciens aut neſciens, tuum numen majeſtatemque violarim, " animal, ut ſcis, mutum, naturæ meæ ſimplicitatem ſequens, " nec multiformium morum varietatibus lubricum?"—[*In Engliſh thus:* " What if the ox, while he is led out to ſlaugh-" ter to appeaſe the fancied wrath of an offended deity, " ſhould aſſume the human voice, and in theſe words aſtoniſh " his conductors; Are theſe, O merciful God, are theſe the " dictates of humanity, or of juſtice, that for the crime of " another I ſhould forfeit my life. I have never by my will " offended thee, and, dumb as I am, and uninformed by rea-" ſon, my actions, according to the ſimplicity of my nature, " cannot have given thee diſpleaſure, who haſt made me as I " am."] —If this argument were ſolid, it would be equally concluſive againſt animal food.

inſpired with love to a good being, or impreſſed with fear of an ill being, ſavages are not at eaſe without ſome ſort of viſible object to fix their attention. A great ſtone ſerved that purpoſe originally; a very low inſtrument indeed of religious worſhip; but not altogether whimſical, if it was introduced, which is highly probable, in the following manner. It was an early and a natural cuſtom among ſavages, to mark with a great ſtone, the place where their worthies were interred; of which we have hints every where in ancient hiſtory, particularly in the poems of Oſſian. "Place "me," ſays Calmar mortally wounded, "at the "ſide of a ſtone of remembrance, that future times "may hear my fame, and the mother of Calmar "rejoice over the ſtone of my renown." Superſtition in later times having deified theſe worthies, their votaries, rejoicing as formerly over the ſtones dedicated to them, held theſe ſtones to be eſſential in every act of religious worſhip performed to their new deities *. Tradition points out many ſtones in

* Frequent mention is made of ſuch ſtones in the poems of Oſſian. "But remember, my ſon, to place this ſword, this "bow, and this horn, within that dark and narrow houſe "marked with one gray ſtone;" p. 55.—"Whoſe fame is "in that dark-green tomb? Four ſtones with their heads of "moſs ſtand there, and mark the narrow houſe of death;" p. 67.—"Let thy bards mourn thoſe who fell. Let Erin "give the ſons of Lochlin to earth, and raiſe the moſſy ſtones "of

in different parts of the world, that were uſed in religious worſhip. The ſun was worſhipped at Emeſa in Syria by the name of *Elagabalus*, and under the form of a black conical ſtone, which, as univerſally believed, had fallen from heaven on that ſacred place. A large ſtone, worſhipped by the Peſſenuntians, a people of Phrygia, under the name of *Idæa mater*, was, upon a ſolemn embaſſy to that people, brought to Rome: it being contained in the Sybilline books, that unleſs the Romans got poſſeſſion of that goddeſs, they never would prevail over Hannibal. And Pauſanias mentions many ſtones in Greece, dedicated to different divinities; particularly thirty ſquare ſtones in Achaia, on which were engraved the names of as many gods. In another place, he mentions a very ancient ſtatue of Venus in the iſland Delos, which, inſtead of feet, had only a ſquare ſtone. This may appear a puzzling circumſtance in the hiſtory ofGreece, conſider ing that all the Grecian gods were

" of their fame; that the children of the north hereafter " may behold the place where their fathers fought;" p. 78.— " Earth here incloſes the loveliеſt pair on the hill: graſs " grows between the ſtones of the tomb;" page 208.—In the ſame poems we find ſtones made inſtruments of worſhip. The ſpirit of Loda is introduced threatening Fingal. " Fly " to thy land, replied the form; receive the wind and fly. " The blaſts are in the hollow of my hand; the courſe of the " ſtorm is mine. The King of Sora is my ſon; he bends at " the ſtone of my power;" p. 209.

were originally mortals, whom it was eaſy to repreſent by ſtatues: but in that early period, the Greeks knew no more of ſtatuary than the moſt barbarous nations. It is perhaps not eaſy to gather the meaning of ſavages, with reſpect to ſuch ſtones: the moſt natural conjecture is, that a great ſtone, dedicated to the worſhip of a certain deity, was conſidered as belonging to him. This notion of property had a double effect; the worſhippers, by connection of ideas, were led from the ſtone to the deity; and the ſtone tended to fix their wandering thoughts. It was probably imagined, over and above, that ſome latent virtue communicated to the ſtone, made it holy or ſacred. Even among enlightened people, a ſort of virtue or ſanctity is conceived to reſide in the place of worſhip: why not alſo in a ſtone dedicated to a deity? The ancient Ethiopians, in their worſhip, introduced the figure of a ſerpent as a ſymbol of the deity: two ſticks laid croſs repreſented Caſtor and Pollux, Roman divinities: a javelin repreſented their god Mars; and in Tartary formerly, the god of war was worſhipped under the ſymbol of an old ruſty ſabre. The ancient Perſians uſed conſecrated fire, as an emblem of the great God. Though the negroes of Congo and Angola have images without number, they are not however idolaters in any proper ſenſe: their belief is, that theſe images are only organs by which the deities ſignify their will to their votaries.

If

If the uſe that was made of ſtones and of other ſymbols in religious worſhip, be fairly repreſented, it may appear ſtrange, that the ingenious Greeks ſunk down into idolatry, at the very time they were making a rapid progreſs in the fine arts. Their improvements in ſtatuary, one of theſe arts, was the cauſe. They began with attempting to carve heads of men and women, repreſenting their deified heroes; which were placed upon the ſtones dedicated to theſe heroes. In the progreſs of the art, ſtatues were executed complete in every member; and at laſt, ſtatues of the gods were made, expreſſing ſuch dignity and majeſty, as inſenſibly to draw from beholders a degree of devotion to the ſtatues themſelves. Hear Quinctilian upon that ſubject. "At quæ Polycleto defuerunt, Phidiæ "atque Alcameni dantur. Phidias tamen diis "quàm hominibus efficiendis melior artifex tra- "ditur: in ebore vero, longè citra æmulum, vel "ſi nihil niſi Minervam Athenis aut Olympium "in Elide Jovem feciſſet, cujus pulchritudo adje- "ciſſe aliquid etiam receptæ religioni videtur; "adeo majeſtas operis deum æquavit*." Here is

* "The deficiencies of Polycletus were made up in Phidias "and Alcamenes. Phidias is reckoned to have had more "ſkill in forming the ſtatues of gods than of men. In works "of ivory he was unrivalled, although there had been no "other proofs of his excellence than the ſtatue of Minerva at "Athens, and the Jupiter Olympius in Elis. Of the latter, "ſo

is laid a foundation for idolatry: let us trace its progreſs. Such ſtatues as are repreſented by Quinctilian, ſerve greatly to inflame devotion; and during a warm fit of the religious paſſion, the repreſentation is loſt, and the ſtatue becomes a deity; preciſely as where King Lear is repreſented by Garrick: the actor vaniſhes; and, behold! the King himſelf. This is not ſingular. Anger occaſions a metamorphoſis ſtill more extraordinary: if I happen to ſtrike my gouty toe againſt a ſtone, the violence of the pain converts the ſtone for a moment into a voluntary agent; and I wreak my reſentment on it, as if it really were ſo. It is true, the image is only conceived to be a deity during the fervour of devotion; and when that ſubſides, the image falls back to its original repreſentative ſtate. But frequent inſtances of that kind, have at laſt the effect among illiterate people, to convert the image into a ſort of permanent deity: what ſuch people ſee, makes a deep impreſſion; what they ſee not, very little. There is another thing that concurs with eye-ſight, to promote this deluſion: devotion, being a vigorous principle in the human breaſt, will exert itſelf upon the meaneſt object, when none more noble is in view.

The ancient Perſians held the conſecrated fire to be an emblem only of the great God: but ſuch veneration

" ſo tranſcendent was the beauty, that it heightened every " ſentiment of the received religion; the majeſty of the image " appearing to rival that of the god himſelf."

veneration was paid to that emblem, and with ſo great ceremony was it treated, that the vulgar came at laſt to worſhip it as a ſort of deity. The prieſts of the Gaures watch the conſecrated fire day and night: they keep it alive with the pureſt wood, without bark: they touch it not with ſword nor knife: they blow it not with bellows, nor with the mouth: even the prieſt is prohibited to approach it, till his mouth be covered with fine linen, leſt it be polluted with his breath: if it happen to go out, it muſt be rekindled by ſtriking fire from flint, or by a burning glaſs.

The progreſs of idolatry will more clearly appear, from attending to the religion of the Greeks and Romans. The Greeks, as mentioned above, made uſe of ſtones in divine worſhip, long before idolatry was introduced: and we learn from Varro, that for a hundred and ſeventy years after Numa, the Romans had no ſtatues nor images in their temples. After ſtatues of the gods became faſhionable, they acquired by degrees more and more reſpect. The Greek and Roman writers talk of divine virtue being communicated to ſtatues; and ſome Roman writers talk familiarly, of the *numen* of a deity reſiding in his ſtatue. Arnobius, in his book againſt the Gentiles, introduces a Gentile delivering the following opinion. "We do not believe, that the metal which compoſes a ſtatue, "whether gold, or ſilver, or braſs, is a god. But "we believe, that a ſolemn dedication brings down "the

" the god to inhabit his image; and it is the god " only that we worſhip in that image." This explains the Roman ceremony, of inviting to their ſide the tutelar deities of towns beſieged by them, termed *evocatio tutelarium deorum.* The Romans, cruel as they were, overflowed with ſuperſtition; and as they were averſe from combating the tutelar deities even of their enemies, they endeavoured to gain theſe deities by large promiſes, and aſſurance of honourable treatment. As they could not hope that a ſtatue would change its place, their notion muſt have been, that by this ceremony, the tutelary deity might be prevailed upon to withdraw its *numen*, and leave the ſtatue a dead lump of matter. When Stilpo was baniſhed by the Areopagus of Athens, for affirming, that the ſtatue in the temple of Minerva, was not the goddeſs, but a piece of matter carved by Phidias; he ſurely was not condemned for ſaying, that the ſtatue was made by Phidias, a fact univerſally known: his hereſy conſiſted in denying that the *numen* of Minerva reſided in the ſtatue. Auguſtus, having twice loſt his fleet by ſtorm, forbade Neptune to be carried in proceſſion along with the other gods; imagining he had avenged himſelf of Neptune, by neglecting the favourite ſtatue in which his *numen* reſided.

When ſaints in the Chriſtian church were deified, even their images became objects of worſhip; from a fond imagination, that ſuch worſhip draws

draws down into the images the ſouls of the ſaints they repreſent; which is the ſame belief that Arnobius, in the paſſage above mentioned, aſcribes to the Gentiles; and is not widely different from the belief of the Pagan Tartars and Oſtiacs, by and by to be mentioned. In the eleventh century, there was a violent diſpute about images in the Greek church; many aſſerting, that in the images of our Saviour and of the ſaints, there reſides an inherent ſanctity which is a proper object of worſhip; and that Chriſtians ought not to confine their worſhip to the perſons repreſented, but ought alſo to extend it to their images.

As ignorant and ſavage nations can form no conception of Deity but of a being like a man, only ſuperior in power and greatneſs; many images have been made of the Deity conformable to that conception. It is eaſy to make ſome reſemblance of a man; but how is power and greatneſs to be repreſented? To perform this with ſucceſs, would require a Phidias. Savages go more bluntly to work: they endeavour to repreſent a man with many heads, and with a ſtill greater number of hands. The northern Tartars ſeem to have no deities but certain ſtatues or images coarſely formed out of wood, and bearing ſome diſtant reſemblance to the human figure. To palliate ſo groſs an abſurdity as that a god can be fabricated by the hands of man, they imagine this image to be endued with a ſoul: to ſay whence that ſoul came would

would puzzle the wiſeſt of them. That ſoul is conceived to be too elevated for dwelling conſtantly in a piece of matter: they believe that it reſides in ſome more honourable place; and that it only viſits the image or idol, when it is called down by prayers and ſupplications. They ſacrifice to this idol, by rubbing its mouth with the fat of fiſh, and by offering it the warm blood of ſome beaſt killed in hunting. The laſt ſtep of the ceremony is, to honour the ſoul of the idol with a joyful ſhout, as a ſort of convoy to it when it returns home. The Oſtiacs have a wooden idol, termed *The Old Man of Oby*, who is guardian of their fiſhery: it hath eyes of glaſs, and a head with ſhort horns. When the ice diſſolves, they crowd to this idol, requeſting that he will be propitious to their fiſhery. If unſucceſsful, he is loaded with reproaches: if ſucceſsful, he is entitled to a ſhare of the capture. They make a feaſt for him, rubbing his ſnout with choice fat; and when the entertainment is over, they accompany the ſoul of the idol a little way, beating the air with their cudgels. The Oſtiacs have another idol, that is fed with milk ſo abundantly, as to come out on both ſides of the ſpoon, and to fall down upon the veſture; which however is never waſhed, ſo little is cleanneſs thought eſſential to religion by that people. It is indeed ſtrangely abſurd, to think, that inviſible ſouls require food like human creatures;

tures; and yet the ſame abſurdity prevailed in Greece.

The ancient Germans, a ſober and ſenſible people, had no notion of repreſenting their gods by ſtatues, or of building temples to them. They worſhipped in conſecrated groves *. The Egyptians, from a juſt conception that an inviſible being can have no reſemblance to one that is viſible, employed hieroglyphical figures for denoting metaphorically the attributes of their gods; and they employed, not only the figures of birds and beaſts, but of vegetables; leeks, for example, and onions. This metaphorical adjunct to religion, innocent in itſelf, ſunk the Egyptians into the moſt groveling idolatry. As hieroglyphical figures, compoſed frequently of heterogeneous parts, reſemble not any being human or divine; the vulgar, loſing ſight of the emblematic ſignification underſtood by poets and philoſophers only, took up with the plain figures as real divinities. How otherwiſe can it be accounted for, that the ox, the ape, the onion, were in Egypt worſhipped as deities? Plutarch, it is true, in his chapter upon Iſis and Oſiris obſerves, that the Egyptians worſhipped the bull, the cat, and other animals, not as divinities, but as repreſentatives of them, like an image ſeen in a glaſs; or, as he expreſſes it in another part of the ſame chapter, "juſt as we ſee the reſemblance of the "ſun in a drop of water." But that this muſt be underſtood

* Tacitus, De moribus Germanorum, cap. 9.

underſtood of Philoſophers only, will be probable from what is reported by Diodorus Siculus, that in a great famine, the Egyptians ventured not to touch the ſacred animals, though they were forced to devour one another. A ſnake of a particular kind, about a yard long, and about the thickneſs of a man's arm, is worſhipped by the Whidans in Guinea. It has a large round head, piercing eyes, a ſhort pointed tongue, and a ſmooth ſkin, beautifully ſpeckled. It has a ſtrong antipathy to all the venomous kind; in other reſpects, innocent and tame. To kill theſe ſnakes being a capital crime, they travel about unmoleſted, even into bed-chambers. They occaſioned, anno 1697, a ridiculous perſecution. A hog, teaſed by one of them, tore it with his tuſks till it died. The prieſts carried their complaint to the king; and no one preſuming to appear as counſel for the hogs, orders were iſſued for ſlaughtering the whole race. At once were brandiſhed a thouſand cutlaſſes; and the race would have been extirpated, had not the king interpoſed, repreſenting to the prieſts, that they ought to reſt ſatisfied with the innocent blood they had ſpilt. Rancour and cruelty never rage more violently, than under the maſk of religion.

It is amazing how prone even the moſt poliſhed nations were to idolatry. A ſtatue of Hercules was worſhipped at Tyre, not as a repreſentative of the deity, but as the deity himſelf. And accordingly, when Tyre was beſieged by Alexander, the

deity was faſt bound in chains, to prevent him from deſerting to the enemy. The city of Ambracia being taken by the Romans, and every ſtatue of their gods being carried to Rome; the Ambracians complained bitterly, that not a ſingle divinity was left them to worſhip. How much more rational are the Hindoſtan Bramins, who teach their diſciples, that idols are emblems only of the Deity, intended merely to fix the attention of the populace!

The firſt ſtatues in Greece and Tuſcany were made with wings, to ſignify the ſwift motion of the gods. Theſe ſtatues were ſo clumſy, as ſcarce to reſemble human creatures, not to talk of a divinity. But the admirable ſtatues executed in later times, were imagined to reſemble moſt accurately the deities repreſented by them; whence the vulgar notion, that gods have wings, and that angels have wings.

I proceed to what in the hiſtory of idolatry may be reckoned the ſecond part. Statues, we have ſeen, were at firſt uſed as repreſentatives only of the Deity; but came afterward to be metamorphoſed into Deities. The abſurdity did not ſtop there. People, not ſatisfied with the viſible deities erected in temples for public worſhip, became fond to have private deities of their own, whom they worſhipped as their own tutelar deities; and this practice ſpread ſo wide, that among many nations every family had houſehold gods cut in wood or ſtone.

ſtone. Every family in Kamſkatka has a tutelar deity in the ſhape of a pillar, with the head of a man, which is ſuppoſed to guard the houſe againſt malevolent ſpirits. They give it food daily, and anoint the head with the fat of fiſh. The Prophet Iſaiah* puts this ſpecies of deification in a moſt ridiculous light: "He burneth part thereof "in the fire: with part thereof he roaſteth fleſh: "of the reſidue he maketh a god, even his graven "image: he falleth down, worſhipping, and praying to it, and ſaith, Deliver me, for thou art my "god." Multiplication could not fail to ſink houſehold-gods into a degree of contempt: ſome ſlight hope of good from them, might produce ſome cold ceremonial worſhip; but there could be no real devotion at heart. The Chineſe manner of treating their houſehold-gods, will vouch for me. When a Chineſe does not obtain what he prays for, "Thou ſpiritual dog," he will ſay, "I "lodge thee well, thou art beautifully gilded, "treated with perfumes and burnt offerings; and "yet thou withholdeſt from me the neceſſaries of "life." Sometimes they faſten a cord to the idol, and drag it through the dirt. The inhabitants of Ceylon treat their idols in the ſame manner. Thor, Woden, and Friga, were the great deities of the Scandinavians. They had at the ſame time inferior deities, who were ſuppoſed to have been men tranſlated into heaven for their good works. Theſe

* Chap. xliv.

they treated with very little ceremony, refuſing to worſhip them if they were not propitious; and even puniſhing them with baniſhment; but reſtoring them after a time, in hopes of amendment. Domeſtic idols are treated by the Oſtiacs with no greater reverence than by the people mentioned. But they have public idols, ſome particularly of braſs, which are highly reverenced: the ſolidity of the metal is, in their imagination, connected with immortality; and great regard is paid to theſe idols, for the knowledge and experience they muſt have acquired in an endleſs courſe of time.

When by philoſophy and improvement of the rational faculty, the Pagan religion in Rome was ſinking into contempt, little regard was had to tutelar deities, to auguries, or to prophecies. Ptolemy, King of Egypt, being thruſt out of his kingdom by a powerful faction, applied to the Senate of Rome to be reſtored. Lentulus, proconſul of Syria, was ambitious to be employed; but he had enemies who made violent oppoſition. They brought religion into the quarrel, alleging a Sybilline oracle, propheſying that Ptolemy ſhould be reſtored, but not by an army. Cicero, in a letter ſtill extant, gave Lentulus the following advice, that with his Syrian army he ſhould invade Egypt, beat down all oppoſition, and when the country was quieted, that Ptolemy ſhould be at hand to take poſſeſſion. And this the great Cicero thought might

might be piouſly done without contradicting the oracle.

Saints, or tutelar deities, are ſometimes not better treated among Roman Catholics, than among Pagans. "When we were in Portugal," ſays Captain Brydone, "the people of Caſtelbranco were "ſo enraged at St Antonio, for ſuffering the Spa-"niards to plunder their town, contrary, as they "affirmed, to his expreſs agreement with them, "that they broke many of his ſtatues to pieces; "and one that had been more revered than the "reſt, they took the head off, and in its ſtead pla-"ced one of St Francis. The great St Januarius "himſelf was in imminent danger, during the laſt "famine at Naples. They loaded him with abuſe "and invective; and declared point-blank, that "if he did not procure them corn by ſuch a time, "he ſhould be no longer their ſaint." The Tutelar ſaint of Cattania, at the foot of Mount Etna, is St Agatha. A torrent of lava burſt over the walls, and laid waſte great part of that beautiful city. Where was St Agatha at that time? The people ſay, that they had given her juſt provocation; but that ſhe has long ago been reconciled to them, and has promiſed never to ſuffer the lava to hurt them again. At the foot of Mount Etna, a ſtatue of a ſaint is placed as a memorial for having prevented the lava from running up the mountain of Taurominum, and deſtroying that town; the

ſaint having conducted the lava down a low valley to the ſea.

Let a traveller once deviate from the right road, and there is no end of wandering. Porphyrius reports, that in Anubis, an Egyptian city, a real man was worſhipped as a god; which is alſo aſſerted by Minutius Fælix, in his apology for the Chriſtians. A thouſand writers have ſaid, that the Tartars believe their high-prieſt, termed *Dalai Lama*, to be immortal. But this is a miſtake: his death is publiſhed through the whole country; and couriers intimate it even to the Emperor of China: his effigy is taken down from the portal of the great church, and that of his ſucceſſor is put in its ſtead. The ſyſtem of the metempſychoſis, adopted in that country, has occaſioned the miſtake.—They believe, that the holy ſpirit, which animates a Dalai Lama, paſſes upon his death into the body of his ſucceſſor. The ſpirit, therefore, is believed to be immortal, not the body. The Dalai Lama, however, is the object of profound veneration. The Tartar Princes are daily ſending preſents to him, and conſulting him as an oracle: they even undertake a pilgrimage in order to worſhip him in perſon. In a retired part of the temple, he is ſhown covered with precious ſtones, and ſitting croſs-legged. They proſtrate themſelves before him at a diſtance, for they are not permitted to kiſs his toe. The prieſts make traffic even of his excrements, which are greedily purchaſed at a high price,

price, and are kept in a golden box hanging from the neck, as a charm againſt every misfortune. Like the croſs of Jeſus, or the Virgin's milk, we may believe, there never will be wanting plenty of that precious ſtuff to anſwer all demands: the prieſts, out of charity, will furniſh a quota, rather than ſuffer votaries to depart with their money for want of goods to purchaſe. The perſon of the Japan Pope, or Eccleſiaſtical Emperor, is held ſo ſacred, as to make the cutting his beard or his nails, a deadly ſin. But abſurd laws are never ſteadily executed. The beard and the nails are cut in the night-time, when the Pope is ſuppoſed to be aſleep; and what is taken away by that operation, is underſtood to be ſtolen from him, which is no impeachment upon his Holineſs.

That the Jews were idolaters when they ſojourned in the land of Goſhen, were it not preſumable from their commerce with the Egyptians, would, however, be evident from the hiſtory of Moſes. Notwithſtanding their miraculous deliverance from the Egyptian king, notwithſtanding the daily miracles wrought among them in the wilderneſs; ſo addicted were they to a viſible deity, that during even the momentary abſence of Moſes converſing with God on the mount, they fabricated a golden calf, and worſhipped it as their god. "And "the Lord ſaid unto Moſes, Go, get thee down: "for thy people which thou broughteſt out of the "land of Egypt, have corrupted themſelves: they

"have

" have turned aſide quickly out of the way " which I commanded them: they have made " them a molten calf, have worſhipped it, have ſa- " crificed thereunto, and ſaid, " Theſe be thy " gods, O Iſrael, which have brought thee up out " of the land of Egypt *." The hiſtory of the Jews, ſhews how difficult it is to reclaim from idolatry a brutiſh nation, addicted to ſuperſtition, and fettered by inveterate habit. What profuſion of blood, to bring that obſtinate and perverſe people to the true religion! all in vain. The book of Judges, in particular, is full of reiterated relapſes, from their own inviſible God, to the viſible gods of other nations. And in all probability, their anxious deſire for a viſible king, related in the firſt book of Samuel, aroſe from their being deprived of a viſible god. There was a neceſſity for prohibiting images †; which would have ſoon been converted into deities viſible: and it was extremely prudent, to ſupply the want of a viſible god, with endleſs ſhews and ceremonies; which accordingly became the capital branch of the Jewiſh worſhip.

It appears to me from the whole hiſtory of the Jews, that a groſs people are not ſuſceptible but of a groſs religion; and without an enlightened underſtanding, that it is vain to think of eradicating ſuperſtition and idolatry. And after all the covenants made with the Jews, after all the chaſtiſements

* Exod. xxxii. 7. † Deut. xvi. 22.

tiſements and all the miracles laviſhed on them, that they were not however reclaimed from the moſt groveling idolatry, is evident from the two golden calves fabricated by Jeroboam, ſaying, "Behold thy gods, O Iſrael, which brought thee "up out of the land of Egypt*." The people alſo of Judah fell back to idol-worſhip under Rehoboam, ſon of Solomon †. Jehu, king of the ten tribes, did not tolerate the worſhip of other gods ‡; but he continued to worſhip the two golden calves fabricated by Jeroboam §. Down to the days of King Hezekiah, the Jews worſhipped the brazen ſerpent erected by Moſes in the wilderneſs. The Jews ſeem indeed to have been a very perverſe people: the many promiſes and threatenings announced by their prophets, and the many miracles wrought among them, had no permanent effect to reſtrain them from idolatry; and yet, during their captivity in Babylon, ſeveral of them ſubmitted to be burnt alive, rather than to join in idol-worſhip ‖. Captivity cured them radically of idolatry; and from that period to this day, they have not been guilty of a ſingle relapſe. Xiphilin, in his abridgment of Dion Caſſius, relating their war with Pompey many centuries after the Babyloniſh captivity, gives the following account of them. "Their "cuſtoms are quite different from thoſe of o-

"ther

* 1 Kings, xii. 28.
† 1 Kings, xiv. 23.
‡ 2 Kings, x. 25.
§ 2 Kings, x. 29.
‖ Daniel, chap. iii.

" ther nations. Beſides a peculiar manner of li-
" ving, they acknowledge none of the common
" deities: they acknowledge but one, whom they
" worſhip with great veneration. There never
" was an image in Jeruſalem; becauſe they be-
" lieve their God to be inviſible and ineffable.
" They have built him a temple of great ſize and
" beauty, remarkable in the following particular,
" that it is open above, without any roof."

There lies no ſolid objection againſt images among an enlightened people, when uſed merely to rouſe devotion; but as images tend to pervert the vulgar, they ought not to be admitted into churches. Pictures are leſs liable to be miſapprehended; and the Ethiopians accordingly indulge pictures in their churches, though they prohibit ſtatues. The general council of Frankfort permitted the uſe of images in churches; but ſtrictly prohibited any worſhip to be addreſſed to them. So prone, however, to idolatry are the low and illiterate, that the prohibition loſt ground both in France and in Germany; and idol-worſhip became again general.

It is probable, that the ſun and moon were early held to be deities, and that they were the firſt viſible objects of worſhip. Of all the different kinds of idolatry, it is indeed the moſt excuſable. Upon the ſun depends health, vigour, and cheerfulneſs: during his retirement, all is dark and diſmal; when he performs his majeſtic round, to bleſs his ſubjects

and

and to beſtow fecundity, can a mere ſavage withhold gratitude and veneration! Hear an old Pagan bard upon that ſubject. "O thou who rolleſt "above, round as the ſhield of my fathers! Whence "are thy beams, O ſun, thy everlaſting light? "Thou comeſt forth in thy awful beauty, and the "ſtars hide their face: thou moveſt alone, for who "can be a companion of thy courſe! The oaks of "the mountain fall: the mountains decay with "years: the ocean ſhrinks and grows again: the "moon herſelf is loſt in heaven: but thou art "for ever the ſame, rejoycing in the brightneſs of "thy courſe. When tempeſts darken the world, "when thunder rolls, and lightning flies, thou "lookeſt in thy beauty from the clouds, and "laugheſt at the ſtorm *." Worſhip to the ſun as a real deity, was in former times univerſal; and prevails in many countries even at preſent. The American ſavages worſhip the ſun as ſovereign of the univerſe, known by the name of *Ariſkoui* among the Hurons, and of *Agriſkoué* among the Iroquois. They offer him tobacco, which they term *ſmoking the ſun:* the chief man in the aſſembly lights the calumet, and offers it thrice to the riſing ſun; imploring his protection, and recommending the tribe to his care. The chief proceeds to ſmoke; and every one ſmokes in his turn. This ceremony is performed on important occaſions only: leſs matters are reſerved for their Manitou.

The

* Oſſian.

The Miſſiſippi people offer to the ſun the firſt of what they take in hunting; which their commander artfully converts to his own uſe. The Apalachites, bordering on Florida, worſhip the ſun; but ſacrifice nothing to him that has life; they hold him to be the parent of life, and think that he can take no pleaſure in the deſtruction of any living creature: their devotion is exerted in perfumes and ſongs. The Mexicans, while a free people, preſented to the ſun a ſhare of their meat and drink. The inhabitants of Darien believe in the ſun as their god, and in the moon as his wife, paying them equal adoration. The people of Borneo worſhip the ſun and moon as real divinities. The Samoides worſhip both, bowing to them morning and evening in the Perſian manner.

But if the ſun and moon were the firſt objects of idolatry, knowledge and reflection reformed many from the error of holding theſe luminaries to be deities. "That original Intelligence," ſay the Magians, "who is the firſt principle of "all things, diſcovers himſelf to the mind and "underſtanding only: but he hath placed the "ſun as his image in the viſible univerſe; and "the beams of that bright luminary, are but a "faint copy of the glory that ſhines in the higher "heavens." The Perſians, as Herodotus reports, had neither temples, nor altars, nor images: for, ſays that author, they do not think, like the Greeks, that there is any reſemblance between gods and men.

men. The Gaures, who to this day profeſs the ancient religion of Perſia, celebrate divine worſhip before the ſacred fire, and turn with peculiar veneration toward the riſing ſun, as the repreſentative of God; but they adore neither the ſun, nor the ſacred fire. They are profeſſed enemies to every image of the Deity cut with hands: and hence the havock made by the ancient Perſians, upon the ſtatues and temples of the Grecian goods. Such ſublimity of thought was above the reach of other uninſpired nations, excepting only the Hindoos and Chineſe.

I cloſe the hiſtory of idolatry with a brief recapitulation of the outlines. Admitting the ſun and moon to have been the firſt objects of idolatry, yet as Polytheiſm was once univerſal, they make only two of the many gods that were every where worſhipped. We have ſeen, that the ſacred fire was employed in the worſhip of the ſun, and that images were employed in the worſhip of other deities. Images were originally uſed for the ſole purpoſe of animating devotion: ſuch was their uſe in Perſia and Hindoſtan; and ſuch was their uſe in every country among philoſophers. The Emperor Julian, in an epiſtle to Theodore concerning the images of the gods, ſays, "We "believe not that theſe images are gods: we "only uſe them in worſhipping the gods." In the progreſs toward idolatry, the next ſtep is, to imagine, that a deity loves his image, that he makes

makes it his reſidence, or at leaſt communicates ſome virtue to it. The laſt ſtep is, to fancy the image itſelf to be a deity; which gained ground imperceptibly as ſtatuary advanced toward perfection. It would be incredible that men of ſenſe ſhould ever ſuffer themſelves to be impreſſed with ſo wild a deluſion, were it not the overbearing influence of religious ſuperſtition. *Credò quia impoſſibile eſt*, is applicable to idolatry as well as to tranſubſtantiation. The worſhipping of the ſun and moon as deities, is idolatry in the ſtricteſt ſenſe. With reſpect to images, the firſt ſtep of the progreſs is not idolatry: the next is mixed idolatry: and the laſt is rank idolatry.

So much upon idolatry. I proceed to what approaches the neareſt to it, which is worſhip addreſſed to deified mortals. The ancient gods were exalted ſo little above men, that it was no hard taſk for the imagination to place in heaven, men who had made a figure on earth. The Grecian heaven was entirely peopled with ſuch men, as well as that of many other nations. Men are deified every day by the Romiſh church, under the denomination of ſaints; perſons are frequently ſelected for that honour who ſcarce deſerved a place on earth, and ſome who never had a place there. The Roman Catholics copy the pagans, in worſhipping theſe ſaints in quality of tutelar deities. One branch of the office beſtowed on them, is to explain the wants of their votaries to the King of heaven,

heaven, and to ſupplicate for them. The mediatorial office prevails with reſpect to earthly potentates, as well as heavenly: being ſtruck with awe and timidity in approaching thoſe exalted above us, we naturally take hold of ſome intermediate perſon to ſolicit with us. In approaching the Almighty, the mind ſinking down into humility and profound veneration, ſtops ſhort, relying upon ſome friend in heaven to intercede in its behalf. Temples among the Cochin-Chineſe are conſtructed with a deep and dark niche, which is their *ſanctum ſanctorum*. They hold, that no repreſentation, whether by painting or ſculpture, can be made of God, who is inviſible. The niche denotes his incomprehenſibility; and the good men placed by them in heaven, are believed to be their interceſſors at the throne of grace. The prayers of the Chinguleſe are ſeldom directed to the Supreme Being, but to his vicegerents. Interceſſors, at the ſame time, contribute to the eaſe of their votaries: A Roman Catholic need not aſſume a very high tone, in addreſſing a tutelar ſaint choſen by himſelf.

Falſe notions of Providence have prompted groveling mortals to put confidence in mediators and interceſſors of a ſtill lower claſs, namely, living mortals, who by idle auſterities have acquired a reputation for holineſs. Take the following inſtance, the ſtrongeſt of the kind that can be figured. Louis XI. of France, ſenſible of the approach of death, ſent for a hermit of Calabria, named *Franciſco Martarillo;*

rillo; and throwing himſelf at the hermit's feet in a flood of tears, entreated him to intercede with God, that his life might be prolonged; as if the voice of a Calabrian friar, ſays Voltaire, could alter the courſe of Providence, by preſerving a weak and perverſe ſoul in a worn-out body.

Having diſcuſſed the perſons that are the objects of worſhip, the next ſtep in order is, to take under view the forms and ceremonies employed in religious worſhip. Forms and ceremonies illuſtrate a prince in his own court: they are neceſſary in a court of law for expediting buſineſs; and they promote ſerioufneſs and ſolemnity in religious worſhip. At the ſame time, in every one of theſe a juſt medium ought to be preſerved between too many and too few. With reſpect to religious worſhip in particular, ſuperfluity of ceremonies quenches devotion, by occupying the mind too much upon externals. The Roman Catholic worſhip is crowded with ceremonies: it reſembles the Italian opera, which is all ſound and no ſentiment. The preſbyterian form of worſhip is too naked: it is proper for philoſophers more than for the populace. This is fundamentally the cauſe of the numerous ſeceſſions from the church of Scotland that have made a figure of late: people diſlike the eſtabliſhed forms, when they find leſs animation in public worſhip than is deſired; and without being ſenſible of the real cauſe, they chuſe paſtors for themſelves, who ſupply the want of ceremonies by loud ſpeaking,

ſpeaking, with much external fervor and devotion *.

* External ſhow figures greatly in dark times, when nothing makes an impreſſion but what is viſible. A German traveller (Hentzner) talking of Queen Elizabeth, thus deſcribes the ſolemnity of her dinner: "While ſhe was "at prayers, we ſaw her table ſet out in the following ſo- "lemn manner. A gentleman entered the room bearing "a rod, and along with him another who had a table- "cloth, which, after they had both kneeled three times "with the utmoſt veneration, he ſpread upon the table, "and after kneeling again, they both retired. Then came "two others, one with the rod again, the other with a "ſalt-cellar, a plate and bread; when they had kneeled, "as the others had done, and placed what was brought "upon the table, they too retired with the ſame ceremo- "nies performed by the firſt. At laſt came an unmarried "lady, (we were told ſhe was a Counteſs), and along with "her a married one, bearing a taſting knife; the former "was dreſſed in white ſilk; who when ſhe had proſtrated "herſelf three times, in the moſt graceful manner, ap- "proached the table, and rubbed the plates with bread "and ſalt, with as much awe as if the Queen had been "preſent: when they had waited there a little while, the "yeomen of the guard entered, bareheaded, clothed in "ſcarlet, with a golden roſe upon their backs, bringing "in at each turn a courſe of twenty-four diſhes, ſerved in "plate moſt of it gilt; theſe diſhes were received by a "gentleman in the ſame order they were brought, and "placed upon the table, while the lady taſter gave to "each of the guard a mouthful to eat, of the particular "diſh

The frequent ablutions or waſhings among the Mahometans and others, as acts of devotion, ſhow the influence that the ſlighteſt reſemblances have on the ignorant. Becauſe purification, in ſeveral languages, is a term applicable to the mind as well as

" diſh he had brought, for fear of any poiſon. During " the time that this guard, which conſiſts of the talleſt " and ſtouteſt men that can be found in all England, were " bringing dinner, twelve trumpets and two kettle-drums " made the hall ring for half an hour together. At the " end of this ceremonial, a number of unmarried ladies " appeared, who, with particular ſolemnity, lifted the " meat off the table, and conveyed it into the Queen's " inner and more private chamber, where, after ſhe had " choſen for herſelf, the reſt goes to the ladies of the " court." Forms were greatly regarded among the old Romans, dreſſes appropriated to different ranks; lictors, axes, bundles of rods, and other enſigns of power; military merit rewarded with triumphs, ovations, crowns of gold, of leaves, &c. &c. Such appearances ſtrike the multitude with reſpect and awe: they are indeed deſpiſed by men of plain ſenſe; but they regain their credit with philoſophers. Exceſſive courage, the exertion of which is viſible, was the heroiſm of the laſt age: " I ſhall never " eſteem a king," ſaid the great Guſtavus Adolphus, " who in battle does not expoſe himſelf like a private " man." By acuteneſs of judgment and refinement of taſte, we cling to the ſubſtance and diſregard forms and ceremonies. External ſhow, however, continues to prevail in many inſtances. A young man is apt to be captivated with beauty or dreſs; a young woman, with equipage or a title. And hence, many an ill-ſorted match.

as to the body, ſhallow thinkers, miſled by the double meaning, imagine that the mind, like the body, is purified by water.

The ſect of Ali uſe the Alcoran tranſlated into the Perſian language, which is their native tongue. The ſect of Omar eſteem this to be a groſs impiety; being perſuaded, that the Alcoran was written in Arabic, by the Angel Gabriel, at the command of God himſelf. The Roman Catholics are not then the only people who profeſs to ſpeak nonſenſe to God Almighty; or, which is the ſame, who profeſs to pray in an unknown tongue.

At meals, the ancients poured out ſome wine as a libation to the gods: Chriſtians pronounce a ſhort prayer, termed a *grace*.

The groſs notion of Deity entertained by the ancients, is exemplified in their worſhipping and ſacrificing on high places; in order, as they thought, to be more within ſight. Jupiter, in Homer, praiſes Hector for ſacrificing to him frequently upon the top of Ida; and Strabo obſerves, that the Perſians, who uſed neither images nor altars, ſacrificed to the gods in high places. Balak carried Balaam the prophet to the top of Piſgah and other mountains, to ſacrifice there, and to curſe Iſrael. The votaries of Baal always worſhipped in high places. Even the ſage Tacitus was infected with that abſurdity. Speaking of certain high mountains where the gods were worſhipped, he expreſſes himſelf thus: *Maxime cœlo*

appropinquare, precesque mortalium a Deo nuſquam propiùs audiri *.

Ceremonies that tend to unhinge morality, belong more properly to the following ſection, treating of the connection between religion and morality.

It is now full time to take under conſideration an objection to the ſenſe of Deity hinted above, arguing from the groſs conceptions of deity among many nations, that this ſenſe cannot be innate. The objection is not indeed directly ſtated in the following paſſage, borrowed from a juſtly-celebrated author; but as it perhaps may be implied, the paſſage ſhall be fairly tranſcribed. "The uni-" verſal propenſity to believe inviſible intelligent " power, being a general attendant on human na-" ture, if not an original inſtinct, may be conſi-" dered as a kind of ſtamp which the Deity has " ſet upon his work; and nothing ſurely can more " dignify mankind, than to be the only earthly " being who bears the ſtamp or image of the uni-" verſal Creator. But conſult this image as it " commonly is in popular religions: How is the " Deity diſfigured! what caprice, abſurdity, and " immorality, are attributed to him †!" A ſatisfactory anſwer to the objection implied in this paſſage,

* "As approaching nearer to heaven, the prayers of " mortals are there more diſtinctly heard."

† Natural Hiſtory of Religion.

paſſage, will occur, upon recollecting the progreſs of men and nations from infancy to maturity. Our external ſenſes, neceſſary for ſelf-preſervation, ſoon arrive at perfection: the more refined ſenſes of propriety, of right and wrong, of Deity, of being accountable creatures, and many others of the ſame kind, are of ſlower growth: the ſenſe of right and wrong in particular, and the ſenſe of Deity, ſeldom reach perfection but by good education and much ſtudy. If ſuch be the caſe among enlightened nations, what is to be expected from ſavages who are in the loweſt ſtage of underſtanding? To a ſavage of New Holland, whoſe ſenſe of deity is extremely obſcure, one may talk without end of a being who created the world, and who governs it by wiſe laws; but in vain, for the ſavage will be never the wiſer. The ſame ſavage hath alſo a glimmering of the moral ſenſe, as all men have; and yet in vain will you diſcourſe to him of approbation and diſapprobation, of merit and demerit: of theſe terms he has no clear conception. Hence the endleſs aberrations of rude and barbarous nations, from pure religion as well as from pure morality. Of the latter, there are many inſtances collected in the preceding tract; and of the former, ſtill more in the preſent tract. The ſenſe of deity in dark times has indeed been ſtrangely diſtorted, by certain biaſſes and paſſions that enſlave the rude and illiterate: but theſe yield gradually to the rational faculty as it ripens, and

at laſt leave religion free to ſound philoſophy. Then it is, that men, liſtening to the innate ſenſe of deity purified from every bias, acquire a clear conviction of one ſupreme Deity who made and governs the world.

The foregoing objection then weighs not againſt the ſenſe of deity more than againſt the moral ſenſe. If it have weight, it reſolves into a complaint againſt Providence for the weakneſs of the ſenſe of deity in rude and illiterate nations. If ſuch complaint be ſolidly founded, it pierces extremely deep: why have not all nations, even in their naſcent ſtate, the ſenſe of deity and the moral ſenſe in purity and perfection? why do they not poſſeſs all the arts of life without neceſſity of culture or experience? why are we born poor and helpleſs infants, inſtead of being produced complete in every member, internal and external, as Adam and Eve were? The plan of Providence is far above the reach of our weak criticiſms: it is but a ſmall portion that is laid open to our view; can we pretend to judge of the whole? I venture only to ſuggeſt, that as, with reſpect to individuals, there is a progreſs from infancy to maturity; ſo there is a ſimilar progreſs in every nation, from its ſavage ſtate to its maturity in arts and ſciences. A child that has juſt conceptions of the Deity and of his attributes, would be a great miracle; and would not ſuch knowledge in a ſavage be equally ſo? Nor can I diſcover what benefit a child or a

ſavage

ſavage could reap from ſuch knowledge; provided it remained a child or a ſavage in every other reſpect. The genuine fruits of religion, are gratitude to the Author of our being, veneration to him as the Supreme Being, abſolute reſignation to the eſtabliſhed laws of his providence, and cheerful performance of every duty: but a child has not the ſlighteſt idea of gratitude nor of veneration, and very little of moral duties; and a ſavage, with reſpect to theſe, is not much ſuperior to a child. The formation and government of the world, as far as we know, are excellent: we have great reaſon to preſume the ſame with reſpect to what we do not know; and every good man will reſt ſatisfied with the following reflection, That we ſhould have been men from the hour of our birth, complete in every part, had it been conformable to the ſyſtem of unerring Providence.

SECT. II.

Morality conſidered as a branch of duty to our Maker.

HAVING travelled long on a rough road, not a little fatiguing, the agreeable part lies before us; which is, to treat of morality as a branch of religion. It was that ſubject which induced me to undertake the hiſtory of natural religion; a ſubject that will afford ſalutary inſtruction; and will

will inſpire true piety, if inſtruction can produce that effect.

Bayle ſtates a queſtion, Whether a people may not be happy in ſociety, and be qualified for good government, upon principles of morality ſingly, without any ſenſe of religion. The queſtion is ingenious, and may give opportunity for ſubtle reaſoning; but it is uſeleſs, becauſe the fact ſuppoſed cannot happen. The principles of morality and of religion are equally rooted in our nature: they are indeed weak in children and in ſavages; but they grow up together, and advance toward maturity with equal ſteps. Where the moral ſenſe is entire, there muſt be a ſenſe of religion; and if a man who has no ſenſe of religion live decently in ſociety, he is more indebted for his conduct to good temper than to ſound morals.

We have the authority of the Prophet Micah, formerly quoted, for holding, that religion, or, in other words, our duty to God, conſiſts in doing juſtice, in loving mercy, and in walking humbly with him. The laſt is the foundation of religious worſhip, diſcuſſed in the foregoing ſection: the two former belong to the preſent ſection. And if we have gratitude to our Maker and Benefactor, if we owe implicit obedience to his will as our rightful ſovereign, we ought not to ſeparate the worſhip we owe to him, from juſtice and benevolence to our fellow-creatures; for to be unjuſt to them,

them, to be cruel or hard-hearted, is a tranſgreſſion of his will, no leſs groſs than a total neglect of religious worſhip. "Maſter, which is the great "commandment in the law? Jeſus ſaid unto him, "Thou ſhalt love the Lord thy God with all thy "heart, with all thy ſoul, and with all thy mind. "This is the firſt and great commandment. And "the ſecond is like unto it, Thou ſhalt love thy "neighbour as thyſelf. On theſe two command-"ments hang all the law and the prophets *." "Then ſhall the King ſay unto them on his right "hand, Come, ye bleſſed of my Father, inherit "the kingdom prepared for you. For I was "hungry, and ye gave me meat: I was thirſty, "and ye gave me drink: I was a ſtranger, and "ye took me in: naked, and ye cloathed me: "ſick, and ye viſited me: in priſon, and ye came "unto me. Then ſhall the righteous anſwer, "ſaying, Lord, when ſaw we thee hungry, and "fed thee? or thirſty, and gave thee drink? "When ſaw we thee a ſtranger, and took thee "in? or naked, and cloathed thee? When ſaw "we thee ſick, or in priſon, and came unto thee? "And the King ſhall anſwer, Verily I ſay unto "you, in as much as ye have done it unto one of "the leaſt of theſe my brethren, ye have done it "unto me †." "Pure religion and undefiled be-"fore God, is this, To viſit the fatherleſs and "widow

* Matthew, xxii. 36. † Matthew, xxv. 34.

" widow in their affliction; and to keep himself " unspotted from the world *." " Hostias et vic- " timas Domino offeram quas in usum mei pro- " tulit, ut rejiciam ei suum munus? Ingratum " est; cùm sit litabilis hostia bonus animus, et " pura mens, et sincera conscientia. Igitur qui " innocentiam colit, Domino supplicat; qui justi- " tiam, Deo libat; qui fraudibus abstinet, pro- " pitiat Deum; qui hominem periculo subripit, " optimam victimam cædit. Hæc nostra sacrificia, " hæc Dei sacra sunt. Sic apud nos religiosior est " ille, qui justior †." The laws of Zaleucus, law-giver to the Locrians, who lived before the days of Pythagoras, are introduced with the following preamble. " No man can question the existence " of Deity who observes the order and harmony " of the universe, which cannot be the production " of chance. Men ought to bridle their passions, " and

* James, i. 27.

† " Shall I offer to God for a sacrifice those creatures " which his bounty has given me for my use? It were " ingratitude to throw back the gift upon the giver. The " most acceptable sacrifice is an upright mind, an un- " tainted conscience, and an honest heart. The actions of " the innocent ascend to God in prayer; the observance " of justice is more grateful than incense; the man who " is sincere in his dealings, secures the favour of his Crea- " tor; and the delivery of a fellow-creature from danger " or destruction, is dearer in the eyes of the Almighty " than the sacrifice of blood."——*Minucius Fælix.*

" and to guard againſt every vice. God is pleaſed " with no ſacrifice but a ſincere heart; and dif- " fers widely from mortals, whoſe delight is ſplen- " did ceremonies and rich offerings. Let juſtice " therefore be ſtudied; for by that only can a " man be acceptable to the Deity. Let thoſe who " are tempted to do ill, have always before their " eyes the ſevere judgments of the gods againſt " wicked men. Let them always keep in view " the hour of death, that fatal hour which is at- " tended with bitter remorſe for tranſgreſſing the " rules of juſtice. If a bad diſpoſition incline you " to vice, pray to Heaven, at the foot of the altar, " to mend your heart."

Morality is thus included in religion. Some nations, however, leave not this propoſition to reaſoning or conviction, but engroſs many moral duties in their religious creed. In the 67th chapter of the Sadder, a lie is declared to be a great ſin, and is forbid even where it tends to bring about good. So much purer is the morality of the ancient Perſians than of the preſent Jeſuits. The religion of the people of Pegu, inculcates charity, forbids to kill, to ſteal or to injure others. Attend to the conſequence: that people, fierce originally, have become humane and compaſſionate. In a ſacred book of the ancient Perſians, it is written, " If you incline to be a ſaint, give good education " to your children; for their virtuous actions will " be imputed to you." The people of Japan pay great

great reſpect to their parents; it being an article in their creed, That thoſe who fail in duty to their parents, will be puniſhed by the gods. In theſe two inſtances, religion tends greatly to connect parents and children in the moſt intimate tie of cordial affection. The reverence the Chineſe have for their anceſtors and the ceremonies performed annually at their tombs, tend to keep them at home, and prevent their wandering into foreign countries.

Ancient Perſia was fertile and populous: at preſent it is barren and thin of inhabitants. Sir John Chardin accounts for the difference. The climate of Perſia is ſo dry, that ſcarce a ſhower falls during ſummer: even graſs will not grow without being watered. This defect of climate was remedied by the ancient inhabitants, termed *Gaures;* among whom it was a religious act, to cultivate waſte land and to plant trees for fruit. It was a maxim in the ſacred book of that religion, That he who cultivates the ground with care and diligence, acquires a greater ſtock of religious merit, that can be acquired by ten thouſand prayers. The religion, on the contrary, of the preſent Mahometan inhabitants, leads them to take no care for tomorrow: they graſp at preſent enjoyment, and leave all the reſt to fate.

Superſtitious rites in ſome religions, are ſucceſsfully employed to enforce certain moral duties. The Romans commonly made their ſolemn covenants in the Capitol, before the ſtatue of Jupiter; by

by which ſolemnity he was underſtood to guarantee the covenant, ready to pour out vengeance upon the tranſgreſſor. When an oath enters into any engagement, the Burates, a people in Grand Tartary, require it to be given upon a mountain, held to be ſacred: they are firmly perſuaded, that the perſon who ſwears a falſehood, will not come down alive. The Eſſenes, a Jewiſh ſect, bound themſelves by a ſolemn oath, to ſhun unlawful gain, to be faithful to their promiſes, not to lie, and never to harm any one. In Cochin-China, the ſouls of thoſe who have been eminent for arts or arms, are worſhipped. Their ſtatues are placed in the temples; and the ſize of a ſtatue is proportioned to the merit of the perſon repreſented. If that be impartially executed, there cannot be a nobler incitement to public ſpirit. The Egyptians did not reach the thought of honouring virtue after death; but they diſhonoured vice, by excluding it from the Elyſian fields.

The ſalutary influence of religion on morality, is not confined to pure religion, whether by its connection with morality in general, or by inculcating particular moral duties. There are many religious doctrines, doubtful or perhaps erroneous, that contribute alſo to enforce morality. Some followers of Confucius aſcribe immortality to the ſouls of the juſt only; and believe that the ſouls of the wicked periſh with their bodies. The native Hindoos are gentle and humane: the metempſychoſis

choſis or tranſmigration of ſouls, is an article in their creed; and hence the prohibition to deſtroy any living creature, becauſe it might diſturb the ſoul of an anceſtor. In the ſecond chapter of the Sadder, it is written, that a man whoſe good works are more numerous than his ſins, will go to paradiſe; otherwiſe that he will be thruſt into hell, there to remain for ever. It adds, that a bridge erected over the great abyſs where hell is ſituated, leads from this earth to paradiſe; that upon the bridge there ſtands an angel, who weighs in a balance the merits of the paſſengers; that the paſſenger whoſe good works are found light in the balance, is thrown over the bridge into hell; but that the paſſenger whoſe good works preponderate, proceeds in his journey to paradiſe, where there is a glorious city, gardens, rivers, and beautiful virgins, whoſe looks are a perpetual feaſt, but who muſt not be enjoyed. In the fourth chapter of the Sadder, good works are zealouſly recommended in the following parable. Zeraduſht, or Zoroaſter, being in company with God, ſaw a man in hell who wanted his right foot. "Oh my Creator," ſaid Zoroaſter, "who is that man who wants the right "foot? God anſwered, He was the king of thirty-"three cities, reigned many years, but never did "any good, except once, when, ſeeing a ſheep "tied where it could not reach its food, he with "his right foot puſhed the food to it; upon which "account that foot was ſaved from hell." In Japan,

pan, thoſe of the Sinto religion believe, that the ſouls of good men are tranſlated to a place of happineſs, next to the habitation of their gods. But they admit no place of torment; nor have they any notion of a devil, but what animates the fox, a very miſchievous animal in that country. What then becomes of the ſouls of ill men? Being denied entrance into heaven, they wander about to expiate their ſins. Thoſe of the Bubſdo religion believe, that in the other world, there is a place of miſery as well as of happineſs. Of the latter there are different degrees, for different degrees of virtue; and yet, far from envying the happier lot of others, every inhabitant is perfectly ſatisfied with his own. There are alſo different degrees of miſery; for juſtice requires, that every man be puniſhed according to the nature and number of his ſins. *Jemma O* is the ſevere judge of the wicked: their vices appear to him in all their horror, by means of a mirror, named *the mirror of knowledge.* When ſouls have expiated their ſins, after ſuffering long in the priſon of darkneſs, they are ſent back into the world, to animate ſerpents, toads, and ſuch vile animals as reſembled them in their former exiſtence. From theſe they paſs into the bodies of more innocent animals; and at laſt are again ſuffered to enter human bodies; after the diſſolution of which, they run the ſame courſe of happineſs or miſery as at firſt. The people of Benin, in Africa, believe a man's ſhadow

to be a real being, that gives teſtimony after death for or againſt him; and that he accordingly is made happy or miſerable in another world. The Negroes hold that their own country is delicious above all others; and it is the belief of ſeveral of their tribes, that where-ever they die, they will return to their own country. This is a perpetual ſource of comfort, and inſpires them with humanity above the other tribes. A religious belief in ancient Greece, that the ſouls of thoſe who are left above ground without rites, have not acceſs to Elyſium, tended to promote humanity; for thoſe who are careful of the dead, will not be altogether indifferent about the living.

Immenſe are the bleſſings that proceed from the union of pure religion with ſound morality: but however immenſe, I boldly affirm, that they ſcarce counterbalance the manifold evils that proceed from impure religion, indulging and even encouraging groſs immoralities. A few glaring inſtances ſhall be ſelected. The firſt I ſhall mention is, the holding religion to conſiſt in the belief of points purely ſpeculative, ſuch as have no relation to good works. The natural effect of that doctrine is, to divorce religion from morality, in manifeſt contradiction to the will of God. What avails it, for example, to the glory of God or to the happineſs of men, whether the conception of the Virgin Mary, was maculate or immaculate? The following few inſtances, ſelected from a great number,

number, are controverſies of that kind, which for ages miſerably afflicted the Chriſtian church, and engendered the bittereſt enmity, productive of deſtruction and ſlaughter among brethren of the ſame religion. In the fifth century, it was the employment of more than one general council, to determine, whether *the mother of God*, or *the mother of Chriſt*, is the proper epithet of the Virgin Mary. In the ſixth century, a bitter controverſy aroſe whether Chriſt's body was corruptible. In the ſeventh century, Chriſtians were divided about the volition of Chriſt, whether he had one or two Wills, and how his Will operated. In the eighth and ninth centuries, the Greek and Latin churches divided about the Holy Ghoſt, whether he proceeded from the Father and Son, or only from the Father. In the eleventh century, there aroſe a warm conteſt between the Greek and Latin churches about uſing unleavened bread in the euchariſt. In the fourteenth century, it was controverted between Pope John XXII. and the divines of his time, whether ſouls in their intermediate ſtate ſee God, or only the human nature of Chriſt. Franciſcans have ſuffered death in multitudes about the form of their hood. It was diſputed between the Dominicans and Franciſcans, whether Chriſt had any property. The Pope pronounced the negative propoſition to be a peſtilential and blaſphemous doctrine, ſubverſive of Catholic faith. Many councils were held at Conſtantinople, to de-

termine what ſort of light it was that the diſciples ſaw on Mount Tabor: it was ſolemnly pronounced, to be the eternal light with which God is encircled; and which may be termed his energy or operation, but is diſtinct from his nature and eſſence. A heap of propoſitions in the creed of St Athanaſius, as far as intelligible, are merely ſpeculative, ſuch as may be adopted or rejected, without the leaſt danger to religion, or to morality; and yet we are commanded to believe every one of them, under the pain of eternal damnation. An endleſs number of ſuch propoſitions, adopted by the Romiſh church, clearly evince, that Chriſtianity was in that church held to conſiſt entirely in belief, without any regard to good works *. Whether the Alcoran be eternal, or whether it were created, is a diſpute that has occaſioned much effuſion of Mahometan blood. The Calif Mamoun, with many doctors, held it to have been created; but the greater number inſiſted, that being the word of God, it muſt like him be eternal. This opinion is embraced by the preſent Mahometans, who hold all who deny it to be infidels. One great maxim of the Brahmins contained in their ancient books, is,

* The great weight that was laid upon orthodoxy, appears from a triumphal arch erected over the tomb of Charlemagne, upon which was the following inſcription: "Here lies the body of Charles, a great and orthodox emperor." And yet that orthodox Emperor could not write his name.

is, that it is better to ſit than to walk, better to lie than to ſit, better to ſleep than to wake, better to die than to live. This is directly ſubverſive of induſtry, and conſequently of morality. There is among men great uniformity of opinion in matters of importance. Religious differences are generally about trifles, where liberty ought to be indulged without reſerve*; and yet upon theſe trifles are founded the bittereſt enmities. It ought therefore to be a fundamental law in every church, to abſtain from loading its creed with articles that are not eſſential: for ſuch articles tend to eradicate brotherly love, and to convert into bitter enemies, men who are fundamentally of the ſame faith. This leads me naturally to ſay a few words on religion as a branch of education, of all the moſt important branch. Avoiding all the points diſputed among the different ſects of Chriſtians, and leaving myſteries to the future ſagacity of your children if they ſhall be inclined to pry into them, let them know that there is a God over all who loves the good, and is an enemy to evil-doers; that this great Being, though inviſible to us, is witneſs to all our words and actions, and that even our ſecret thoughts are not hid from him. Take every opportunity to inculcate this great truth, till it make ſo deep an impreſſion as to be the great regulator of their conduct. With reſpect to every intended action, train

* Elements of Criticiſm, vol. ii. p. 493. edit. 5.

them up into the habit of inquiring firſt how it will appear in the ſight of their Maker at the great day of judgment. This is true religion, the main ſupport of virtue. It is all that is requiſite in point of education; leaving to thoſe who have penetration and leiſure to form a more complete ſyſtem.

In the next place ſhall be mentioned, certain articles of faith that tend to ſap the very foundation of one or other moral duty. What, for example, can more effectually promote cruelty, than the creed of the Idaans, a people in the iſland of Borneo, That every perſon they put to death muſt attend them as a ſlave in the other world? This belief makes them prone to war, and occaſions aſſaſſinations without end. According to the creed of the ſavages in Canada, the killing and burning enemies are what chiefly entitle them to be happy in another world; and that he who deſtroys the greateſt number, will be the moſt happy. At the ſame time, they have no notion of greater happineſs there, than plenty of game, great abundance of all things without labour, and full gratification of every ſenſual appetite. The Scandinavians had no notion of greater bliſs in another world, than to drink beer out of the ſkull of an enemy, in the hall of Woden their tutelar deity: can hatred and revenge indulged in this world be more honourably rewarded? The doctrine of tutelar deities is equally productive of hatred and revenge!

relying

relying on a ſuperior power who eſpouſes all my quarrels, I put no bounds to my reſentment, and every moral duty in oppoſition is trampled under foot. The following creed of the inhabitants of the Marian or Ladrone iſlands, is a great encouragement to cowardice. Heaven, according to that creed, is a region under the earth, filled with cocoa-trees, ſugar-canes, and variety of other delicious fruits. Hell is a vaſt furnace, conſtantly red-hot. Their condition in the other world depends not on good or bad actions, but on the manner of their death. Thoſe who die a natural death, go ſtraight to heaven: they may ſin freely, if they can but ſecure their perſons againſt violence. But war and bloodſhed are their averſion, becauſe thoſe who ſuffer a violent death go ſtraight to hell. In many ancient nations, a goddeſs was worſhipped, whoſe province it was to promote animal love without regard to matrimony. That goddeſs was in Greece termed *Aphrodité*, in Rome *Venus*, and in Babylon *Mylitta*. To her was ſacrificed, in ſome countries, the virginity of young women; which, it was believed, did ſecure their chaſtity for ever after. Juſtin mentions a cuſtom in the iſland of Cyprus, of ſending young women at ſtated times to the ſea-ſhore; where they proſtituted themſelves as a tribute to Venus, that they might be chaſte the reſt of their lives. His words are, "Pro reliqua pudicitiæ libamenta Veneri ſo-

" luturas*." In other nations, a ſmall number only were proſtituted, in order to ſecure to the remainder, a chaſte and regular life. This explains a cuſtom among the Babylonians, which, far from being thought a religious act, is held as a proof of abandoned debauchery. The cuſtom was, That every woman once in her life ſhould proſtitute herſelf in the temple of the goddeſs Mylitta. Herodotus reports, that thereby they became proof againſt all temptation. And Ælian obſerves the ſame of the Lydian ladies. *Credat Judæus apella.* Margaret Poretta, who in the fourteenth century made a figure among the Beguines, preached a doctrine not a little favourable to incontinence. She undertook to demonſtrate, " That the ſoul, " when abſorbed in the love of God, is free from " the reſtraint of law, and may freely gratify every " natural appetite, without contracting guilt;" a cordial doctrine for a lady of pleaſure. That crazy perſon, inſtead of being laughed at, was burnt alive at Paris. In the fifteenth century, a ſect termed *brethren and ſiſters of the free ſpirit*, held, That modeſty is a mark of inhering corruption; and that thoſe only are perfect, who can behold nakedneſs without emotion. Theſe fanatics appeared at public worſhip, without the leaſt covering. Many tenets profeſſed by the Jeſuits, open a door to every immorality. " Perſons truly wick- " ed, and void of the love of God, may expect " eternal

* Lib. xviii. cap. 5.

" eternal life in heaven; provided only they be " impreſſed with fear of divine anger, and avoid " heinous crimes through the dread of future pu- " niſhment." Again, " Perſons may tranſgreſs " with ſafety, who have any plauſible argument " for tranſgreſſing. A judge, for example, may " decide for the leaſt probable ſide of a queſtion, " and even againſt his own opinion, provided he " be ſupported by any tolerable authority." Again, " Actions intrinſically evil, and contrary to " divine law, may however be innocently per- " formed, by thoſe who can join, even ideally, a " good end to the performance. For example, an " eccleſiaſtic may ſafely commit ſimony by pur- " chaſing a benefice, if to the unlawful act, he " join the innocent purpoſe of procuring to him- " ſelf a ſubſiſtence. A man who runs another " through the body for a ſlight affront, renders " the action lawful, if his motive be honour, not " revenge." A famous Jeſuit taught, that a young man may wiſh the death of his father, and even rejoice at his death, provided the wiſh proceed, not from hatred, but from fondneſs of his father's eſtate. And another Jeſuit has had the effrontery to maintain, that a monk may lawfully aſſaſſinate a calumniator, who threatens to charge his order with ſcandalous practices. Among the negroes of Sanguin on the river Seſtro in Guinea, it is an article of faith that dextrous robbery is no leſs lawful than beneficial.

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The Quakers, a ſect generated during the civil wars in the reign of Charles I., contracted ſuch an averſion to war as to declare it unlawful even in ſelf-defence; a doctrine that ſoars high above morality, and is contradictory to human nature. But by what magic has a tenet ſo unnatural ſubſiſted ſo long? The Quakers exclude pride, admitting no difference of rank, but conſidering all men as their brethren. And they exclude vanity by ſimplicity and uniformity of dreſs. Thus, by humility and temperance, they have preſerved their inſtitutions alive. But theſe paſſions cannot always be kept in ſubjection: vanity is creeping in, eſpecially among the females, who indulge in ſilks, fine linen, bone-lace, &c. Vanity and pride will reach the males; and the edifice will totter and fall.

A doctrine that ſtrikes at the root of every moral duty, as well as of religion itſelf, is, That God will accept a compoſition for ſin; a doctrine that prevailed univerſally during the days of ignorance. Compoſitions for crimes were countenanced by law in every country *; and men, prone to indulge their paſſions, flattered themſelves, that they might compound with God for ſinning againſt him, as with their neighbours for injuring them: thoſe who have no notion of any motive but intereſt, naturally think it to be equally powerful with the Deity. An opinion prevailed univerſally in the Chriſtian

* Hiſtorical Law Tracts, Tract I.

Chriſtian church, from the eighth century down to the Reformation, that liberal donations to God, to a ſaint, to the church, would procure pardon even for the groſſeſt ſins. During that period, the building churches and monaſteries was in high vogue. This abſurd, or rather impious doctrine, proved a plentiful harveſt of wealth to the clergy; for the great and opulent, who are commonly the boldeſt ſinners, have the greateſt ability to compound for their ſins. There needs nothing but ſuch an opinion, to annihilate every duty, whether moral or religious; for what wicked man will think either of reſtitution or of reformation, who can purchaſe a pardon from Heaven with ſo little trouble? Louis XI. of France was remarkably ſuperſtitious, even in a ſuperſtitious age. To ingratiate himſelf with the Virgin Mary, he ſurrendered to her the county of Boulogne with great ſolemnity. Voltaire remarks, that godlineſs conſiſts, not in making the Virgin a Counteſs, but in abſtaining from ſin. Compoſition for ſins is a doctrine of the church of Rome, boldly profeſſed without diſguiſe. A book of rates, publiſhed by authority of the Pope, contains ſtated prices for abſolutions, not excepting the moſt heinous ſins. So true is the obſervation of Æneas Silvius, afterwards Pope Paul II. "Nihil eſt quod abſque "argento Romana curia det: ipſa manuum im-"poſitio, et Spiritus Sancti dona, venduntur; nec "peccatorum

" peccatorum venia niſi nummatis impenditur *." Of all the immoral atonements for ſin, human ſacrifices are the moſt brutal; deviating no leſs from the purity of religion, than from the fundamental principles of morality. They wore out of uſe as kindly affections prevailed; and will never again be reſtored, unleſs we fall back to the ſavage manners of our forefathers. Compoſition for crimes, once univerſal, is now baniſhed from every enlightened nation. Compoſition for ſins, was once equally univerſal; and I wiſh it could be ſaid, that there are now no remains of that poiſonous opinion among Chriſtians: the practice of the church of Rome will not permit it to be ſaid. Were men deeply convinced, as they ought to be, that ſincere repentance and reformation of manners are the only means for obtaining pardon, they would never dream of making bargains with the Almighty, and of compounding with him for their ſins.

In the practice of religion, the laying too great weight on forms, ceremonies, and other external arbitrary acts, tends to the corruption of morals. That error has infected every religion. The Sadder,

* " There is nothing to be obtained from the court of " Rome but by the force of money: even the ceremony of " conſecration, and the gifts of the Holy Ghoſt, are ſold; " and the remiſſion of ſins is beſtowed only on thoſe who can " pay for it."

der, the Bible of the Gaures, prohibits calumny and detraction, lying, ſtealing, adultery, and fornication. It, however, enervates morality and religion, by placing many trifling acts on a level with the moſt important duties. It enjoins the deſtruction of five kinds of reptiles, frogs, mice, ants, ſerpents, and flies that ſting. It teaches, that to walk barefoot profanes the ground. Great regard for water is enjoined: it muſt not be uſed during night; and when ſet upon the fire, a third part of the pot muſt be empty, to prevent boiling over. The Bramins have wofully degenerated from their original inſtitutions, thinking that religion conſiſts in forms and ceremonies. As ſoon as an infant is born, the word *Oum* muſt be pronounced over it; otherwiſe it will be eternally miſerable: its tongue muſt be rubbed with conſecrated meal: the third day of the moon, it muſt be carried into open air, with its head to the north. The inhabitants of Formoſa believe in hell; but it is only for puniſhing thoſe who fail to go naked in certain ſeaſons, or who wear cotton inſtead of ſilk. In the time of Ghenhizcan, it was held in Tartary a mortal ſin, to put a knife into the fire, to whip a horſe with his bridle, or to break one bone with another; and yet theſe pious Tartars held treachery, robbery, murder, to be no ſins. A faction in Ægina, a Greek commonwealth, treacherouſly aſſaſſinated ſeven hundred of their fellow-citizens. They cut off the hands of a miſerable fugitive,

fugitive, who had laid hold of the altar for protection, in order to murder him without the precincts of the temple. Their treacherous aſſaſſinations made no impreſſion: but though they refrained from murder in the temple, yet by profaning it with blood, ſays Herodotus, they offended the gods, and contracted inexpiable guilt. Would one believe, that a tribunal was eſtabliſhed by Charlemagne more horrible than the inquiſition itſelf? It was eſtabliſhed in Weſtphalia, to puniſh with death every Saxon who eat meat in lent. It was eſtabliſhed in Flanders and in French-county, the beginning of the ſeventeenth century. Smollet in his travels into Italy obſerves, that it is held more infamous to tranſgreſs the ſlighteſt ceremonial inſtitution of the church of Rome, than to tranſgreſs any moral duty; that a murderer or adulterer will be eaſily abſolved by the church, and even maintain his character in ſociety; but that a man who eats a pigeon on a Saturday, is abhorred as a monſter of reprobation. During the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, long curled hair, of which men of faſhion in England were extremely vain, ſuffered a violent perſecution. Anſelm, Archbiſhop of Canterbury, pronounced the ſentence of excommunication againſt thoſe who indulged in that dreſs; and was celebrated by his brethren of the clergy, though at that time excommunication was a dreadful puniſhment. William of Malmſbury relates in lively colours an incident

cident that ſhows the groſs ſuperſtition of that age. " A certain knight, who was very proud of " his long luxuriant hair, dreamed that a perſon " ſuffocated him with its curls. As ſoon as he " awoke from his ſleep, he cut his hair to a decent " length. The report of this ſpread over all Eng- " land ; and almoſt all the knights reduced their " hair to the proper ſtandard. But this reforma- " tion was not of long continuance. For in leſs " than a year all who wiſhed to appear faſhion- " able, returned to their former wickedneſs, and " contended with the ladies in length of hair. " Thoſe to whom nature had denied that orna- " ment, ſupplied the defect by art." What can be more groſsly ſuperſtitious than the form uſed in Roman Catholic countries, of baptizing a church-bell? The prieſt, aſſiſted by ſome of his brethren, mumbles over ſome prayers, and ſprinkles the outſide with holy water, while they waſh the inſide with the ſame precious liquor. The prieſt next draws ſeven croſſes on the outſide, and four on the inſide, with conſecrated oil. Then a cenſer, full of frankincenſe, is put under the bell to ſmoke it. And the whole concludes with prayer.

Liſten to a celebrated writer upon this ſubject. " It is certain, that in every religion, however ſu- " blime, many of the votaries, perhaps the greateſt " number, will ſtill ſeek the divine favour, not by " virtue and good morals, which alone can be ac-

" ceptable

" ceptable to a perfect being, but either by frivo-
" lous obſervances, by intemperate zeal, by rap-
" turous ecſtaſies, or by the belief of myſterious
" and abſurd opinions. When the old Romans
" were attacked with a peſtilence, they never
" aſcribed their ſufferings to their vices, or dream-
" ed of repentance and amendment. They never
" thought that they were the general robbers of
" the world, whoſe ambition and avarice made
" deſolate the earth, and reduced opulent nations
" to want and beggary. They only created a
" dictator in order to drive a nail into a door;
" and by that means they thought that they had
" ſufficiently appeaſed their incenſed deity *."
Thus, gradually, the eſſentials of religion wear out of mind, by the attention given to forms and ceremonies: theſe intercept and exhauſt the whole ſtock of devotion, which ought to be reſerved for the higher exerciſes of religion. The neglect or tranſgreſſion of mere punctilios, are puniſhed as heinous ſins; while ſins really heinous are ſuffered to paſs with impunity. The Jews exalted the keeping their Sabbath holy, above every other duty; and it was the general belief, that the ſtrict obſervance of that day, was alone ſufficient to atone for every ſin. The command of reſting that day, was taken ſo literally, that they would not on that day defend themſelves even againſt an aſſaſſin.

* Natural Hiſtory of Religion, by David Hume Eſq.

aſſaſſin. Ptolomy, ſon of Lagus, entered Jeruſalem on the Jewiſh ſabbath, in a hoſtile manner without reſiſtance. Nor did experience open the eyes of that fooliſh people. Xiphilin, relating the ſiege of Jeruſalem by Pompey, ſays, that if the Jews had not reſted on the ſabbath, Pompey would not have been ſucceſsful. Every Saturday he renewed his batteries; and having on that day made a breach, he marched into the town without oppoſition. One cannot help ſmiling at an Amſterdam Jew, who had no check of conſcience for breaking open a houſe and carrying off money; and yet being ſtopped in his flight by the ſabbath, he moſt piouſly reſted, till he was apprehended, and led to the gallows. Nor are the Jews to this day cured of that frenzy. In ſome late accounts from Conſtantinople, a fire broke out in a Jew's houſe on Saturday: rather than profane the ſabbath, he ſuffered the flames to ſpread, which occaſioned the deſtruction of five hundred houſes*. We laugh

* "And there was a woman which had a ſpirit of infir-
" mity eighteen years, and was bowed together. And
" Jeſus laid his hands on her, and immediately ſhe was
" made ſtraight, and glorified God. And the ruler of the
" ſynagogue with indignation ſaid unto the people, There
" are ſix days in which men ought to work: in them
" therefore come and be healed, and not on the ſabbath-
" day. The Lord then ſaid, Thou hypocrite, doth not each
" one of you on the ſabbath looſe his ox or his aſs from
" the

at the Jews, and we have reaſon; and yet there are many well-meaning Proteſtants, who lay the whole of religion upon punctual attendance at public worſhip. Are the Roman Catholics leſs ſuperſtitious with reſpect to the place of worſhip, than the Jews are with reſpect to the day of worſhip? In the year 1670, ſome Arabians, watching an opportunity, got into the town of Dieu, when the gates were opened in the morning. They might eaſily have been expelled by the cannon of the citadel; but the Portugueſe governor was obliged to look on without firing a gun, being threatened with excommunication, if the leaſt miſchief ſhould be done to any of the churches. The only doctrine inculcated from the Romiſh pulpit down to the Reformation, were the authority of holy mother-church; the merit of the ſaints, and their credit in the court of heaven; the dignity and glory of the bleſſed Virgin; the efficacy of relics; the intolerable fire of Purgatory; and the vaſt importance of indulgencies. Relying on ſuch pious acts for obtaining remiſſion of ſin, all orders of men ruſhed headlong into vice *; nor was there a ſingle attempt

" the ſtall, and lead him away to watering? and ought " not this woman, whom Satan hath bound, be looſed " from this bond on the ſabbath-day? *Luke* xiii. 11.

* An ingenious writer pleaſantly obſerves, " That a " croiſade was the South-Sea project of former times: by " the latter, men hoped to gain riches without induſtry: " by

attempt to ſtem the current of immorality; for the traffic of indulgencies could not but flouriſh in proportion to the growth of ſin. And thus was religion ſet in direct oppoſition to morality. St Eloy, biſhop of Noyon in the ſeventh century, and canonized by the church of Rome, delivers the following doctrine. "He is a good chriſtian who goes "frequently to church; who preſents his obla- "tions upon the altar; who taſtes not the fruit of "his own induſtry till part be conſecrated to "God; who, when the holy feſtivals approach, "lives chaſtely even with his own wife for ſeveral "days; and who can repeat the creed and the "Lord's prayer. Redeem then your ſouls from "deſtruction, while you have the means in your "power: offer preſents and tithes to churchmen: "come more frequently to church: humbly im- "plore the patronage of ſaints. If you obſerve "theſe things, you may, in the day of judgment, "go with confidence to the tribunal of the eternal "Judge, and ſay, Give to us, O Lord, for we have "given unto thee." A modern author ſubjoins a proper obſervation. "We ſee here a very ample "deſcription of a good chriſtian, in which there is "not the leaſt mention of the love of God, reſigna- "tion to his will, obedience to his laws, nor of

 "juſtice,

"by the former, they hoped to gain heaven without re- "pentance, amendment of life, or ſanctity of manners." *Sir David Dalrymple, a Judge in the Court of Seſſion.*

" juſtice, benevolence, or charity." Groſs ignorance and wretched ſuperſtition prevailed ſo much even in the fourteenth century, that people reckoned themſelves ſecure of ſalvation, if at the day of judgment they could ſhow any connection with monks. Many at the point of death, made it their laſt requeſt, to be admitted into the mendicant order, or to be interred in their burial-place. Religion need not aſſociate with morality, if ſuch ſilly practices be ſufficient for obtaining the favour of God. Is this leſs abſurd than the Hindoſtan belief, That the water of the Ganges hath a ſanctifying virtue; and that thoſe who die on its banks, are not only exempted from future puniſhment, but are wafted ſtraight to paradiſe?

Forms and ceremonies are viſible acts, which make a deep impreſſion on the vulgar. Hence their influence in reaſoning and in morality, as we have ſeen in the two ſketches immediately foregoing; and hence alſo their influence in religion. Forms and ceremonies are uſeful at public worſhip: but they ought not to take place of eſſentials. People however, governed by what they ſee and hear, are more addicted to external acts of devotion, than to heart worſhip, which is not known but by reflection.

It will be no excuſe for relying ſo much on forms and ceremonies, that they are innocent. In themſelves they may be innocent; but not ſo in their conſequences. For they have by ſuch reliance

ance a vigorous tendency to relax the obligations of morality. "La pure morale," ſays M. Rouſſeau, "eſt ſi chargée de devoirs ſéveres que ſi on "la ſurcharge encore de formes indifférentes, "c'eſt preſque toujours aux dépends de l'eſſentiel. "On dit que c'eſt le cas de la plupart des moines, "qui, ſoumis à mille regles inutiles, ne ſavent ce "que c'eſt qu'honneur et vertu." Religious rites that contradict not any paſſion, are keenly embraced, and punctally performed; and men, flattering themſelves that they have thus been punctual in their duty to God, give vent to their paſſions againſt men. "They pay tithes of mint, and an-"niſe, and cummin; but omit the weightier mat-"ters of the law, judgment, mercy, and faith *." Upon ſuch a man religion ſits extremely light. As he ſeldom exerciſes any act of genuine devotion, he thinks of the Deity with eaſe and familiarity: how otherwiſe is it accountable, that the plays, termed *Myſteries*, could be reliſhed, where mean and perhaps diſſolute perſons are brought on the ſtage, acting Jeſus Chriſt, the Virgin Mary, and even God himſelf? Theſe objects of worſhip were certainly no more regarded than the Grecian gods, who frequently made part of the *Dramatis perſonæ* in Greek plays. Many other facts might be urged, to prove the low ebb of religion in thoſe days: I ſelect one or two, which probably will afford ſome amuſement to the reader. Bartolus,

* Matthew xxiii. 23.

a famous lawyer, in order to ſhew the form of proceeding in a court of juſtice, imagines a proceſs between the devil and mankind. The devil cites mankind to appear at the tribunal of Jeſus Chriſt, claiming them as belonging to him by Adam's fall. He ſwells in rage, demanding whether any one dare appear in their behalf. Againſt the Virgin Mary offering herſelf as their advocate, the devil makes two objections; firſt, That being the mother of the Judge, her influence would be too great; ſecond, That a woman is debarred from being an advocate: and theſe objections are ſupported by numberleſs quotations from the *Corpus Juris*. The Virgin, on her part, quotes texts permitting women to appear for widows, orphans, and for perſons in diſtreſs. She is allowed to plead for mankind, as coming under the laſt article. The devil urges preſcription, as having been in poſſeſſion of mankind ever ſince the fall. The Virgin anſwers, That a *mala fide poſſeſſor* cannot acquire by preſcription. Preſcription being repelled, the parties go to the merits of the caſe, which are learnedly diſcuſſed with texts from the Pandects. The memoirs of the French academy of Belles Lettres * has the following ſtory: A monk returning from a houſe which he durſt not viſit in day-light, had a river to croſs. The boat was overturned by Satan, and the monk was drowned when he was beginning to invocate the Virgin Mary.

* Vol. xviii.

Mary. Two devils having laid hold of his ſoul, were ſtopped by two angels. "My Lords, ſaid the "devils, true it is and not a fable, that God died "for his friends; but this monk was an enemy to "God, and we are carrying him to hell." After much altercation, it was propoſed by the angels, to refer the diſpute to the Virgin Mary. The devils were willing to accept of God for judge, becauſe he would judge according to law. "But "from the Virgin Mary," ſaid they, "we expect "no juſtice: ſhe would break to atoms every gate "of hell, rather than ſuffer one to remain there "a moment who pays any worſhip to her image. "She may ſay, that black is white, and that pud-"dled water is pure—God never contradicts her. "The day on which God made his mother, was a "fatal day to us."

People who profeſs the ſame religion, and differ only in forms and ceremonies, may juſtly be compared to neighbouring ſtates, who are commonly bitter enemies to each other, if they have any difference. At the ſame time, diſſocial paſſions never rage ſo furiouſly, as under the maſk of religion; for in that caſe they are held to be meritorious, as exerted in the cauſe of God. This obſervation is but too well verified in the diſputes among Chriſtians. However low religion was in the dark ages, yet men fought for forms and ceremonies as *pro aris et focis*. In the Armenian form of baptiſm, the prieſt ſays at the firſt im-

merſion, *In name of the Father;* at the ſecond, *In name of the Son;* at the third, *In name of the Holy Ghoſt.* This form is bitterly condemned by the Romiſh church, which appoints the three perſons of the Trinity to be joined in the ſame expreſſion, in token of their union. Strahlenberg gives an account of a Chriſtian ſect in Ruſſia, which differs from the eſtabliſhed Greek church in the following particulars: Firſt, In public worſhip they repeat *Halleluia* but twice; and it is a mortal ſin to repeat it thrice. Second, In celebrating maſs, not five but ſeven loaves ought to be uſed. Third, The croſs ſtamped upon a maſs-loaf ought to have eight corners. Fourth, In ſigning with the croſs at prayers, the end of the ring-finger muſt be joined to the end of the thumb, and the two intermediate fingers be held out at full length. How trifling are theſe differences! and yet for theſe, all who diſſent from them are held unclean, and no better than Pagans: they will not eat nor drink with any of the eſtabliſhed church; and, if a perſon of that church happen to ſit down in a houſe of theirs, they waſh and purify the ſeat *.

There

* Chriſtians, occupied too much with external forms, have corrupted ſeveral of the fine arts. They have injured architecture, by erecting magnificent churches in the ugly form of a croſs. And they have injured painting, by withdrawing the beſt hands from proper ſubjects, and employing them on the legendary martyrdom of pretended ſaints, and other ſuch diſagreeable ſubjects.

There are few ſects founded upon more trivial differences than the Turkiſh and Perſian Mahometans. The epithets given to the Perſians by the Turks are, "Forſaken of God, Abominable, "Blaſphemers of the Holy Prophet;" and ſo bitter is their enmity to the Perſians, That the ſchools of the ſeraglio are open to young men of all nations, thoſe of Perſia alone excepted. The Perſians are held to be ſuch apoſtates from the true faith, as to be utterly paſt recovery: they receive no quarter in war, being accounted unworthy of life or ſlavery: nor do the Perſians yield to the Turks in hatred. Whether coffee be or be not prohibited in the Alcoran, has produced much controverſy in the Mahometan church, and conſequently much perſecuting zeal. A mufti, not fond of coffee, declared it to have an inebriating quality, and therefore to be virtually prohibited by Mahomet. Another mufti, fond of coffee for its exhilarating virtue, declared it lawful; "be-"cauſe," ſaid he, "all things are lawful that are "not expreſsly prohibited in the Alcoran." The coffee-houſes in Conſtantinople were for a long period alternately opened and ſhut, according to the taſte of the reigning mufti; till coffee at laſt, ſurmounting all obſtacles, came to be an eſtabliſhed Mahometan liquor. Religion thus runs wild, whenever it loſes ſight of its true ends, worſhipping God, and enforcing juſtice to man. The Hindoos hate the Mahometans for eating the fleſh

of

of cows: the Mahometans hate the Hindoos for eating the flesh of swine. The aversion that men of the same religion have at each other for the most trivial differences, converts them frequently into brutal savages. Suppose, for example, that a man, reduced to the extremity of hunger, makes a greedy meal of a dead horse, a case so deplorable would wring every heart. And yet, let this be done in Lent, or on a meagre day——Behold! every zealot is instantly metamorphosed into a devil incarnate. In the records of St Claude, a small district of Burgundy, is engrossed a sentence against a poor gentleman named *Claude Guillon*. The words are: "Having considered the process, "and taken advice of the doctors of law, we de- "clare the said Claude Guillon duly convicted "for having carried away and boiled a piece of "a dead horse, and of having eat the same on the "31st March, being Saturday." And he was beheaded accordingly 28th July 1629; notwithstanding a defence above all exception, That he committed that irregularity to preserve his life. How was it possible for the monsters to persuade themselves, that this sentence was agreeable to God, who is goodness itself!

No less prejudical to morality than the relying too much on forms and ceremonies, is the treating some sins with great severity; neglecting others equally heinous, or perhaps more so. In a book of rates for absolution, mentioned above, no just distinction

diſtinction is made among ſins; ſome venial ſins being taxed at a higher rate than many of the deepeſt dye. For example, the killing father, mother, brother, ſiſter, or wife, is taxed at five groſs; and the ſame for inceſt with a mother or ſiſter. The lying with a woman in the church is taxed at ſix groſs; and, at the ſame time, abſolution for uſury is taxed at ſeven groſs, and for ſimony at no leſs than ſixteen groſs *.

A maxim adopted by many pious perſons, has a ſmiling appearance, but in its conſequences is hurtful both to religion and morality; which is, That to teſtify our veneration for the Deity, and zeal for his ſervice, the performing public and private worſhip, and the fulfilling moral duties, are not alone ſufficient; that over and above we are bound to faſt, to do penance, to honour the prieſthood, and to puniſh the enemies of God, *i. e.* thoſe who differ from us in principle or practice. This maxim, which may be termed *the doctrine of ſupererogation*, is finely illuſtrated by an author mentioned above. "The duties which a man "performs as a friend or parent, ſeem merely "owing to his benefactor or children; nor can "he be wanting to theſe duties without breaking "through all the ties of nature and morality. A "ſtrong inclination may prompt him to the per-"formance: a ſentiment of order and moral "beauty joins its force to theſe natural ties: and "the

* A groſs is the third part of a ducat.

" the whole man is drawn to his duty without
" any effort or endeavour. Even with regard to
" the virtues which are more auſtere, and more
" founded on reflection, ſuch as public ſpirit, filial
" duty, temperance, or integrity: the moral ob-
" ligation, in our apprehenſion, removes all pre-
" tence to religious merit: and the virtuous con-
" duct is eſteemed no more than what we owe to
" ſociety, and to ourſelves. In all this, a ſuper-
" ſtitious man finds nothing which he has pro-
" perly performed for the ſake of his Deity, or
" which can peculiary recommend him to the
" divine favour and protection. He conſiders not,
" that the moſt genuine method of ſerving the
" Divinity is, by promoting the happineſs of his
" creatures. He ſtill looks out for ſome more
" immediate ſervice of the Supreme Being: and
" any practice recommended to him, which either
" ſerves to no purpoſe in life, or offers the ſtrong-
" eſt violence to his natural inclinations; that
" practice he will the more readily embrace, on
" account of thoſe very circumſtances, which
" ſhould make him abſolutely reject it. It ſeems
" the more purely religious, that it proceeds from
" no mixture of any other motive or conſidera-
" tion. And if for its ſake he ſacrifices much of
" his eaſe and quiet, his claim of merit appears
" ſtill to riſe upon him, in proportion to the zeal
" and devotion which he diſcovers. In reſtoring
" a loan, or paying a debt, his divinity is nowiſe
" beholden

" beholden to him; becauſe theſe acts of juſtice " are what he was bound to perform, and what " many would have performed, were there no " God in the univerſe. But if he faſt a day, or " give himſelf a ſound whipping, this has a di- " rect reference, in his opinion, to the ſervice of " God. No other motive could engage him to " ſuch auſterities. By theſe diſtinguiſhed marks " of devotion, he has now acquired the divine " favour; and may expect in recompenſe, pro- " tection and ſafety in this world, and eternal " happineſs in the next *." My yoke is eaſy, ſaith our Saviour, and my burden is light. So they really are. Every eſſential of religion is founded on our nature, and to a pure heart is pleaſant in the performance: what can be more pleaſant, than gratitude to our Maker, and obedience to his will in comforting our fellow-creatures? But enthuſiaſts are not eaſily perſuaded, that to make ourſelves happy in the exerciſes of piety and benevolence, is the moſt acceptable ſervice to God that we can perform. In loading religion with unneceſſary articles of faith and practice, they contradict our Saviour, by making his yoke ſevere, and his burden heavy †.

Law,

* Natural Hiſtory of Religion.

† An old woman walking with others to a ſacrament, was obſerved to pick out the worſt bits of the road: " I never " can do enough," ſaid ſhe, " for ſweet Jeſus."

Law, who writes on Chriſtian perfection, enjoins ſuch unnatural auſterity of manners, as to be ſubverſive both of religion and morality: looſe education is not more ſo. Our paſſions, when denied proper exerciſe, are apt to break their fetters, and to plunge us into every extravagance: like the body, which ſqueezed in one part, ſwells the more in another. In the ſame way of thinking, the pious Jeremy Taylor, treating of mortification, preſcribes it as the indiſpenſable duty of a Chriſtian, to give no indulgence even to the moſt innocent emotions; becauſe, ſays he, the moſt indifferent action becomes ſinful, when there is no other motive for the performance but barely its being pleaſant. Could a malevolent deity contrive any thing more ſevere againſt his votaries?

In the ſame ſpirit of ſupererogation, holidays have been multiplied without end, depriving the working poor of time, that would be more uſefully employed in providing bread for themſelves and families. Such a number of holidays, beſide contradicting Providence which framed us more for action than contemplation, have ſeveral poiſonous effects with reſpect to morality. The moral ſenſe has great influence on the induſtrious, who have no time for indulging their irregular appetites: the idle, on the contrary, lie open to every temptation. Men likewiſe are apt to aſſume great merit from a rigid obſervance of holidays and other ceremonies; and having thus acquired, in

their

their opinion, the favour of God, they rely on his indulgence in other matters which they think too ſweet for ſinners.

Monaſtic inſtitutions are an improvement upon holidays: the whole life of a monk is intended to be a holiday, dedicated entirely to the ſervice of God. The idleneſs of the monaſtic ſtate among Chriſtians, opens a wide door to immorality.

In the third ſection, penances are handled as a mode of worſhip, for obtaining pardon of ſin. But they are ſometimes ſubmitted to by the innocent, in order to procure from the Almighty ſtill more favour than innocence alone is entitled to; in which view, they are evidently a work of ſupererogation. They ſeem to have no bad effect with reſpect to religion as diſtinguiſhed from morality: the body is indeed tortured unneceſſarily; but if enthuſiaſts voluntarily ſubmit to bodily diſtreſſes, they have themſelves only to blame. With reſpect to morality, their bad tendency is not ſlight. Thoſe who perform extraordinary acts of devotion, conceive themſelves peculiarly entitled to the favour of God. Proud of his favour, they attach themſelves to him alone, and turn indifferent about every other duty. The favourite of a terreſtrial potentate aſſumes authority; and takes liberties that private perſons dare not venture upon: ſhall a favourite of Heaven be leſs indulged? The Faquirs in Hindoſtan ſubmit to dreadful penances; and, holding themſelves ſecure of God's

God's favour, they are altogether indifferent about the duty they owe to a neighbour. So much are they above common decency, as to go about naked, not even concealing what modeſty hides. The penances enjoined in the Romiſh church, ſuch as faſting and flagellation, have evidently the ſame bad tendency *. With reſpect to faſting in particular, to what good purpoſe it can ſerve, except to gluttons, is not readily conceived. Temperance in eating and drinking is eſſential to health: too much or too little are equally noxious, though their effects are different †. Faſting, therefore, ought never to be enjoined to the temperate as a religious duty, becauſe it cannot be acceptable to a benevolent Deity. Liſten to a great prophet on that ſubject: "Behold, ye faſt for ſtrife and "debate, and to ſmite with the fiſt of wickedneſs; "ye ſhall not faſt as ye do this day, to make your "voice

* A ſect of Chriſtians, ſtyled *Flagellantes*, held, that flagellation is of equal virtue with baptiſm and the other ſacraments; that it will procure forgiveneſs of ſin; that the old law of Chriſt is to be aboliſhed; and a new law ſubſtituted, enjoining the baptiſm of blood to be adminiſtered by whipping.

† The Baron de Manſtein obſerves, that the frequent lents enjoined by the Greek church, contribute greatly to promote diſeaſes in the Ruſſian armies. They are forbidden to touch fleſh three-fourths of the year. The ſynod, it is true, grants a diſpenſation to ſoldiers during war; but ſuch is the ſuperſtition of the people, that few take the benefit of the diſpenſation.

" voice to be heard on high. Is it ſuch a faſt that " I have choſen? a day for a man to afflict his " ſoul? Is it to bow down his head as a bulruſh, " and to ſpread ſackcloth and aſhes under him? " Wilt thou call this a faſt, and an acceptable day " to the Lord?—Is not this the faſt that I have " choſen, to looſe the bands of wickedneſs, to un- " do the heavy burdens, and to let the oppreſſed " go free, and that ye break every yoke? Is it not " to deal thy bread to the hungry; and that thou " bring the poor that are caſt out to thy houſe? " When thou ſeeſt the naked, that thou cover " him, and that thou hide not thyſelf from thine " own fleſh *?"

The moſt extraordinary penance of all is celibacy conſidered as a religious duty. Many fathers of the church declare againſt matrimony. St Jerome in particular ſays, That the end of matrimony is eternal death; that the earth, indeed, is filled by it, but heaven by virginity. The intemperate zeal of many primitive Chriſtians led them to abſtain from matrimony, and even from conjugal careſſes, if they had the misfortune to be married; believing that the carnal appetite is inconſiſtent with pure religion. Edward the Confeſſor was fainted, for no better reaſon than the abſtaining from matrimonial duties. Jovian, in the fourth century, taught that all who obſerve the laws of piety and virtue laid down in the goſpel, have an equal title to

* Iſaiah, lviii. 4. &c.

happineſs in another life: conſequently, that thoſe who paſs their days in celibacy and mortification, are in no reſpect more acceptable to God than thoſe who live virtuouſly in marriage without mortification. He publiſhed his opinions in a book, againſt which Jerome wrote a bitter and abuſive treatiſe, ſtill extant. Theſe opinions were condemned by the church, and by St Ambroſe, in a council at Milan; and Jovian was baniſhed by the Emperor Honorius. Such ridiculous ſelf-denial was not confined to Chriſtians. Strabo mentions a ſect among the Thracians who made a vow of perpetual virginity; and were much reſpected on that account. Garcillaſſo mentions virgins in Peru conſecrated to the ſun: a veſtal guilty of frailty was buried alive, her lover hanged, and the inhabitants of the town where ſhe lived put to the ſword. Among all the abſurd acts of mortification, celibacy is the ſtrongeſt inſtance of ſuperſtition triumphing over common ſenſe; for what can be more inconſiſtent with common ſenſe, not to talk of religion, than an endeavour to put an end to the human ſpecies? Barbeyrac, *De la Moriae des Pères*, gives examples of fathers of the church who wiſhed to extinguiſh by celibacy the human ſpecies, and to haſten the day of judgment. Some glimpſes of reaſon have abated the zeal of enthuſiaſts for celibacy; but have not totally extirpated it; for celibacy of the clergy remains to this day a law in the Romiſh church. It cannot, however,

ever, ſeriouſly be thought the will of our benevolent God, that his prieſts ſhould be denied the exerciſe of natural powers, beſtowed on all for a moſt valuable purpoſe. This impious reſtraint, which contradicts the great law of *Increaſe and multiply*, has opened the door to groſs debauchery in the paſtors of the Romiſh church, though eccleſiaſtics ought, of all men, to be the moſt circumſpect in their conduct. Men reſtrained from what is neceſſary and proper, are more prone than others to break out into groſs irregularities*. Marriage is warmly recommended in the laws of Zoroaſter. Children are ſaid to be a bridge that conducts men to heaven; and a man who has no children, is held to be under the power of Ahriman. The prayer of a prieſt who has no children, is held diſagreeable to Ormuſd.

The celibacy of the clergy was countenanced by the Pope; and enforced from a political con-

 ſideration,

* An ingenious writer, mentioned above, makes the following obſervation: "The celibacy of eccleſiaſtics was originally introduced by ſome ſuperſtitious refinements on the "law of God and nature. Could men have been kept alive "without eating or drinking as well as without marriage, the "ſame refinements would have prohibited eccleſiaſtics from "eating and drinking, and thereby have elevated them ſo "much nearer to the ſtate of angels. In proceſs of time, "this fanatical interdiction became an inſtrument of worldly "wiſdom: and thus, as frequently happens, what weak men "began, politicians completed." *Sir David Dalrymple.*

ſideration, That it united the whole clergy into one compact body, under his ſpiritual Majeſty. How ſhort ſighted is man! It was juſtly eſteemed at the time to be the corner-ſtone of Papal power; and yet became the chief cauſe of its downfal. Celibacy precipitated the Romiſh clergy into adultery, fornication, cunning, diſſimulation, and every ſecret vice. Will men of ſuch manners be liſtened to, when they preach purity to others? There was no medium, but either to reform their own manners, or to give every indulgence to the laity. But ignorance and ſuperſtition in the latter, made the former think themſelves ſecure. The reſtoration of learning broke the charm. Men beginning to think for themſelves, were provoked at the diſſolute lives of their paſtors; and raiſed a loud cry againſt them. Reformers were burnt as heretics; and clergymen were held to be emiſſaries from Satan, to eſtabliſh his throne upon earth. Knox, that violent reformer, believed ſeriouſly that Cardinal Beaton was *a conjured enemy to Chriſt Jeſus*. Providence brings good out of ill. Had not the clergy been diſſolute, poor Chriſtians might have laboured under ignorance and eccleſiaſtic thraldom to this hour. Our reformers, beginning with their paſtors, extended inſenſibly their hatred to the doctrines taught by their paſtors. Every article of faith was ſifted: the chaff was ſeparated from the corn: and a reformation

was

was eſtabliſhed upon the Scriptures, rejecting every innovation of the Romiſh church.

There is not mentioned in hiſtory a more impudent diſregard of moral principles, than a privilege aſſumed by the Biſhop of Rome to diſengage men from their oaths and promiſes: it is not a greater ſtretch to diſengage them from every duty, whether of morality or of religion. The barons of Valentia, dreading a perſecution againſt the induſtrious Moors, their tenants, obtained the following clauſe to be inſerted in their king's coronation-oath: "That he ſhould not expel the Moriſcos, nor force them to be baptized; that he ſhould never deſire to be relieved from the oath by a diſpenſation from the Pope, nor accept a diſpenſation if offered." The Emperor Charles V. took this oath ſolemnly in preſence of his nobles; and yet accepted a diſpenſation from the Pope, abſolving him from the oath, and from the guilt of perjury in breaking it. Auguſtus King of Poland, in the treaty of Altrâmſtadt, renounced the kingdom of Poland to his competitor Staniſlaus. The defeat of the King of Sweden at Poltowa was an inviting opportunity to renew his pretenſions. A ſolemn treaty ſtood in his way; but the Pope removed that obſtacle, by annulling the treaty, and ſetting him at liberty. The Pope has been known to beſtow that wonderful privilege upon others. Pope Paſcal II. having, with a ſolemn oath, renounced the right of inveſtitures, empower-

ed the cardinals to declare his oath null. Biſhops alſo, imitating their ſuperior, have aſſumed the privilege of diſpenſing with moral duties. Inſtances are not rare, of curates being authoriſed by their biſhop to entertain concubines, paying for each a regular tax of a crown yearly. Nay, in ſome provincial ſynods, they are enjoined to keep concubines, in order to prevent ſcandal. Common proſtitutes, licenſed in the city of Leghorn, have a church peculiar to themſelves, and muſt not enter into any other. They follow their trade with the utmoſt freedom; except in Paſſion-week, during which they muſt forbear ſinning, under pain of baniſhment *.

The

* Sir David Dalrymple, in his Annals of Scotland, vol. ii. page 16., has the following paragraph: "Thus "did Edward chaſtiſe the Scots for their breach of faith. "It is remarkable, that in the preceding year he himſelf "procured a papal bull, abſolving him from the oath "which he had taken for maintaining the privileges of his "people. But the Scots, without papal authority, violated their oaths, and were puniſhed as perjured men. It "is a truth not to be diſguiſed, that in thoſe times the "common notions of right and wrong were, in ſome ſort, "obliterated. Conſcience, intoxicated with indulgencies, "or ſtupified by frequent abſolution, was no longer a "faithful monitor amidſt the temptations of intereſt, ambition, and national animoſities." This author, a few pages after, very ingeniouſly obſerves, that, in thoſe days, an

The power of beſtowing kingdoms, aſſumed by the Biſhop of Rome, was an encroachment on the rules of juſtice, no leſs bold. Chriſtian princes, not many ages ago, eſteemed the Pope's gift to be their beſt title of property. In the 1346, the Venetians requeſted the Pope's permiſſion to carry on commerce in Aſia, and to purchaſe there pepper and cinnamon. The Pope not only granted their requeſt, but pronounced anathemas upon any who ſhould dare to interfere in that commerce. Ferdinand and Iſabella of Spain applied to Pope Alexander VI. to veſt in them the property of America, diſcovered under their auſpices by Columbus. The Pope having formerly granted to the kings of Portugal their diſcoveries in the Eaſt Indies, both grants were held ſacred; and it came to be ſtrenuouſly diſputed, under which of the grants the Molucca iſlands were comprehended. Both grants proceed upon a narrative, of the power beſtowed by Almighty God on the Pope, as ſucceſſor to St Peter and vicar of Chriſt. To imagine that the Almighty would beſtow ſuch powers on the Biſhop of Rome, or on any human being, ſhews groſs ignorance of the common rights of mankind, and of the government of Providence.

The groſſeſt of all deviations, not only from ſound morality, but from pure religion, and the

an oath or promiſe on the honour of knighthood, was the only thing relied on; becauſe the Pope did not pretend to interpoſe in a point of honour.

moſt extenſive in its baneful effects, is a doctrine embraced by eſtabliſhed churches, not many excepted, That, becauſe heretics are odious in the ſight of God, it is the duty of the orthodox to extirpate them, root and branch. Obſerve the conſequence: people who differ from the eſtabliſhed church are held to be obſtinate ſinners, deſerving puniſhment here as well as hereafter. The religion of every country is changeable; and the religion at preſent dominant may ſoon be under depreſſion; which of courſe ſubjects all mankind to the rigour of perſecution. An invention more effectual for extirpating the human race, is not within the reach of imagination: the horror of human ſacrifices is as nothing in compariſon.

Perſecution for differences in religion can never take place but where the miniſters of religion are formed into a claſs, totally diſtinct from the reſt of the people. They made not a diſtinct claſs among the old Romans; who, far from having any notion of perſecution, adopted the gods of every nation they conquered. A learned * writer obſerves, that, as the number of their gods increaſed with their conqueſts, it is poſſible that they might have worſhipped all the gods in the world. Their belief in tutelar deities produced that effect. Titus Livius mentions a ſect of Bacchanals ſpread through Italy. They performed their ceremonies during night; men and women mixing in the dark, after intemperate

* Morinus.

intemperate eating and drinking. Never did wicked wretches deſerve more exemplary puniſhment; yet liſten to the following decree of the Roman ſenate, breathing the true ſpirit of toleration. "Ne qua Bacchanalia Romæ, neve in Italia "eſſent. Si quis tale ſacrum, ſolenne, et neceſ- "ſarium duceret, nec ſine religione et piaculo ſe "id omittere poſſe; apud Prætorem urbanum "profiteretur; Prætor ſenatum conſuleret. Si "ei permiſſum eſſet, quum in ſenatu centum non "minus eſſent; ita id ſacrum faceret, dum ne "plus quinque ſacrificio intereſſent; neu qua pe- "cunia communis, neu quis magiſter ſacrorum, "aut ſacerdos eſſet *." The Jews were prone to perſecution, becauſe their prieſts formed a diſtinct body. It is true, they believed in tutelar deities: their hatred, however, of neighbouring nations prevailed to make them hold in abhorrence the worſhip of every other god. Even among themſelves

* "Let there be no Bacchanalian ceremonies performed "in the city, nor within Italy. If there be any perſon "who reckons it a matter of conſcience to perform theſe "rites, and that he ought not to omit them, let him ſtate "his opinion to the city Prætor, who ſhall thereupon con- "ſult the ſenate. If liberty be granted him by the ſenate "when no fewer than a hundred ſenators are preſent, let "him perform the ſacrifice, but privately, in preſence of "no greater number than five perſons. Let there be no "public fund for them, nor any who ſhall preſide as prieſt "or maſter of the rites."

ſelves they were abundantly diſpoſed to war; and nothing kept within bounds the Phariſees, the Saducees, and the Eſſenes, their three ſects, but terror of the Roman power. The Chriſtian religion implies toleration in its very nature and principles; and yet became prone to perſecution above all others. Chriſtian ſects were inflamed againſt each other to a degree of brutality; the moſt oppoſite to peace and brotherly love, inculcated in the goſpel. It was propagated by the orthodox, that Arius expired in a common jakes, and that his entrails burſt out. The ſame is related of Huneric King of the Vandals, a zealous Arian; with the following addition, that being poſſeſſed with the devil, whom he had glutted with the blood of many martyrs, he tore his fleſh with his teeth, and ended his wretched life in the moſt excruciating, though juſtly deſerved torments. The falſehoods every where ſpread, during the fourteenth century, againſt the Jews, ſuch as their poiſoning the public fountains, killing Chriſtian infants, and drinking their blood, with many other falſehoods of the ſame ſtamp, were invented, and greedily ſwallowed, through the influence of religious hatred. Through the ſame influence a law was once made in England, that a Chriſtian marrying a Jew ſhould be burnt alive. The greater part of perſecutions have been occaſioned in the ſame manner; for men are not ſo deſperately wicked, as to approve of perſecution, unleſs when blinded by intemperate

intemperate zeal. The ſame religious hatred produced the aſſaſſination of the Duke of Guiſe, and of two Henrys, Kings of France; produced the gun-powder plot; and produced the moſt horrid deed that ever was perpetrated among men, the maſſacre of St Bartholomew *.

There is no occaſion to be particular on the maſſacre of St Bartholomew, the circumſtances of which are univerſally known. I ſhall mention another, which happened in Liſbon, 6th April 1506, the effect entirely of bigotry. The day mentioned being Sunday, certain perſons in the church of St Dominic, obſerving that a crucifix in one of the chapels was more than ordinary luminous, the prieſt cried out, A miracle! a miracle: A new convert, who had been a Jew, ſaying ſlightly that it was but the ſun ſhining on the crucifix, he was dragged inſtantly out of the church, and burnt. The friars, with vehement ſpeeches, encouraged the rabble aſſembled about the fire to more miſchief; while other friars ran about the ſtreets bawling

* Monſieur de Tavannes, afterwards Mareſchal of France, was a great partiſan of the Queen-mother; and ſo active in the maſſacre, as with his own hand to murder no fewer than ſeventeen Hugenots. Having on death-bed made a full confeſſion of his ſins, "What," ſaid the prieſt, "not a "word of St Bartholomew?" "Of St Bartholomew!" anſwered the penitent; "the ſervice I did that memorable "day to God and the church, is alone a ſufficient atone-"ment for all my tranſgreſſions."

bawling out, Hereſy, hereſy, with crucifixes in their hands. Above 500 men gathered together, and ſlew every new convert they could find, and burnt them to aſhes. Next morning they murdered above 1000 men, women, and children, dragging them from the altars, to which they had fled as a ſanctuary. The ſame fury continued the third day, on which above 400 perſons more were maſſacred.

No falſe principle in religion has ſhed more innocent or rather virtuous blood, than that of perſecuting heretics; *i. e.* thoſe who differ in any article from the religion eſtabliſhed by law. The doctrine of burning heretics, is in effect the profeſſing to burn men eminently virtuous; for they muſt be ſo, when they ſubmit to be burnt alive, rather than be guilty even of diſſimulation. The Mahometan practice, of converting people by the ſword, if not more rational, is at leaſt more manly. Louis IX. of France, one of its beſt princes, would have been a greater bleſſing to his people had he been leſs pious: he had an implacable averſion to heretics; againſt whom he thought it more proper to employ racks and gibbets, than argument. Torquemada, that infernal inquiſitor of Spain, brought into the inquiſition, in the ſpace of fourteen years, no fewer than 80,000 perſons; of whom 6000 were condemned to the flames, and burnt alive with the greateſt pomp and exultation. Of that vaſt number, there was perhaps not a ſingle perſon,

perſon, who was not more pure in religion, as well as in morals, than their outrageous perſecutor. *Hunter*, a young man about nineteen years of age, was one of the unhappy victims to the zeal of Queen Mary of England for Popery. Having been inadvertently betrayed by a prieſt to deny tranſubſtantiation, he abſconded, to keep out of harm's way. Bonner, that arch-hangman of Popery, threatened ruin to the father, if he did not deliver up the young man. Hunter, hearing of his father's danger, made his appearance, and was burnt alive, inſtead of being rewarded for his filial piety. A woman of Guernſey was brought to the ſtake, without regard to her big belly; which burſting by the torture, ſhe was delivered in the midſt of the flames. One of the guards ſnatched the infant from the fire: but the magiſtrate who attended the execution ordered it to be thrown back; being reſolved, he ſaid, that nothing ſhould ſurvive which ſprung from a parent ſo obſtinately heretical. Father Paul * computes, that, in the Netherlands alone, from the time that the edict of Charles V. was promulgated againſt the reformers, 50,000 perſons were hanged, beheaded, buried alive, or burnt, on account of religion. Some Faquirs, crazed with opium and fanaticiſm, have been known, with poiſoned daggers, to fall upon uncircumciſed Europeans, and to put every one to death whom they could maſter. In the laſt century, a Faquir at Surat,

* Council of Trent, Book 5.

Surat, murdered, within the ſpace of a minute, ſeventeen Dutch ſailors with ſeventeen ſtabs of a dagger. We think with horror of human ſacrifices among the ancient Pagans; and yet we behold them every day, among Chriſtians, rendered ſtill more horrid by the moſt atrocious torments that religious hatred can deviſe.

The great motive to ſuch cruelties, is the ſuperſtitious and abſurd notion, that heretics are God's enemies; which makes it thought an acceptable ſervice to God, not only to perſecute them by fire and ſword in this world, but to deliver them over to Satan in the world to come. Another circumſtance inflames religious hatred; which is, that neighbours are either intimate friends or bitter enemies. This holds, with a ſlight variation, in ſects of the ſame religion: however minute their differences are, they cannot be intimate friends; and therefore are bitter enemies: the nearer they approach to uniſon, if not entirely ſo, the greater in proportion is their mutual hatred. Such hatred, ſubduing the meek ſpirit of Chriſtianity, is an additional cauſe for perſecution. Blind zeal for what is believed to be the only true religion, never diſcovers error nor innocence in thoſe who differ, but perverſeneſs and criminal obſtinacy. Two religions totally different, like two countries in oppoſite parts of the globe, produce no mutual enmity. At the ſiege of Conſtantinople by the Turks, anno 1453, the Emperor, in order to procure aſ-

ſiſtance

ſiſtance from the princes of the Latin church, ordered maſs to be celebrated in one of his churches according to the form uſed in Rome. The people with great indignation proteſted, that they would rather ſee the Turks in their churches, than the hat of a cardinal.

The hiſtory of the Waldenſes, though well known, cannot be too often repeated. In the twelfth century, a merchant of Lyons, named *Peter Valdo*, diſſatisfied with the pomp and ceremonies of the Romiſh church, ill ſuited, in his opinion, to the humility of a Chriſtian, retired to a deſart in the high country of Provence, with ſeveral poor people his diſciples. There he became their ſpiritual guide, inſtructing them in certain doctrines, the ſame that were afterwards adopted by the Proteſtants. Their inceſſant labour ſubdued the barren ſoil, and prepared it for grain as well as for paſture. The rent which in time they were enabled to pay for land that afforded none originally, endeared them to their landlords. In 250 years, they multiplied to the number of 18,000, occupying thirty villages, beſide hamlets, the work of their own hands. Prieſts they had none, nor any diſputes about religion: neither had they occaſion for a court of juſtice, as brotherly love did not ſuffer them to go to law: they worſhipped God in their own plain way, and their innocence was ſecured by inceſſant labour. They had long enjoyed the ſweets of peace and mutual affection, when

when the reformers of Germany and Geneva ſent miniſters among them; which unhappily laid them open to religious hatred, the moſt unrelenting of all furies. In the year 1540, the parliament of Provence condemned nineteen of them to be burnt for hereſy, their trees to be rooted up, and their houſes to be razed to the ground. The Waldenſes, terrified at this ſentence, applied in a body to Cardinal Sadolet, biſhop of Carpentras; who received them kindly, and obtained from Francis I. of France, a pardon for the perſons under ſentence of death, on condition of abjuring hereſy. The matter lay over five years; when the parliament, irritated at their perſeverance, prevailed on the King to withdraw his pardon. The ſentence was executed with great rigour; and the parliament, laying hold of that opportunity, broke through every reſtraint of law, and commenced a violent perſecution againſt the whole tribe. The ſoldiers began with maſſacring old men, women, and children, all having fled who were able to fly; and proceeded to burn their houſes, barns, and corn. There remained in the town of Cabriere ſixty men and thirty women; who having ſurrendered upon promiſe of life, were butchered all of them without mercy. Some women who had taken refuge in a church, were dragged out and burnt alive. Twenty-two villages were reduced to aſhes; and that populous and flouriſhing diſtrict became once more a deſart.

To

To conceive this horrid ſcene in all its deformity, the people perſecuted ought to be compared with the clergy their perſecutors; for the civil magiſtrate was the hand only that executed their vengeance: on the one ſide, an induſtrious honeſt people, pure in their morals, and no leſs pure in their religion: on the other, proud pampered prieſts, abandoned without ſhame to every wickedneſs, impure in their morals, and ſtill more impure in their religion—the world never furniſhed ſuch another contraſt. Had the ſcene been reverſed, to make theſe wretches ſuffer perſecution from the Waldenſes—but that people were too upright and too religious for being perſecutors. The manners of the Chriſtian clergy in general, before the Reformation, enlivens the contraſt. The doctrine promulgated during the dark times of Chriſtianity, That God is a mercenary being, and that every perſon however wicked may obtain pardon of his ſins by money, made riches flow into the hands of the clergy in a plentiful ſtream. And riches had the ſame effect upon the Chriſtian clergy that they have upon all men, which is, to produce pride, ſenſuality, and profligacy: theſe again produced diſſipation of money, which prompted avarice, and every invention for recruiting exhauſted treaſures *. Even as early as the eighth

* In the eleventh and twelfth centuries, many of the clergy became merchants; and, being free of taxes, engroſſed all. In

century, the Chriſtian clergy, tempted by opulence, abandoned themſelves to pleaſure, without moderation; and far exceeded the laity in luxury, gluttony, and luſt. When ſuch were the paſtors, what muſt have been the flock! Rejoice, O Scotland, over the poverty and temperance of thy paſtors. During that period, the clergy could read, and, like parrots, they could mumble prayers in Latin: in every other reſpect, they rivalled the laity in ignorance. They were indeed more cunning than the laity; and underſtood their intereſt better, if to covet riches at the expence of probity, deſerve that name. Three articles were eſtabliſhed that made religion an eaſy ſervice. Firſt, That faith is the eſſence of religion, without regard to good works; and hence the neceſſity of being ſtrictly orthodox, which the church only could determine. Second, Religious worſhip was reduced to a number of external ceremonies and forms, which, being declared ſufficient for ſalvation, abſolved Chriſtians from every moral duty. Remark, that a prieſt is always the chief perſon in ceremonial worſhip. The third article, That God is a mercenary being, is mentioned above, with its neceſſary conſequences. Theſe articles brought about a total neglect, both in clergy and laity, not only of morality, but of every eſſential religious

In the Netherlands particularly, there was a great cry, that monaſteries were converted into ſhops and warehouſes, and the manſions of ſecular prieſts into tap-houſes and inns.

religious duty. In fine, there never was a religion that deviated more from juſt principles, than that profeſſed by Chriſtians during the dark ages. Perſecution reached none but the ſincerely pious and virtuous. What a glorious tolerating ſentiment doth Arnobius * throw out, and what profuſion of blood would have been prevented, had it been adopted by all Chriſtians! "Da veniam, "Rex ſumme, tuos perſequentibus famulos: et "quod tuæ benignitatis eſt proprium, fugientibus "ignoſce tui nominis et religionis cultum. Non "eſt mirum, ſi ignoraris: majoris eſt admirationis, "ſi ſciaris †." The following parable againſt perſecution was communicated to me by Dr Franklin of Philadelphia, a man who makes a figure in the learned world. "And it came to paſs after theſe "things, that Abraham ſat in the door of his "tent, about the going doing down of the ſun. "And behold a man, bent with age, coming from "the way of the wilderneſs leaning on a ſtaff. "And Abraham aroſe, and met him, and ſaid unto him, Turn in, I pray thee, and waſh thy feet, "and tarry all night; and thou ſhalt ariſe early

* Lib. 1. Adverſus Gentes.

† "Forgive, Almighty Power, the perſecutors of thy ſervants; and, in the peculiar benevolence of thy nature, pardon thoſe men whoſe unhappineſs it is to be ſtrangers to thy name and worſhip. That they ſhould be ignorant of thy divine nature, is leſs the ſubject of wonder, than that any finite being ſhould preſume to know thee aright!"

" in the morning, and go on thy way. And the " man ſaid, Nay; for I will abide under this tree. " But Abraham preſſed him greatly: ſo he turn- " ed, and they went into the tent: and Abraham " baked unleavened bread, and they did eat. " And when Abraham ſaw that the man bleſſed " not God, he ſaid unto him, Wherefore doſt thou " not worſhip the moſt high God, creator of hea- " ven and earth? And the man anſwered and ſaid, " I do not worſhip thy God, neither do I call " upon his name; for I have made to myſelf a god, " which abideth always in mine houſe, and provi- " deth me with all things. And Abraham's zeal " was kindled againſt the man, and he aroſe, and " fell upon him, and drove him forth with blows, " into the wilderneſs. And God called unto A- " braham, ſaying, Abraham, where is the ſtran- " ger? And Abraham anſwered and ſaid, Lord, he " would not worſhip thee, neither would he call " upon thy name; therefore have I driven him " out from before my face into the wilderneſs. " And God ſaid, Have I borne with him theſe hun- " dred ninety and eight years, and nouriſhed him, " and clothed him, notwithſtanding his rebellion " againſt me; and couldſt not thou, who art thy- " ſelf a ſinner, bear with him one night?" The hiſtorical ſtyle of the Old Teſtament is here finely imitated; and the moral muſt ſtrike every one who is not ſunk in ſtupidity and ſuperſtition. Were it really a chapter of Geneſis, one is apt to think, that

that perſecution could never have ſhown a bare face among Jews or Chriſtians. But alas! that is a vain thought. Such a paſſage in the Old Teſtament, would avail as little againſt the rancorous paſſions of men, as the following paſſages in the New Teſtament, though perſecution cannot be condemned in terms more explicit. "Him that "is weak in the faith, receive you, but not to "doubtful diſputations. For one believeth that "he may eat all things; another, who is weak, "eateth herbs. Let not him that eateth, deſpiſe "him that eateth not; and let not him which "eateth not, judge him that eateth. Who art "thou that judgeſt another man's ſervant? to his "own maſter he ſtandeth or falleth. One man "eſteemeth one day above another; another e-"ſteemeth every day alike. Let every man be "fully perſuaded in his own mind. But why doſt "thou judge thy brother? or why doſt thou ſet "at nought thy brother? for we ſhall all ſtand "before the judgment-ſeat of Chriſt, every one "to give an account of himſelf to God. I know, "that there is nothing unclean of itſelf: but to "him that eſteemeth any thing unclean, to him it "is unclean. The kingdom of God is not meat "and drink, but righteouſneſs and peace, and joy "in the Holy Ghoſt. Let us therefore follow af-"ter the things which make for peace, and things "wherewith one may edify another *." Our Saviour

* Epiſtle of Paul to the Romans, chap. xiv.

viour himſelf declared againſt perſecution in the moſt expreſs terms. The Jews and Samaritans were of the ſame religion; but ſome trivial differences in the ceremonial part of worſhip, rendered them odious to each other. Our Saviour being refuſed lodging in a village of Samaria, becauſe he was travelling to Jeruſalem, his diſciples James and John ſaid, "Lord, wilt thou that we "command fire to come down from heaven, and "conſume them, even as Elias did? But he "rebuked them, and ſaid, The Son of Man is "not come to deſtroy mens' lives, but to ſave "them *†."

It gives me real concern, that even the hot fire of perſecution did not altogether purify our Reformed clergy from that ſatanical ſpirit. No ſooner were the Diſſenters ſettled in New England, where they fled to avoid perſecution, than they ſet on foot a perſecution againſt the Quakers, no leſs furious

* Luke ix. 54.

† Toleration in religion, though obvious to common underſtanding, was not however the production of reaſon, but of commerce. The advantage of toleration for promoting commerce, was early diſcovered by the Portugueze. They were too zealous Catholics to think of ſo bold a meaſure in Portugal; but it was permitted in Goa, and the inquiſition in that town was confined to Roman Catholics. There is a ſingular example of toleration in the Knights of Malta. That fraternity was inſtituted to make perpetual war againſt the Turks; and yet of late years they have erected a moſque for their Turkiſh priſoners.

furious than what they themſelves had ſuffered at home. Nor did the Reformed clergy in Scotland loſe ſight of the ſame magiſterial authority that had been aſſumed by their predeceſſors of the Romiſh church, on the ridiculous pretext of being ambaſſadors to men from Jeſus Chriſt. Upon a repreſentation, anno 1646, from the commiſſion of the kirk of Scotland, James Bell and Colin Campbell, bailies of Glaſgow, were committed to priſon by the parliament, merely for having ſaid, that kirkmen meddled too much in civil matters. Could a deſpotic prince have exerted a more arbitrary act? but the church was all-powerful in thoſe days*.

* The Chriſtian religion is eminent for a ſpirit of meekneſs, toleration, and brotherly love; and yet perſecution never raged ſo furiouſly in any other religion. Such oppoſition between practice and principle, is a ſingular phenomenon in the hiſtory of man. Let us try to account for it. In the Pagan religion, I diſcover few traces of perſecution. Tutelar deities were univerſal; and, far from impoſing theſe deities on others, every nation valued itſelf on being the only favourite of its own deity. Prieſts by profeſſion have ever been ambitious of impoſing on the laity peculiar forms of worſhip and peculiar religious tenets; but the Greeks and Romans had none ſuch. The Jews had prieſts by profeſſion; and they were beſide a gloomy people naturally inclined to perſecution: they hated their neighbours, and were hated by them. The Mahometan religion was ſown in a fertile ſoil. The Arabians were warlike; but ignorant and eaſily deluded by a warm imagination.

I would do juſtice to every church, not excepting that of Rome; and it is doing that church no more

imagination. The Koran is finely contrived to impoſe upon ſuch a people. The ambition of Mahomet correſponded to the warlike genius of his countrymen; who were taught to convert all men to his religion, by the ſimple but effectual argument of fire and ſword. This ſpirit of perſecution accompanied that of conqueſt. The latter is now extinguiſhed by luxury and ſenſuality; and there ſcarce remains any veſtige of the former.

Among an illiterate and credulous people, directed by the light of nature to worſhip the Deity, but without any eſtabliſhed form, every innovation is peaceably and cordially admitted. When Chriſtianity was introduced into Britain, the Druids, as appears from Oſſian, had loſt all authority. The people were prepared for the new religion; and there could be no perſecution where there was none to oppoſe. Upon that plain people, the Chriſtian religion had its genuine effect: it ſoftened their manners, and produced a ſpirit of meekneſs and brotherly love. Never was practice more concordant with principle. The ſcene is very different where a new religion is introduced in oppoſition to one long eſtabliſhed. Zeal for a new religion inflames its converts; and as violent paſſions are infectious, thoſe who adhere to the eſtabliſhed worſhip are by degrees equally inflamed. Mutual hatred and perſecution are the never-failing conſequences. This was the caſe in the countries where the Chriſtian religion was firſt promulgated.

When that religion began to make a figure, the Roman empire was finely prepared for its reception. The fables of Paganiſm, which paſs current as important truths in days of ignorance, were now exploded as childiſh and ridiculous. The

deſpotiſm

more but juſtice to acknowledge, that the ſpirit of perſecution was not more eminent in it, than zeal for

deſpotiſm of the Roman government, and ſucceſſive irruptions of barbarians, had ſunk the Roman people, had filled them with ſuperſtitious terrors, and diſpoſed them to embrace any religion that promiſed happineſs either here or in another world. Luckily, the new religion was that of Jeſus Chriſt. The meek ſpirit of the goſpel would in time have prevailed over a religion that was groſsly idolatrous; but, unhappily, the zeal of the new converts, and their abhorrence of idolatry, was not confined to argument, but was vented with all the violence of religious hatred. Here, the Man got the better of the Chriſtian. Thoſe of the eſtabliſhed religion became equally violent, through the infection of paſſion; and mutual perſecution knew no bounds.

This appears to be a fair account of the mutual perſecution between Chriſtians and Pagans. But perſecution did not ſtop there; it raged among different ſects of Chriſtians no leſs than formerly againſt the common enemy. This requires to be accounted for. Acuteneſs and ſubtility formed the character of the Greeks. Every man eminent for learning had his followers: in philoſophy many ſects were formed, and much diſputation and wrangling enſued. The Chriſtian religion was early introduced into Greece; and its votaries were infected with the ſpirit of the nation: the ſlighteſt differences occaſioned diſputes; and ſects were formed upon the ſlighteſt differences. In the goſpel, eternal happineſs is promiſed to thoſe who believe in Jeſus Chriſt. The true ſenſe was perverted by the bulk of Chriſtians; and ſalvation was annexed to the mere act of belief, without regard to good works. Men are prone to ſuch a doctrine: they conceive belief to be an eaſy matter, as it puts no reſtraint upon their paſſions: they are extremely willing to believe, provided they be left free to act as they pleaſe.

for making converts. The former is retiring out of the world; and I wiſh it moſt profound reſt, never

pleaſe. Thus as the whole of religion was underſtood to reſt upon belief, the moſt minute differences in belief, became of the higheſt importance. That Chriſt was a divine perſon ſent by God to correct and reform mankind, is the belief of the Arians. This is not believing in Chriſt, ſay the orthodox. "You muſt believe, that he is the Son of God, and equal to "the Father." This was a capital diſpute. But the ſpirit of diſputation did not reſt there; every trifle was made a ſubject of wrangling; and hence perſecution without end. Violent paſſions were thus encouraged among Chriſtians; and even the moſt unmanly vices were meritorious to promote the intereſt of one ſect againſt another. It became a maxim, that ill may be done in order to bring about good; and accordingly every deceit was put in practice by clergymen, not excepting forgery, in ſupport of their own ſect. Such practices were common as early as the third century. The perſecuting ſpirit continues in vigour among the Roman Catholics, againſt thoſe who deny the infallibility of their ſovereign pontiff. It is high treaſon to diſregard his authority; and rebels are perſecuted with fire and ſword in this world, and with eternal damnation in the next. No ſooner had Proteſtants renounced the Papal authority, than they gave vent to perſecution againſt one another. America was the refuge of many diſſenters from the Church of England, to avoid perſecution at home. But ſcarce were they eſtabliſhed there, when they raiſed a violent perſecution againſt Quakers, the moſt innocuous of all ſects.

Zeal for a new religion is immoderate. It cools gradually, and at laſt vaniſhes where that religion has been long eſtabliſhed, and is peaceably ſubmitted to. Then it is, that a ſalutary truth is diſcovered, That people of different religions, nay

never again to awake. People begin to be aſhamed of it, as of a garment long out of faſhion. Let the other continue for amuſement: it is innocent; and if it do no good, it is not productive of ſo much harm.

The deſire of making converts proceeds from two different cauſes. In ſuperſtitious zealots, it proceeds from an opinion, that all who differ from them are in the road to damnation: for which reaſon, there is a rage of making converts among Roman Catholics; who, without ceremony, deliver over to the flames of hell, every perſon who is not of their communion. The other cauſe is more natural: every man thinks himſelf in the right, eſpecially in matters of conſequence; and, for that reaſon, he is happy to find others of his opinion *. With reſpect to the firſt cauſe, I beg attention to the following conſiderations; not with any hope of converting zealots, but to prevent, if poſſible,

nay even of different ſects, may live peaceably together. In England and Holland, men are permitted to worſhip God their own way, provided they give no diſturbance to ſociety. Holland has given to mankind a glorious example, not only of univerſal toleration, but of permitting men, without regard to difference of religion, to enjoy all the privileges of a citizen. Even the Jews in Surinam are admitted to bear a part in the government. And that laudable example is copied by Britain with reſpect to the Roman Catholics in the iſland Grenade.

* Elements of Criticiſm, vol. ii. p. 493. edit. 5.

poſſible, others from becoming ſuch. In none of the works of God is variety more happily blended with uniformity, than in the formation of man. Uniformity prevails in the human face with reſpect to eyes, noſe, mouth, and other capital parts: variety prevails in the expreſſions of theſe parts, ſerving to diſtinguiſh one perſon from another, without hazard of error. In like manner, the minds of men are uniform with reſpect to their paſſions and principles; but the various tones and expreſſions of theſe, form different characters without end. A face deſtitute of a noſe or of a mouth, is monſtrous: a mind deſtitute of the moral ſenſe, or of a ſenſe of religion, is no leſs ſo. But variety of expreſſion in different faces is agreeable, becauſe we reliſh variety; and a ſimilar variety in the expreſſions or tones of paſſion, ought to be equally agreeable. Endleſs differences in temper, in taſte, and in mental faculties, that of reaſon in particular, produce neceſſarily variety in ſentiment and in opinion. Can God be diſpleaſed with ſuch variety, when it is his own work? He requires no uniformity, except with reſpect to an upright mind and clear conſcience, which are indiſpenſable. Here at the ſame time is diſcovered an illuſtrious final cauſe. Different countenances in the human race, not only diſtinguiſh one perſon from another, but promote ſociety, by aiding us to chuſe a friend, an aſſociate, a partner for life. Differences in opinion and ſentiment have ſtill more

more beneficial effects: they rouſe the attention, give exerciſe to the underſtanding, and ſharpen the reaſoning faculty. With reſpect to religion in particular, perfect uniformity, which furniſheth no ſubject for thinking nor for reaſoning, would produce languor in divine worſhip, and make us ſink into cold indifference. How fooliſh then is the rage of making proſelytes? Let every man enjoy his native liberty, of thinking as well as of acting; free to act as he pleaſes, provided only he obey the rules of morality; equally free to think as he pleaſes, provided only he acknowledge the Great God as his maker and maſter, and perceive the neceſſary connection of religion with morality. Strict uniformity in other matters, may be compared to a ſpring-day, calm and ſerene; neither ſo hot as to make us drop a garment, nor ſo cold as to require an addition; no wind to ruffle, nor rain to make ſhelter neceſſary. We enjoy the ſweet ſcene for a moment: we walk, we ſit, we muſe—but ſoon fall aſleep. Agitation is the element of man, and the life of ſociety. Let us not attempt to correct the works of God: the attempt will betray us into abſurd errors. This doctrine cannot be better illuſtrated than by a converſation, reported by the Jeſuit Tachard, between the King of Siam, and a French ambaſſador, who, in his maſter's name, urged that king to embrace the Chriſtian religion. "I am ſurpriſed," ſaid his Majeſty of Siam, "that the King of France, my

"good

" good friend, ſhould intereſt himſelf ſo warmly " in what concerns God only. He hath given to " his creatures different minds and different in- " clinations, which naturally lead them to differ " in opinion. We admire variety in the material " world: why not equally admire it in matters of " religion? Have we not then reaſon to believe, " that God takes pleaſure in all the different forms " of worſhip? Had it been the intention of God, " to produce uniformity in religion, he would have " formed all men with the ſame mind." Bernier introduces ſome Gentiles of Hindoſtan defending their religion much in the ſame manner: " That " they did not pretend their law to be univerſal; " that they did not hold ours to be falſe, as, for " ought they knew, it might be a good law for " us; and that God probably made many roads to " heaven."

With reſpect to the other cauſe above mention- ed, the deſire of putting people in the right road. To reaſon others into our religious principles, is natural; but it is not always prudent. I wiſh my neighbour to be of my opinion, becauſe I think my opinion right: but is there no danger of un- dermining his religious principles, without eſta- bliſhing better in their ſtead? Ought I not to reſtrain my deſire of making converts, when the attempt may poſſibly reduce them to abandon re- ligion altogether, as a matter of utter uncertain- ty? If a man of clear underſtanding has, by

ſome

ſome unhappy means, been led into error, that man may be ſet right by fair reaſoning: but beware of endeavouring to convert people of low parts, who are indebted for their creed to parents, to education, or to example: it is ſafer to let them reſt as they are.

At any rate, let us never attempt to gain proſelytes by rewards, or by terror: what other effect can ſuch motives produce, but diſſimulation and lying, parents of every ſecret crime. The Empreſs of Ruſſia uſes a method for converting her Pagan ſubjects of Kamſkatka, no leſs agreeable than effectual; which is, to exempt from taxes for ten years, ſuch of them as profeſs the Chriſtian religion. This practice may be political; but it tends not to advance religion, and is deſtructive of morality. Terror, on the other hand, may be equally effectual, but is not altogether ſo agreeable. The people of Rum, one of the Hebrides, were Papiſts till the beginning of the preſent century, when in one day they were all proſelyted to the Proteſtant faith. Maclean of Coll, their chieftain, went to the iſland with a Proteſtant miniſter, and ordered all the inhabitants to appear on Sunday at public worſhip. They came, but refuſed to hear a Proteſtant miniſter. The chieftain reaſoned with them: but finding that his reaſonings made no impreſſion, he laid hold of the moſt forward; and having made a deep impreſſion on him with his cane,

cane, puſhed him into the church. The reſt followed like meek lambs; and from that day have continued firm Proteſtants. The Proteſtantiſm of Rum is ſtyled by their Popiſh neighbours the faith of the *yellow ſtick*.

To apply any means for making proſelytes, other than fair reaſoning, appears to me a ſtrange perverſion. Can God be pleaſed with uſing rewards or puniſhments, or can any rational man juſtify them? What then ſhould move any one to put them in practice? I ſhould be utterly at a loſs to anſwer the queſtion, but for a fact mentioned more than once above, that the rude and illiterate judge by ſight only, not by reflection. They lay weight on the external viſible act, without thinking of intention, which is not viſible. In truth, the bulk of mankind reſt upon the external profeſſion of religion: they never think of the heart, nor conſider how that ſtands affected. What elſe is it but the external act merely that moves the Romiſh miſſionaries to baptize the infants of ſavages even at the moment of expiring? which they proſecute with much pious ardour. Their zeal merits applauſe, but not their judgment. Can any rational perſon ſeriouſly believe, that the dipping a ſavage or an infant in water will make either of them a Chriſtian, or that the want of this ceremony will precipitate them into hell? The Lithuanians, before their converſion to Chriſtianity,

ſtianity, worſhipped ſerpents, every family entertaining one as a houſehold-god. Sigiſmundus, in his commentaries of Muſcovy, reports the following incident. A converted Chriſtian having perſuaded a neighbour to follow his example, and, in token of his converſion, to kill his ſerpent, was ſurpriſed, at his next viſit, to find his convert in the deepeſt melancholy, bitterly lamenting that he had murdered his god, and that the moſt dreadful calamities would befal him. Was this perſon a Chriſtian more than nominally? At the end of the laſt century, when Kempfer was in Japan, there remained but about fifty Japan Chriſtians, who were locked up in priſon for life. Theſe poor people knew no more of the Chriſtian religion, but the names of our Saviour and of the Virgin Mary; and yet ſo zealous Chriſtians were they, as rather to die miſerably in jail, than to renounce the name of Chriſt, and be ſet at liberty. The inhabitants of the iſland Annaboa, in the gulf of Guinea, have been converted by the Portugueſe to Chriſtianity. No more is required of them, as Boſman obſerves, but to repeat a *Pater Noſter*, and *Ave Maria*, confeſs to the prieſt, and bring offerings to him.

I cannot with ſatisfaction conclude this Sketch, without congratulating my preſent countrymen of Britain upon their knowledge of the intimate connection that true religion has with morality.

May the importance of that connection, always at heart, excite us to govern every action of our lives by the united principles of morality and religion;——what a happy people would we be!

APPEN-

APPENDIX.

SKETCHES

CONCERNING

SCOTLAND.

SKETCH I.

SCOTCH ENTAILS CONSIDERED IN MORAL AND POLITICAL VIEWS.

MAN is by nature a hoarding animal; and to ſecure what is acquired by honeſt induſtry, the ſenſe of property is made a branch of human nature *. During the infancy of nations, when artificial wants are unknown, the hoarding appetite makes no figure. The uſe of money produced a great alteration in the human heart. Money having at command the goods of fortune, introduced inequality of rank, luxury, and artificial wants without end. No bounds are ſet to hoarding, where an appetite for artificial wants is indulged:

* Book I. Sketch 2.

ged: love of money becomes the ruling paſſion: it is coveted by many, in order to be hoarded; and means are abſurdly converted into an end.

The ſenſe of property, weak among ſavages, ripens gradually till it arrives at maturity in poliſhed nations. In every ſtage of the progreſs, ſome new power is added to property; and now, for centuries, men have enjoyed every power over their own goods, that a rational mind can deſire *: they have the free diſpoſal during life, and even after death, by naming an heir. Theſe powers are ſufficient for accompliſhing every rational purpoſe: they are ſufficient for commerce, and they are ſufficient for benevolence. But the artificial wants of men are boundleſs: not content with the full enjoyment of their property during life, nor with the proſpect of its being enjoyed by a favourite heir, they are anxiouſly bent to preſerve it to themſelves for ever. A man who has amaſſed a great eſtate in land, is miſerable at the proſpect of being obliged to quit his hold: to ſoothe his diſeaſed fancy, he makes a deed ſecuring it for ever to certain heirs; who muſt without end bear his name, and preſerve his eſtate entire. Death, it is true, muſt at laſt ſeparate him from his idol: it is ſome conſolation, however, that his will governs and gives law to every ſubſequent proprietor. How repugnant to the frail ſtate of man are ſuch ſwollen conceptions! Upon theſe, however, are found-

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* Hiſtorical Law-Tracts, Tract 3.

ed entails, which have prevailed in many parts of the world, and unhappily at this day infeſt Scotland. Did entails produce no other miſchief but the gratification of a diſtempered appetite, they might be endured, though far from deſerving approbation: but, like other tranſgreſſions of nature and reaſon, they are productive of much miſchief, not only to commerce, but to the very heirs for whoſe ſake alone it is pretended that they are made.

Conſidering that the law of nature has beſtowed on man every power of property that is neceſſary either for commerce or for benevolence, how blind was it in the Engliſh Legiſlature to add a moſt irrational power, that of making an entail! But men will always be mending; and, when a lawgiver ventures to tamper with the laws of nature, he hazards much miſchief. We have a pregnant inſtance above, of an attempt to mend the laws of God in many abſurd regulations for the poor; and that the law authoriſing entails is another inſtance of the ſame kind, will be evident from what follows.

The miſchievous effects of Engliſh entails were ſoon diſcovered: they occaſioned ſuch injuſtice and oppreſſion, that even the judges ventured to relieve the nation from them by an artificial form, termed *fine and recovery*. And yet, though no moderate man would deſire more power over his eſtate than he has by common law, the legiſlature of Scotland enabled every land-proprietor to fet-

ter his eſtate for ever; to tyrannize over his heirs; and to reduce their property to a ſhadow, by prohibiting them to alien, and by prohibiting them to contract debt, were it even to redeem them from death or ſlavery. Thus, many a man, fonder of his eſtate than of his wife and children, grudges the uſe of it to his natural heirs, reducing them to the ſtate of mere liferenters. Behold the conſequences! A number of noblemen and gentlemen among us lie in wait for every parcel of land that comes to market. Intent upon aggrandizing their family, or rather their eſtate, which is the favourite object, they ſecure every purchaſe by an entail; and the ſame courſe will be followed, till no land be left to be purchaſed. Thus every entailed eſtate in Scotland becomes in effect a mortmain, admitting additions without end, but abſolutely barring alienation; and if the Legiſlature interpoſe not, the period is not diſtant, when all the land in Scotland will be locked up by entails, and withdrawn from commerce.

The purpoſe of the preſent Eſſay, is to ſet before our Legiſlature, coolly and impartially, the deſtructive effects of a Scotch entail. I am not ſo ſanguine as to hope, that men, who convert means into an end, and avariciouſly covet land for its own ſake, will be prevailed upon to regard, either the intereſt of their country, or of their poſterity: but I would gladly hope, that the Legiſlature may be

be rouſed to give attention to a national object of no ſlight importance.

I begin with effects of a private or domeſtic nature. To the poſſeſſor, an entail is a conſtant ſource of diſcontent, by ſubverting that liberty and independence, which all men covet with reſpect to their goods as well as their perſons. What can be more vexatious to a proprietor of a great land-eſtate, than to be barred from the moſt laudable acts, ſuitable proviſions, for example, to a wife or children? not to mention numberleſs acts of benevolence, that endear individuals to each other, and ſweeten ſociety. A great proportion of the land in Scotland is in ſuch a ſtate, that, by laying out a thouſand pounds or ſo, an intelligent proprietor may add a hundred pounds yearly to his rent-roll. But an entail effectually bars that improvement: it affords the proprietor no credit; and ſuppoſing him to have the command of money independent of the eſtate, he will be ill-fated if he have not means to employ it more profitably for his own intereſt. An entail, at the ſame time, is no better than a trap for an improvident poſſeſſor: to avoid altogether the contracting debt, is impracticable; and if a young man be guided more by pleaſure than by prudence, which commonly is the caſe of young men, a vigilant and rapacious ſubſtitute, taking advantage of a forfeiting clauſe, turns him out of poſſeſſion, and delivers him over to want and miſery.

I beg indulgence for introducing a caſe, which, though particular, may frequently happen. A gentleman, who has a family-ſeat finely ſituated, but in the ſtate of nature, is tempted to lay out great ſums upon improvements and embelliſhments, having a numerous iſſue to benefit by his operations. They all fail; and a ſtranger, perhaps his enemy, becomes the heir of entail. Fond, however, of his darling ſeat, he is willing to preſerve all entire, upon procuring to his heirs a reaſonable ſum for his improvements; which is refuſed. Averſe to lay waſte the work of his own hands, he reſtricts his demand to the real value of the growing timber—All in vain. Provoked at the obſtinacy of the heir of entail, he cuts down every tree, diſmantles the place; and with a ſad heart abandons his beloved habitation. In a bare country like Scotland, is it not cruel to deter proprietors by an entail, from improving their land, and embelliſhing their family-ſeats? Is it not ſtill more cruel, to force a proprietor, who has no heir of his own blood, to lay all waſte, inſtead of leaving behind him a monument of his taſte and induſtry?

But an entail is productive of conſequences ſtill more diſmal, even with reſpect to heirs. A young man upon whom the family-eſtate is entailed without any power reſerved to the father, is not commonly obſequious to advice, nor patiently ſubmiſſive to the fatigues of education: he abandons himſelf

ſelf to pleaſure, and indulges his paſſions without controul. In one word, there is no ſituation more ſubverſive of morals, than that of a young man, bred up from infancy in the certainty of inheriting an opulent fortune.

The condition of the other children, daughters eſpecially, is commonly deplorable. The proprietor of a large entailed eſtate leaves at his death children who have acquired a taſte for ſumptuous living. The ſons drop off one by one, and a number of daughters remain, with a ſcanty proviſion, or perhaps with none at all. A collateral male heir ſucceeds, who, after a painful ſearch, is diſcovered in ſome remote corner, qualified to procure bread by the ſpade or the plough, but entirely unqualified for behaving as maſter of an opulent fortune. By ſuch a metamorphoſis, the poor man makes a ludicrous figure; while the daughters, reduced to indigence, are in a ſituation much more lamentable than are the brats of beggars.

Our entails produce another domeſtic evil, for which no proper remedy is provided. The ſums permitted in moſt entails to younger children, however adequate when the entail is made, become in time too ſcanty, by a fall in the value of money, and by increaſe of luxury; which is peculiarly hard upon daughters of great families: the proviſions deſtined for them will not afford them bread; and they cannot hope to be ſuitably matched, without

out a decent fortune. If we adhere to entails, nunneries ought to be provided.

But the domeſtic evils of an entail make no figure, compared with thoſe that reſpect the public. Theſe in their full extent would fill a volume: they are well known; and it may be ſufficient to keep them in view by ſome ſlight hints.

As obſerved above, few tenants in tail can command money for improvements, however profitable. Such diſcouragement to agriculture, hurtful to proprietors of entailed eſtates, is ſtill more ſo to the public. It is now an eſtabliſhed maxim, That a ſtate is powerful in proportion to the product of its land: a nation that feeds its neighbours, can ſtarve them. The quantity of land that is locked up in Scotland by entails, has damped the growing ſpirit of agriculture. There is not produced ſufficiency of corn at home for our own conſumpt: and our condition will become worſe and worſe by new entails, till agriculture and induſtry be annihilated. Were the great entailed eſtates in Scotland ſplit into ſmall properties of fifty or a hundred pounds yearly rent, we ſhould ſoon be enabled, not only to ſupply our own markets, but to ſpare for our neighbours.

In the next place, our entails are no leſs ſubverſive of commerce than of agriculture. There are numberleſs land eſtates in Scotland of one, two, or three hundred pounds yearly rent. Such an eſtate cannot afford bare neceſſaries to the proprietor, if he

he pretend to live like a gentleman. But he has an excellent reſource: let him apply to any branch of trade, his eſtate will afford him credit for what money he wants. The profit he makes, pays the intereſt of the money borrowed, with a ſurplus; and this ſurplus, added to the rent of his eſtate, enables him to live comfortably. A number of land-proprietors in ſuch circumſtances, would advance commerce to a great height. But alas! there are not many who have that reſource: ſuch is the itch in Scotland for entailing, as even to deſcend lower than one hundred pounds yearly. Can one behold with patience, the countenance that is given to ſelfiſh wrong-headed people, acting in direct oppoſition to the proſperity of their country? Commerce is no leſs hurt in another reſpect: when our land is withdrawn from commerce by entails, every proſperous trader will deſert a country where he can find no land to purchaſe; for to raiſe a family, by acquiring an eſtate in land, is the ultimate aim of every merchant, and of every man who accumulates money.

Thirdly, An entail is a bitter enemy to population. Population depends greatly on the number of land-proprietors. A very ſmall portion of land, managed with ſkill and induſtry, affords bread to a numerous family; and the great aim of the frugal proprietor, is to provide a fund for educating his children, and for eſtabliſhing them in buſineſs. A numerous iſſue, at the ſame time, is commonly the

the lot of the temperate and frugal; becauſe luxury and voluptuouſneſs enervate the body, and dry up the ſources of procreation. This is no chimera or fond imagination: traverſe Europe; compare great capitals with diſtant provinces, and it will be found to hold univerſally, that children abound much more among the induſtrious poor, than among the luxurious rich. But, if diviſion of land into ſmall properties, tend to population; depopulation muſt be the neceſſary conſequence of an entail, the avowed intent of which is to unite many ſmall properties in one great eſtate; and conſequently to reduce land-proprietors to a ſmall number.

Let us, in the fourth place, take under conſideration the children of landholders with reſpect to education and induſtry; for, unleſs men be uſefully employed, population is of no real advantage to a ſtate. In that reſpect, great and ſmall eſtates admit no compariſon. Children of great families, accuſtomed to affluence and luxury, are too proud for buſineſs; and, were they even willing, are incapable to drudge at a laborious employment. At the ſame time, the father's hands being tied up by his entail from affording them ſuitable proviſions, they become a burden on the family, and on the ſtate, and can do no ſervice to either, but by dying. Yet there are men ſo blind, or ſo callous, as to be fond of entails. Let us try whether a more pleaſing ſcene will have

have any effect upon them. Children of ſmall landholders are from infancy educated in a frugal manner; and they muſt be induſtrious, as they depend on induſtry for bread. Among that claſs of men, education has its moſt powerful influence: and upon that claſs a nation chiefly relies, for its ſkilful artiſts and manufacturers, for its lawyers, phyſicians, divines, and even for its generals and ſtateſmen.

And this leads to conſider, in the fifth place, the influence that great and ſmall eſtates have on manners. Gentlemen of a moderate fortune, connected with their ſuperiors and inferiors, improve ſociety, by ſpreading kindly affection through the whole members of the ſtate. In ſuch only reſides the genuine ſpirit of liberty, abhorrent equally of ſervility to ſuperiors, and of tyranny to inferiors. The nature of the Britiſh government creates a mutual dependance of the great and ſmall on each other. The great have favours to beſtow: the ſmall have many more, by their privilege of electing parliament-men; which obliges men of high rank to affect popularity, however little feeling they may have for the good of their fellow-creatures. This connection produces good manners at leaſt, between different ranks, and perhaps ſome degree of cordiality. Accumulation of land into great eſtates, produces oppoſite manners: when all the land in Scotland is ſwallowed up by a number of grandees, and a few gentlemen of the middle

middle rank are left; even the appearance of popularity will vaniſh, leaving pride and inſolence on the one hand, and abject ſervility on the other. In a word, the diſtribution of land into many ſhares, accords charmingly with the free ſpirit of the Britiſh conſtitution; but nothing is more repugnant to that ſpirit, than overgrown eſtates in land.

In the ſixth place, Arts and ſciences can never flouriſh in a country, where all the land is engroſſed by a few. Science will never be cultivated by the diſpirited tenant, who can ſcarce procure bread; and ſtill leſs, if poſſible, by the inſolent landlord, who is too ſelf-ſufficient for inſtruction. There will be no encouragement for arts: great and opulent proprietors, foſtering ambitious views, will cling to the ſeat of government, which is far removed from Scotland; and if vanity make them ſometimes diſplay their grandeur at their country-ſeats, they will be too delicate for any articles of luxury but what are foreign. The arts and ſciences being thus baniſhed, Scotland will be deſerted by every man of ſpirit who can find bread elſewhere.

In the ſeventh place, Such overgrown eſtates will produce an irregular and dangerous influence with reſpect to the Houſe of Commons. The Parliament-boroughs will be ſubdued by weight of money; and, with reſpect to county-elections, it is a chance if there be left in a county as many qualified

qualified landholders as to afford a free choice. In ſuch circumſtances, will our conſtitution be in no danger from the ambitious views of men elevated above others by their vaſt poſſeſſions? Is it unlikely, that ſuch men, taking advantage of public diſcord, will become an united body of ambitious oppreſſors, overawing their Sovereign as well as their fellow-ſubjects? Such was the miſerable condition of Britain, while the feudal oligarchy ſubſiſted: ſuch at preſent is the miſerable condition of Poland: and ſuch will be the miſerable condition of Scotland, if the Legiſlature do not ſtretch out a ſaving hand.

If the public intereſt only were to be regarded, entails ought to be deſtroyed root and branch. But a numberleſs body of ſubſtitutes are intereſted, many of whom would be diſinherited, if the tenants in tail had power. To reconcile as much as poſſible theſe oppoſite intereſts, it is propoſed that the following articles be authoriſed by a ſtatute. Firſt, That the act of Parliament 1685 be repealed with reſpect to all future operations. Second, That entails already made and completed, ſhall continue effectual to ſuch ſubſtitutes as exiſt at the date of the act propoſed; but ſhall not benefit any ſubſtitute born after it. Third, That power be reſerved to every proprietor, after the act 1685 is at an end, to ſettle his eſtate upon what heirs he thinks proper, and to bar theſe heirs from altering

altering the order of ſucceſſion; theſe powers being inherent in property at common law.

At the ſame time, the prohibiting entails will avail little, if truſt-deeds be permitted in their utmoſt extent, as in England. And therefore, in order to re-eſtabliſh the law of nature with reſpect to land-property, a limitation of truſt-deeds is neceſſary. My propoſal is, That no truſt-deed, directing or limiting the ſucceſſion of heirs to a land-eſtate, ſhall be effectual beyond the life of the heirs in exiſtence at the time.

SKETCH II.

GOVERNMENT OF ROYAL BOROUGHS IN SCOTLAND.

BY a royal borough is in Scotland underſtood, an incorporation that hold their lands of the Crown, and are governed by magiſtrates of their own naming. The adminiſtration of the annual revenues of a royal borough, termed the *common good*, is truſted to the magiſtrates; but not without controul. It was originally ſubjected to the review of the Great Chamberlain; and accordingly the chap. 39. § 45. of the *Iter Camerarii*, contains

contains the following articles, recommended to the Chamberlain, to be inquired into. "Giff "there be an good aſſedation and uptaking of the "common good of the burgh, and giff faithful "compt be made thereof to the community of "the burgh; and giff no compt is made, he "whom and in quhaes hands it is come, and how "it paſſes by the community." In purſuance of theſe inſtructions, the Chamberlain's precepts for holding the ayr, or circuit, is directed to the provoſt and bailies, enjoining them "to call all thoſe "who have received any of the town's revenues, "or uſed any office within the burgh, ſince the "laſt chamberlain-ayr, to anſwer ſuch things as "ſhall be laid to their charge." *Iter Camer. cap.* 1. And in the third chapter, which contains the forms of the chamberlain-ayr, the firſt thing to be done after fencing the court, is, to call the bailies and ſerjeants to be challenged and accuſed from the time of the laſt ayr.

This office, dangerous by exceſs of power, being ſuppreſſed, the royal boroughs were left in a ſtate of anarchy. There being now no check or controul, the magiſtracy was coveted by noblemen and gentlemen in the neighbourhood; who, under the name of office-bearers, laid their hands on the revenues of the borough, and converted all to their own profit. This corruption was heavily complained of in the reign of James V.; and a remedy was provided by act 26. Parl. 1535, en-

acting, 1ſt, That none be qualified to be provoſt, bailie, or alderman, but an indwelling burgeſs. 2dly, " That no inhabitant purchaſe lordſhip out " of burgh, to the terror of his comburgeſſes. " And, 3dly, That all provoſts, bailies, and alder- " men of boroughs, bring yearly to the chequer, " at a day certain, the compt-books of their com- " mon good, to be ſeen and conſidered by the " Lords Auditors, giff the ſame be ſpended for " the common well of the burgh, or not, under " the penalty of loſing their freedom. And that " the ſaids provoſts, bailies, and aldermen, warn " yearly, fifteen days before their coming to the " chequer, all thoſe who are willing to come for " examining the ſaid accounts, that they may im- " pugn the ſame, in order that all murmur may " ceaſe in that behalf." And to enforce theſe regulations, a brieve was iſſued from the chancery, commanding the magiſtrates to preſent their accounts to the Exchequer, and ſummoning the burgeſſes to appear and object to the ſame.

A defect in this ſtatute made it leſs effectual than it was intended to be. Magiſtrates, to avoid the penalty, brought the count-books of their common-good to the Exchequer; but they brought no rental of the common-good to found a charge againſt them. This defect was remedied by act 28. Parl. 1693, containing the following preamble. " That the royal boroughs, by the mal-admini- " ſtration of their magiſtrates, have fallen under " great

" great debts and burdens, to the diminution of " their dignity, and the diſabling of them to ſerve " the crown and government as they ought; and " that the care, overſight, and controul, of the " common-good of boroughs, belong to their " Majeſties by virtue of their prerogative-royal; " therefore, for preventing the like abuſes and " miſapplications in all time thereafter, their " Majeſties ſtatute and ordain, That every burgh-" royal ſhall, betwixt and the firſt day of No-" vember next, bring to the Lords of Treaſury " and Exchequer an exact account of charge and " diſcharge, ſubſcribed by the magiſtrates and " town-clerk, of their whole public-good and " revenues, and of the whole debts and incum-" brances that affect the ſame." This completed the remedy, by purting means into the hands of the Barons of Exchequer to controul the accounts enjoined by the former ſtatute to be yearly given in.

The foregoing regulations are kept in obſervance. Every year a precept iſſues from the Exchequer, ſigned by one of the Barons, addreſſed to the director of the chancery, requiring him to make out a brieve for every royal borough. The brieve is accordingly made out, returned to the Exchequer, and ſent to the ſeveral ſheriffs, to be ſerved in all the royal boroughs within their bounds, as directed by the ſtatute. Theſe brieves are accordingly ſo ſerved by the ſheriffs; and particu-

larly it is a conſtant form in moſt of the royal boroughs, to iſſue a proclamation, fifteen days before the day named for appearance in Exchequer, warning the inhabitants to repair there, in order to object to the public accounts of the town: and further, in order to give them opportunity to frame objections, the book and counts are laid open for theſe fifteen days, to be inſpected by all the inhabitants.

We learn from the records of Exchequer, that, from the year 1660 to the year 1683, accounts were regularly given in to Exchequer, in obedience to the ſtatute. The town of Edinburgh only having failed for ſome ſhort time, Captain Thomas Hamilton, merchant there, by an action in Exchequer, compelled the magiſtrates to produce upon oath their treaſurer's accounts, which were accordingly audited. And we alſo learn, that, from the Reſtoration down to the Union, a clerk to the borough-roll was appointed by the crown, whoſe proper buſineſs it was to examine and audite the accounts of the boroughs.

Notwithſtanding the foregoing ſalutary regulations, and the form conſtantly practiſed to make them effectual, the boroughs of late years have forborn to preſent their accounts in Exchequer; hoping that they would be overlooked by the Engliſh court of Exchequer, eſtabliſhed in Scotland after the Union; which accordingly happened. This neglect in the Court of Exchequer is greatly

greatly to be regretted, becauſe it reduces the royal boroughs, by the mal-adminiſtration of their magiſtrates, to the ſame miſerable condition that is ſo loudly complained of in the ſtatutes above mentioned. It is undoubtedly in the power of the Barons to reſtore good government to the boroughs, by compelling the magiſtrates to account yearly in the court of Exchequer, according to the foregoing regulations: no more is neceſſary, but to ſignify publicly that they are reſolved to put theſe regulations in execution.

How beneficial that ſtep would be to this country in general, and to the royal boroughs in particular, will appear from conſidering, firſt, the unhappy conſequences that reſult from ſuffering magiſtrates to diſpoſe of the town's revenues, without any check or controul; and next, the good effects that muſt reſult from a regular and careful management, under the inſpection of the King's judges.

The unhappy conſequences of leaving magiſtrates without any check or controul, are too viſible to be diſguiſed. The revenues of a royal borough are ſeldom laid out for the good of the town, but in making friends to the party who are in poſſeſſion of the magiſtracy; and in rioting and drunkenneſs, for which every pretext is laid hold of, particularly that of hoſpitality to ſtrangers. Such miſmanagement tends to idleneſs, and corruption of manners; which accordingly are re-

markable in moſt royal boroughs. Nor is the contagion confined within the town: it commonly ſpreads all around.

Another conſequence no leſs fatal, of leaving magiſtrates to act without controul, is a ſtrong deſire in every licentious burgeſs, of ſtepping into the magiſtracy, for his own ſake, and for that of his friends. Hence the factions and animoſities that prevail in almoſt all the royal boroughs; which are violently and indecently purſued, without the leaſt regard to the good of the community.

The greateſt evil of all, reſpects the choice of their repreſentatives in parliament. A habit of riot and intemperance, makes them fit ſubjects to be corrupted by every adventurer who is willing to lay out money for purchaſing a ſeat in parliament. Hence the infamous practice of bribery at elections, which tends not only to corrupt the whole maſs of the people, but, which is ſtill more dreadful, tends to fill the Houſe of Commons with men of diſſolute manners, void of probity and honour.

But, turning from ſcenes ſo diſmal, let us view the beautiful effects that reſult from an adminiſtration regularly carried on, as directed by the ſtatutes above mentioned. The revenues of the royal boroughs are ſuppoſed to be above L. 40,000 yearly. And were this ſum, or the half of it, prudently expended, for promoting arts and induſtry among the numerous inhabitants of royal boroughs; the benefit, in a country ſo narrow and poor

poor as Scotland, would be immenſe: it would tend to population, it would greatly increaſe induſtry, manufactures, and commerce, beſide augmenting the public revenue. In the next place, as there would be no temptation for deſigning men to convert the burden of magiſtracy into a benefit, faction and diſcord would vaniſh; and there would be no leſs ſolicitude to ſhun the burden, than at preſent is ſeen to obtain it. None would ſubmit to the burden but the truly patriotic, men who would cheerfully beſtow their time, and perhaps their money, upon the public; and whoſe ambition it would be to acquire a character, by promoting induſtry, temperance, and honeſty, among their fellow-citizens.

And when the government of the royal boroughs comes to be in ſo good hands, bribery, which corrupts the very vitals of our conſtitution, will be baniſhed of courſe. And conſidering the proper conſtitutional dependence of the royal boroughs upon the king's judges, we may have reaſonable aſſurance, that few repreſentatives will be choſen but who are friends to their country and to their ſovereign.

SKETCH III.

PLAN FOR IMPROVING AND PRESERVING IN ORDER THE HIGHWAYS IN SCOTLAND.

PREFACE.

HIGHWAYS have in Scotland become a capital object of police, by the increaſe of inland commerce, upon which bad roads are a heavy tax. Happily for our country, no perſon is ignorant of this truth; and we ſee with pleaſure the fruits of their conviction in various attempts, public and private, to eſtabliſh this valuable branch of police upon the beſt footing. As this is no eaſy taſk, it may reaſonably be hoped, that men intereſted will ſeriouſly apply to it, and will freely produce ſuch hints as occur to them. In the latter view, the following plan is offered to the public: and if, from the various propoſals that have been or ſhall be publiſhed, an effective plan can be framed, ſuch as completely to anſwer its purpoſe, it may ſafely be pronounced, that it will produce more benefit to this country, than has been produced by any other ſingle improvement ſince the union of the two kingdoms.

1. THE juſtices of peace, commiſſioners of ſupply, the ſheriff or ſtewart depute, and the firſt magiſtrate of royal boroughs, ſhall be commiſſioners

miſſioners for making and repairing highways, bridges, and ferries, in the ſeveral ſhires and ſtewartries. All the powers given by law to the juſtices of peace, and commiſſioners of ſupply, with reſpect to highways, bridges, and ferries, ſhall be transferred to them; and any two ſhall be a quorum, except where a greater number is required by this act.

2. The ſheriff or ſtewart depute ſhall appoint the firſt day of meeting of the ſaid commiſſioners, as ſoon as may conveniently be after the date of the act, by an intimation at each pariſh-church upon a Sunday, at the cloſe of the forenoon ſervice. And the laſt Tueſday of March ſhall yearly thereafter be a day of meeting at the head borough of the ſhire or ſtewartry, in place of the firſt or third Tueſday of May appointed by former acts. The commiſſioners ſhall appoint a preſes, convener, and clerk: and they ſhall be empowered to adjourn themſelves from time to time.

3. The commiſſioners, at their firſt meeting, ſhall divide the ſhire or ſtewartry into two or more diſtricts, as they ſee convenient. And if they cannot overtake this work at that meeting, they ſhall appoint proper perſons to form a plan of the intended diviſions, which plan ſhall be reported to the commiſſioners at their next meeting, in order to be approved or altered by them. This being ſettled, the commiſſioners ſhall appoint the heritors in theſe ſeveral diſtricts, or any three of them, to meet on a certain day and place, to make

liſts

liſts of the whole public roads within their reſpective diſtricts, and to ſettle the order of reparation, beginning with thoſe that are the moſt frequented. The proceedings of theſe diſtrict meetings muſt be reported to the commiſſioners at their next meeting; who are empowered to ſettle the order of reparation, in caſe of variance among the heritors; and alſo to add any road that may have been omitted. And they ſhall record a ſcheme or plan of the whole roads in the ſhire, thus enliſted, with their reſolutions thereupon, to be ſeen in the clerk's hands *gratis*. But upon any juſt cauſe appearing in the courſe of adminiſtration, the commiſſioners ſhall be empowered to alter or vary this plan, provided it be at a meeting previouſly appointed for that purpoſe, and where three-fifths at leaſt of the commiſſioners are preſent.

4. If the ſheriff or ſtewart neglect to appoint the firſt meeting of the commiſſioners, he ſhall incur a penalty of L. 100, upon a ſummary complaint to the Court of Seſſion by any one heritor of the ſhire, with coſts of ſuit; the one-half of the penalty to the plaintiff, and the other half to be applied by the commiſſioners for the purpoſes of this act. If the commiſſioners fail to meet at the day appointed by the ſheriff or ſtewart, or fail to divide the ſhire or ſtewartry into diſtricts, within ſix months of their firſt meeting, the ſheriff or ſtewart depute, under the foreſaid penalty, ſhall be bound to do that work himſelf; and alſo to appoint

point the heritors in the ſeveral diſtricts, or any three of them, to make liſts of the public roads as above mentioned, and to report their reſolutions to him; and he is empowered to ſettle the order of reparation, in caſe of variance among the heritors. If the heritors fail to meet, and to make a liſt of the roads as aforeſaid, this work ſhall be performed by the ſheriff or ſtewart depute himſelf. And he ſhall be indemnified of whatever expences he is at in proſecuting the ſaid work, out of the ſums that are to be levied by authority of this act, in manner after mentioned, with an additional ſum for his own trouble, to be named by the circuit judges.

5. No perſon ſhall act as a commiſſioner upon this ſtatute, but who has an eſtate within the county of L. 200 Scots valuation, or is heir-preſumptive to ſuch an eſtate, or is named a commiſſioner *virtute officii*, under the penalty of L. 20 Sterling *toties quoties*, to be proſecuted before any competent court, by a proper action, with coſts of ſuit; the one-half to the plaintiff, the other half to the purpoſes of this act.

6. Whereas the ſum of 10 d. directed by the act 1669 to be impoſed upon each L. 100 of valued rent, is inſufficient for the purpoſes therein expreſſed; and whereas the ſix days ſtatute-work for repairing the highways is in many reſpects inconvenient; and therefore, inſtead of the 10 d. and inſtead of the ſtatute-work, the commiſſioners.

ers, together with the heritors poſſeſſed of L. 200 Scots of valued rent, five, whether commiſſioners or heritors, making a quorum, ſhall annually, upon the ſaid laſt Tueſday of March, aſſeſs each heritor, in a ſum not exceeding upon each L. 100 valued rent; the aſſeſſment impoſed on the heritors to be levied by the collector of ſupply, along with the ceſs, and by the ſame legal remedies. The heritors are entitled to relieve themſelves of the one-half of the ſaid aſſeſſment, by laying the ſame upon their tenants, in proportion to the rent they pay; an heritor being always conſidered as a tenant of the land he has in his natural poſſeſſion.

7. With reſpect to boroughs of royalty, regality, and barony, and large trading villages, the commiſſioners are empowered to levy from each houſeholder, a ſum not exceeding 2 s. yearly, more or leſs in proportion to the aſſeſſment of the ſhire, to be paid within forty days after notice given, under the penalty of double, beſides expences of proceſs. Provided, that any of theſe houſeholders who have country-farms, by which they contribute to relieve their landlords as above mentioned, ſhall be exempted from this part of the aſſeſſment.

8. If the commiſſioners and heritors neglect to aſſeſs their ſhire, or name ſo ſmall a ſum as to be an eluſory aſſeſſment, inſufficient to anſwer the purpoſes of this act, the court of Juſticiary, or the circuit-judges, are in that caſe empowered and required

quired to lay on the higheſt aſſeſſment that is made lawful by this act. In caſe of a total omiſſion, the commiſſioners and heritors who, by neglecting to convene without a good cauſe of abſence, have occaſioned the ſaid omiſſion, ſhall be ſubjected each of them to a penalty of L. 20 Sterling. And to make theſe penalties effectual, the Truſtees for fiſheries and manufactures are appointed to ſue for the ſame before the Court of Seſſion, and to apply the ſame, when recovered, to any uſeful purpoſe within the ſhire, eſpecially to the purpoſes of this act. And to preſerve the ſaid fines entire for the public ſervice, the truſtees ſhall be entitled to coſts of ſuit.

9. The ſums levied as aforeſaid ſhall be laid out annually upon the highways, bridges, and ferries, for making, repairing, or improving the ſame; proceeding regularly with the reparation according to the ſcheme or plan ordered as above to be ſettled in each ſhire and ſtewartry.

10. With reſpect to roads that are not the firſt in order, and for which there is no interim proviſion by this act during reparation of the more frequented roads, the commiſſioners are empowered to exact from cottars and day-labourers their ſtatute-work, according to the acts preſently in force, to be applied to theſe ſecondary roads. The ſtatute-work is not to be demanded unleſs for this purpoſe; and is to ceaſe totally after the highways have,

have, by means of the preſent act, been once totally repaired.

11. The commiſſioners and heritors, at all their meetings, ſhall bear their own charges.

12. The clauſe in the act 1661, empowering heritors, at the ſight of the ſheriff, to caſt about highways for their convenience, ſhall be repealed; and it ſhall be declared unlawful, in time coming, to turn about or change any highway, unleſs for the benefit of the public, as by ſhortening it, carrying it through firmer ground, or making it more level; and to that purpoſe the commiſſioners ſhall be empowered to turn about highways, as alſo to widen the ſame, not exceeding thirty feet, free of ditches. But the commiſſioners ſhall have no power to carry a road through any houſe, garden, orchard, or pleaſure-ground.

13. The commiſſioners ſhall have power to take from the adjacent lands, ſtones, ſand, gravel, or other materials for making the highways, paying always for the damage done.

14. With reſpect to highways that bound the properties of neighbouring heritors, which it may be found neceſſary to alter or widen, the commiſſioners ſhall be empowered to adjudge to one heritor any ſmall bits of ground cut off from the other by the road ſo altered; and if land cannot be given for land, to make a compenſation in money, valuing the land at the current price of the market.

15. In order to prevent water ſtagnating on the highways,

highways, the commiſſioners ſhall be empowered to make ditches or drains through neighbouring grounds; and ſuch ditches or drains ſhall be preſerved entire by the proprietors of the land, or at their charges.

16. As the foreſaid aſſeſſment, after repairing the highways, may not be ſufficient for building bridges or making ferries, where rivers are large; any five of the commiſſioners may, for building bridges or making ferries, eſtabliſh a pontage or toll; ſo much for horſes, ſo much for horned cattle, and ſo much for ſheep, and the double for each beaſt in a wheel-carriage. Upon the credit of the toll, the ſaid commiſſioners may borrow money, to be employed wholly upon the bridge or ferry where the toll is gathered.

But before borrowing, an eſtimate muſt be made of the expence of the work. After the work is finiſhed, the ſum beſtowed on it muſt be aſcertained: an accurate account muſt be kept of the gradual payments of this ſum by the toll; and when it is completely paid, the commiſſioners muſt declare the bridge or ferry to be free.

17. The determinations of the commiſſioners ſhall be final, unleſs complained of in manner following.

18. If any heritor apprehend that undue preference is given to a certain highway, or conceive himſelf aggrieved by any order or ſentence of the commiſſioners, it ſhall be lawful for him, within forty

forty days of the act complained of, to enter a complaint in the Court of Seſſion; and the judgment upon ſuch complaint ſhall be final. But ſuch complaint ſhall only be effectual for damages, and ſhall not ſtay execution of the work. At the ſame time, no complaint ſhall be admitted till ſecurity be given to pay full coſts, in caſe the plaintiff be found in the wrong.

19. Former laws concerning highways, bridges, or ferries, to continue in force, unleſs as far as altered by this act.

20. An annual ſtate of what is done by virtue of this act, made by the commiſſioners, or their clerk, ſhall, before the laſt Tueſday of March, be laid before the truſtees for fiſheries and manufactures, in order to be made a part of their annual report to the King; and theſe truſtees ſhall direct proper perſons to inſpect what work is done upon the high-roads, and in what manner. Upon any miſapplication or embezzlement of the money levied, any neglect in levying, or any wrong done to the public, contrary to the intention of this act, the truſtees are required to ſet on foot and proſecute what redreſs is competent in law or equity, provided the proſecution be commenced within a year after the offence.

Query, Ought not broad wheels to be required?

CON-

CONSIDERATIONS THAT SUPPORT THE PRECEDING PLAN.

THE laws in Scotland relating to this branch of public police, are numerous; ſome enacted while Scotland was a ſeparate kingdom, ſome after its union with England. It is not the purpoſe of this eſſay to enter into a detail of the various regulations eſtabliſhed by theſe laws: they are generally known; and in the late abridgment of our ſtatute-law, they are all recapitulated with brevity and preciſion. It ſhall ſuffice curſorily to obſerve, that the acts made during the reign of Charles II. form the ground-work of our regulations concerning highways: the later acts are little more than explanatory of the former.

It ſeems to have been the plan of the Legiſlature, that highways ſhould be repaired by thoſe who are employed in huſbandry; and accordingly, the ſix days annual labour is, in the ſtatutes of Charles II. impoſed upon them only.

This was a meaſure not ill ſuited to the ſtate of Scotland at that period. During the laſt century, we had little inland commerce to require good roads, except that of corn carried to market; and for that reaſon, it was natural to impoſe upon

huſbandmen the burden of repairing highways. Theſe perſons, at the ſame time, paſſing the whole ſummer in idleneſs, unleſs when called to perform perſonal ſervices to capricious and unfeeling landlords, could not think it a hardſhip to have ſome part of their time employed in ſerving themſelves inſtead of their landlords.

That annual labour upon highways, limited to a few days, ſhould be required from men in that condition, appears not unjuſt. And why may we not ſuppoſe the Legiſlature at that time capable of ſuch enlarged views, as to prefer this method for repairing highways, in order to bring on gradually a habit of labour and induſtry? But the condition of Scotland at preſent differs widely from what it was in the reign of Charles II.; and the regulations for repairing highways which were then proper, have, by alteration of circumſtances, become both unjuſt and inexpedient.

Unjuſt they have become in a high degree. Inland commerce, which begins to flouriſh in Scotland, is greatly promoted by good roads; and every dealer, and indeed every traveller, profits by them. But no men are leſs intereſted in good roads than day-labourers, or thoſe who are commonly called *cottars;* and yet theſe chiefly are burdened with the reparation. Such men, at the ſame time having commonly many children, find it difficult to ſupport their families, even with their utmoſt induſtry. Nothing can be more unjuſt,

juſt, than to impoſe upon ſuch men an annual tax of ſix days labour for repairing roads, the goodneſs of which contributes little or nothing to their convenience.

Our preſent laws are inexpedient, as well as unjuſt. In the firſt place, a tax of this nature diſcourages the propagation of children, in which the ſtrength of a ſtate conſiſts: the poor labourer ought to be encouraged with a reward, inſtead of being diſcouraged with a tax. In the next place, cottars called out to perform the ſtatute-work, obey with reluctance, and trifle away time without doing any thing effectual. To enforce the law, and to compel ſuch men to labour, is grievous to the gentlemen who are empowered to execute the law: they cannot puniſh with rigour or firmneſs men who have ſo good reaſon to decline the ſervice: they are ſoon diſguſted with being taſkmaſters, and the generality deſiſt altogether.

Laws concerning private property are always kept in obſervance; and they execute themſelves, as is commonly expreſſed, becauſe there are always a multitude of individuals ſtrongly intereſted to have them executed. But, in making public laws, the great difficulty has ever been, to lay down effectual meaſures for putting them in execution: by what means to make ſuch laws execute themſelves, is one of the moſt intricate problems in politics. Our laws concerning highways, are eminently defective in that reſpect: and accordingly,

though moſt of them have exiſted near a century, they never have at any period been executed to any extent. Take the following ſpecimen, among many that may be urged, of this defect. Overſeers are forced into the ſervice under a penalty, in order to compel the peaſants to perform faithfully their ſix days labour. To hope any good from a reluctant overſeer ſet over a ſet of reluctant labourers, is a fond conceit: it is much if his reſentment tempt him not to encourage their idleneſs. In vain would we expect, that any overſeer, without a ſuitable reward, will exert himſelf in promoting the work.

To remedy the hardſhip of laying the burden of reparation upon thoſe who are leaſt able and leaſt benefited, and at the ſame time to make this remedy effectual, is the purpoſe of the foregoing plan. And upon conſidering the matter in its different views, the only method that promiſes ſucceſs, appears to be a county-tax laid upon land according to the valuation, and a capitation-tax on the inhabitants of boroughs. Theſe taxes relieve the labouring poor, and lay the burden where it ought to be laid: and the law will execute itſelf, if that effect can be hoped from any public law: effectual meaſures are laid down for levying the tax; and, if once levied, there is no danger of its being allowed to lie unemployed in the hands of the collector, for every heritor will be anxious to have ſome part employed for his benefit. The danger will

will rather be of factious diſputes about the diſtribution. This danger alſo is attempted to be prevented; and, it is hoped, with ſucceſs.

Some narrow-minded perſons may poſſibly grudge a tax, that loads the preſent generation for the advantage of thoſe who come after: but is it rational to grudge, that others ſhould benefit by meaſures evidently calculated for advancing our own intereſt? Let us ſuppoſe, that the heritors of a ſhire were to concert meaſures in common, for improving their lands: to make good roads would be one effectual meaſure; for, ſuppoſing their reparation to coſt L. 5000, their eſtates would be bettered double that ſum.

To conclude: it is not to be expected that any regulations concerning highways, or concerning any branch of police, can be ſo framed as to pleaſe every individual. Wiſe men are practicable men, to uſe an expreſſion of Lord Bacon, and will make conceſſions, in order to promote a general good, if without ſuch conceſſions it cannot be obtained. Better far to have a good law, though, in our opinion, defective in ſome articles, than to have no law at all; or, which is worſe, a law eminently defective, unjuſt, and inexpedient.

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